Canada Post v. Blackburn, docket T-747-99

Date: 20000418

Docket: T-747-99

BETWEEN:

    

CANADA POST

Plaintiff

-and-

CLAUDINE BLACKBURN

Defendant

-and-

GROUPE DE SANTÉ MÉDISYS INC.

Defendant

REASONS FOR ORDER

TEITELBAUM, J:

[1]      This is an application for judicial review of a decision made by an arbitrator appointed by the Minister of Labour pursuant to the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C.1985, c. L-2, to hear the complaint of Ms. Claudine Blackburn for unjust dismissal against Canada Post. On March 29, 1999 the arbitrator held that Canada Post was the employer of Ms. Claudine Blackburn.

[2]      The plaintiff seeks an order quashing the decision of the adjudicator for the following reasons:

(i) La décision comporte des erreurs de nature juridictionnelle ou manifestement déraisonnable de nature à constituer un excès de juridiction. Plus particulièrement, la conclusion de la décision arbitrale ne peut trouver un fondement rationnel en faits et en droits en ce que:

(a) l"arbitre s"arroge sur une juridiction qu"il n"a pas et modifie le droit en décidant qu"une personne ayant un contrat d"emploi avec une entreprise de juridiction provinciale puisse être un employée d"une entreprise de juridiction fédérale;

(b) l"interprétation donnée par l"arbitre au mot "employeur" mentionnée aux articles 166 et 240 du Code Canadien de travail constitue une erreur de droit grave puisqu"elle ne peut s"appuyer sur la preuve qui a été présenté ainsi que sur le droit en vigueur;

(c) l"arbitre a interprété erronément une loi don"t il n"a pas la compétence exclusive, soit le code civil du Québec;

(d) le raisonnement tenu par l"arbitre tient compte de considérations étrangères au litige et omet de tenir compte ou annihile une preuve pertinente et non contredite;

(e) la décision crée une confusion dans les lois tant provinciales que fédérales et aboutie à des résultats irréalistes, anormaux et irrationnels;

(f) la décision enlève tout effet pratique au consentement dans les contrats d"emploi pour le remplacer par une analyse judiciaire de cas par cas;

(g) la décision n"est pas motivée.

[3]      In the alternative, the plaintiff submits that in finding Canada Post was the employer of Ms. Claudine Blackburn and terminated her employment, the adjudicator exceeded the jurisdiction conferred upon him by the parties.

[4]      The plaintiff seeks an order striking out the decision of the arbitrator and a declaration that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to hear the complaint of Ms. Claudine Blackburn.

FACTS (for a more detailed description of the facts, see page 403 and following of Volume II of the Dossier de la Demanderesse)

[5]      Canada Post Corporation is a corporation created pursuant to the Canada Post Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-10.

[6]      With respect to all questions relating to working conditions, Canada Post is subject to Part III of the Canada Labour Code.

[7]      Le Groupe de Santé Médisys Inc. (Médisys) is a corporation created pursuant to the laws of Canada and having its Head Office in Montreal, province of Quebec.

[8]      Claudine Blackburn is a professional specializing in the re-adaptation of employees into the workplace.

[9]      Canada Post entrusted the administration of all its health services to Médisys, and during all times pertinent to this application they were responsible for the delivery of these services to Canada Post. This means, I am satisfied, that Canada Post "contracted out" its health services to Médisys.

[10]      Médisys and Claudine Blackburn entered into an employment agreement on June 23, 1994.

[11]      Found in the employment agreement is the following clause:

" La compagnie retient les services de l"employée, Claudine Blackburn, pour oeuvrer à titre de consultante de réadaptation professionnelle en santé au travail avec affectation au service de la Société canadienne des postes. "

[12]      The agreement also contained benefits and conditions of employment with Médisys including remuneration, vacation time, wage increases, and overtime.

[13]      This agreement took effect on July 18, 1994 and was scheduled to be terminated on December 17, 1997 or before for any reason specified in the agreement.

[14]      Between July 18, 1994 and May 10, 1996, Claudine Blackburn acted as a re-adaptation consultant for Médisys at Canada Post.

