Date: 20020107
Docket: T-550-99
Citation: 2002 FCT 13
Ottawa, Ontario, this 7th day of January, 2002
PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PELLETIER
BETWEEN:
VIACOM HA! HOLDING COMPANY AND OTHERS
Plaintiffs
- and -
JANE DOE AND OTHERS
Defendants
AND BETWEEN: Court File No.: T-823-99
NINTENDO OF AMERICA INC. AND OTHERS
Plaintiffs
- and -
JANE DOE AND OTHERS
Defendants
AND BETWEEN: Court File No.: T- 1058-98
THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY AND OTHERS
Plaintiffs
- and -
JANE DOE AND OTHERS
Defendants
AND BETWEEN: Court File No.: T-1064-98
TIME WARNER ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY, L.P.
Plaintiff
- and -
JANE DOE and JOHN DOE
Defendants
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] The defendants in each of these Anton Piller actions ( Alnashir Tejani, Ghanwa Elmerhebi, Global Fashions and Toys, Toys in Motion and Bathroom City Enterprises Ltd) bring a motion seeking several kinds of relief including an order directed to the former counsel for the plaintiffs that he show cause why he should not be found in contempt of court, and an order dismissing the action for delay or as an abuse of process. The same motion is filed in each of four actions, specifically T-823-99, T-1058-99, T-1064-99, and T-550-99. These reasons will apply to each action, and will be filed on each file.
[2] The notice of motion in this matter is, on the face of it, signed by Keith Bowman, a member of the Law Society of British Columbia. Mr. Bowman acts for the corporate defendants, whoever they are, he says. Mr. Bowman appears to be unclear as to the status of certain entities who may be his clients if they are corporations. He says that he has put their corporate status in issue in the statement of defence which he has filed but he remains in a state of doubt because the plaintiffs have not clarified the corporate status of the entities who may be his clients.
[3] At the opening of this matter, the Court invited Mr. Bowman to speak to his motion. Mr. Bowman then advised the Court that it was not his signature which appeared above his name and that the motion material had been prepared by Mr. Tejani, one of the individual defendants. When asked why he had signed above Mr. Bowman's name, Mr. Tejani replied that there was only one line for signature and since his name appeared further down on the document, he believed it appropriate to sign where he did.
[4] The last page of this document is a series of written consents to the filing of the motion by Mr. Bowman executed by the various defendants. When asked why he was consenting to the filing of the motion by Mr. Bowman if it was his motion, Mr. Tejani replied that it was simply to show that the material reflected the position of all the defendants.
[5] This is not satisfactory. The Court agreed to proceed with the hearing in order to resolve a series of outstanding issues in this matter, but that is not to be taken as an indication that this manner of proceeding is acceptable. As an officer of the Court, Mr. Bowman had an obligation to advise the Court if his name was being applied to materials for which he was not responsible. At the conclusion of the hearing, Mr. Bowman was advised that any pleadings or representations which he filed in the future should appear under his name alone and should not be joined with materials prepared by anyone else. Mr. Tejani and Ms. Elmerhebi are hereby advised that they are not to put Mr. Bowman's name on any materials which they file on their own behalf.
[6] The first head of relief sought is an order that Mr. Lipkus, the former counsel for the plaintiff, be required to show cause why he should not be found in contempt of court for disobeying an order of Mr. Justice Muldoon. When the review motion first came before the Court on June 7, 1999, it was adjourned to allow the defendants to seek legal counsel. It came back before the Court on June 28, 1999, when it was adjourned sine die. It was next spoken to on February 1, 2000, before Mr. Justice Muldoon when certain motions brought by the defendants were also to be spoken to. At that time the defendant's solicitor, Mr. Dallas, sought to rely on his own affidavit setting out the substance of his conversation with a police officer who was present at the execution of the various Anton Piller orders on the defendants. Justice Muldoon ruled that the affidavit had been improperly filed. In doing so he relied on Rule 82 which provides that:
82. Except with leave of the Court, a solicitor shall not both depose to an affidavit and present argument to the Court based on that affidavit.
82. Sauf avec l'autorisation de la Cour, un avocat ne peut à la fois être l'auteur d'un affidavit et présenter à la Cour des arguments fondés sur cet affidavit.
