Date: 19971125
Docket: IMM-4498-96
Present: The Honourable Mr. Justice Pinard
Between:
JESUS ALEJANDRO DIAZ RAMIREZ,
Applicant,
- and -
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION,
Respondent.
ORDER
The application for judicial review of the decision rendered on October 31, 1996 by the Convention Refugee Determination Division, which found that the applicant is not a Convention refugee, is dismissed.
YVON PINARD
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
November 25, 1997
Certified true translation
Christiane Delon
Date: 19971125
Docket: IMM-4498-96
Between:
JESUS ALEJANDRO DIAZ RAMIREZ,
Applicant,
- and -
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION,
Respondent.
REASONS FOR ORDER
PINARD J.:
[1] The application for judicial review concerns a decision rendered on October 31, 1996 by the Convention Refugee Determination Division, which found that the applicant is not a Convention refugee as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration Act.
[2] After summarizing the facts, the panel stated the following in analysing the evidence:
| [translation] The panel was able to carefully observe how the claimant testified at the hearing and to carefully assess the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced. In light of what follows, the panel feels that the claimant is not credible and has no reason to fear returning to Venezuela. |
|
| Although the claimant"s testimony does not contain any contradictions or discrepancies, whether intrinsic or in relation to his PIF, the panel has noted a number of implausibilities that seriously affect his credibility. |
|
[3] The panel concluded as follows after thoroughly examining some eight instances of implausibility:
| [translation] Considering the implausibilities noted above, the panel feels that the claimant"s testimony is not credible. It concludes that he has not discharged his burden of proving that he has a well-founded fear of persecution for one of the reasons given in the definition, and it considers that there is no "reasonable chance" he will be persecuted if he returns to Venezuela. |
|
[4] It is therefore apparent that the panel"s decision was based on the applicant"s lack of credibility, pure and simple, and that this assessment was properly arrived at (see Rajaratnam v. M.E.I. (December 5, 1991), A-842-90 (F.C.A.)) in light of the many implausibilities carefully noted and considered in the decision.
[5] In Aguebor v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1993), 160 N.R. 315, Décary J.A., writing for the Federal Court of Appeal, stated at pages 316-17 that the same level of judicial deference is applicable to questions of credibility and questions of implausibility:
| It is correct, as the court said in Giron, that it may be easier to have a finding of implausibility review where it results from inferences than to have a finding of non-credibility review where it results from the conduct of the witness and from inconsistencies in the testimony. The court did not, in saying this, exclude the issue of the plausibility of an account from the Board"s field of expertise, nor did it lay down a different test for intervention depending on whether the issue is "plausibility" or "credibility". |
|
| There is no longer any doubt that the Refugee Division, which is a specialized tribunal, has complete jurisdiction to determine the plausibility of testimony: who is in a better position than the Refugee Division to gauge the credibility of an account and to draw the necessary inferences? As long as the inferences drawn by the tribunal are not so unreasonable as to warrant our intervention, its findings are not open to judicial review. In Giron, the court merely observed that in the area of plausibility, the unreasonableness of a decision may be more palpable, and so more easily identifiable, since the account appears on the face of the record. In our opinion, Giron in no way reduces the burden that rests on an appellant, of showing that the inferences drawn by the Refugee Division could not reasonably have been drawn. In this case, the appellant has not discharged this burden. |
|
(Emphasis added.)
[6] In the case at bar, I find based on my review of the evidence that the panel could reasonably conclude as it did. Its perception that the applicant was not credible effectively amounted to a finding that there was no credible evidence that could justify his refugee claim. In Sheikh v. Canada, [1990] 3 F.C. 238, at page 244, MacGuigan J.A. wrote the following:
| The concept of "credible evidence" is not , of course, the same as that of the credibility of the applicant, but it is obvious that where the only evidence before a tribunal linking the applicant to his claim is that of the applicant himself (in addition, perhaps, to "country reports" from which nothing about the applicant"s claim can be directly deduced), a tribunal"s perception that he is not a credible witness effectively amounts to a finding that there is no credible evidence on which the second-level tribunal could allow his claim. |
|
[7] For these reasons, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
YVON PINARD
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
November 25, 1997
Certified true translation
Christiane Delon
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
| STYLE OF CAUSE: JESUS ALEJANDRO DIAZ RAMIREZ v. MCI |
| PLACE OF HEARING: MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC |
| DATE OF HEARING: NOVEMBER 18, 1997 |
| REASONS FOR ORDER BY: PINARD J. |
APPEARANCES:
Paul Fréchette FOR THE APPLICANT
Édith Savard FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Paul Fréchette FOR THE APPLICANT
Montréal, Quebec
George Thomson FOR THE RESPONDENT
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
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