Date: 20010807
Docket: T-1835-99
Neutral citation: 2001 FCT 861
BETWEEN:
LORNE HAINS, AMY SIU
and BADRUDIN MOOSA
Applicants
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
AKBAR ALIBHAI, BRION BAILEY,
MARGARET CHEUNG, JOHN DEMEULEMEESTER,
NIZAR DEVJI, ERIC ELISON, GARY HARVIE, WILLIAM KING,
PETER LING, RICHARD LOW, JOHN PATTON and DARSHAN SINGH
Respondents
REASONS FOR ORDER
Heneghan, J.
INTRODUCTION
[1] Lorne Hains, Badrudin Moosa and Amy Siu (the "Applicants") seek judicial review of the decision of Carol-Ann Hart, Chairperson, Public Service Commission Appeal Board (the "Board"). The decision, made on September 3, 1999, allowed the appeal brought pursuant to Section 21 of the Public Service Employment Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-33, as amended (the "Act"), in file number 97-NAR-01608, which decision was communicated to the Applicants on September 17, 1999.
FACTS
[2] The Applicants are employees of Canada Customs and Revenue Agency in the Burnaby/Fraser Tax Services Office in British Columbia. They held job classification "AU" which is an auditor position. Their employment is governed by the Act.
[3] In June 1997, an internal competition was held to establish a list of eligible employees to staff various AU-04 positions (the "initial competition"). The result of the competition was the finding that thirty-three candidates were found to be "qualified". The Selection Board established an eligibility list consisting of the names of the top twelve qualified candidates. The Applicants were included on the eligibility list and were appointed to new positions between December 1997 and May 1998.
[4] Mr. Hains was appointed to the position of Large File Case Manager (AU-04) on December 1, 1997. Mr. Moosa was appointed to the position of Team Leader of Technical Services on December 1, 1997. Ms. Siu was appointed to the position of AU-04 Team Leader in May 1998.
[5] In November 1997, an appeal was undertaken by a number of persons who had unsuccessfully competed for nomination to the eligibility list. These appellants included Akbar Alibhai, Brion Bailey, Margaret Cheung, John Demeulemeester, Nizar Devji, Eric Elison, Gary Harvie, William King, Peter Ling, Richard Low, John Patton and Darshan Singh (the "individual Respondents"). The appeal was pursuant to Selection 21 of the Act, on the basis that the decision of the Selection Board was erroneous.
[6] The Appeal Board began hearing the appeal on September 28, 1998. The hearing was conducted over eleven days. Witnesses were called, including a member of the Selection Board. The Appeal Board delivered its decision on September 3, 1999, allowing the appeal on the ground that the Selection Board had committed numerous errors.
[7] This application for judicial review was then commenced by the candidates who had been successful in the initial competition for appointment to the eligibility list. The Applicants claim that the Appeal Board erred in concluding that the Selection Board had acted unreasonably in the marking of one of the questions used in the selection process and also in concluding that the Selection Board could not reconstruct the manner in which the candidates were marked.
ISSUES
[8] Three issues are raised in this application:
(1) Did the Appeal Board make a reviewable error with respect to the marking of question nine?
(2) Did the Appeal Board commit a reviewable error with respect to its findings on the Selection Board's inability to replicate the marks awarded to candidates in conjunction with use of a marking guide?
(3) Did the Appeal Board err in law by applying the wrong standard of review when it reviewed the marks and marking method used by the Selection Board?
Applicants' Submissions
[9] The Applicants argue that the decision of the Appeal Board, on both the findings respecting the marking of question nine and the inability to reconstruct the manner in which the candidates were marked, is patently unreasonable. They also argue that reliance by the Appeal Board on the standard of patent unreasonableness in relation to the marking of question nine is doubtful.
[10] The Applicants submit that the Appeal Board erred in finding that the Selection Board could not "sufficiently reconstruct their assessments of the candidates to demonstrate that the merit principle had been upheld". According to the Applicants, the Appeal Board mistakenly assumed that the marking grids used by the Selection Board were significant in assessing the marks of the candidates. As well, the Applicants say that the Appeal Board erred in requiring the Selection Board to demonstrate the precise basis for marking each candidate.
