Date: 20000330
Docket: T-1335-99
BETWEEN:
NATURAL WATERS OF VITI, LIMITED
and BRIO BEVERAGES INC.
Plaintiffs
- and -
C.E.O. INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS INC.,
FERN BROOK SPRINGS BOTTLED WATER COMPANY LIMITED,
CLYDE VIOLA and C.E.O. BOTTLING LTD.
Defendants
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
LAFRENIÈRE P.:
[1] The Defendants have brought a motion seeking, inter alia, the following relief:
| (a) an order striking Brio Beverages Inc. ("Brio" ) as a co-plaintiff in this action, removing Brio as a party and requiring the Defendants to deliver an amended statement of claim naming Natural Waters of Viti, Limited ("Viti" ) as the sole Plaintiff; |
| (b) an order striking the claims for copyright infringement relating to the label designs shown in Schedules "B"and "D", in paragraphs 1(d), 1(f), (vi), and (vii), 14 and 15 of the Statement of Claim; |
| (c) an order striking paragraphs 1(f)(ii) and 26(e) of the Statement of Claim relating to alleged breaches of Section 7(d) of the Trade-marks Act, and limiting the declaration sought in paragraph 1(e) of the Statement of Claim to Acts contrary to Section 7(b) of the Trade-marks Act; |
| (d) an order extending the period in which the defendants must deliver their defence; and |
| (e) costs of this motion. |
[2] The Defendants withdrew at the start of the hearing of the motion their additional request to strike the allegations against the personal defendant, Clyde Viola, and paragraph 20 of the Statement of Claim relating to alleged conspiracy. Consequently, the following are my reasons for order for the balance of the relief sought by the Defendants.
Background
[3] On July 23, 1999, the Plaintiffs issued a Statement of Claim alleging passing off of the FIJI trademark and infringement of copyright. The product at issue is bottled water. Viti, which is based in Fiji, is the manufacturer and bottler of the product. Viti alleges in the Statement of Claim rights in the get-up of its bottles and claims ownership of certain trade marks, consisting of the word FIJI, a distinguishing guise, front and back labels and the combination of the front and back labels.
[4] The Statement of Claim consists of 29 paragraphs and is 14 pages in length, excluding attachments. Reproduced below are a few relevant paragraphs:
| 9. Brio is the exclusive distributor of the Product bearing the Fiji Trade-marks in Canada and has, in conjunction with Viti, set up an extensive distribution system for the Product and has extensively promoted and sold the Product bearing the Fiji Trade-Marks in Canada. All use by Brio of the Fiji Trade-marks has been authorized and controlled by Viti and the Plaintiffs claim the benefit of Section 50 of the Trade-marks Act. |
| 12. The Plaintiffs have extensively used and advertised the Product bearing the Fiji Trade-mark in Canada as well as in the United States and elsewhere throughout the world. The Fiji Trade-marks are, therefore, known in Canada as distinguishing the Product of Viti from the wares of others. The public has, by virtue of the Plaintiffs"use, advertising and promotion of its Viti Trade-marks come to associate these trade-marks with the Product of Viti. |
| 13. Viti is also the owner of copyright in the original literary work found in the distinctive design and informational material which appears in the back panel of the Product (the "Literary Work") a copy of which is attached hereto as Schedule "C"which is incorporated herein by reference thereto. The author of the literary work is Douglas Carlson, a citizen of the United States of America, and who was an employee of Viti at the time the Literary Work was created. The Work was made in the course of the author"s employment with Viti. |
| 17. Viti has established an excellent reputation and extensive goodwill in Canada, the United States and elsewhere, in association with the Fiji Trade-marks including its distinctive distinguishing guise of Schedule "A"since its inception. During this period, Viti has enjoyed a substantial business reputation with Canadian residents in Canada, with Canadian residents travelling in the United States and elsewhere and by means of Canadian residents being exposed to advertising and promotions appearing in publications in Canada. |
The Defendants"position
[5] The Defendants submit that Brio should be removed as a co-plaintiff in this action on the grounds that it has no standing to maintain an action for infringement of either the unregistered trade mark rights or the copyright at issue. The Defendants also seek an order striking the claims for copyright infringement relating to the label designs shown in Schedules "B"and "D"in paragraphs 1(d), 1(f), (vi), and (vii), 14 and 15 of the Statement of Claim on the grounds that there is no pleaded assignment of the copyright by a document in writing by the author or assignor in conformity with section 13(4) of the Copyright Act. Finally, the Defendants object to paragraphs 1(f)(ii) and 26(e) of the Statement of Claim relating to alleged breaches of section 7(d) of the Trade-marks Act on the basis that they contain nothing more than a bare allegation.
