Date: 19990408
Docket: IMM-2476-98
OTTAWA, ONTARIO, APRIL 8, 1999
PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE TEITELBAUM
BETWEEN
VALENTIN ZUEVICH
ALEXEI ZUEVICH
Applicants
Respondent
O R D E R
For the reasons set out in the Reasons for Order, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
Max M. Teitelbaum
J.F.C.C.
Certified true translation
M. Iveson
Date: 19990408
Docket: IMM-2476-98
BETWEEN
VALENTIN ZUEVICH
ALEXEI ZUEVICH
Applicants
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
TEITELBAUM J.
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is an application for judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board, dated April 16, 1998, which determined that the applicants are not Convention refugees. The applicants ask that the decision be quashed and the matter referred back to a differently constituted panel.
FACTS
[2] The applicants, Valentin Zuevich, born in 1952, and his 19 year-old son Alexei Zuevich, are nationals of the former Soviet Union. Mr. Zuevich emigrated to Israel in 1991 and his son joined him there in 1995. They left Israel for Canada on June 20, 1996.
[3] The applicants allege they fear persecution for reasons of their nationality, religion and membership in a particular social group, Russians. Alexei also raised conscientious objections to Israeli military service.
[4] Mr. Zuevich explained that he was born in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to a Jewish mother, but that he was baptized in the Orthodox faith. He said that he had to leave Russia because of how he was treated, since he was considered Jewish. He was beaten twice by members of the fascist movement and emigrated to Israel in 1991 to escape persecution from which the state could not protect him.
[5] As soon as he arrived in Israel, he stated that attempts were made to convert him to Judaism by forcing him to follow religious classes because he was a Christian, in order to be able to obtain a government authorization. He stated that the lawyer he consulted recommended that he convert to Judaism and take the classes because Christians did not have a right to Israeli citizenship. After he took the class, officials set a date for his circumcision and insisted that he change his name. He refused and moved to Tel-Aviv in Bat-Galim where he found a job in a workshop.
[6] On the job, his co-workers insulted him by calling him a Christian and a filthy Russian. Following an incident during which an Arab employee was hurt, managers of the business tried to intimidate him and offered him bribes to testify that the incident was due to the fault of an Arab employee. He refused and was harassed, intimidated and attacked by men who kicked and threatened him. The applicant stated that he told his story to a police officer who took careful notes and recorded where the marks had been left on his body from the attack, but that the officer"s attitude toward the applicant changed quickly when he learned he was a Christian. He became suspicious. The officer later told the applicant that his testimony had not been corroborated. The situation deteriorated because of this incident and the applicant received further threats at work. He decided to leave the city to look for work in Haifa. In February 1996, the applicant was summoned by the union from Tel-Aviv concerning the incident with his former employer. He was threatened by his former superior. In March 1996, the applicant and his son were set upon by three men near their home. The applicant filed a complaint with the police, but to no avail. Not long after, the same men attacked him, hit him about the head and took him away in a car. They put a bottle of vodka in his mouth and twisted his arms. They also beat him and threatened to gouge out his eyes. When he went to the police, he was told that he had made everything up and that he had simply fallen and hit his head. He then went to the legal aid centre for new settlers where a lawyer contacted the headquarters of the Ministry of the Interior in Tel-Aviv. He was summoned to see them and was told that the police had acted within the law and that the centre had no right to intervene in police matters.
[7] As for the applicant"s son, he also claims to have suffered persecution. As soon as he arrived in Israel, he was humiliated, teased and beaten after classes by Jewish students. A meeting with the principal, who insisted that his son take classes in Judaism, did not help matters and the insults continued. The applicant"s son also alleges he was assaulted by new immigrants at the school. He claims they insulted him, took off his pants and threatened to circumcise and rape him. The applicant went to the police to file a complaint. A police officer went to the school but told the applicant several days later than there was no basis for an investigation as his son had no bruises and the adolescents refused to admit what happened. On the recommendation of a psychologist he had consulted, the applicant decided to have his son see a psychotherapist.