[7] As Mr. Dallas was purporting to argue the merits of the matter on the strength of his own affidavit, Justice Muldoon declared that the affidavit had been filed in error, ordered that it be returned to Mr. Dallas, gave Mr. Dallas leave to file an affidavit in substitution for his own and adjourned the matter to a date in March. Mr. Dallas brought to the Court's attention that Mr. Lipkus had appeared on the original return of the motion when his own affidavit was before the Court. Mr. Justice Muldoon commented that "He ought not to have been.". The order given at the conclusion of the hearing made no mention of Mr. Lipkus nor of any affidavit signed by him.
[8] According to the Affidavit of Ghanwa Elmerhebi affirmed August 16, 2001, the following occurred at the cross-examination on the affidavits filed in relation to the defendant's motion.
Furthermore, the Defendants were present when Mr. Lorne Lipkus, the solicitor for the Plaintiff appeared to conduct the Cross-examinations of the Defendants (in February 2000) after the Order date (sic) made by the Honourable Mr. Jurstice Muldoon.
Mr. Dallas, the solicitor for the defendants clearly objected that Mr. Lipkus would conduct such an examination. Mr. Lipkus was informed that he was disobeying an Order of the Court. Mr. Lipkus was in agreement but justified his actions by stating that he was saving money for the Defendants. The Cross-examinations were terminated. The Plaintiff engaged the services of another law firm to conduct the said cross-examinations.
This is the only evidence on this point as it relates to Mr. Lipkus.
[9] The Court did not call upon Mr. Wotherspoon with respect to this portion of the motion.
[10] Rule 82 is limited in its application to the situation where counsel swears an affidavit and then seeks to argue a matter based on that affidavit. Mr. Dallas' affidavit was returned to him for that reason. When faced with an objection based on rule 82, counsel's choices are to withdraw the affidavit which has been filed, or to retain an agent to argue the motion. Mr. Dallas chose the former while Mr. Lipkus chose the latter. He did not act as counsel on the argument of the review motion and in fact has not presented argument to the Court since the issue was raised. Mr. Justice Muldoon did not order Mr. Lipkus to do anything. He expressed the view that Mr. Lipkus' earlier appearance was inappropriate. He made no order with respect to Mr. Lipkus' future attendances. There is no rule that a solicitor who files an affidavit in interlocutory proceedings is thereafter precluded from acting as counsel in the balance of the proceedings.
[11] The Court was told that Mr. Lipkus' affidavit underlay all subsequent proceedings and will necessarily be before the Court at the trial of this matter. While it may be that the affidavit will be referred to in other proceedings, that is a matter to be dealt with when it arises. If this matter proceeds to trial, the proof of the facts will come from the testimony of witnesses and not by affidavit. It remains to be seen what effect this has on Mr. Lipkus' participation at the trial of this matter. This part of the motion is dismissed.
[12] The next relief sought is an application pursuant to Rules 58 and 59 seeking the dismissal of the action on the ground of an irregularity.
58. (1) A party may by motion challenge any step taken by another party for non-compliance with these Rules.
58. (1) Une partie peut, par requête, contester toute mesure prise par une autre partie en invoquant l'inobservation d'une disposition des présentes règles.
(2) A motion under subsection (1) shall be brought as soon as practicable after the moving party obtains knowledge of the irregularity.
(2) La partie doit présenter sa requête aux termes du paragraphe (1) le plus tôt possible après avoir pris connaissance de l'irrégularité.
59. Subject to rule 57, where, on a motion brought under rule 58, the Court finds that a party has not complied with these Rules, the Court may, by order,
59. Sous réserve de la règle 57, si la Cour, sur requête présentée en vertu de la règle 58, conclut à l'inobservation des présentes règles par une partie, elle peut, par ordonnance :
(a) dismiss the motion, where the motion was not brought within a sufficient time after the moving party became aware of the irregularity to avoid prejudice to the respondent in the motion;
a) rejeter la requête dans le cas où le requérant ne l'a pas présentée dans un délai suffisant - après avoir pris connaissance de l'irrégularité - pour éviter tout préjudice à l'intimé;
(b) grant any amendments required to address the irregularity; or
b) autoriser les modifications nécessaires pour corriger l'irrégularité;
(c) set aside the proceeding, in whole or in part.
c) annuler l'instance en tout ou en partie.