[15]      On May 10, 1996 Claudine Blackburn took maternity leave from her work.

[16]      On September 23, 1996 Médisys terminated the employment agreement with Claudine Blackburn and payed her the indemnity specified in article 3 of the employment agreement.

[17]      On October 1, 1996 Claudine Blackburn submitted a complaint against Médisys pursuant to the Loi sur les normes de travail L.R.Q., c. N-1.1.

[18]      On October 18, 1996 Claudine Blackburn submitted a second complaint against Canada Post pursuant to section 240 under Part III of the Canada Labour Code.

[19]      Following this complaint against Canada Post, Me Pierre Lamarche was designated as the arbitrator to hear this matter.

[20]      From the beginning, Me Lamarche made it clear that Médisys was an intervening party in the proceedings.

[21]      Claudine Blackburn"s evidence commenced on February 24, 1998 and was limited to her testimony.

[22]      On the issue of her employment, she states the following:

"Dans in premier temps, nous, notre prétention a toujours été que l"employeur est la Société canadienne des postes. C"est vrai qu"il y a eu un contrat avec Médisys. C"est vrai que les chèques de paie émanaient de Médisys. Ceci dit, quant à nous, ça c"est un contrat bidon. C"est un voile. Ce n"est pas le véritable employeur. C"est notre prétention. C"est d"ailleurs la raison pour laquelle on est ici. "

[23]      At the outset of her testimony, Canada Post made an objection to this evidence as the evidence had the sole objective of contradicting a written contract of employment between herself and Médisys. This objection was taken under reserve by the arbitrator.

[24]      The only witness called by Canada Post was Serge DeCourval, manager.

[25]      On March 29, 1999, the arbitrator, Me Lamarche, rendered his decision stating that the employer of Claudine Blackburn was Canada Post.

DECISION OF THE ARBITRATOR

[26]      The following paragraphs, beginning at page 37 of the arbitrator"s decision, contain the essential findings:

Mme Blackburn offrit ses services au bénéfice exclusivf de la Société canadienne des Postes pendant plus de deux ans.

Malheureusement pour les instances qui doivent décider, il n"existe pas un seul ou un nombre défini de facteurs qui permettent de trancher nettement lorsqu"il s"agit de déterminer dans une relation tripartite qui est l"employeur. C"est plutôt une conjugaison de facteurs qui conduisent finalement à une décision et qui parfois, par voie de conséquence, entraînent des conclusions différentes selon les lois applicables.

[...] En d"autres termes, dans la présente affaire s"il s"agit pas de s"assurer que la plaignante < < puisse négocier avec la partie qui exerce le plus grand contrôle sur tous les aspects de son travail > > mais il s"agit de déterminer, selon le Code canadien de travail, si l"intimée est le véritable employeur de la plaignante ou si c"est l"intervenante.

Or la preuve révèle que Médisys a agi davantage à titre de mandataire de la S.C.P. pour recruter et a agi à titre d"agent payeur du salaire et dépenses de la plaignante, pour le compte de la S.C.P.

La véritable vie professionnelle de la plaignante s"est entièrement déroulée auprès de la S.C.P. qui, même par mandataire interposé, contrôlait tant les aspects de subordination juridique, selon la conception classique, que tous les aspects, selon la conception plus moderne, du contrôle globale de la vie au travail de la plaignante et cela, jusqu"à la décision péremptoire de la S.C.P. de mettre fin à l"emploi de la plaignante.

En conséquence, après avoir examiné la preuve documentaire et testimoniale, après avoir pris en compte la doctrine et la jurisprudence soumise, après avoir pris connaissance des lois applicables, l"arbitre désigné par le ministre du Travail:

DÉCIDE:

Aux fins d"application des disposition du Code canadien du travail, partie III, section XIV que l"employeur de Mme Claudine Blackburn est la Société canadienne des Postes, et

REJETTE:

L"objection préliminaire faite par l"intimée.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

Plaintiff"s Written Submissions

[27]      At the outset, the plaintiff submits that the applicable standard of review for the decision of the arbitrator is one of correctness. In that the plaintiff is arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction, it is submitted that the Court must review this decision according to the correctness standard articulated in Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557 at 590.