The Plaintiffs"position
[6] The Plaintiffs submit that Brio is a proper party to the present action in view of sections 7, 19, 20, 50 and 53.2 of the Trade-marks Act. They assert that the action brought by the Plaintiffs is not based on trade-mark infringement, as alleged by the Defendants, but rather on passing off and unfair competition pursuant to section 7 of the Trade-marks Act. The Plaintiffs contend that the copyright claim is properly pleaded and that an assignment of the copyright is not required in light of the allegation that the Plaintiff Viti owns the literacy works and artistic works. With respect to the sufficiency of the section 7(d) claim allegations, the Plaintiffs submit that it is supported when the whole of the Statement of Claim is taken into account.
Relevant sections of the Trade-marks Act
[7] Sections 7, 19, 20, 50 and 53.2 of the Trade-marks Act state:
| 7. No person shall
(a) make a false or misleading statement tending to discredit the business, wares or services of a competitor;
(b) direct public attention to his wares, services or business in such a way as to cause or be likely to cause confusion in Canada, at the time he commenced so to direct attention to them, between his wares, services or business and the wares, services or business of another;
(c) pass off other wares or services as and for those ordered or requested;
(d) make use, in association with wares or services, of any description that is false in a material respect and likely to mislead the public as to
(i) the character, quality, quantity or composition,
(ii) the geographical origin, or
(iii) the mode of the manufacture, production or performance of the wares or services; or
(e) do any other act or adopt any other business practice contrary to honest industrial or commercial usage in Canada.
|
|
| 7. Nul ne peut :
a) faire une déclaration fausse ou trompeuse tendant à discréditer l'entreprise, les marchandises ou les services d'un concurrent;
b) appeler l'attention du public sur ses marchandises, ses services ou son
entreprise de manière à causer ou à vraisemblablement causer de la confusion au Canada, lorsqu'il a commencé à y appeler ainsi l'attention, entre ses marchandises, ses services ou son entreprise et ceux d'un autre;
c) faire passer d'autres marchandises ou services pour ceux qui sont commandés ou demandés;
d) utiliser, en liaison avec des marchandises ou services, une désignation qui est fausse sous un rapport essentiel et de nature à tromper le public en ce qui
regarde :
(i) soit leurs caractéristiques, leur qualité, quantité ou composition,
(ii) soit leur origine géographique,
(iii) soit leur mode de fabrication, de production ou d'exécution;
e) faire un autre acte ou adopter une autre méthode d'affaires contraire aux
honnêtes usages industriels ou commerciaux ayant cours au Canada.
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|
| 19. Subject to sections 21, 32 and 67, the registration of a trade-mark in
respect of any wares or services, unless shown to be invalid, gives to the owner of the trade-mark the exclusive right to the use throughout Canada of the trade-mark in respect of those wares or services.
|
19. Sous réserve des articles 21, 32 et 67, l'enregistrement d'une marque de
commerce à l'égard de marchandises ou services, sauf si son invalidité est
démontrée, donne au propriétaire le droit exclusif à l'emploi de celle-ci, dans tout le Canada, en ce qui concerne ces marchandises ou services.
|
| 20. (1) The right of the owner of a registered trade-mark to its exclusive use shall be deemed to be infringed by a person not entitled to its use under this Act who sells, distributes or advertises wares or services in association with a confusing trade-mark or trade-name, but no registration of a trade-mark prevents
a person from making
(a) any bona fide use of his personal name as a trade-name, or
(b) any bona fide use, other than as a trade-mark,
(i) of the geographical name of his place of business, or
(ii) of any accurate description of the character or quality of his wares or
services,
in such a manner as is not likely to have the effect of depreciating the value of the goodwill attaching to the trade-mark.