[13] The irregularity alleged in this case is the delay of the plaintiffs in serving and filing their affidavits of documents. The defendants allege that they complied with the rules in this regard and that the plaintiffs have not. They therefore ask for an order pursuant to Rule 59 dismissing the proceedings. Mr. Tejani acknowledged that the plaintiffs' affidavits of documents have been served and filed since this motion was launched.
[14] The Court would not be disposed to dismiss a claim for failure to file affidavits of documents in a timely manner. Had they not been filed yet, the Court would order them filed by a given date and would award the defendants the cost of the motion. As it is, they have been filed, so that the only issue is the question of costs. This will be dealt with later.
[15] The defendants' real complaint and the reason for which they sought dismissal of the claim is a series of alleged misrepresentations by plaintiffs' counsel which they say have prejudiced them before the Court, and the delay in the prosecution of the action by the plaintiffs.
[16] The defendants allege that Mr. Lipkus misrepresented to the Court the number of persons in attendance at the execution of the Anton Piller orders and that he has given inconsistent testimony as to who served the Anton Piller order on the defendants.
[17] The defendants allege that Ms. May Cheng misrepresented to the Court that she had not sworn any affidavits in this matter whereas she had, in fact, sworn an affidavit for use in the appeal of Madam Justice Tremblay Lamer's decision in the review motion.
[18] The defendants allege that the plaintiffs say that they only received one affidavit of documents from the defendants but the plaintiffs own documents show that they received two.
[19] The defendants allege that the plaintiffs say that they received the defendants' affidavit of documents on July 20, 2001, whereas the defendants produced documents from the post office which establish that something was sent from the defendants to the counsel for the plaintiffs in February 2001.
[20] The defendants allege that the plaintiffs' lawyers have concealed from them the name and address of the court reporters who transcribed the cross-examinations on affidavits at which Mr. Lipkus attended. I am satisfied that the present counsel had no hand in making the arrangements for the court reporters and have disclosed the information they have on this issue The defendants were represented by counsel at the cross-examinations which are in issue. They should address their inquiries to him if the information which they have received is not satisfactory.
[21] In the course of making these allegations, the defendants use very intemperate language. They accuse counsel of perjury, of fabricating evidence, and of misleading the Court.
[22] In support of the allegation that Mr. Lipkus misrepresented the number of persons in attendance at the execution of the order, the defendants refer to a brief excerpt from the cross- examination of Mr. Lipkus in which he advises that more than four persons were in attendance. That excerpt in its material parts is as follows:
206 Q. And then date of enforcement, the 23rd of May, 1999, that's not a problem. Persons in attendance, you say here there is only four people; was that right, was that correct.
A. Those were not all the persons in attendance.
207 Q. Well, how would the judge know that?
A. Well, the judge would not know that unless it was put somewhere else.
208 Q. And it wasn't?
A. I don't believe so.
[23] These questions and answers are in relation to the Solicitors report which was filed with respect to the execution of the order. It was completed by Mr. Ovadia, not Mr. Lipkus. Mr. Lipkus subsequently swore an affidavit in response to the allegations made by Mr. Tejani about the circumstances surrounding the execution of the order. In that affidavit, Mr. Lipkus says this about the persons in attendance at the execution of the order:
Mr. Tejani alleges in paragraph 3 of his affidavit that "a truck had pulled up in front of the store and eight men dressed in ordinary street clothing came into the store in an aggressive and abrupt manner." I emphatically deny the truth of that statement and deny the accuracy of the impression it leaves with the reader of that statement. The fact is that prior to commencement of the execution of the Anton Piller orders all vehicles, including the truck in question, were parked on an adjacent street or at an adjacent parking lot to the premises in question. We did not all enter the store at the same time and, in fact, only Daniel Ovadia, Jack Hunter, Detective Constable Ellis and I entered the store while the others waited outside. The truck in question was only brought to the front of the store and put in a position to load goods onto it after we had served the Court orders and received appropriate permission to proceed. ...