[9] The Applicants say that the Appeal Board had no evidence before it concerning the use of the marking grids except that they were used to ensure consistency. The marking grids were not used to grade the candidates. In placing significance on the marking grids for a purpose which was not relied on by the original decision-makers, the Appeal Board effectively substituted its own opinion in place of the assessment conducted by the Selection Board. According to the Applicants, this is an error of fact and law as discussed in Scarizzi v. Marinaki (1994), 87 F.T.R. 66.
[10] The Applicants also submit that the Appeal Board erroneously relied on the remarks of Chair Preto in the case of Battaglia et al. (1995) ABF [14-1] 29 (Preto). The Applicants say that the decision in Battaglia, supra, is factually different from the case at bar.
[11] In Battaglia, supra, Chair Preto was concerned about the attempts of the selection board to correct errors in examination marks in a situation where the existence of those errors was admitted. That situation does not exist here because there is no evidence that the Selection Board erred in the marks which it awarded. It was interviewing candidates for management positions and was properly concerned with the quality of answers provided by the candidates. This required a subjective evaluation based on the interviews which were conducted and the consensus which members of the Selection Board reached after each candidate was interviewed.
Respondents' Submissions
[12] The Respondent Attorney General submits that the Appeal Board correctly applied the standard of reasonableness in its review of the decision of the Selection Board and that the same standard applies in the Court to the decision of the Appeal Board. The Respondent says that the decision of the Appeal Board is reasonable on the basis of the evidence before it and that the decision should be upheld.
[13] The individual Respondents also argue that the decision of the Appeal Board is reasonable and should be reviewed against that standard. Since the decision itself relates to an employment competition within the federal public service and such competitions are governed by the merit principle, the appropriate standard of review for both the Selection Board and Appeal Board is reasonableness; see Majdan v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] F.C.J. No. 1739.
[14] As well, the individual Respondents submit that the appropriate standard of review in this case is reasonableness, both as the test to be applied by the Appeal Board in its review of the decision of the Selection Board and by this Court in the present application. The individual Respondents argue that the use of the words "patently unreasonable" by the Appeal Board to describe the decision reached by the Selection Board does not mean that the Appeal Board either misunderstood or misapplied the test for reviewing the decision of the Selection Board. The use of these words mean that the Appeal Board member concluded that the Selection Board "acted unreasonably". The individual Respondents here rely on Ewing v. Canada (1999), 171 F.T.R. 136 and Upadhyaya v. Canada, [2000] F.C.J. No. 2006.
[15] The individual Respondents also address the merits of the decision given by the Appeal Board. Concerning question nine of the competition, these Respondents say that the Appeal Board acted reasonably in concluding that it could not be sure that the merit principle was respected. It was appropriate for the Appeal Board to examine the documentary context in order to determine if the merit principle had been respected. In this case, the documentary evidence shows a clear discrepancy between the details given in the expected answers and the answers which were accepted by the Selection Board. The situation parallels the one in Majdan, supra. In light of the enhanced marks awarded to some candidates and the differences between the anticipated and actual answers, the Appeal Board appropriately concluded that the Selection Board was unreasonable in its selection process.
[16] Likewise, the individual Respondents argue the Appeal Board was in possession of evidence relating to the marking grid in evaluating questions 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8. That evidence showed that the marking grid was used in a contradictory and inconsistent manner by the Selection Board. For example, there was evidence before the Appeal Board that the Selection Board had placed an "x" on one candidate's marking grid in spite of an entry in member Wolsford's notes that the response had not been provided by that candidate.[1]
[17] Furthermore, inconsistent testimony was presented to the Appeal Board from members of the Selection Board about the use of the marking grid. Selection Board members had testified that there was no actual relationship between the grid and the marks awarded to the candidates.[2]
[18] There was evidence before the Appeal Board that the marking grid was used during the selection process. The specific design of that grid did not support the assertions of Selection Board members that the grid had no impact on the marks assigned to each candidate. The use of "x's" and "y's" clearly show that the grid was used for the relative assessment of candidates' answers. According to the individual Respondents, the Appeal Board correctly concluded that the Selection Board members were confused concerning the tacit manner in which the candidates were assessed.[3]
[19] The individual Respondents argue that respect for the merit principle in the selection of candidates requires the Selection Board members to be able to offer an explanation for the assessing method which they used. The individual Respondents say that the confusion of the Selection Board members, in trying to explain the marking process, undermined the credibility of that explanation; see Field v. Canada (Attorney General) (1995), 93 F.T.R. 158.
