Date: 20010213
Docket: IMM-1774-00
Neutral reference: 2001 FCT 59
BETWEEN:
SULTANA NUR NIGER BEGUM
MOHAMMAD RUSLAAN HOSSAIN
Plaintiffs
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Defendant
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
BLAIS J.
[1] This is an application for judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Division on February 29, 2000 that the female plaintiff is not a Convention refugee.
[2] The two plaintiffs are citizens of Bangladesh and maintain that they have a well-founded fear of persecution based on family violence. For the purposes of the case at bar I will refer to the female plaintiff, as the claim by the minor child is based on his mother's claim.
[3] The plaintiff is forty-three years old. She obtained several university degrees from the University of Rajahahi. Before leaving her country of origin, she taught at the Oxford International School in Dhaka.
[4] The plaintiff married on October 4, 1981 and two children were born of her marriage. The first boy was born in 1983 and is currently living with his father in Bangladesh. The plaintiff came to Canada with her second son, three years old.
[5] The plaintiff alleged that she was the victim of various forms of abuse by her husband during the seventeen years of her marriage.
[6] The plaintiff mentioned that in 1986 her mother-in-law came to live with them. She was very demanding and tyrannical towards the plaintiff, and her husband took his mother's part at her expense. Her husband forced her to obey his mother and went so far as to beat her if she refused.
[7] In August 1987 the plaintiff's husband went to Texas in the U.S.A. to complete his Ph.D., while the plaintiff went to live with her parents at Rajahahi for a year and a half and complete her studies.
[8] On June 24, 1988 the plaintiff, accompanied by her five-year-old son, went to join her husband in Texas. She stayed there with her husband and son until May 1992. During those four years she was continually the subject of [TRANSLATION] "torture and humiliation" by her husband.
[9] The family then returned to Bangladesh. Shortly after her return, the plaintiff had to take refuge at her brother's home because she was being continually subjected to mistreatment by her husband. Her brother contacted her husband and her husband agreed to stop his reprehensible behaviour. At this point, the plaintiff went back to live with her husband in Dhaka.
[10] On March 10, 1993 her husband asked her to give him all the money she was earning at the school where she was teaching. She refused and her husband struck her and threw her to the ground. He threatened to throw her out the window and asked her to leave the house. About ten days later, she went to her parents' home in Rajahahi and filed a complaint with the Boalia police station. The plaintiff alleged that she lived with her parents for seven to eight months, until October 1993, when her husband sent her a notice through his lawyer asking her to come home. He apologized for his behaviour and once again she went back to her husband's home, for the sake of their son.
[11] A month later the plaintiff, her husband and their son went back to Texas to file a legal action against the physician who treated their son for meningitis in 1990. They returned to Bangladesh in February 1994.
[12] Early in 1995 her mother-in-law came back to live with them and continued to harass her. In fact, she disapproved of the way in which the plaintiff dressed and at one point even burned her clothes. For his part, her husband had the same attitude towards her, even forcing her to have sexual relations against her wishes. She alleged that in June 1996 she was raped by her husband.
[13] In October 1997 her husband went back to Texas with their son for treatment for a four-month period.
[14] In January 1998, her husband asked her for money. When she refused, he twisted her sari around her neck and even went so far as to threaten to kill her. He forced her to leave the house and went to drive her back to her sister's place. At this point, the plaintiff filed a second complaint with the police. She stayed at her sister's home until December 1998. She alleged that since January 1998 she has been separated from her husband. In December 1998, the plaintiff sent her husband a notice of separation. She alleged that someone tried to kidnap her and her son on the street, but they were saved in extremis by passers-by. Once again she filed a complaint to the police. She subsequently received a threatening telephone call at her sister's residence.
[15] Because of this, she was obliged to leave her sister's home and hide. According to her, her husband was trying to locate her.
[16] With her father's help, she left the country on December 25, 1998 accompanied by her younger son. After spending a month in the U.S., she arrived in Canada on February 8, 1999 and claimed refugee status on entry to Canada.
[17] She feared that her husband would kill her if she was forced to go back to her country.
BOARD'S DECISION
[18] The Refugee Division concluded that the plaintiff was not credible.
[19] The Refugee Division found that the plaintiff's story was full of gross exaggerations and several contradictions. The Refugee Division concluded that her story was not plausible.
[20] The Refugee Division noted that despite her allegations that she had suffered a life of torture and humiliation for the seventeen years of her marriage, and despite death threats from her husband, she had travelled abroad with him and returned to her country several times and had never claimed refugee status when travelling abroad.