[28]      Secondly, the plaintiff argues that given the employment contract which existed between Claudine Blackburn and Médisys, the question before the arbitrator was whether Part III of the Canada Labour Code permitted him to designate another party as her employer when there existed no written contractual relationship with any third party.

[29]      The plaintiff argues that the employment contract between Claudine Blackburn and Médisys was governed by the Code Civil du Québec and as such, the arbitrator should not have stepped outside of the contractual relationship which existed between these two parties and applied the Canada Labour Code to determine whether Canada Post was the employer.

[30]      Finally, the plaintiff argues that the arbitrator exceeded the jurisdiction conferred upon him by the parties in his determination that Claudine Blackburn was dismissed unjustly which was outside the scope of the question posed by the parties which asked only whether Canada Post was the employer of Claudine Blackburn. The issue of unjust dismissal was not before the arbitrator to decide.

[31]      The defendant failed to file any written submissions. As a result, in preparing to hear this judicial review application, I was unable to determine what legal arguments would be submitted by the defendant at the oral hearing for determination.

[32]      The oral hearing was called to begin at 9:30 a.m. in Montreal, Quebec, on the 9^th day of March, 2000. I did not start the hearing until 9:55 a.m. At the commencement of the hearing, neither the defendant nor her counsel were present. Counsel for the plaintiff informed me that he spoke to counsel for the defendant who said he would not be present for the hearing on March 9, 2000.

[33]      Counsel for the defendant, Ms. Blackburn, remains counsel on record and he is Me Pierre Laplante. Me Laplante received notice of the hearing by letter dated October 20, 1999 sent to him by registered mail.

[34]      As a result of neither the defendant nor her attorney being present, I decided to proceed on an ex parte basis.

ISSUES

[35]      The following three questions are raised by this application:

(1)      What is the applicable standard of review of the arbitrator"s decision?

(2)      Did the arbitrator make an error of law in exercising his jurisdiction?

(3)      Did the arbitrator exceed the jurisdiction conferred upon him by the parties by finding that Canada Post had unjustly dismissed the defendant?

ANALYSIS     

Issue I: The Applicable Standard of Review

[36]      The Federal Court of Appeal articulated in Szczecka v. M.E.I. (1993), 170 N.R. 58 (F.C.A.) that unless special circumstances exist, there should be no judicial review of an interlocutory decision.

[37]      This decision was reaffirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Schnurer v. M.N.R., [1997] 2 F.C. 545 (C.A.) where the Court made the following comments:

In my view, sections 18, 18.1 to 18.5, and 28 of the current Federal Court Act confirm the view expressed in these later authorities that the judicial review jurisdiction of the Court extends beyond a review of the ultimate decision of a federal board, commission, or other tribunal.

Notwithstanding the broad wording of these provisions, however, this Court must exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to entertain judicial review applications strictly in accordance with the object of sections 18 and 28 of the Federal Court Act. Applications for judicial review should not be allowed to frustrate and delay federal tribunals in the proper exercise of their statutory jurisdiction. Although rendered prior to the 1990 amendments, the following statement by Jackett C.J. inIn re Anti-Dumping Act andin re Danmor Shoe Co. Ltd. [fn: [1974] 1 F.C. 22 at 34 (C.A.)], and reaffirmed by MacGuigan J.A. inBrennan v. The Queen [fn: [1984] 2 F.C. 799 (C.A.)], provides an accurate summary of the relevant policy considerations at play:

In my view, the object of sections 18 and 28 of the Federal Court Act is to provide a speedy and effective judicial supervision of the work of federal boards, commissions and other tribunals with a minimum of interference with the work of those tribunals. Applying section 11 of the Interpretation Act, with that object in mind, to the question raised by these section 28 applications, it must be recognized that the lack of a right to have the Court review the position taken by a tribunal as to its jurisdiction or as to some procedural matter, at an early stage in a hearing, may well result, in some cases, in expensive hearings being abortive. On the other hand, a right, vested in a party who is reluctant to have the tribunal finish its job, to have the Court review separately each position taken, or ruling made, by a tribunal in the course of a long hearing would, in effect, be a right vested in such a party to frustrate the work of the tribunal.