|
|
| 20. (1) Le droit du propriétaire d'une marque de commerce déposée à l'emploi exclusif de cette dernière est réputé être violé par une personne non admise à l'employer selon la présente loi et qui vend, distribue ou annonce des marchandises ou services en liaison avec une marque de commerce ou un nom commercial créant de la confusion. Toutefois, aucun enregistrement d'une marque de commerce ne peut empêcher une personne :
a) d'utiliser de bonne foi son nom personnel comme nom commercial;
b) d'employer de bonne foi, autrement qu'à titre de marque de commerce :
(i) soit le nom géographique de son siège d'affaires,
(ii) soit toute description exacte du genre ou de la qualité de ses marchandises ou services,
d'une manière non susceptible d'entraîner la diminution de la valeur de l'achalandage attaché à la marque de commerce.
|
|
| 50. (1) For the purposes of this Act, if an entity is licensed by or with the
authority of the owner of a trade-mark to use the trade-mark in a country and the owner has, under the licence, direct or indirect control of the character or quality of the wares or services, then the use, advertisement or display of the
trade-mark in that country as or in a trade-mark, trade-name or otherwise by that entity has, and is deemed always to have had, the same effect as such a use, advertisement or display of the trade-mark in that country by the owner.
(2) For the purposes of this Act, to the extent that public notice is given of the fact that the use of a trade-mark is a licensed use and of the identity of the owner, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proven, that the use is licensed by the owner of the trade-mark and the character or quality of the wares or services is under the control of the owner.
(3) Subject to any agreement subsisting between an owner of a trade-mark and a licensee of the trade-mark, the licensee may call on the owner to take proceedings for infringement thereof, and, if the owner refuses or neglects to do so within two months after being so called on, the licensee may institute
proceedings for infringement in the licensee's own name as if the licensee were the owner, making the owner a defendant.
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|
| 50. (1) Pour l'application de la présente loi, si une licence d'emploi d'une marque de commerce est octroyée, pour un pays, à une entité par le propriétaire de la marque, ou avec son autorisation, et que celui-ci, aux termes de la licence, contrôle, directement ou indirectement, les caractéristiques ou la qualité des marchandises et services, l'emploi, la publicité ou l'exposition de la marque, dans ce pays, par cette entité comme marque de commerce, nom
commercial - ou partie de ceux-ci - ou autrement ont le même effet et sont réputés avoir toujours eu le même effet que s'il s'agissait de ceux du propriétaire.
(2) Pour l'application de la présente loi, dans la mesure où un avis public a été donné quant à l'identité du propriétaire et au fait que l'emploi d'une marque de commerce fait l'objet d'une licence, cet emploi est réputé, sauf preuve contraire, avoir fait l'objet d'une licence du propriétaire, et le contrôle des caractéristiques ou de la qualité des marchandises et services est
réputé, sauf preuve contraire, être celui du propriétaire.
(3) Sous réserve de tout accord encore valide entre lui et le propriétaire d'une marque de commerce, le licencié peut requérir le propriétaire d'intenter des procédures pour usurpation de la marque et, si celui-ci refuse ou néglige de le faire dans les deux mois suivant cette réquisition, il peut intenter ces
procédures en son propre nom comme s'il était propriétaire, faisant du propriétaire un défendeur.
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|
| 53.2 Where a court is satisfied, on application of any interested person, that any act has been done contrary to this Act, the court may make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances, including an order providing for relief by way of injunction and the recovery of damages or profits and for the
destruction, exportation or other disposition of any offending wares, packages, labels and advertising material and of any dies used in connection therewith.
|
53.2 Lorsqu'il est convaincu, sur demande de toute personne intéressée, qu'un acte a été accompli contrairement à la présente loi, le tribunal peut rendre les ordonnances qu'il juge indiquées, notamment pour réparation par voie d'injonction ou par recouvrement de dommages-intérêts ou de profits, pour l'imposition de dommages punitifs, ou encore pour la disposition par destruction, exportation ou autrement des marchandises, colis, étiquettes et
matériel publicitaire contrevenant à la présente loi et de toutes matrices
employées à leur égard.
|
Analysis
[8] The test governing striking of pleadings is succinctly stated by Madame Justice Wilson, writing for the Supreme Court of Canada, in Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc.1:
| Assuming that the facts as stated in the statement of claim can be proved, is it "plain and obvious"that the plaintiff"s statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action ? |
[9] Accordingly, on a motion to strike for want of a reasonable cause of action, the facts set out in the statement of claim must be taken as proven. A party seeking to strike a pleading, or parts thereof, must establish that it is "plain and obvious"that the cause of action cannot possibly succeed. Moreover, as was stated by Henry, J. (as he then was) in Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) Commissioners of Police2, the Statement of Claim must be read "as generously as possible to accommodate any inadequacies in the form of the allegations which are merely the result of drafting deficiencies".