[8] The applicant also sought help from the newspaper Maariv, the office of the mayor of Haifa and the Mitsne, who refused to help them as soon as it became clear they were Christians of Russian origin. The applicant also asked the municipal department of the Ministry of Education to have his son transferred to another school. The situation did not improve after he was transferred and he was teased and insulted by his classmates.
[9] In April 1996, the applicant"s son was attacked in the street by three young believers. He had to see a doctor because of constant pain in his rib cage as a result of the blows he received. That same night, the applicant received a telephone call threatening his son with death if he stayed in Israel. After consulting a lawyer to press charges against the police in court for their inaction, the lawyer advised him that he was unable to find any evidence, since the police would admit nothing. Feeling helpless, the applicant decided to leave Israel.
Decision of the Immigration and Refugee Board
[10] The Board rejected the applicants" claim on three main grounds. The Board held that the conscientious objections to militarism raised by the applicant"s son were not well founded because he did not offer or establish religious or philosophical principles to support these objections. The Board also held that the applicants did not establish with clear and convincing proof that the State of Israel was unable to protect them. Moreover, the Board held that by remaining in Israel for three years and sponsoring his son to join him in Israel, the applicant"s actions were inconsistent with the allegations of persecution.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
[11] The applicants offered essentially three arguments. First, the Board erred in interpreting and applying the case law by requiring that the applicants prove the Israeli authorities were complicit and in holding they did not establish the inability of the state to protect them. The applicant submitted that he did not have to prove the state was complicit in the alleged persecution and that the "clear and convincing" proof of the state"s inability to protect could be provided in several ways, including by his own testimony. The applicant alleged that his testimony with respect to the numerous complaints to the police amply demonstrated the state"s inability to protect its citizens. Second, the applicants alleged that the Board erred in law in assuming that the State of Israel is a democratic country within the meaning proposed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada v. Ward , [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689. Third, the applicants alleged that the Board erred in dismissing the conscientious objections against militarism. In particular, the Board did not apply the objective test set out in paragraph 171 of the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Geneva, 1979) in order to determine whether the evidence established that the Israeli army took action condemned by the international community as contrary to the basic rules of human conduct.
[12] The respondent argued that the Board"s conclusion was sound in law, since the applicants did not establish there was a reasonable or serious chance they would be persecuted if they returned to Israel.
[13] First, the applicants did not establish the state"s inability to protect its citizens and in the absence of clear and convincing proof, the state is presumed capable of protecting its citizens. The respondent contended that it was open to the Board to find that the applicants did not provide proof of the state"s inability to protect them, since the applicants never signed a report or filed a written complaint and could have taken other measures, such as filing a complaint against the police with the Ministry of Justice. Second, the Board was justified in finding that the State of Israel is a democratic state as established in the case law, since the applicants did not prove at the time of the hearing that there had been a complete breakdown of the apparatus of the State of Israel. Third, the applicant"s son did not demonstrate that his conscientious objections were well founded, since he did not raise religious or philosophical principles against militarism. First, after finding that the applicant was not a conscientious objector, the Board was not required to take its analysis any further. Second, the Federal Court has already ruled that the Israeli army does not violate accepted international standards, and the applicants have not proven condemnation by the international community.
ISSUES
[14] The applicant raises three issues:
| 1) Did the Board err in interpreting and applying the case law with respect to complicity of the state in persecution and proof of the state"s inability to protect its citizens? |
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| 2) Did the Board err in law in assuming that the State of Israel is a democratic state? |
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| 3) Did the Board err in dismissing the conscientious objections to militarism cited by the applicant"s son? |
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DISCUSSION
Inability of the State of Israel to protect its citizens
[15] The Board dismissed the applicants" arguments that the State of Israel was unable to protect them on the ground that the applicants had not advanced clear and convincing proof to this effect. This statement is consistent with the principles set out in Ward , supra.