[24] It is impossible to determine from the material provided whether the concession made by Mr. Lipkus in his cross-examination was that there were more than four persons involved in the execution of the order or whether there were more than four persons in the premises when the order was served. The purpose of the limitation in the order as to the number of persons to be present is to prevent a climate of intimidation at the time of service and explanation of the order. It does not preclude additional persons being employed to assist in the removal of the goods once the order has been explained and the defendants have consented to the removal of the goods. The solicitor's report may be referring to the number of persons on the premises when the order was served and explained while Mr. Lipkus may be referring to the size of the party on hand when the goods were removed. This is an ambiguity which should be corrected in the future. The report on the execution of the order which is filed with the Court should make clear who was present at which stage of the execution. That said, I am not prepared to find that either Mr. Lipkus or Mr. Ovadia were being untruthful.
[25] The other inconsistency relates to the identity of the person who served the order and explained it to the defendants. In this case, the solicitor's report form completed by Mr. Ovadia indicates that Mr. Lipkus served the order and explained it to the defendants. In his cross-examination on his affidavit, Mr. Lipkus said that Mr. Ovadia was the person responsible for serving and explaining the order.
21 Q. So how would anybody ever know who the Plaintiff's solicitor was, particularly the Court?
A. The Court on every service of an Anton Piller Order receives a report signed by the Solicitor who explained the Order
22 Q. I see. And in these matters were you that Solicitor?
A. The Solicitor who explained the Orders and filed the Report at the time was Mr. Ovadia.
This is only partially correct since the report was submitted by Mr. Ovadia but the report clearly shows that Mr. Lipkus explained the order.
[26] This is confirmed by Mr. Lipkus in his affidavit where he says:
Contrary to Mr. Tejani's statements in paragraph 4 of his affidavit, at all times I made clear our purpose for attending in his store. I advised him that the store had counterfeit goods on display and for sale of several Plaintiffs for whom we had Federal Court orders. I served Mr. Tejani with the Anton Piller Orders, Statements of Claim and Notices of Motion on behalf of the Plaintiffs who are party to this action, and I explained the Federal Court Orders and specifically but not exclusively paragraph 3 of the Federal Court Orders. Mr. Tejani had severas questions and stopped me during my explanation of the Court Orders in relation to some of the paragraphs. I explained other paragraphs of the Order in addition to those in paragraph 3. I answered all of Mr. Tejani's questions ...
[27] While Mr. Lipkus was mistaken in his cross-examination, the material which he put before the Court was consistent and accurate. His error on cross-examination was just that, an error.
[28] Mr. Wotherspoon conceded that Ms. Cheng had made two errors in her affidavits. She swore that she had not submitted an affidavit in the proceedings when in fact she had filed an affidavit in the appeal of the review order. She also swore that only one affidavit of documents was received from the defendants when, at a different point in the materials, she admits that two affidavits, covering all the defendants, were received. The Court also brought to Mr. Wotherspoon's attention an error in the affidavit of Julie Peacock where the text of the affidavit is to the effect that no affidavit of documents was received in response to a demand letter written by Ms. Cheng when the exhibit to which reference is made in the affidavit is a letter acknowledging receipt of the affidavit of documents.
[29] The last item is the allegation that the solicitors for the plaintiff have mislead the Court by saying or allowing it to be understood that they only received the defendant's affidavit of documents in July 2001 when, in fact, the documents were forwarded to them and were received by them in February 2001. This is set out at paragraph 3 of the written representations of the defendant's reply motion record where the following appears:
3. Paragraph 29 of the Responding Motion Record of Time Warner Entertainment Company states:
On or about July 30, 2001, the Defendants served on the Plaintiff two affidavits of Documents sworn on February 20, 2001.
The defendants are in possession of the Receipts issued by Canada Post at the time of mailing the said Affidavit of Documents by Registered Mail. ...