[10] Finally, the Court must exercise great care in applying the plain and obvious test as articulated by Prothonotary Hargrave in Hodgson et al v. Ermineskin Indian Band No. 9423:
| This law on striking out of pleadings is sometimes referred to as trite law. Yet it bears repeating for otherwise, perhaps in an effort to save expense for all concerned and to preserve the resources of the Court, there is a temptation to strike out a pleading too easily. To strike out without keeping strictly to the safeguards of the stringent requirements is to deprive a party of what may well be a proper and deserved day in court and perhaps in the process, on occasion, stifle the advancement or refinement of the law. However, where a proceeding is fruitless and will not lead to a practical result, the resources of all concerned ought not to be squandered. |
[11] The question as to whether an exclusive distributor has a right of action under section 53 (now 53.2) of the Trade-marks Act has already been considered by this Court in Gund Inc. v.Ganz Bros. Toys Ltd.4. The defendant brought a motion to strike as a party an exclusive distributor of a co-plaintiff"s products. Pinard, J. dismissed the motion on the basis that the defendant did not prove that the distributor"s action could not possibly succeed. His decision was based, at least in part, on the fact that:
| ...the question of "shared reputation and goodwill in indicia", in the context of this particular case involve serious issues of law... |
[12] The Plaintiffs submit that the Gund decision deals squarely with the right of action of an exclusive distributor. However, in my view, the decision is of little assistance. First, it can be distinguished on the facts. The Plaintiffs have not alleged in their pleading that Brio has a shared reputation or goodwill with its co-plaintiff. Based on the facts as pleaded in the Statement of Claim, nothing would have transpired to suggest to the public in Canada that the trade marks in question were anything other than the manufacturer"s marks.
[13] Secondly, there is no indication that the English decision of the High Court of Justice, King"s Bench Division in Dental Manufacturing Company Ltd. V. C. De Trey & Co.5was brought to Pinard, J."s attention. This decision stands for the proposition that a mere exclusive distributor cannot sue for infringement of trade marks rights in the absence of some goodwill owned by it, or the trade mark at issue being distinctive of it at least in part. Although decided almost a century ago, the words of Pickford, J. are still pertinent today:
| I think, as a matter of fact, the action of Richards v. Butcher may have been on the pleadings for infringement of Trade Mark only, but Mr. Justice Kay distinctly dealt with the other question, because, after discussing what the position of an exclusive agent was and what the meaning of an agreement for exclusive agency was, he said:-"How does that give them the "right to prevent the infringement of Heidsieck"s Trade Mark"- so far he was dealing with Trade Mark only -"or to prevent , if the case is put on that ground, "though that is not the ground prominently put forward in the pleadings, "somebody from committing fraud by selling wine as Heidsieck"s which is not "Heidsieck" s. I do not in the least follow."Therefore this, as I say, is either an express decision or an express and a very strong dictum - I am inclined to think it is a decision - of Mr. Justice Kay that a passing-off action cannot be maintained by an exclusive agent; and although there are passages in a number of other cases that certainly may be read inconsistently with that, they are not cases in which the point arose directly, and I am not convinced that the learned Judges in these cases had this point under their consideration. At any rate, whether that be so or not, I have the express opinion of Mr. Justice Kay to the effect I have mentioned, and therefore I do not think I can do anything else but follow that and say that an exclusive agent cannot maintain an action for passing off. |
[14] The decision of Pickford, J. was upheld by the English Court of Appeal6. Although accepting that a person dealing with the goods of another may have goodwill in the business of dealing with them, Buckley, L.J. concluded that such goodwill must be distinct from that of the owner to found a cause of action:
