Date: 20001124
Docket: IMM-5178-99
BETWEEN:
SHENG GUO
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
TREMBLAY-LAMER J.:
[1] This is an application for judicial review against a decision of Lise Pouliot (the visa officer), rendered on September 13, 1999, refusing the application for a student authorization in Canada of Mr. Sheng Guo (Applicant) presented at the Canadian High Commission in Accra, Ghana.
[2] The Applicant was born on January 17, 1975 in Bejing, China. The Applicant resides and works in Ghana since 1996.
[3] On April 28, 1999, the Applicant presented at the Canadian High Commission in Accra, Ghana an application for a student authorization in Canada and filed a visitor visa questionnaire as well.
[4] On August 23, 1999, the visa officer interviewed the Applicant at the Canadian High Commission in Accra, Ghana. During the interview, the Applicant stated that he had been accepted in a 12 month Bachelor of Commerce program at Royal Road University, Victoria (B.C.) and that his current employer would offer him a job in marketing after completion of his studies in Canada.
[5] The visa officer concluded that the Applicant did not fulfill the legislative requirements as he did not meet the definition of "visitor" in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration Act.1 The Applicant failed to satisfy the visa officer that, on the totality of the evidence, he did not intend to immigrate to Canada.
[6] The visa officer concluded that the Applicant had not demonstrated that he was seeking an entry for a temporary purpose in that he did not satisfy the visa officer that he had sufficient ties to Ghana, his country of residence, which would ensure his return to that country after completion of studies in Canada.
[7] The Applicant argues that the conclusions found in the CAIPS notes and affidavit of the visa officer that the Applicant lacked personal involvement in his admission to his program of studies and that he left nothing behind in Ghana, were unreasonably drawn without reference to the evidence or through an erroneous finding of fact made in a perverse and capricious manner.
[8] The decision of the visa officer to issue or not a visitor visa to an applicant is of a discretionary nature. The visa officer must properly consider any application but is not required to issue a visitor visa unless the visa officer is convinced that the applicant fulfills the legislative requirements.2
[9] In the present matter, after a careful reading of the decision, the CAIPS notes and the affidavits of the Applicant and of the visa officer, I find that it was reasonable for the visa officer to conclude that the Applicant was not credible with respect to his alleged intention to study in Canada. The Applicant clearly failed to provide answers to questions respecting his program of studies, answers that could be found in his own documentation provided in support of this application. This lack of knowledge of the program certainly could demonstrate his lack of interest in studying.
[10] I also find that it was reasonable for the visa officer to conclude that the Applicant had not demonstrated that he was seeking entry for a temporary purpose in that he had insufficient ties to Ghana, his country of residence. The only tie the Applicant has with his country of residence is a job in marketing with his current employer. It was within the visa officer's discretion to weigh this factor with the others and to find that in itself it was not sufficient.
[11] Concerning the applicant's possibility of going back to China, it was clear from the answers given by the Applicant, that he had no intention of going back to that country at the end of the visit. The Applicant therefore failed to establish to the satisfaction of the visa officer that he would be able to go from Canada to some other country, as provided by subsection 13(2)b) of the Immigration Regulations, 1978.3
[12] Thus, I am satisfied that the visa officer's assessment should be left undisturbed by this Court as it is not perverse, capricious or made without regard to the evidence adduced.
[13] Consequently, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
"Danièle Tremblay-Lamer"
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
November 24, 2000
__________________
1 R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2.
2 See, e.g., De La Cruz v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1989), 7 Imm. L.R. (2nd) 75 (F.C.T.D.).
3 SOR/78-172.
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