[20] The individual Respondents say, in conclusion, that the determinations of the Appeal Board in relation to question nine and the use of the marking grid in marking the answers to questions 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 were supported by the evidence before the Appeal Board and are not capricious or perverse. In light of the contradictory evidence before the Appeal Board, that Board acted reasonably in concluding that it could not properly find that the merit principle had been respected in the assessment of the candidates.
ANALYSIS
[21] The first issue to be addressed is the appropriate standard of review. That issue must be considered in relation to both the review by the Selection Board's decision by the Appeal Board and the review of the Appeal Board's decision by this Court. Since this application relates to the review of the decision of the Appeal Board it is appropriate to first address the standard of review to be applied by this Court.
[22] This application is taken pursuant to the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, as amended, sections 18 and 18.1. These sections provide as follows:
| 18. (1) Subject to section 28, the Trial Division has exclusive original jurisdiction
(a) to issue an injunction, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus or writ of quo warranto, or grant declaratory relief, against any federal board, commission or other tribunal; and(b) to hear and determine any application or other proceeding for relief in the nature of relief contemplated by paragraph (a), including any proceeding brought against the Attorney General of Canada, to obtain relief against a federal board, commission or other tribunal.
(2) The Trial Division has exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine every application for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition or writ of mandamus in relation to any member of the Canadian Forces serving outside Canada.
(3) The remedies provided for in subsections (1) and (2) may be obtained only on an application for judicial review made under section 18.1.R.S., 1985, c. F-7, s. 18; 1990, c. 8, s. 4.
18.1 (1) An application for judicial review may be made by the Attorney General of Canada or by anyone directly affected by the matter in respect of which relief is sought.
(2) An application for judicial review in respect of a decision or order of a federal board, commission or other tribunal shall be made within thirty days after the time the decision or order was first communicated by the federal board, commission or other tribunal to the office of the Deputy Attorney General of Canada or to the party directly affected thereby, or within such further time as a judge of the Trial Division may, either before or after the expiration of those thirty days, fix or allow.
(3) On an application for judicial review, the Trial Division may
(a) order a federal board, commission or other tribunal to do any act or thing it has unlawfully failed or refused to do or has unreasonably delayed in doing; or
(b) declare invalid or unlawful, or quash, set aside or set aside and refer back for determination in accordance with such directions as it considers to be appropriate, prohibit or restrain, a decision, order, act or proceeding of a federal board, commission or other tribunal.
(4) The Trial Division may grant relief under subsection (3) if it is satisfied that the federal board, commission or other tribunal
(a) acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or refused to exercise its jurisdiction;
(b) failed to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness or other procedure that it was required by law to observe;
(c) erred in law in making a decision or an order, whether or not the error appears on the face of the record;
(d) based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it;
(e) acted, or failed to act, by reason of fraud or perjured evidence; or
(f) acted in any other way that was contrary to law.
(5) Where the sole ground for relief established on an application for judicial review is a defect in form or a technical irregularity, the Trial Division may
(a) refuse the relief if it finds that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred; and
(b) in the case of a defect in form or a technical irregularity in a decision or order, make an order validating the decision or order, to have effect from such time and on such terms as it considers appropriate.
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18. (1) Sous réserve de l'article 28, la Section de première instance a compétence exclusive, en première instance, pour_:
a) décerner une injonction, un bref de certiorari, de mandamus, de prohibition ou de quo warranto, ou pour rendre un jugement déclaratoire contre tout office fédéral;
b) connaître de toute demande de réparation de la nature visée par l'alinéa a), et notamment de toute procédure engagée contre le procureur général du Canada afin d'obtenir réparation de la part d'un office fédéral.
(2) La Section de première instance a compétence exclusive, en première instance, dans le cas des demandes suivantes visant un membre des Forces canadiennes en poste à l'étranger_: bref d'habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, de certiorari, de prohibition ou de mandamus.
(3) Les recours prévus aux paragraphes (1) ou (2) sont exercés par présentation d'une demande de contrôle judiciaire.
L.R. (1985), ch. F-7, art. 18; 1990, ch. 8, art. 4.
18.1 (1) Une demande de contrôle judiciaire peut être présentée par le procureur général du Canada ou par quiconque est directement touché par l'objet de la demande.