| A passing-off action is one in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant is depriving him of his property by taking away trade which, but for the defendant"s wrongful acts, would come to the plaintiff in his business. It is an action in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant so gets up his goods as that the public, intending to buy the plaintiff"s goods are induced to buy the defendant"s goods in the belief that they are buying the plaintiff"s goods. The plaintiff"s goods need not be manufactured by the plaintiff. They may be goods which he purchases or which he imports or otherwise acquires, and which he sells under some get-up which conveys that they are goods which, whether made, imported, or sold by him, carry with them the advantage of the reputation that the plaintiff"s well known firm are responsible for their quality or their character. I do not doubt that a person dealing with the goods of another may have a goodwill in the business of dealing with them. A carrier who carries goods of others may have a goodwill in his business of carrier. An agent who is the agent for the sale of the goods of others may have a goodwill in his agency business and, as such, may have a get-up the reproduction of which may entitle him to succeed in a passing -off action. To apply that to the present case, I myself entertain no doubt that de Trey & Co, as sole agents for the sale of Clark"s spittoons, may have a goodwill in respect of that business, and I have no doubt that if they had a get-up of their own under which they sold Clark"s goods they might succeed in a passing-off action. Those are propositions which it is not necessary to decide for the purposes of this case, but they are propositions which, I think, are true, and upon the basis of which I proceed in this judgment. |
| In my judgment this appeal must be dismissed, not upon the ground that the sole agent for sale has not a goodwill and cannot succeed in a passing-off action, because, in proper circumstances, I think that he would both have a goodwill and could succeed in such an action, but I think the Defendants wholly fail upon the facts, because there was here no representation whatever, affording any basis for a passing-off action, that these goods were in any material sense the goods of de Trey & Co. There is nothing to connect the goods with de Trey & Co. which was used to induce the purchaser to buy them. On that ground I think that the appeal must be dismissed. |
[15] The above decisions are in harmony with Canadian jurisprudence. Generally, a trade-mark is that of the manufacturer and not that of the Canadian distributor: see Manhattan Industries Inc v Princeton Manufacturing Ltd7and Royal Doulton Tableware Ltd v Cassidy"s Ltd.8
[16] The Federal Court of Appeal in Asbjorn Horggard A/S v. Gibbs/Nortac Industries Ltd.9explained the nature of the remedy afforded by section 7(b) of the Trade-marks Act. Speaking for the Court, MacGuigan, J.A. said:
| What is at issue is Parliament"s right to create a remedy in relation to a trade mark not registered under the Act. |
| Subsection 7(b) is a statutory statement of the common law action of passing off, which consisted of a misrepresentation to the effect that one"s goods or services are someone else"s, or sponsored by or associated with that other person. It is effectively a "piggybacking" by misrepresentation. |
| Halsbury"s Laws of England, 4thed., vol 48, p. 99 states that "The action for passing off may have been recognised at common law as long as during the reign of Elizabeth I". However, only in equity was the exclusive right to use a trade name or mark protected in the absence of fraud, and in England the common law courts continued to require fraudulent intent until the fusion of the court of common law and equity. Halsbury further states, at p. 108: |
| "155. Nature of goodwill. A passing-off action is now recognised as being a remedy for the invasion of a right of property, the property being in the business or goodwill likely to be injured by the misrepresentation rather than in the mark, name or get-up improperly used. "Goodwill" has been defined as the benefit and advantage of the good name, reputation and connection of a business, the attractive force which brings in custom, and the one thing which distinguishes an old-established business from a new business at its first start. |
| At common law the right to a trade mark thus arose through the use of a mark by a business to identify its products to the public. There was no need for the business to register its mark in order to protect its right to use the trade mark and prevent the misuse of its trade mark by other businesses. The passing-off action was the enforcement mechanism available for the protection of trade mark rights. Without the passing-off action, common law trade mark rights would have little value. |
[17] The Plaintiffs argue in their written submissions that there is an arguable case as to whether a licensed distributor may bring or join in a passing off action. Yet the Plaintiffs have not pleaded material facts to suggest that Brio is licensed by Viti.