[16] In Ward, supra, Mr. Justice Laforest, writing for the Supreme Court of Canada, stated the following with respect to the evidence required to establish the state"s inability to protect its citizens, pages 724-25:
| The issue that arises, then, is how, in a practical sense, a claimant makes proof of a state's inability to protect its nationals as well as the reasonable nature of the claimant's refusal actually to seek out this protection. On the facts of this case, proof on this point was unnecessary, as representatives of the state authorities conceded their inability to protect Ward. Where such an admission is not available, however, clear and convincing confirmation of a state's inability to protect must be provided. For example, a claimant might advance testimony of similarly situated individuals let down by the state protection arrangement or the claimant's testimony of past personal incidents in which state protection did not materialize. Absent some evidence, the claim should fail, as nations should be presumed capable of protecting their citizens. Security of nationals is, after all, the essence of sovereignty. Absent a situation of complete breakdown of state apparatus, such as that recognized in Lebanon in Zalzali, it should be assumed that the state is capable of protecting a claimant. |
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[17] The Board justified its finding by clarifying that the applicants had not signed any reports or filed a written complaint. The Board further indicated, based on the remarks of Mr. Justice Décary in Kadenko v. M.C.I. (1997), 206 N.R. 272, that in a democratic state it is not enough to show that the applicants simply went to see some members of the police force and that these efforts were unsuccessful.
[18] In Kadenko, supra, the Federal Court of Appeal of Canada considered the issue certified by the trial judge and found as follows:
| Once it is assumed that the state (Israel in this case) has political and judicial institutions capable of protecting its citizens, it is clear that the refusal of certain police officers to take action cannot in itself make the state incapable of doing so. The answer might have been different if the question had related, for example, to the refusal by the police as an institution or to a more or less general refusal by the police force to provide the protection conferred by the country's political and judicial institutions. |
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| In short, the situation implied by the question under consideration recalls the following comments by Hugessen J.A. in Minister of Employment and Immigration v. Villafranca: [See: (1992), 150 N.R. 232, at p. 233 (F.C.A.)] |
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| No government that makes any claim to democratic values or protection of human rights can guarantee the protection of all its citizens at all times. Thus, it is not enough for a claimant merely to show that his government has not always been effective at protecting persons in his particular situation. . . . |
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| When the state in question is a democratic state, as in the case at bar, the claimant must do more than simply show that he or she went to see some members of the police force and that his or her efforts were unsuccessful. The burden of proof that rests on the claimant is, in a way, directly proportional to the level of democracy in the state in question: the more democratic the state's institutions, the more the claimant must have done to exhaust all the courses of action open to him or her. [See: Minister of Employment and Immigration v. Satiacum (1989), 99 N.R. 171, at p. 176 (F.C.A.), approved by Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, at p. 725.] |
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[19] On this issue, the applicant submitted that proof of the state"s inability to protect could be made in different ways and that by unsuccessfully asking the police "ten or twelve times" for help, he demonstrated that the state was unable to protect him. He further submitted that the Board and the Federal Court of Appeal erred in holding that the State of Israel is a democratic state and that their attempts to approach the authorities went far beyond the standards set in the case law. I cannot accept this argument.
[20] In the instant case, the applicants suggested they have adduced much evidence to support their claims that Israel is not a democratic state, including the affidavit of Lynda Brayer which was made under oath on December 5, 1993, some four and one-half years before the hearing before the panel. In this affidavit, Lynda Brayer, a member of the bar practising law in Israel and Executive Legal Director of the Society of St. Yves, a human rights resource centre (Court File, page 168), states that Israel is a Jewish state. She adds that it is not a democratic state for the heterogeneous population of Jews, Christians, Muslims and others. Reference is also made to an excerpt from an article entitled Discrimination in the State of Israel?, published in the Globe and Mail of December 20, 1991, and appearing at page 137 of the Court File. The applicant also cited a passage from a speech given by Lynda Brayer at a conference on Israel which was held at the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada.
[21] Despite the arguments advanced by the applicants, I am not satisfied that the Board erred in holding, as did the Federal Court in Kadenko, supra, that Israel is a democratic state. Nevertheless, as stated in Kadenko, supra, the burden of proof that rests on the applicants is directly proportional to the level of democracy in the state in question: Maximilok v. Canada (M.C.I.) (IMM-1861-97, August 14, 1998). I am persuaded that the State of Israel is a democratic state, with all of the institutions of a democratic state.
[22] Moreover, I am convinced that the Board properly interpreted the facts in finding that it was not enough to simply file complaints with the police to then say that the state does not provide protection because the outcome is not what was expected.