[21] The Refugee Division also observed that the plaintiff had stayed with her parents and had gone back to her husband's home several times. On two occasions, it was her husband himself who went to drive her at her parents' home or at her sister's home. The Refugee Division considered to be contradictory and implausible the account suggesting that her husband on the one hand subjected her to mistreatment and threatened her with death and then himself went to drive her to her parents or sister's homes.
[22] The Refugee Division considered that the plaintiff's statements about her husband's behaviour were confused. She found it difficult to believe that her husband could on one hand force her to go and live with her parents and at other times force her to live with him; the plaintiff provided no explanation of these contradictions.
[23] Additionally, the Refugee Division noted that the plaintiff's complaints to the police were not very specific and that there were several years between them. The Refugee Division also observed that the plaintiff did not try to contact women's protection groups, did not appear to know of any and could not provide any information on this point. This lack of knowledge of women's assistance groups and of the details regarding the complaints filed with the police undermined the plaintiff's credibility.
[24] The Refugee Division considered that the plaintiff could have obtained assistance earlier if she had wanted to, but she did not seem to have tried to get it. It also disputed the plaintiff's credibility. The Refugee Division considered that the plaintiff was not very logical when she mentioned on one hand that the women's groups could not help her, whereas she had never tried to contact them and had no information about those groups.
[25] The Refugee Division also could not understand why if the plaintiff had been tortured and persecuted and her life was at risk she voluntarily agreed to travel abroad with her husband, when
she could have stayed at home or with her family in safety and benefited from that family's support.
[26] The Refugee Division did not believe that the plaintiff's life was really in danger. The Refugee Division considered that the fact that the plaintiff travelled with her husband after receiving threats on several occasions showed that there was no subjective fear.
[27] The Refugee Division also did not accept that the lives of the children were in danger as the plaintiff provided no evidence that the children were mistreated. What is more, the fact that her husband went back to the U.S. with the older boy for treatment and brought a court action against physicians for professional negligence was not consistent with the plaintiff's suggestion that he did not look after his children.
[28] The Refugee Division also observed that the plaintiff responded evasively when she was asked why she wrote in her personal information form (PIF) that she had sent a notice of separation rather than a note of divorce, as is the usual practice in her country. She did not appear to be aware of the distinction. She filed no legal documents in support of her allegation about a notice of separation.
[29] Additionally, the Refugee Division noted that the document sent by the plaintiff to her husband used the phrase [TRANSLATION] "legal separation" and that that document also did not appear to follow the usual procedure. It was dated November 2, 1998. The Refugee Division considered that the plaintiff had already decided to leave the country before sending this letter, since her passport was renewed in October 1998. She obtained her visa for the U.S. on November 30, 1998. The plaintiff alleged that she was separated from her husband. In other correspondence in her file her husband indicated that he was in fact divorced from his wife. It appeared that the plaintiff's marital status was not clear and that the explanations given to the Refugee Division at the hearing did nothing to clarify the situation. The Refugee Division considered that the inability to clarify this point once again undermined the plaintiff's credibility.
[30] The plaintiff sent her husband a second notice of divorce on July 26, 1999. The Refugee Division explained that under Islamic law the plaintiff could apply for divorce from her husband herself, as she had that privilege under her marriage contract. However, the Refugee Division considered that the notice of divorce should have gone through the usual procedure and could not be regarded as a de facto divorce, as the plaintiff suggested. This second document actually suggested that the plaintiff was still married when she left her country.
[31] The Refugee Division further noted that both in her PIF and the port-of-entry notes, the plaintiff indicated that she was married. When asked if she wished to change this information at the time of the hearing to the word [TRANSLATION] "separated", the plaintiff replied that she had not understood the question correctly. The Refugee Division did not accept this explanation as the plaintiff admitted that she completed her form with the help of an interpreter. The Division
could not accept that the question was not understood when she had understood others. The Refugee Division considered that based on the evidence submitted, the plaintiff was married when she left her country and had not taken any divorce proceedings as she alleged.
[32] The Refugee Division concluded that the plaintiff was neither in the process of separating from her husband nor had she been mistreated by her husband.
[33] The plaintiff suggested that she decided to leave the country after unknown persons tried to kidnap herself and her son in December 1998 on a motorcycle. At the hearing, she altered her testimony and said that the incident occurred in November, not December. She did not explain why she changed the date, but the Refugee Division considered that on more careful explanation it was clear that according to the plaintiff's itinerary she was already in the U.S. in December 1998.
