Date: 20000128
Docket: IMM-2230-99
BETWEEN:
HAWA AHMED HOUSSEIN
HOUDA DJIBRIL
Applicants
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
TREMBLAY-LAMER J.:
[1] This is an application for judicial review under section 82.1 of the Immigration Act1 (the Act) of a decision of the Convention Refugee Determination Division of the Immigration Refugee Board (the Board) whereby the Board determined that the applicant is not a Convention refugee as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Act.
[2] The applicant and her child, both citizens of Djibouti, base their claim on the well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of her nationality or race, as a member of the Afar tribe, her political opinion, namely membership in the Party for Democratic Renewal (PRD) or due to her membership in a particular social group, namely, as the spouse of a militant or active member of the PRD.
[3] The applicant"s father, a supporter of the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), was killed in 1992 during the civil war between government authorities in Djibouti and the FRUD. Afterwards, the applicant"s family sought refuge in Ethiopia, while the applicant remained in Djibouti city.
[4] In 1992, the applicant began working as a secretary in the Djiboutian Ministry of Education.
[5] In 1995, the applicant married Mr. Djibril Ismael Egueh, a police officer and a member of the PRD. In fact, Mr. Egueh an active member of the PRD encouraged the applicant to join the party as well.
[6] The applicant did in fact become a member of the PRD in 1995 although her involvement was limited to financial contributions at the beginning. The applicant indicated that women"s role within the PRD was not a political one.
[7] Late in 1995, the applicant"s husband lost his job with the police, apparently due to his political involvement with the PRD.
[8] On November 15, 1996 the applicant was arrested during the course of a meeting of PRD members" wives that had been called to organize a demonstration to mark children"s international day. She was taken to the central police station, where questioned and detained for twenty-four (24) hours.
[9] At the beginning of 1998, after learning from a friend that he was on a list of individuals who could be arrested, the applicant"s husband, fled the country to seek refuge Ethiopia.
[10] In March 1998, during a teacher"s strike, employees of the Ministry of Education, such as the applicant, were sent to replace the striking teachers. The applicant, as well as other employees, however refused, and was subsequently arrested, detained in Nagadh for forty-eight (48) hours, and later transferred to the Gabode prison for ten (10) days. The applicant alleges that she was interrogated, tortured and beaten in prison.
[11] After, her release, the applicant alleges that feeling alone with her daughter with no information from neither her husband nor her family, she decided she would leave the country. In August 1998, the applicant applied for an American visa.
[12] In the fall of 1998, during another teachers" strike, the applicant, still employed as a secretary at the Ministry of Education, once again, refused to replace the striking teachers. After her supervisor presented her with an ultimatum, to replace a striking teacher or lose her job, the applicant chose the latter option. She thus lost her job with the Ministry of Education as a secretary.
[13] The applicant left Djibouti on October 2,1998 fearing for her and her daughter"s life, passed through France and the United States before seeking refuge in Canada.
[14] On the whole, the tribunal found the applicant to be trustworthy and stated that they believed the incidents she recounted regarding her husband"s loss of employment, her arrest and detention on November 15, 1996, her re-arrest and detention in March 1998, as well as the alternative presented to her by her employer in October 1998 but concluded that the mistreatment endured by the applicant did not constitute persecution.
[15] The judicial review in the case at bar essentially hinges on the question of persecution.
[16] Given the absence of a definition of the term "persecution" in the Act we turn to the Rajudeen v. MEI2 decision, wherein the Federal Court of Appeal cited the dictionary definition of "persecution":
| The first question to be answered is whether the applicant had a fear of persecution. The definition of Convention refugee in the Immigration Act does not include a definition of "persecution". Accordingly, ordinary dictionary definitions may be considered. The Living Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary defines "persecute" as: |
| "To harass or afflict with repeated acts of cruelty or annoyance; to afflict persistently, to afflict or punish because of particular opinions or adherence to a particular creed or mode of worship." |
| The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary contains, inter alia, the following definitions of "persecution": |
| "A particular course or period of systematic infliction of punishment directed against those holding a particular (religious belief); persistent injury or annoyance from any source."3 |
[17] In addressing the question of persecution and after reviewing the definition of the term, the Board stated that:
| [T]here are two elements, I think, that should be stressed; that is, there must be grave or serious mistreatment or there must be a significant threat to fundamental human rights. And the second aspect is that this mistreatment must be inflicted in a repetitive, persistent, and systematic manner.4 |
[18] I believe that this is consistent with that in the Rajudeen5 decision.
[19] In light of this conception of persecution the Board then reviewed the Applicant"s mistreatment and held as follows:
| [F]or example, at the end of 1995, your husband was dismissed because of his political involvement; on 15 November 1996, you were arrested, detained, and questioned for 24 hours; in March 1998, you were arrested, detained, and questioned for 12 days; and finally, you were dismissed in October 1998. Each one of these incidents, you see, does not, in our view, constitute persecution. Two arrests and arbitrary detentions for brief periods, involving questioning and attempted intimidations, as well as the fact that both you and your husband lost your employment, these elements, taken alone or together, do not, in our view, constitute persecution; nor do they substantiate a well-founded fear of persecution.6 |
[20] I find it difficult to understand how arrests and detentions are considered "deplorable treatment" but do not amount to persecution. Given the definition set out by the Board stressing the importance of "serious and grave mistreatment, inflicted in a repetitive, persistent manner", and given the Board"s acceptance of the documentary evidence indicating the persistent and systematic harassment and imprisonment of political opponents, I consider the Board"s finding to be perverse.
[21] For the foregoing reasons, the application for judicial review is allowed and the matter is referred back for redetermination by a newly constituted panel.
"Danièle Tremblay-Lamer"
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
January 28, 2000.
__________________
1 R.C.S. 1985, c. I-2.
2 (1984) , 55 N.R. 129.
3 Ibid. at pp. 133-34.
4 Applicant "s Record, at p. 17.
5 Supra note 2.
6 Applicant "s Record, at pp. 17-18.
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