Andrade v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 59

                                                                                                                                             Date: 20020118

                                                                                                                                  Docket: IMM-1486-01

                                                                                                                     Neutral Citation: 2002 FCT 59

Between:

                                      Miguel Angel PERDOMO ANDRADE

                                                                                                                        Applicant

                                                              - and -

                                            MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

                                                  AND IMMIGRATION

                                                                                                                    Respondent

                                                REASONS FOR ORDER

PINARD J.:

[1]         The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the "Board") dated February 26, 2001, in which the Board determined he was not a Convention refugee as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2.

[2]         The applicant, Miguel Angel Perdomo Andrade, is a citizen of Colombia. He claims to have a well-founded fear of persecution based on his political opinion, race, religion and membership in a particular social group - young black men in Colombia subject to forced conscription into guerilla forces.

[3]         The Board determined the applicant not to be a Convention refugee by concluding that the documentary evidence does not support his allegations. The following reasons were noted:

-           The evidence does not suggest that the guerilla raids on the city of Buenaventura occur very frequently. Therefore, the chance of the claimant being seized in a raid cannot be said to be more than a mere possibility.

-           The documentation does not support the claimant's allegation that he would not be able to find work and housing outside Buenaventura of the same type he had in that city. Given his age and world experience, it would not be unreasonable to expect him to relocate in Colombia before seeking international protection.

[4]         The Board concludes as follows:

In my view, the claimant is one of the many persons in Colombia who has reached the limits of his tolerance with the overall level of violence and economic turmoil in his homeland and has, a result, decided to try to live elsewhere. However, in my view, his situation does not bring him within the Convention definition of Convention refugee.

[5]         The first issue raised is that the evidence presented by the applicant was not rejected, questioned or impeached by the Board in its analysis. After reviewing the evidence, I do not feel that evidence was disregarded by the Board and its decision appears to be well-founded both on the applicant's testimony and the documentary evidence. I am of the view that the conclusions reached by the Board about the possibility of the applicant to be seized by guerilla raids, the probative value of the testimony of Carmencita Angulo and the credibility of the applicant were open to it considering the material before it. Indeed, it is well established that the Board is assumed to have considered all the evidence presented to it (Florea v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (June 11, 1993), A-1307-91 (F.C.A.)) and also in the absence of clear proof that a relevant and significant piece of evidence was not considered by the Board, there is a presumption that the panel assessed all of the evidence before it (Hassan v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1992), 147 N.R. 317 at 318 (F.C.A.)). Furthermore, the following was confirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Zhou v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1994] F.C.J. No. 1087:

We are not persuaded that the Refugee Division made any error that would warrant our interference. The material relied on by the Board was properly adduced as evidence. The Board is entitled to rely on documentary evidence in preference to that of the claimant. There is no general obligation on the Board to point out specifically any and all items of documentary evidence on which it might rely. . . .

[6]         The applicant further submits that the Board erred in its definition of the test to determine whether an Internal Flight Alternative ("IFA") was available to him. The applicable test in considering the possibility of an IFA was defined by the Federal Court of Appeal in Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1994] 1 F.C. 589 at page 597:

Thus, IFA must be sought, if it is not unreasonable to do so, in the circumstances of the individual claimant. This test is a flexible one, that takes into account the particular situation of the claimant and the particular country involved. This is an objective test and the onus of proof rests on the claimant on this issue, just as it does with all the other aspects of a refugee claim. Consequently, if there is a safe haven for claimants in their own country, where they would be free of persecution, they are expected to avail themselves of it unless they can show that it is objectively unreasonable for them to do so.

[7]         In the case at bar, I am satisfied that the test defined in Thirunavukkarusu, supra, was well applied by the Board. It took into account both the particular situation of the applicant and the particular country involved.

[8]         Moreover, simply because the Board found the applicant's testimony to be credible does not necessarily imply that it accepted the applicant's opinion that he would be a victim of forced conscription into the guerilla forces if he were to move to another part of Colombia. The Board in fact noted that the applicant has not been personally targeted and has no political profile, rendering the applicant of less interest to the guerilla forces. In my view, the Board's decision was reasonable in light of all the evidence before it.

[9]         Consequently, the application for judicial review is dismissed.

       JUDGE

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

January 18, 2002