[30] At the hearing of this matter, Mr. Wotherspoon took the position that the proof that the affidavits of documents had been served in February 2001 was deficient in that the affidavit evidence did not disclose that it was the affidavits of documents which were sent to his firm at that time. While this is true, the Court requested Mr. Wotherspoon's undertaking to produce the cover letter which accompanied the defendants' affidavit of documents. This followed an inquiry as to the firm's practice with respect to date stamping incoming mail. The Court received an undertaking to search for and to produce if found, the cover letter. To this date, the Court has not received anything in response to the undertaking given by counsel.
[31] Then, there is the matter of delay. The defendants claim that the plaintiffs have been dilatory in moving this action forward. The plaintiffs justify themselves by pointing to the large number of interlocutory applications in this matter and to the pending appeal of the review motion. In this particular case, the plaintiffs seized thousands of dollars worth of the defendants' stock more than two years ago and in that time have just now served their affidavit of documents in response to this motion. The rationale offered for this glacial pace is that since an appeal was pending from the review order, there was no advantage in incurring the costs of discovery until it was known whether the appeal was successful. If it was, the action would be at an end and no advantage would have been derived from the expense incurred in the discoveries. Therefore better to wait until the appeal is decided. Furthermore, a comment is made that no case management conference was held. This is true and it is a matter for which I accept responsibility.
[32] However, there is no reason to believe that the appointment of a case management judge puts matters on hold till the case management judge issues a decree as to the steps to be taken. It is true that a notice of status review impairs the ability of parties to take further steps while the status review is pending. But once a case management order is signed, the parties are free to proceed subject only to some order to the contrary by the case management judge. Case management was never intended to be an excuse for not proceeding with one's action. It was intended to assist the parties in moving their case forward. If the plaintiffs were intent on proceeding with their action, no case management judge would tell them to slow down.
[33] I find that there has been delay in moving this matter forward. While I do not necessarily subscribe to the defendants' theory that the delay is intended to wear the defendants' down, I do find that there is no incentive on the part of the plaintiffs to move these matters forward. Once the allegedly counterfeit goods have been seized, the plaintiffs' primary objective has been satisfied. The counterfeit goods are no longer on the market. However, the proof of counterfeiting tendered at the review motion is merely prima facie proof and is not conclusive of the issue. Given that the plaintiffs have been given the right to seize the defendants' stock pending the trial of the matter on the theory that it would otherwise not be available for the trial, it is incumbent on the plaintiffs to take steps to move the matter forward expeditiously. This is a positive obligation arising from the remedy which the court has granted the plaintiffs. This is not a case where the plaintiffs can argue that the defendants have not done what they could to move the matter forward.
[34] That said, these defendants have brought a number of motions which have held this matter up, though they are not responsible for the full extent of the delay. Defendants have to use their judgment as to how to best resolve the claim against them. Motions are easily brought but generally do not result in a disposition of the outstanding claim.
[35] On balance, there has been delay in moving this matter forward but it is delay to which the defendants and the Court have contributed. In the circumstances, it would not be appropriate to dismiss the claim for delay or for abuse of process. This problem is better handled through the case management process.
[36] Finally, the defendants raise certain allegations of lack of candour against Ms. Georgina Starkman Danzig. These allegations are in relation to matters which are of no consequence such as whether Mr. Tejani is an employee or partner of Ms. Elmerhebi. These are matters within the knowledge of the defendants and Ms. Starkman Danzig would only know what the defendants told her about them. I find that there is no substance to these allegations.
[37] The defendants have not succeeded with respect to any of their allegations, though they have highlighted a significant lapse of care in the preparation of the affidavits filed by the plaintiffs' present firm. It is simply unacceptable for a firm and a solicitor to file affidavit after affidavit containing errors which could have been identified by the simple expedient of consulting the firm's own file.
[38] This state of affairs is not improved by counsel's failure to comply with his undertaking to search for and produce the letter from the defendants forwarding their affidavits of documents. Having given the undertaking, counsel's only options were to comply with the undertaking, or to explain why compliance was impossible and, in either case, to do so in a timely fashion.
[39] It is unseemly for the plaintiffs and their counsel to behave as though this Court will grant them rolling Anton Piller orders as of right, ratify their seizures as a matter of course and give them judgment whenever they are moved to request it. The orders in question are all discretionary orders. It may well be that one day, there will be a reluctance to exercise that discretion.
