Date: 20001206
Docket: IMM-4131-99
Ottawa, Ontario, the 6th day of December 2000
Present: The Honourable Justice Pinard
Between:
AJJOUR Toufic
AJJOUR Abd
AJJOUR Ali
AJJOUR Nathalie
Applicants
- and -
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
ORDER
The application for judicial review concerning the decision rendered on
August 3, 1999, by the Convention Refugee Determination Division, determining that the
applicants are not Convention refugees, is dismissed.
YVON PINARD
JUDGE
Certified true translation
Monica Chamberlain
Date: 20001206
Docket: IMM-4131-99
Between:
AJJOUR Toufic
AJJOUR Abd
AJJOUR Ali
AJJOUR Nathalie
Applicants
- and -
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
PINARD, J.:
[1] This is an application for judicial review of a decision rendered on
August 3, 1999, by the Convention Refugee Determination Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the "CRDD"), determining that Toufic Ajjour and his three minor children are not Convention refugees in accordance with subsection 2(1) of the
Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2.
[2] The applicants are citizens of Lebanon and live in the region of Haret-Hreik. The children's refugee claim was based on the claim of their father who alleged having a
well-founded fear of persecution in his country due to his political opinions and his membership in a particular social group, namely his family. It should be noted that the applicant's wife was granted Convention refugee status due to the persecution she suffered as a Palestinian, since she refused to comply with the Islamic dress code.
[3] The CRDD refused to grant refugee status to the applicant and his children on the basis that the applicant's fear was not related to one of the grounds of persecution provided in the Convention.
[4] The CRDD found that the fear felt by the applicant was of a security guard on whom he had inflicted serious injuries during an altercation. The CRDD stated as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
As to the search of the claimant by Hezbollah, we learned that while the claimant was detained by members of this faction, it was his cousin Samir who, as a member of this group, succeeded in securing his release. We do not believe that his fear is of this group, to which a family member belongs. The fear, the claimant's real fear, is of the security guard. During his testimony, the claimant reckoned that he feared being harassed by him. The Board has great difficulty in linking these incidents with persecution as defined by the Convention.
[5] In conclusion, the CRDD refused to grant the applicant refugee status and since the claims of the children were based on their father's, they were also denied status.
[6] The applicants' argument based on section 43 of the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (the Handbook) will first be disposed of, which will also allow me to dispose of their argument based on the CRDD's assessment of the evidence. The principal claimant therefore submits that pursuant to section 43 of the Handbook, it is not necessary for him to have been personally persecuted. He claims instead that his wife's situation can establish that his own fear of persecution and that of his children are founded.
[7] In Salibian v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1990] 3 F.C. 250, Mr. Justice Décary, writing for the Federal Court of Appeal, summarizes the state of the law on this issue very well at page 258:
It can be said in light of earlier decisions by this Court on claims
to Convention refugee status that
(1) the applicant does not have to show that he had himself been persecuted in the past or would himself be persecuted in the future;
(2) the applicant can show that the fear he had resulted not from reprehensible acts committed or likely to be committed directly against him but from reprehensible acts committed or likely to be committed against members of a group to which he belonged;
¼
(4) the fear felt is that of a reasonable possibility that the applicant will be persecuted if he returns to his country of origin. (Citations omitted.)
[8] It should be noted, in the present case, that the CRDD did not mention the possible relation between the claimant's fear and his membership in his family, which represents a social group. However, when it concluded that the claimant's real fear was of revenge by the security guard, the CRDD in fact determined that the claimant had failed to prove that his fear resulted from reprehensible acts committed against his wife. The applicant did not therefore meet the second requirement set out in Salibian, supra.
[9] In my view, the determination of the CRDD concerning the applicant's real fear was fully supported by the evidence. In fact, the transcript reveals the following exchange that took place during the hearing:
[TRANSLATION]
If I understand correctly, Mr. Ajjour, you are telling the Board that your life, the lives of your wife and your children are in danger because of a security guard who¼who definitely wants to¼to avenge himself for what you did to him?
Yes.
[10] It was also reasonable for the CRDD to conclude that personal revenge in itself did not amount to persecution because it was related neither to the claimant's political opinions nor to his membership in a social group (see, for example, Pierre-Louis v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (April 29, 1993), A-1264-91 (F.C.A).
[11] It is also known that in terms of assessment of the facts, it is not for this Court to substitute itself for the CRDD, which acts as a specialized tribunal, in cases, such as the present, where persons who claim refugee status fail to establish that the decision is based on an erroneous finding of fact, drawn in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material available (see paragraph 18.l(4)(d) of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. F-7).
[12] As to the applicants' final argument based on family unity, precedents set by this Court unanimously establish that this principle outlined in section 182 of the Handbook is not included in the current definition of a Convention refugee (see, for example, Casetellanos v. Canada (Solicitor General), [1995] 2 F.C. 190; Greim v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (June 20 1997), IMM-2733-96; Dawlatly v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (June 16 1998), IMM-3607-97; and Vijayamalini Jeyarajah and the Minister (March 17 1999), IMM-2473-98).
[13] For these reasons, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
YVON PINARD
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
December 6, 2000
Certified true translation
Monica Chamberlain
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
COURT FILE NO.: IMM-4131-99
STYLE OF CAUSE: AJJOUR Toufic et al. v. MCI
PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal, Quebec
DATE OF HEARING: October 25, 2000
REASONS FOR ORDER OF JUSTICE PINARD
DATED: December 6, 2000
APPEARANCES:
James Louski FOR THE APPLICANTS
Marie Nicole Moreau FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
James Louski FOR THE APPLICANTS
Montréal, Quebec
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada FOR THE RESPONDENT
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