Date: 19971205
Docket: IMM-4174-96
Ottawa, Ontario, the 5th day of December 1997.
Present: The Honourable Mr. Justice Pinard
Between:
GHEORGHE MARIS,
Applicant,
- and -
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION,
Respondent.
ORDER
The application for judicial review of the decision rendered on October 9, 1996 by the Convention Refugee Determination Division, which found that the applicant is not a Convention refugee, is dismissed.
YVON PINARD
JUDGE
Certified true translation
Christiane Delon
Date: 19971205
Docket: IMM-4174-96
Between:
GHEORGHE MARIS,
Applicant,
- and -
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION,
Respondent.
REASONS FOR ORDER
PINARD J.:
[1] The application for judicial review concerns a decision rendered on October 9, 1996 by the Convention Refugee Determination Division, which found that the applicant is not a Convention refugee as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration Act (the Act). The applicant is basing his claim on his fear of persecution in Romania due to membership in a particular social group, namely young Romanians between the ages of 19 and 26.
[2] The applicant left Romania on February 5, 1994. He went to Hungary, the Czech Republic, Germany, France and Spain before finally arriving in Canada.
[3] After holding that young Romanians between the ages of 19 and 26 are not a particular social group within the meaning of the Convention, as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Act " which would have been sufficient to deny the applicant"s claim " the panel nevertheless considered the applicant"s version of the facts and his conduct. It ultimately concluded as follows:
| [translation] In this context, the claimant has not discharged his burden of proof, since he has not shown in a reasonable and credible fashion that there is a "serious possibility" he will be persecuted if he returns to Romania. |
|
[4] On the issue of credibility relating to the fear of persecution expressed by the applicant personally, the panel found it implausible that the applicant had managed to be rehired by the same company under a false identity and had worked there for several months without any problems. The Refugee Division further found that the applicant"s conduct was inconsistent with a genuine subjective fear of persecution, since he had not claimed refugee status in any of the other countries where he had gone before coming to Canada, specifically Germany, France and Spain. The panel stated the following on these points:
| [translation] Second, we note the implausibility of his employment history. The claimant worked as a mechanic for the IELIF company from February 1988 to September 1989, until his military training. On October 5, 1990, following his military training and the problems he experienced during that training, the claimant, with the help of friends, managed to get rehired by IELIF under a false identity, and he worked there as a mechanic until April 1991 without any problems. |
|
| We find it implausible that the claimant could have worked under a false identity at a company where he had already worked shortly before then for about a year and a half. |
|
| We also want to mention the claimant"s subjective fear. On question 35 of this PIF, he said that he never claimed refugee status in any country other than Canada. On question 22 of his PIF, he stated that he lived for a while in Frankfurt, Germany, Paris, France and Santander, Spain before coming to Canada and claiming refugee status here. We find his conduct after he left Romania inconsistent with his fear of persecution. If the claimant had feared persecution, he would at least have claimed refugee status in one of the countries where he lived before coming to Canada. |
|
[5] In Aguebor v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1993), 160 N.R. 315, Décary J.A., writing for the Federal Court of Appeal, stated at pages 316-17 that the same level of judicial deference is applicable to questions of credibility and questions of implausibility:
| It is correct, as the court said in Giron, that it may be easier to have a finding of implausibility review where it results from inferences than to have a finding of non-credibility review where it results from the conduct of the witness and from inconsistencies in the testimony. The court did not, in saying this, exclude the issue of the plausibility of an account from the Board"s field of expertise, nor did it lay down a different test for intervention depending on whether the issue is "plausibility" or "credibility". |
|
| There is no longer any doubt that the Refugee Division, which is a specialized tribunal, has complete jurisdiction to determine the plausibility of testimony: who is in a better position than the Refugee Division to gauge the credibility of an account and to draw the necessary inferences? As long as the inferences drawn by the tribunal are not so unreasonable as to warrant our intervention, its findings are not open to judicial review. In Giron, the court merely observed that in the area of plausibility, the unreasonableness of a decision may be more palpable, and so more easily identifiable, since the account appears on the face of the record. In our opinion, Giron in no way reduces the burden that rests on an appellant, of showing that the inferences drawn by the Refugee Division could not reasonably have been drawn. In this case, the appellant has not discharged this burden. (Emphasis added.) |
|
[6] In the case at bar, it is my view, having regard to the evidence, that the applicant has not discharged the burden that rests on him of showing that the inferences drawn by the Refugee Division, which is a specialized tribunal, could not reasonably have been drawn. This is sufficient to justify dismissing the application for judicial review without this Court having to rule on the question of whether the applicant is a member of a particular social group as defined in the Convention.
[7] Moreover, the stare decisis rule relied on by the applicant is not applicable here, since all the facts of the other claim before the Refugee Division were not adduced in evidence (see Handal et al. v. M.E.I. (June 10, 1993), 92-A-6875).
[8] For all these reasons, the application for judicial review must be dismissed.
YVON PINARD
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
December 5, 1997
Certified true translation
Christiane Delon
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
| STYLE OF CAUSE: GHEORGHE MARIS v. MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION |
| PLACE OF HEARING: MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC |
| DATE OF HEARING: DECEMBER 3, 1997 |
| REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PINARD |
APPEARANCES: SERGE SEGAL
(514) 849-9336
FOR THE APPLICANT
JOSÉE PAQUIN
(514) 283-1895
FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
SEGAL, LAFOREST, EL MASRI
ATTORNEYS
240 SAINT-JACQUES, SUITE 200
MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC
H2Y 1L9
FOR THE APPLICANT
GEORGE THOMSON
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
FOR THE RESPONDENT
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