[34] The Refugee Division also considered that it was very unlikely that a women and her son would be kidnapped on a motorcycle in the middle of traffic when both were shouting and struggling. The plaintiff agreed with the question put by the Refugee Division and suggested instead that there might have been a car behind. The Refugee Division considered that this explanation was an adjustment but regarded it as unacceptable. Further, in view of the fact that the plaintiff already had her passport since October 5, 1998 and her U.S. visa from November 30, 1998, the Refugee Division concluded that if this incident actually occurred it had no decisive effect on the plaintiff's decision to leave the country.
[35] Finally, the Refugee Division considered that the plaintiff had not met the burden of establishing that there was a reasonable possibility that she would be the victim of persecution if she were to return to her country.
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS
[36] The plaintiff submitted that the Refugee Division's finding that her testimony was contradictory, implausible and confused was patently unreasonable, since she had described the usual relationship of a battered woman with her husband, relations which were replete with excuses, separations, reunifications, involvement of other family members, promises and so on.
[37] The plaintiff further submitted that the Refugee Division erred in concluding that her testimony was contradictory when she explained that she was both married and separated.
[38] The plaintiff alleged that the Refugee Division erred when it referred to a document obtained after the hearing and sent to her counsel. In these circumstances, the plaintiff submitted that she was under no obligation to apply for a reopening of the hearing and that it was actually the Refugee Division which had a duty to act within its mandate.
[39] The plaintiff stated that there was no offer to reopen the hearing and in any case she had not agreed either formally or expressly to the filing of Exhibit P-11, to which the Refugee Division referred expressly in its decision.
[40] It was suggested that the facts in the case at bar met the test laid down in Yousuf v. M.E.I., F.C.A., A-823-90.
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS
[41] The defendant submitted that evidence does not have to be obtained at the hearing and that the plaintiff waived her right to reopen the hearing because she did not object to the additional evidence filed by the Refugee Division and also did not ask that the hearing be reopened.
[42] On the plaintiff's credibility, the defendant submitted that the Refugee Division was fully entitled to consider that the evidence filed by the plaintiff and her credibility were vitiated by the many contradictions in her oral testimony and her personal information form (PIF).
[43] Further, assessment of the credibility and plausibility of the facts in support of the plaintiff's refugee status claim is within the Refugee Division's jurisdiction.
POINTS AT ISSUE
[44] 1. Did the Refugee Division commit a reviewable error when it concluded that the conduct both of the plaintiff and of her ex-husband was improbable?
2. Did the Refugee Division commit a reviewable error in basing its decision on evidence filed after the hearing without the plaintiff's express consent?
ANALYSIS
1. Did the Refugee Division commit a reviewable error when it concluded that the conduct both of the plaintiff and of her ex-husband was improbable?
[45] In Aguebor v. M.E.I. (1993), 160 N.R. 315, the Federal Court of Appeal indicated:
There is no longer any doubt that the Refugee Division, which is a specialized tribunal, has complete jurisdiction to determine the plausibility of testimony: who is in a better position than the Refugee Division to gauge the credibility of an account and to draw the necessary inferences? As long as the inferences drawn by the tribunal are not so unreasonable as to warrant our intervention, its findings are not open to judicial review. In Giron, the Court merely observed that in the area of plausibility, the unreasonableness of a decision may be more palpable, and so more easily identifiable, since the account appears on the face of the record. In our opinion, Giron in no way reduces the burden that rests on an appellant, of showing that the inferences drawn by the Refugee Division could not reasonably have been drawn.
[46] In Boye v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1994), 83 F.T.R. 1 (F.C.T.D.), Jerome A.C.J. explained:
To begin with, questions of credibility and weight of evidence are within the jurisdiction of the Refugee Division as the trier of facts in respect of Convention refugee claims. When a tribunal's impugned finding relates to the credibility of a witness, the Court will be reluctant to interfere with that finding, given the tribunal's opportunity and ability to assess the witness, his demeanor, frankness, readiness to answer, coherence and consistency in oral testimony before it.
[47] The plaintiff suggested that the Refugee Division's findings on her credibility were patently unreasonable as she was a victim of the battered woman syndrome.
[48] In Griffith v. M.C.I., [1999] F.C.J. No. 1141 (F.C.T.D.), Campbell J. analysed a failure by the Refugee Division to adequately take into account its own guidelines:
As stated, knowing how to decide whether to believe a refugee claimant who has suffered domestic violence is critical. Under the heading "D. Special Problems at Determination Hearings", the Gender Guidelines clearly point out that:
Women refugee claimants who have suffered sexual violence may exhibit a pattern of symptoms referred to as Rape Trauma Syndrome, and may require extremely sensitive handling. Similarly, women who have been subjected to domestic violence may exhibit a pattern of symptoms referred to as Battered Woman Syndrome and may also be reluctant to testify.
