Kalonda v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 396

                                                                                                                                   Date: 20010427

                                                                                                                         Docket: IMM-2597-00

                                                                                                           Neutral Citation: 2001 FCT 396

Between:

                                       MOLUKA ARTHUR KALONDA

                                                                                                               Applicant

                                                          - and -

                                      THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

                                               AND IMMIGRATION

                                                                                                            Respondent

                                             REASONS FOR ORDER

PINARD, J.:

[1]         The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board) dated April 25, 2000, in which the Board determined he was not a Convention refugee as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2.

[2]         The Board concluded that the applicant is not a Convention refugee due to a lack of credibility. The Board is entitled to infer that an applicant is not credible because of implausibilities in his or her evidence as long as its inferences are not unreasonable (Aguebor v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1993), 160 N.R. 315) and its reasons are set out in "clear and unmistakable terms" (Hilo v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1991), 15 Imm.L.R. (2d) 199 at 201 (F.C.A.)). In Aguebor, supra, Décary, J.A., writing for the Federal Court of Appeal, stated at pages 316 and 317 that the same level of judicial deference is applicable to questions of credibility and questions of implausibility.

[3]         In the case at bar, I am of the opinion that the Board erred in its determination with respect to the circumstances of the August 13, 1999 event. Indeed, the applicant argues that the Board should not have penalized him for not knowing why the authorities did what they did. The applicant cites two cases in support of this contention: Chen v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (October 4, 1993), A-30-91 (F.C.A.) and Kong v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (January 27, 1994), IMM-471-93, (F.C.T.D.). In Kong, Madam Justice Reed found that:

[11]          It is important to reflect on the type of question being put to the applicant. He was being asked how the police found out about his involvement. Clearly, he could not know that. He might speculate, as he did. He might have been told by others what they thought had occurred. He recounted what he had been told and this did not include any reference to the wrapping papers. Certainly on the basis of the evidence before the Board, counsel for the applicant was right to point out that the questions being put to the applicant related to matters about which he had no knowledge. . . .

[4]         In the present matter, in answering questions posed by his counsel, Mr. Kalonda stated:

                               Q.            Donc, pourquoi sont-ils venus vous arrêter?

A.            Bon, à l'instant, à votre question, s'il vous plaît, je pourrais imaginer. Je peux donner un avis parce que...

Q.            Vous ne savez peut-être pas la raison, mais...

A.            Oui.

Q.            ...qu'est-ce que vous pensez que ça peut être?

A.            Moi, je pense qu'ils avaient une information que moi, j'ignorais. Ils pouvaient avoir une information que moi, j'ignorais. Bon. Dans le...

Q.            Quelle information?

A.            Par exemple, les rapports avec Munyuampenda ou bien la lettre que j'avais reçue de Aloïs Ndamage, parce que c'était quand même curieux . . .

Q.            Mais cette lettre, elle a été interceptée ou bien vous l'avez reçue?

A.            Ça, je l'avais reçue au mois de juin (inaudible).

Q.            Donc, pourquoi est-ce que les forces de l'ordre auraient été au courant de cette information?

A.            Dans l'ordre des choses actuelles, je ne peux qu'imaginer. Je ne sais pas quel genre d'information ils avaient, mais je ne peux qu'interpréter leurs déclarations et leurs actes.

[. . .]

Q.            Donc, quand ils sont venus vous arrêter, ils n'avaient pas ces documents? Ils les ont pris à cette occasion? C'est ça?

A.            Oui. Ils les ont pris à cette occasion, quand ils ne m'ont pas trouvé.

Q.            Donc, s'ils n'avaient pas ces informations avant, pourquoi auraient-ils voulu vous arrêter?

A.            À votre question, je ne peux encore que deviner. . . .

Q.            . . . Comment est-ce que le gouvernement a su ces informations?

R.            Le gouvernement a ses méthodes de travail que j'ignore. Malheureusement, sur -- je peux interpréter ce que -- leurs intentions que par les actes qu'ils posent. . . .

[5]         Contrary to the respondent's submission, the Board's determination was not merely a "common sense"inference (see Shahamati v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (March 24, 1994), A-388-92 (F.C.A.)). Rather, it is evident in reading this excerpt that the applicant was merely speculating in response to the Board's questions and that the Board was fully aware of this. The applicant specifically stated on at least four occasions that he could only venture a guess with respect to the authorities' reasons for coming to arrest him on the 16^th of August 1999. His whole evidence concerning why the authorities had any interest in him at that date was clearly only speculation on his part. Nonetheless, the Board's decision reads in part:

En plus de ne pas croire à l'existence du mandat d'arrestation pour les raisons susmentionnées, le tribunal ne croit pas au témoignage du revendicateur lorsqu'il décrit le déroulement de la visite des militaires. Dans son témoignage oral, il a indiqué qu'on lui aurait imputé des opinions politiques suite à la saisie des documents des réunions à la maison du revendicateur. Il est invraisemblable qu'on désire l'arrêter avant d'avoir saisi les documents qui seraient, selon le témoignage du revendicateur, la raison pour laquelle on s'intéressait au revendicateur, puisqu'il a témoigné qu'auparavant les autorités ne s'intéressaient pas à lui, ni à son association. Le tribunal ne croit pas au témoignage du revendicateur. Son histoire est invraisemblable et non logique.

[6]         It is true that unless an error has some effect on the outcome of the decision, this Court is not obliged to set aside the decision (see Schaaf v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1984] 2 F.C. 334 at 342 (F.C.A.) and Canadian Cable Television Association v. American College Sports Collective of Canada, Inc., [1991] 3 F.C. 626 (F.C.A.)). Nonetheless, in the present case the Board concludes: "Le tribunal ne croit pas au témoignage du revendicateur. Son histoire est invraisemblable et non logique." In my view, this demonstrates the tremendous impact this single issue had on the applicant's overall credibility in the Board's eyes. As in Kong, supra, it is apparent that the Board drew very damaging conclusions from this evidence which were central to the applicant's claim. It must be noted that the applicant's account of this event was otherwise consistent and not contradictory. I conclude, therefore, that this Court's intervention is warranted.

[7]         Consequently, the application for judicial review is allowed, the decision of the Board is quashed and the matter is remitted for rehearing by a differently constituted panel.

       JUDGE

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

April 27, 2001