[18] In any event, the right of a licensee to bring such an action appears limited. In Smith & Nephew Inc. v. Glen Oak Inc.10, the Federal Court of Appeal was called upon to determine whether the plaintiff as licensee of a Canadian registered trade mark could assert any rights against persons importing, distributing and selling goods bearing those same trade marks which the owner thereof had put into the stream of commerce. Speaking for the Court, Hugessen, J.A. (as he then was) concluded that only an owner of the goodwill associated to a trade mark could bring a statutory passing-off action as follows:
| No doubt the appellants, by the use of the Nivea trade marks, are directing attention to the wares they sell in a way which may cause confusion with the wares sold by the respondent. But that is because in both cases the wares in question are not those of the appellants or the respondent respectively, but rather those of BDF. The latter alone owns the trade mark and the goodwill associated with it and the statutory passing-off action, like its common law counterpart, can only be brought by it as the owner of such goodwill. |
| Thus, even if paragraph 7(b) had the reach contended for by respondent and created protection for other than unregistered trade marks the respondent could not sustain such an action in this case. |
[19] In light of the above decisions, I must conclude that Brio"s cannot maintain an action for passing-off under the Trade-marks Act. The facts as pleaded in the Statement of Claim do not establish that Brio has a shared reputation and goodwill with Viti, let alone a distinct goodwill in Viti"s products. Nor have the Plaintiffs alleged that Brio has been "licensed by or with the authority of"Viti as provided under section 50 of the Trade-marks Act. Brio"s standing must be determined on the pleadings as they stand. As such, the Brio shall be struck as a party to the proceeding.
[20] I reject the Defendants contention that Viti"s claim for copyright infringement should be struck on the basis that an assignment of the copyright in writing has not been pleaded. Paragraph 13 of the Statement of Claim alleges ownership of the copyright in the subject literacy works and artistic works in the Plaintiff Viti. In the context of this motion, those facts must be taken as proven.
[21] The Defendants also seek to strike the allegations relating section 7(d) on the basis that a bare conclusion of a breach of statute is insufficient to support a cause of action. In determining the sufficiency of the section 7(d) claim allegations, it is necessary to consider the whole of the Statement of Claim. The Plaintiffs have alleged with sufficient detail that the Defendants have consciously and intentionally created a product look which would lead the consumer, and is intended to lead the consumer, to the false conclusion that the Defendants"product is the same as or originates at the same place as that of the Plaintiff Viti. In my view, the pleading taken as a whole discloses a reasonable cause of action.
ORDER
[22] The Plaintiff Brio Beverages Inc. is hereby struck as a party to the proceeding.
[23] The remaining Plaintiff, Natural Waters of Viti, Limited, shall serve and file an amended Statement of Claim within 10 days of the date of this Order.
[24] The time for completion of subsequent steps in the proceeding is extended to run from the date of service of the Amended Statement of Claim on the Defendants.
[25] The motion is otherwise dismissed.
[26] In light of the divided success of the parties, costs of the motion shall be in the cause.
"Roger R. Lafrenière"
Prothonotary
Toronto, Ontario
March 30, 2000
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record
| STYLE OF CAUSE: NATURAL WATERS OF VITI, LIMITED |
and BRIO BEVERAGES INC.
| C.E.O. INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS INC., FERN BROOK SPRINGS BOTTLED WATER COMPANY LIMITED, CLYDE VIOLA and C.E.O. BOTTLING LTD. |
| DATE OF HEARING: MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1999 |
| PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO, ONTARIO |
REASONS FOR ORDER
| AND ORDER BY: LAFRENIÈRE, P. |
DATED: THURSDAY, MARCH 30, 2000
APPEARANCES: Mr. Ken Mackay
For the Plaintiffs
Mr. Michael Charles
For the Defendants
| SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Sim, Hughes, & McKay |
Barristers & Solicitors
330 University Avenue
6 th Floor
Toronto, Ontario
M5G 1R7
Bereskin & Parr
Barristers & Solicitors
Box 401, 40 King St. W.,
Toronto, Ontario
M5H 3Y2
For the Defendants
Date: 20000330
Docket: T-1335-99
Between:
| NATURAL WATERS OF VITI, LIMITED and BRIO BEVERAGES INC. |
Plaintiffs
- and -
| C.E.O. INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS INC., FERN BROOK SPRINGS BOTTLED WATER COMPANY LIMITED, CLYDE VIOLA and C.E.O. BOTTLING LTD. |
Defendants
REASONS FOR ORDER
__________________
1 ©1990ª 2 S.C.R. 959 at p. 980
2 (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th ) 396 at 398
3 unreported, March 13, 2000
4 (1989), 23 C.I.P.R. 86 (F.C.T.D.)
5 (1912), 29 R.P.C. 617
6 (1912), 29 R.P.C. 621.
7 (1971), 4 CPR (2d) 6 (FC TD)
8 [1986] 1 FC 357 (TD)
9 (1987), 14 C.P.R. (3d) 314
10 (1996), 68 C.P.R. 153 (F.C.A) at p. 164
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