[23] It is clear from a reading of the transcript of a conference held in Montréal on August 19, 1994, by the Immigration and Refugee Board with respect to the State of Israel, with the goal of "obtain[ing] the most possible information on the issue of refugee claimants in Canada, from citizens of Israel, who have lived in the former Soviet Union, before", that the applicants in the instant case failed to exhaust all possible courses of action after their dealings with the police proved unsuccessful.
[24] Irwin Cotler, a professor at McGill University who is nationally and internationally recognized in the area of human rights, spoke of people from Israel coming to Canada after having obtained Israeli citizenship.
[25] At page 6 of the transcript of the conference, Professor Cotler states:
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As some of you may know, I"ve had occasion, in the past, to participate in other country condition seminars, particularly with respect to the former Soviet Union, and to serve, from time to time, as an expert witness in refugee determination hearings. |
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[26] From a reading of Professor Cotler"s remarks, it is unequivocally clear that the State of Israel is a democratic state with a democratically elected government from which citizens may seek redress. There is also no doubt that there is discrimination in Israel, as in all other countries, including Canada.
[27] From a reading of the remarks of Lynda Brayer, a lawyer in Jerusalem now practising law at the Society of St. Yves, I find that she speaks of discrimination and not of persecution.
[28] Jonathan Livny, founder and former parliamentary secretary of the Citizens Rights Movement, practices law in Jerusalem. He states, at page 60 of the transcript:
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I spend 80 percent of my time working with olim(phon.) immigrants from the former Soviet Union. I have been involved with the Russian resettlement, actually, ever since I was a student at the University of Pennsylvania, in 1979, when I was one of those who established on campus a group called Triple S J, a Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry). |
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[29] At page 62, he states:
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My entire life now is really devoted to helping Soviet immigrants to Israel. It doesn"t pay well, but it is the most lovely time and the most important thing I feel I have done in my entire life, and I want to share it with you. |
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[30] After reading the transcript, I find that Mr. Livny is a person who spends his time and energy helping Jewish and non-Jewish immigrants coming from the former USSR.
[31] At page 69, Mr. Livny states that there is discrimination in Israel. I believe that this is a given.
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First of all, I want to make one thing clear: People in Israel have prejudices against any group of newcomers that come into the country, regardless of whether they are Jewish, half-Jewish or non-Jewish [sic] at all. I wouldn"t have no [sic ] work as a lawyer who represents former Soviet refugees, if everything would be wonderful. It"s not the case. |
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[32] At pages 71 and 72, he also discusses the treatment in store for people such as the applicants:
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I can tell you for a fact that I know of no case that a Russian person who was not Jewish did not receive support from the state, whether it was for renting an apartment or mortgage for buying an apartment, or a job, based on the fact that he is not Jewish. On the contrary, I"m embarrassed to say some Israeli employers prefer to employ non-Jews, and say to me: Look, non-Jews have a better working ethic. Jews only want to be engineers and want to be lawyers and want to be doctors, and I would rather employ someone who is not Jewish. |
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Besides, when you get an employment [sic] in the State of Israel, nobody ever looks at your identity card. What you are asked, after they employ you, is to fill in a paper in which you have write [sic] your identity card number, because all social payments, salary payments, taxation payments and so on, are deducted with this number that every Israeli citizen has. |
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I"ll tell you another thing: There is not one - and I say so because I deal with the issues every day - there is not one person who has come from the former Soviet Union, in the State of Israel, who doesn"t have an identity card, whether he is Jewish or not. |
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[33] The applicant"s testimony indicates that other than going to the police on several occasions, he did little except to consult various organizations. In light of all of the evidence, the Board"s conclusion is reasonable.
[34] In addition, according to its reasons, the Board also seems to have required the applicants to establish the complicity of the state. Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Ward, supra, it is settled that it is not necessary to prove that the authorities are complicit in the persecution. This is an error which matters little in the panel"s decision.
[35] The respondent submitted that this is not a material error of the kind that would justify the intervention of this Court. According to the respondent, a reading of the record indicates that it was not unreasonable for the Board to find there was no reasonable chance of persecution. I agree with this argument.