It was these policy considerations which led this Court, inSzczecka v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [footnote omitted], to conclude that, absent special circumstances, there should not be any appeal or immediate judicial review of an interlocutory decision under section 28. The Szczecka decision was based upon section 28 as currently enacted.

[38]      The "special circumstances" referred to in the above jurisprudence include questions of jurisdiction, as was the case in Cyanamid v. Canada (May 31, 1983), T-153-83 (F.C.T.D.).

[39]      The case at bar also concerns jurisdictional issues. In essence, the plaintiff is arguing that the question before the arbitrator was a precondition to his jurisdiction on the basis that if Médisys was found to be the employer, then the arbitrator would not have the jurisdiction to consider the complaint. Further, the plaintiff submits that the arbitrator exceeded the jurisdiction conferred upon him by the parties.

[40]      Therefore, "special circumstances" appear to be present in the case at bar. In addition, both parties agreed that the question of jurisdiction should be decided before the judicial review should proceed on the merits.

[41]      At the core of this application, and of the defendant"s complaint, is the underlying statutory framework. The relevant provisions are contained in Part III of the Canada Labour Code as follows:

240. (1) Subject to subsections (2) and 242(3.1), any person

(a) who has completed twelve consecutive months of continuous employment by an employer, and

(b) who is not a member of a group of employees subject to a collective agreement,

may make a complaint in writing to an inspector if the employee has been dismissed and considers the dismissal to be unjust.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), a complaint under subsection (1) shall be made within ninety days from the date on which the person making the complaint was dismissed.

240. (1) Sous réserve des paragraphes (2) et 242(3.1), toute personne qui se croit injustement congédiée peut déposer une plainte écrite auprès d'un inspecteur si_:

a) d'une part, elle travaille sans interruption depuis au moins douze mois pour le même employeur;

b) d'autre part, elle ne fait pas partie d'un groupe d'employés régis par une convention collective.

(2) Sous réserve du paragraphe (3), la plainte doit être déposée dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours qui suivent la date du congédiement.

To be inserted 242 (1) (2) (3)(3.1)(4)

[42]      In determining the applicable standard of review to be applied in this case, subsection 243(2) must be considered as it contains the privative clause which precludes this Court from prohibiting or restraining an arbitrator under section 242 proceedings.

[43]      Notwithstanding this privative clause, the tribunal may be subject to judicial review if it has exceeded its jurisdiction: Canada Post v. Pollard, [1992] 2 F.C. 697.

[44]      It has been firmly established in the jurisprudence that any error concerning jurisdiction of a tribunal is reviewed on the correctness standard: Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557 at 590. Thus, the complaint before the arbitrator will be reviewed against a standard of correctness.

Issue II: The Arbitrator"s Reasons

[45]      The plaintiff submits that the adjudicator erred in his interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Canada Labour Code. More specifically, the plaintiff states that because there existed a contract of employment between Médisys and Claudine Blackburn, the issue was whether section III of the Canada Labour Code permitted the arbitrator to bypass freedom of contract and designate another party as the employer.

[46]      It is argued that the arbitrator effectively nullified the employment contract between Médisys and Claudine Blackburn by applying Part III of the Canada Labour Code to determine that her employer was Canada Post.

[47]      The plaintiff refers the Court to subsection 168(1) of the Canada Labour Code as statutory authority for the assertion that Part III does not have the effect of invalidating the contract between employee and employer.

[48]      Subsection 168(1) reads as follows:

168. (1) This Part and all regulations made under this Part apply notwithstanding any other law or any custom, contract or arrangement, but nothing in this Part shall be construed as affecting any rights or benefits of an employee under any law, custom, contract or arrangement that are more favourable to the employee than his rights or benefits under this Part.