[40] Mr. Tejani complained bitterly at the hearing of this motion that his every misstep was a cause of criticism whereas lapses by counsel were treated as mere oversights to be remedied by an apology. He argued that he and the Court had a right to expect a higher standard of performance from officers of the Court. In so far as the affidavits filed by Ms. Cheng and Ms. Peacock are concerned, he was right. But it does not follow from this that the claim against him and the other defendants should be dismissed. Nor does this excuse his own excesses.
[41] The defendants have not succeeded in establishing perjury, intentional misleading of the Court, or fabrication of evidence, all of which are pleaded in their motion material. In spite of the fact that they had access to legal advice, they have misconstrued the rules as to contempt of court and in so doing have made very serious allegations about Mr. Lipkus. They have needlessly slandered Ms. Starkman Danzig. All of this appears over the name of Mr. Bowman who did not dissociate himself from these allegations until called upon by the Court to justify them. In the meantime these allegations go into the public domain. It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that Mr. Bowman has simply lent his name to these proceedings to satisfy the Court's requirement that the corporate entities be represented by counsel. It turns out there may be a cost associated with such a course of action.
[42] There is authority for the proposition that unproven allegations of fraud or other serious misconduct can result in an award of solicitor client costs. See Shibamoto & Co. v. Western Fish Producers Inc. (Trustee of) [1991] F.C.J. No. 967 and more recently Desrochers v. Canada (Treasury Board) [2000] F.C.J. No. 505. Solicitor client costs for these four motions would amount to a significant sum. On the other hand, the defendants did succeed on the issue of affidavits of documents, and showed that some of the affidavits before the Court were mistaken. Balancing these various factors, I assess costs of all four motions against the defendants and Mr. Bowman; $500 payable by Mr. Bowman and $1,000 payable by the defendants, jointly and severally. Mr. Bowman is not to recover from his clients the amounts payable by him by way of disbursement or otherwise.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that:
1. For the reasons set out above, the defendants' motion is hereby dismissed with costs in the amount of $500 payable by Mr. Keith Bowman personally (which amount shall not be the subject of recovery from Mr. Bowman's clients), and $1,000 payable by the defendants jointly and severally, such costs payable forthwith. There shall be only one award of costs for the motions brought on files T-1058-98, T-1064-98 T-550-99 and T-823-99.
"J.D. Denis Pelletier"
Judge
Date: 20020107
Court File No.: T-550-99
Neutral Citation: 2002 FCT 13
BETWEEN:
VIACOM HA! HOLDING COMPANY AND OTHERS
Plaintiffs
- and -
JANE DOE AND OTHERS
Defendants
AND BETWEEN: Court File No.: T-823-99
NINTENDO OF AMERICA INC. AND OTHERS
Plaintiffs
- and -
JANE DOE AND OTHERS
Defendants
Page: 2
AND BETWEEN: Court File No.: T- 1058-98
THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY AND OTHERS
Plaintiffs
- and -
JANE DOE AND OTHERS
Defendants
AND BETWEEN: Court File No.: T-1064-98
TIME WARNER ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY, L.P.
Plaintiff
- and -
JANE DOE and JOHN DOE
Defendants
SUPPLEMENTARY REASONS
[1] These reasons are supplementary to those issued in this matter on January 7, 2002. In those reasons I said that counsel had not, to that date, complied with an undertaking given to the Court.
[2] It has now come to my attention that counsel had in fact, on December 10, 2001, forwarded to the Registry of the Court a package of materials in compliance with his undertakings. Those materials were forwarded to my office but did not come to my attention in the preparation of my
Page: 3
reasons. The responsibility for the error rests with me alone. Accordingly, any suggestion that counsel did not discharge his undertaking in a timely manner is unwarranted.
[3] These supplementary reasons shall be attached to and form part of the reasons for decision dated January 7, 2002.
"J. D. Denis Pelletier"
Judge
Ottawa, Ontario
January 10, 2002
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-550-99
STYLE OF CAUSE: VIACOM HA! HOLDING COMPANY ET AL. v.
JANE DOE ET AL.