Conscientious objection to militarism
[36] The Board held that the applicant"s son did not establish he had conscientious objections to militarism. The Board clarified its decision as follows:
| [TRANSLATION] Paragraphs 170 and 171 put forward by counsel refer to claims based on convictions to explain an aversion to military service. The claimant did not explain the religious or philosophical principles behind his conscientious objection against militarism: he simply said that it was because of his Greek Orthodox religion. When he was asked for further details, he did not answer. When the father was asked why the conscientious objection was not included in the PIF, he answered that "I could talk about it at the hearing". This answer does not justify why it was not included in the PIF. |
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[37] The applicant submitted that the Board erred in failing to determine whether the evidence established that the Israeli army had taken action condemned by the international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct, the objective test set out in paragraphs 170 and 171 of the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status.
[38] In support of his arguments, the applicant quoted an excerpt from the affidavit of Lynda Brayer in which she states that the army refuses to acknowledge and ensure that the basic standards recognized in the United Nations conventions are respected, and that the army"s attitude toward and treatment of Palestinian civilians is aggressive, abusive and often lethal. The applicant also cited several articles deploring the number of Palestinian children and adults killed by Israeli soldiers.
[39] In Al-Maisri v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1995] F.C.J. No.642 (A-493-92), Mr. Justice Stone, writing for the Federal Court of Appeal, stated the following:
| More importantly, in my view, the Refugee Division misapplied the guidance afforded by paragraph 171 of the UNHCR Handbook, when it ruled that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as [sic] not "condemned by the international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct" notwithstanding, as it found, that the invasion and occupation of Kuwait was condemned by the United Nations and the annexation of that country by Iraq was declared by that body to be "null and void". In The Law of Refugee Status (Toronto: 1991), Professor Hathaway states at page 180-181: |
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| . . . there is a range of military activity which is simply never permissible, in that it violates basic international standards. This includes military action intended to violate basic human rights, ventures in breach of the Geneva Convention standards for the conduct of war, and non-defensive incursions into foreign territory. Where an individual refuses to perform military service which offends fundamental standards of this sort, "punishment for desertion or draft evasion could, in the light of all other requirements of the definition, in itself be regarded as persecution". [emphasis added; footnotes omitted] |
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| On the basis of these views, the correctness of which were not challenged, I am persuaded that the Refugee Division erred in concluding that Iraq's actions were not contrary to the basic rules of human conduct. Accordingly, in my view, the punishment for desertion which would likely be visited upon the appellant if he were returned to Yemen, whatever that punishment might be, would amount to persecution of which the appellant has a well-founded fear. |
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[40] In another decision quoted by the respondent, a judgment delivered from the bench in Popov v. Canada (M.E.I.) (Trial Division, IMM-2567-93, March 22, 1994), Madam Justice Reed set out what must be established to come within paragraphs 170 and 171 of the Handbook, supra:
| With respect to the obligations to serve in the military, I start from the position that it is not persecution to have compulsory military service. Clearly, that alone cannot be a ground for Convention Refugee status. |
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| The Board referred to the position of a conscientious objector and said that it could not accept that this Applicant objected to serving in the military on the grounds of being a conscientious objector because he had served in the army in Russia. This decision is soundly based insofar as the Board was considering whether he was a conscientious objector in the usual sense of that phrase, for example because he was a pacifist or was against war and all militarism on the grounds of principle, either religious or philosophical. The Board's decision in this regard is quite a credible conclusion. |
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| What is more, there is no evidence that the Applicant claimed exemption from military service in Israel on the ground that he was a conscientious objector and was refused exemption from military service. One would not be surprised to find that there are in Israel alternative methods of service for individuals falling into that category. But that aside, we simply do not know and as I have said there is no evidence that he objected to serving in the military as a conscientious objector when he was in Israel, so what disposition might be made by the Israeli government in such a case is not known. |
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| What the Applicant asserts is that he objects to serving in the military because of Israeli military activity against the Palestinians which he asserts contravenes acceptable international standards. I do not think the evidence supports a conclusion that the activity of the Israeli military falls into that category. |
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| It is true that the evidence contains accounts of violations from time to time, or allegations, at least, of violations from time to time. And one would not be too surprised if the allegations were substantiated. But an isolated incident or incidents of the violation of international standards is not the kind of activity which the Federal Court of Appeal was referring to in the jurisprudence which has been cited. [See Note 1 below] One is talking about military activity which is condoned in a general way by the state, by the military forces. One thinks of places like El Salvador. |
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[41] As Reed J. states, it is not enough to submit evidence with a view to establishing that the actions of the Israeli army with respect to the Palestinians are bad or even deplorable. In accordance with paragraphs 170 and 171 of the Handbook on Procedures, supra, it must be established that the action is condemned by the international community. The applicants did not establish this fact and there is no evidence on the record to this effect.
