Date: 19990430
Docket: IMM-1482-98
Between :
ONKAR SINGH RANDHAWA, domiciled and residing at
D'Anvers, apartment 14, Montreal, Quebec, H3N 1C6,
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION, c/o Justice Department,
Guy Favreau Complex, 200 West René-Lévesque,
East Tower, 5th Floor, Montreal, Quebec, H2Z 1X4,
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
PINARD, J. :
[1] The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board) dated February 27, 1998, in which the Board determined he was not a Convention refugee.
[2] The Board did not find the applicant's story credible for the following reasons:
- the panel did not find it plausible that the applicant's father would return to Punjab thinking that circumstances had changed when he was told by Kuldip Singh Wadala, a family friend, to leave the country;
- the panel gave no weight to a letter from the Sikh temple alleging that the applicant had been president until he left the country;
- the panel did not find it plausible that the applicant would not seek the assistance from his party, the Akali Dal party, considering that the applicant was involved in human rights work for the party;
- the panel relied on documentary evidence showing that Sikh militancy had whittled away in the applicant's area during 1995-1997;
- the panel found some of the evidence submitted by the applicant to be self-serving and untrustworthy;
- the panel declined to accept the medical report submitted given that the findings in that document do not relate to the incidents put forward by the applicant to support his claim.
[3] The applicant argues that the Board failed to consider material evidence before it, that the Board cannot dismiss evidence because it deems it to be "self-serving" and that it simply declined to give weight to the medical reports adduced as evidence.
[4] It is well established that:
| (1) the Board is presumed to have considered all of the evidence before it (see, i.e., Hassan v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1992), 147 N.R. 317 at page 318), and that it is reasonable for it to prefer documentary evidence to that of a claimant (see, i.e., Zhou v. M.E.I. (July 18, 1994), A-492-91); |
| (2) the assessment of weight to be given to a document is a matter within the discretion of the Board in assessing, as it must do, the evidence before it (see, i.e., Huang v. M.E.I. (1993), 66 F.T.R. 178 at pages 180-181, and Villalba v. M.C.I. (October 19, 1994), IMM-7172-93); |
| (3) if the Board does not believe the underlying facts to an expert opinion, it is entitled to give less weight to it (see, i.e., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 24">R. v. Abbey, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 24 at pages 42-43, [1967] S.C.R. 14">Wilband v. The Queen, [1967] S.C.R. 14 at page 21, and Danailov v. M.C.I. (October 6, 1993), T-273-93). |
[5] Applying the above principles to the case at bar, I am not convinced, upon reviewing the evidence which was before the Board, that the latter committed any reviewable error. Furthermore, as regards findings of credibility, it is a question of fact that is entirely within the jurisdiction of the Board as the trier of fact. As emphasized by the Federal Court of Appeal in Aguebor v. M.E.I. (1993), 160 N.R. 315, the Board, which is a specialized tribunal, is free to find that an applicant is untrustworthy on the basis of implausibilities in his or her testimony, provided that its findings are not unreasonable. Here, I find there was sufficient evidence to entitle the Board to reasonably conclude as it did.
[6] Consequently, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
April 30, 1999
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