PLACE OF HEARING: VANCOUVER
DATE OF HEARING: NOVEMBER 22, 2001
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER : PELLETIER, J.
DATED: JANUARY 7, 2002
APPEARANCES:
DAVID WOTHERSPOON FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
ALNASHIR TEJANI
GHANWA ELMERHEBI (on their own behalf) FOR THE DEFENDANTS
KEITH BOWMAN FOR THE DEFENDANTS BATHROOM CITY ENTERPRISES LTD., TOYS IN MOTION, AND GLOBAL FASHION & TOYS
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
FASKEN MARTINEAU DuMOULIN LLP FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
VANCOUVER
KESTENBERG SIEGAL LIPKUS FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
TORONTO
KEITH BOWMAN FOR THE DEFENDANTS
RICHMOND BATHROOM CITY ENTERPRISES LTD., TOYS IN MOTION, AND GLOBAL FASHION & TOYS
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-823-99
STYLE OF CAUSE: NINTENDO OF AMERICA INC. ET AL. v. JANE
DOE ET AL.
PLACE OF HEARING: VANCOUVER
DATE OF HEARING: NOVEMBER 22, 2001
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER : PELLETIER, J.
DATED: JANUARY 7, 2002
APPEARANCES:
DAVID WOTHERSPOON FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
ALNASHIR TEJANI
GHANWA ELMERHEBI (on their own behalf) FOR THE DEFENDANTS
KEITH BOWMAN FOR THE DEFENDANTS BATHROOM CITY ENTERPRISES LTD., TOYS IN MOTION, AND GLOBAL FASHION & TOYS
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
FASKEN MARTINEAU DuMOULIN LLP FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
VANCOUVER
KESTENBERG SIEGAL LIPKUS FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
TORONTO
KEITH BOWMAN FOR THE DEFENDANTS
RICHMOND BATHROOM CITY ENTERPRISES LTD., TOYS IN MOTION, AND GLOBAL FASHION & TOYS
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-1058-98
STYLE OF CAUSE: THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY ET AL. v. JANE
DOE ET AL.
PLACE OF HEARING: VANCOUVER
DATE OF HEARING: NOVEMBER 22, 2001
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER : PELLETIER, J.
DATED: JANUARY 7, 2002
APPEARANCES:
DAVID WOTHERSPOON FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
ALNASHIR TEJANI
GHANWA ELMERHEBI (on their own behalf) FOR THE DEFENDANTS
KEITH BOWMAN FOR THE DEFENDANTS BATHROOM CITY ENTERPRISES LTD., TOYS IN MOTION, AND GLOBAL FASHION & TOYS
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
FASKEN MARTINEAU DuMOULIN LLP FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
VANCOUVER
KESTENBERG SIEGAL LIPKUS FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
TORONTO
KEITH BOWMAN FOR THE DEFENDANTS
RICHMOND BATHROOM CITY ENTERPRISES LTD., TOYS IN MOTION, AND GLOBAL FASHION & TOYS
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-1064-98
STYLE OF CAUSE: TIME WARNER ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY,
L.P. v. JANE DOE ET AL.
PLACE OF HEARING: VANCOUVER
DATE OF HEARING: NOVEMBER 22, 2001
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER : PELLETIER, J.
DATED: JANUARY 7, 2002
APPEARANCES:
DAVID WOTHERSPOON FOR THE PLAINTIFF
ALNASHIR TEJANI
GHANWA ELMERHEBI (on their own behalf) FOR THE DEFENDANTS
KEITH BOWMAN FOR THE DEFENDANTS BATHROOM CITY ENTERPRISES LTD., TOYS IN MOTION, AND GLOBAL FASHION & TOYS
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
FASKEN MARTINEAU DuMOULIN LLP FOR THE PLAINTIFF
TORONTO
KEITH BOWMAN FOR THE DEFENDANTS
RICHMOND BATHROOM CITY ENTERPRISES LTD., TOYS IN MOTION, AND GLOBAL FASHION & TOYS
The order which was actually issued appears to allow Mr. Dallas to substitute a further affidavit of his own for the affidavit which was returned to him but I am satisfied from reading the transcript of the proceedings that this was not his intent.
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