168. (1) La présente partie, règlements d'application compris, l'emporte sur les règles de droit, usages, contrats ou arrangements incompatibles mais n'a pas pour effet de porter atteinte aux droits ou avantages acquis par un employé sous leur régime et plus favorables que ceux que lui accorde la présente partie.

[49]      The plaintiff argues that this section precluded the arbitrator from setting aside the employment contract between Médisys and Claudine Blackburn as he did and in doing so, the arbitrator committed an error of law for which the intervention of this Court is warranted.

[50]      It is further argued by the plaintiff that the complainant, Claudine Blackburn, bore the burden of rebutting the prima facie evidence of her contract with Médisys, that being the contract itself.

[51]      Providing that she did not establish that the contract was invalid, inapplicable or that her complaint fell into one of the exceptions enumerated in Part III of the Canada Labour Code, the plaintiff argues that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to override the terms of the employment contract.

[52]      On the jurisdictional issue, the arbitrator made the following comments at pages 19 and 20 of his decision:

" Moi, j"ai juridiction et vous me demandez de décider, premièrement, selon l"objection préliminaire qui est déposée par la Société canadienne des postes, je vais procéder comme ça, je vais rendre une première décision après vous avoir entendus et après avoir entendu le plaidoyer pour, d"une façon intérimaire, dire si j"estime que la Société canadienne des postes est l"employeur ou n"est pas l"employeur. "

[53]      I am of the opinion that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction to apply the provisions of Part III of the Canada Labour Code to the complaint before him given that it dealt with a contract of employment with a person other than Canada Post. The applicable law is found in the Code du travail du Québec which would be applicable to the initial complaint against Médisys.

[54]      I am satisfied the adjudicator did not apply the correct law.

[55]      Simply put, I respectfully disagree, from my appreciation of the facts with the conclusion of the arbitrator when he decided that Canada Post was the defendant"s employer. That is to say, the arbitrator erred in law, basing himself on the facts, when he concluded that Canada Post was the employer. I say this for the following reasons.

[56]      Exhibit P-2 is an advertisement by Groupe Santé Médisys for a "Consultant(e)s en réadaptation professsionnelle". It states in the ad that "Deux postes contractuels sont disponibles immédiatement au sein d"une importante société d"État"(emphasis added)..

[57]      This clearly indicates that Médisys is offering a position and that the position is to be carried out for a Crown corporation (P-2 is found at page 53 of the plaintiff"s Record.

[58]      Exhibit P-3 found at page 53 of the plaintiff"s Record is the "Convention d"Emploi" dated June 23, 1994. This "Convention d"Emploi" is between Médisys and Claudine Blackburn. Claudine Blackburn is referred to as "ci-après désignée l"employée".

[59]      This, in itself, would not necessarily convince me that Ms. Blackburn was an employee of Médisys, being designated as an employee does not make the "employee" an employee of Médisys.

[60]      After reading the agreement filed as Exhibit P-3, it is abundantly clear that the agreement is an agreement of employment. The agreement lists the services to be performed by Ms. Blackburn and where she is expected to perform these services, at Société canadienne des postes (SCP).

[61]      The agreement gives the term of the agreement as well as the conditions of termination of employment. The contract speaks of remuneration and salary increases and lists all the terms and conditions of employment.

[62]      The only mention, in this agreement, of the SCP is that the defendant will work at the SCP not that she will be employed by the SCP.

[63]      It should be noted that the SCP is not a party to the agreement found at Exhibit P-3.

[64]      I am satisfied from the above and, as I have said, the defendant not being present and not having made any written submissions to the contrary, that the defendant clearly was an employee of Médisys. Médisys is not a corporation governed by the Canada Labour Code but the contract having been entered into in the Province of Quebec and the defendant only having worked in the Province of Quebec, is governed by the Loi sur les normes de travail L.R.Q., c. N-1.1.

[65]      Thus, the arbitrator, I am satisfied, erred in law.

[66]      The application for judicial review is allowed. The arbitrator appointed pursuant to the Canada Labour Code has no jurisdiction to hear a complaint by a person signed to an employment contract by a private corporation under the circumstances of the present case.

                        

                                 J.F.C.C.

Ottawa, Ontario

April , 2000