(2) Les demandes de contrôle judiciaire sont à présenter dans les trente jours qui suivent la première communication, par l'office fédéral, de sa décision ou de son ordonnance au bureau du sous-procureur général du Canada ou à la partie concernée, ou dans le délai supplémentaire qu'un juge de la Section de première instance peut, avant ou après l'expiration de ces trente jours, fixer ou accorder.
(3) Sur présentation d'une demande de contrôle judiciaire, la Section de première instance peut_:
a) ordonner à l'office fédéral en cause d'accomplir tout acte qu'il a illégalement omis ou refusé d'accomplir ou dont il a retardé l'exécution de manière déraisonnable;
b) déclarer nul ou illégal, ou annuler, ou infirmer et renvoyer pour jugement conformément aux instructions qu'elle estime appropriées, ou prohiber ou encore restreindre toute décision, ordonnance, procédure ou tout autre acte de l'office fédéral.
(4) Les mesures prévues au paragraphe (3) sont prises par la Section de première instance si elle est convaincue que l'office fédéral, selon le cas_:
a) a agi sans compétence, outrepassé celle-ci ou refusé de l'exercer;
b) n'a pas observé un principe de justice naturelle ou d'équité procédurale ou toute autre procédure qu'il était légalement tenu de respecter;
c) a rendu une décision ou une ordonnance entachée d'une erreur de droit, que celle-ci soit manifeste ou non au vu du dossier;
d) a rendu une décision ou une ordonnance fondée sur une conclusion de fait erronée, tirée de façon abusive ou arbitraire ou sans tenir compte des éléments dont il dispose;
e) a agi ou omis d'agir en raison d'une fraude ou de faux témoignages;
f) a agi de toute autre façon contraire à la loi.
(5) La Section de première instance peut rejeter toute demande de contrôle judiciaire fondée uniquement sur un vice de forme si elle estime qu'en l'occurrence le vice n'entraîne aucun dommage important ni déni de justice et, le cas échéant, valider la décision ou l'ordonnance entachée du vice et donner effet à celle-ci selon les modalités de temps et autres qu'elle estime indiquées.
1990, ch. 8, art. 5.
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[23] This Court will intervene if the decision under review is based on erroneous findings of fact that were made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the evidence before the decision-maker; see Brothers v. Canada (Attorney General), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1756. When an appeal essentially raises an issue of law in the application of the merit principle, the applicable standard of review is correctness; see Boucher v. Canada (Attorney General), (2000) N.R. 186 (F.C.A.).
[24] In my opinion, the present application concerns the review of the Appeal Board's decision with respect to its factual findings about the Selection Board's decision and the Appeal Board's application of the merit principle pursuant to section 10 of the Act. The Appeal Board reviewed the evidence presented to it. The question is whether the Appeal Board's conclusions are supported by that evidence. The applicable standard, then, is reasonableness.
[25] In Maassen v. Canada (Attorney General), [2001] F.C.J. No. 961, this Court found that the standard of review of an Appeal Board decision is correctness with respect to issues of law such as the interpretation of the Act; see Boucher, supra. However, findings of fact are entitled to a higher degree of deference except where such findings are made without regard to the evidence before the Appeal Board; see Canada (Public Service Commission Appeal Board) v. Rogerville (1996), 117 F.T.R. 53 (T.D.).
[26] Turning now to the standard of review to be applied by the Appeal Board in its review of the Selection Board's decision, that depends upon the role of the Appeal Board.
[27] In Ratelle v. Canada (Public Service Commission, Appeals Branch), (1975) 12 N.R. 85 the Federal Court of Appeal described the function of an Appeal Board at paragraph 3:
One must remember that there is quite a difference between the role of a Selection Board and that of a board to which an appeal has been made under s. 21. The Selection Board is merely the Public Service Commission's means of fulfilling the task with which it has been entrusted by the legislator. The role of the Selection Board is to decide on the merit of candidates for a given position by using whatever means it deems appropriate, subject to the provisions of the Act and its regulations. The role of the Appeal Board is quite different. Generally speaking, it is not required to replace the Selection Board's appraisal of the candidates with its own. Assessment of the merit of different people is often a matter of opinion and we have no reason to prefer the opinion of the Appeal Board to that of the Selection Board in this matter. The function of the Appeal Board is to hold an inquiry in order to determine whether the Selection Board made its choice in such a way that it was a "selection according to merit". If the Appeal Board concludes that the Selection Board met this requirement, it must dismiss the appeal even if it is of the opinion that, had it been responsible for the task entrusted to the Selection Board, the result might have been different. If a Selection Board has performed its duty in accordance with the Act and regulations and has made an honest effort to choose the most deserving candidate, then an Appeal Board would be exceeding its authority if it allowed the appeal from the decision of the Selection Board on the grounds that the latter had not availed itself of the means considered by the Appeal Board to be most appropriate for the performance of its duty.