CONCLUSION
[42] The application for judicial review is dismissed.
QUESTION TO BE CERTIFIED
[43] The following question has been submitted for certification:
[TRANSLATION]
| Since "(t)he burden of proof that rests on the claimant is, in a way, directly proportional to the level of democracy in the state in question" |
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| Is the panel required to evaluate the level of democracy in the state in question in order to determine whether a refugee claimant has overturned the presumption that the authorities of the country of origin are able to protect the claimant? |
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[44] I do not see why the above question should be certified. I am satisfied that the panel is not required to determine a country"s "level" of democracy. According to Ward , supra, it is the ability of the state to protect its citizens which must be determined. If such protection exists, the applicant cannot be recognized as a Convention refugee.
[45] In Kadenko, supra, the Court of Appeal had to answer the following certified question:
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Where there has not been a complete breakdown of the governmental apparatus and where a State has political and judicial institutions capable of protecting its citizens, does the refusal by certain police officers to take action suffice to establish that the State in question is unable or unwilling to protect its nationals? |
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[46] The Federal Court of Appeal answered in the negative. Mr. Justice Décary stated at pages 273 and 274:
| In her reasons, the motions judge herself suggested that this question should be answered in the affirmative and that once certain police officers in a democratic state refuse to take action, there is automatically incapacity on the part of the state. |
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| In our view, the question as worded must be answered in the negative. Once it is assumed that the state (Israel in this case) has political and judicial institutions capable of protecting its citizens, it is clear that the refusal of certain police officers to take action cannot in itself make the state incapable of doing so. The answer might have been different if the question had related, for example, to the refusal by the police as an institution or to a more or less general refusal by the police force to provide the protection conferred by the country"s political and judicial institutions. |
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| In short, the situation implied by the question under consideration recalls the following comments by Hugessen J.A. in Minister of Employment and Immigration v. Villafranca: |
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| No government that makes any claim to democratic values or protection of human rights can guarantee the protection of all its citizens at all times. Thus, it is not enough for a claimant merely to show that his government has not always been effective at protecting persons in his particular situation. . . . |
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| When the state in question is a democratic state, as in the case at bar, the claimant must do more than simply show that he or she went to see some members of the police force and that his or her efforts were unsuccessful. The burden of proof that rests on the claimant is, in a way, directly proportional to the level of democracy in the state in question: the more democratic the state"s institutions, the more the claimant must have done to exhaust all the courses of action open to him or her. (See Minister of Employment and Immigration v. Satiacum (1989), 99 N.R. 171, at p. 176 (F.C.A.), followed in Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689; 153 N.R. 321, at p. 725). |
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[47] It is thus now settled, according to the remarks of Décary J., that Israel is a democratic state.
[48] Consequently, I do not see why a panel should determine the "level" of democracy which exists in Israel.
Max M. Teitelbaum
J.F.C.C.
Ottawa, Ontario
April 8, 1999
Certified true translation
M. Iveson
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
COURT NO.: IMM-2476-98
STYLE OF CAUSE: VALENTIN ZUEVICH, ALEXEI ZUEVICH V. THE MINISTER
PLACE OF HEARING: MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC
DATE OF HEARING: MARCH 18, 1999
REASONS FOR ORDER OF TEITELBAUM J.
DATED APRIL 8, 1999
APPEARANCES:
YVES GRAVEL FOR THE APPLICANT
CAROLINE DOYON FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
YVES GRAVEL FOR THE APPLICANT
MORRIS ROSENBERG FOR THE RESPONDENT
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF CANADA
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