[28] In the present case, the Appeal Board allowed the appeal on the ground that it was not satisfied that the Selection Board has respected the merit principle. Section 10 of the Act requires that any appointment to the Public Service shall be based on selection on the basis of merit. Section 10 provides as follows:
| 10. (1) Appointments to or from within the Public Service shall be based on selection according to merit, as determined by the Commission, and shall be made by the Commission, at the request of the deputy head concerned, by competition or by such other process of personnel selection designed to establish the merit of candidates as the Commission considers is in the best interests of the Public Service.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), selection according to merit may, in the circumstances prescribed by the regulations of the Commission, be based on the competence of a person being considered for appointment as measured by such standard of competence as the Commission may establish, rather than as measured against the competence of other persons.
R.S., 1985, c. P-33, s. 10; 1992, c. 54, s. 10.
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10. (1) Les nominations internes ou externes à des postes de la fonction publique se font sur la base d'une sélection fondée sur le mérite, selon ce que détermine la Commission, et à la demande de l'administrateur général intéressé, soit par concours, soit par tout autre mode de sélection du personnel fondé sur le mérite des candidats que la Commission estime le mieux adapté aux intérêts de la fonction publique.
(2) Pour l'application du paragraphe (1), la sélection au mérite peut, dans les circonstances déterminées par règlement de la Commission, être fondée sur des normes de compétence fixées par celle-ci plutôt que sur un examen comparatif des candidats. L.R. (1985), ch. P-33, art. 10; 1992, ch. 54, art. 10.
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[29] The Appeal Board specifically considered the manner in which candidates were marked on question nine and the use of the marking guide in reaching its decision on this point. In its reasons, the Appeal Board made the following finding concerning the marking of question nine:
After carefully considering all of the allegations related to question 9, I have determined that the Board members, in accepting the answers they did in the marking of question 9, were clearly unreasonable, or not in accordance with reason. The answers given by the candidates as recorded in the notes of the Selection Board members bear very little resemblance to the expected answers (the actual provisions of the Income Tax Act and the Excise Tax Act). Many of the answers accepted by the Board (as indicated in the notes taken during the interviews) did not nearly correctly reflect the actual expected answer as set out in the Oral Interview Questions and Marking Key (Exhibit D-6). As a result, some candidates were generously over marked for this question. This is patently unreasonable, and I cannot be sure that merit was respected. Allegations 14, 15(b), 16, 17(b), 18(b) and 19(b) are upheld. Although the Applicants argue that this paragraph shows that the Appeal Board erroneously applied the test of patent unreasonableness in its review of the Selection Board's decision, that argument is unsound.[4]
[30] It is clear from this extract from its reasons that the Appeal Board appreciated that the applicable standard of review was reasonableness. It is equally clear, in my opinion, that the Appeal Board applied that standard, regardless of the words used here. The difference between "reasonable" and "patently unreasonable" was discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Competition Act) v. Southam Inc. [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748 where the Court said as follows at paragraph 57:
The difference between ‘unreasonable' and ‘patently unreasonable' lies in the immediacy or obviousness of the defect. If the defect is apparent on the face of the tribunal's reasons, then the tribunal's decision is patently unreasonable. But if it takes some significant searching or testing to find the defect, then the decision is unreasonable but not patently unreasonable.
[31] In my opinion, the analysis conducted by the Appeal Board in assessing the evidence before it on the issue of the marking of question nine demonstrates that it tested that evidence before reaching its conclusion. This shows that it applied the standard of reasonableness. In my view, it was justified in doing so. In any case, if the Board found that the marking of question nine was patently unreasonable, it is also, by definition, unreasonable.
[32] The Appeal Board also found that the marking guide was used inconsistently by the Selection Board and that the Selection Board was unable to explain how it had assessed the candidates. The Appeal Board made the following comments on this issue:
In the case before me, although there was documentary evidence in the form of the notes and the grids, the Board had attempted to minimize the importance of the grids, and had also taken the position that not everything considered in marking the candidates was recorded in the interview notes. Furthermore, the Board was not able to provide adequate oral testimony to explain the marks assigned, or not awarded in many situations. The Selection Board members appeared to be somewhat confused regarding the exact manner in which candidates were assessed.
...
The Board was not able to demonstrate how it had used the criteria established for the assessment as set out in the marking grid. At the outset, the Board members had testified that the grids had not been used at all, and then later they indicated that the grids had been used to ensure consistency. The method used for assessment was unclear and appeared to be inconsistent.
As set out in the Field decision, a Selection Board must be able to explain how it had assessed the candidates so that it can be demonstrated that the candidates were assessed with the merit principle. In the Appeal Board decision in Battaglia et al. Appeal Board Chairperson Preto wrote as follows at page 42:
...A Selection Board must be accountable for the marks it assigns to candidates in a selection process. One of its duties is to take the necessary measures to ensure that its marking of candidates' responses is accurate and consistent. I find that the instant Selection Board has failed to discharge that duty satisfactorily. That represents a fatal flaw in the instant selection process. A few marks can make the difference between a candidate qualifying or not qualifying, or , if qualified, of significantly altering a candidate's ranking order on the eligibility list. I have carefully reviewed all of the evidence and argument with respect to this issue, and I am left to conclude that the results of the instant competition were based on an inaccurate and inconsistent marking of the candidates' answers to the knowledge questions. This leaves me with no assurance that the most meritorious candidates have been identified. In making this allegation, the appellants raised 29 instances of alleged erroneous marking. During the second day of the hearing, the Department conceded, either in whole or in part, 10 of those instances. On day three of the hearing, it conceded a further five. On its own, it also identified and brought forward 17 additional instances where the marking had been conducted incorrectly. While I recognize the Department's determined efforts to attempt to salvage the marking of the instant Selection Board, I am nevertheless left with no confidence in that the proposed results accurately reflect the relative merit of the candidates. I am of the view that a complete remarking of the knowledge examination for all candidates is necessary in this instance. The greater question of whether all qualified candidates have been identified and properly ranked, that is, of whether merit has been served, needs to be addressed.
The situation in this case is similar to that described in the Battaglia case. I found that the members of the Selection Board had little or no present recollection of the manner in which candidates were assessed, and were not able to sufficiently reconstruct their assessments of the candidates to demonstrate that the merit principle had been upheld. The appeals of all appellants are allowed.[5]
[33] As noted above, the Applicants argue that the Appeal Board erroneously relied on Battaglia for the proposition that the Minister must be able to justify the marks assigned to candidates in a selection process. The Applicants say that Battaglia can be distinguished from the present case on its facts. Specifically, the Applicants argue that in this case, there is no evidence that the Selection Board erred in the assignment of marks.
[34] In my opinion, that argument must also fail. The Appeal Board provided detailed reasons to express its view that the Selection Board erred in its use of the grid. It also found that the grid had to be set aside because the members of the Selection Board who testified were unable to explain how the grid was used. In my opinion, these findings are sufficient bases for the Appeal Board to find that the use of the marking grid was unreasonable.
[35] In the result, the Applicants have failed to show that the Appeal Board committed any reviewable error of law in its decision. The application is dismissed with costs to all Respondents.
"E. Heneghan"
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
August 7, 2001
Date: 20010807
Docket: T-1835-99
OTTAWA, ONTARIO, THIS 7TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2001
Present: THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE HENEGHAN
BETWEEN:
LORNE HAINS, AMY SIU
and BADRUDIN MOOSA
Applicants
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
AKBAR ALIBHAI, BRION BAILEY,
MARGARET CHEUNG, JOHN DEMEULEMEESTER,
NIZAR DEVJI, ERIC ELISON, GARY HARVIE, WILLIAM KING,
PETER LING, RICHARD LOW, JOHN PATTON and DARSHAN SINGH
Respondents
ORDER
The application is dismissed with costs to all Respondents.
"E. Heneghan"
JUDGE
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