The "pattern of symptoms" to be expected of women who have been battered is described in the footnote to the quote just cited as follows:
For a discussion of the battered woman syndrome see R. v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852. [S.C.C.] In Lavallee, Madame Justice Wilson addressed the mythology about domestic violence and phrased the myth as [e]ither she was not as badly beaten as she claims, or she would have left the man long ago. Or, if she was battered that severely, she must have stayed out of some masochistic enjoyment of it." The Court further indicated that a manifestation of the victimization of battered women is a "reluctance to disclose to others the fact or extent of the beatings". In Lavallee, the Court indicated that expert evidence can assist in dispelling these myths and be used to explain why a woman would remain in a battering relationship.
Therefore, the Gender Guidelines suggest that to assess the actions of a women subjected to domestic violence, special knowledge is an essential tool to use in reaching a fair and correct judgment.
. . . . .
To know how to acquire the kind of special knowledge needed to properly judge a case involving domestic violence, Wilson J. in Lavallee at 873 gives the following guidance to decision makers:
Expert testimony on the psychological effects of battering have been admitted in American courts in recent years. In State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (1984), at p. 378, the New Jersey Supreme Court commended the value of expert testimony in these terms:
It is aimed at an area where the purported common knowledge of the jury may be very much mistaken, an area where jurors' logic, drawn from their own experience, may lead to a wholly incorrect conclusion, an area where expert knowledge would enable the jurors to disregard their prior conclusions as being common myths rather than common knowledge.
The Court concludes at p. 379 that the battering relationship is "subject to a large group of myths and stereotypes." As such, it is "beyond the ken of the average juror and thus is suitable for explanation through expert testimony." I share that view.
In Lavallee, the knowledge required to reach a just decision was introduced by expert testimony. As alluded to in the passage above quoted from the Gender Guidelines, such testimony might very well be required in some hearings conducted by the CRDD.
While expert testimony might not be considered practicable or necessary in some cases, in my opinion it is, nevertheless, incumbent on panel members to exhibit the knowledge required, and to apply it in an understanding and sensitive manner when deciding domestic violence issues in order to provide a fair result and avoid the risk of reviewable error in reaching findings of fact, the most important being the finding respecting the claimant's credibility.
If a claimant is not believed, reasons must be given. In the case of credibility findings with respect to women suffering domestic violence, in my opinion, the requirement for reasons becomes specific: the reasons must be responsive to what is known about women in this condition. The Gender Guidelines are, in fact, an effort to implement the professional education needed to accomplish this objective.
In the present case, with respect to the CRDD's main credibility concern quoted above at paragraph 8, the CRDD made the following finding:
The claimant did not provide a satisfactory explanation for the fact that she did not try to leave Saint Vincent at an earlier date, considering that the alleged abuse went on from 1971 to 1992, a period of twenty-one years. She had obtained a passport in 1987. The reasons she gave for not leaving the country at an earlier date were that her children were small and later that she was waiting for an opportunity to come to Canada. She came when she received a letter inviting her to visit a friend in Canada. The panel is not persuaded that she could not have left at an earlier date, with the help of her parents who continued to assist her and who looked after her children. She could have sought refuge in other Caribbean countries, which were easier to reach and did not require visas.
The CRDD then goes on to state:
A major delay occurred in Canada, where she waited more than five years to make her claim. Furthermore, she made a claim only after her application to stay on humanitarian and compassionate grounds was rejected. She testified that she remained illegally in Canada and that she did not inquire about regularising her position for a long time. Information about the possibility to claim refugee status is easily available to an English speaking person in Toronto and can be obtained from many sources. The panel finds that her behaviour contradicts the well-founded fear of persecution she claims. Her testimony that she did not move from the address where she resided even after she was informed that her husband was making attempts to have her deported from Canada as an illegal immigrant confirms the above finding of the panel.
In my opinion, these statements of the CRDD do not disclose the degree of knowledge, understanding, and sensitivity required to avoid a finding that a reviewable error has been made in judging the applicant's statements and conduct.
The pitfall exposed in the statements is that the panel members' interpretation of an "objective" standard is being used as the standard against which the actions of the applicant are being judged; that is, the objective standard of the "reasonable man" so commonly used in criminal and civil law. The issue is not whether men or women are decision makers, but rather whether a male norm is being unfairly applied. About this, Wilson J. in Lavallee at 874 says this:
If it strains credulity to imagine what the "ordinary man" would do in the position of a battered spouse, it is probably because men do not typically find themselves in that situation. Some women do, however. The definition of what is reasonable must be adapted to circumstances which are, by and large, foreign to the world inhabited by the hypothetical "reasonable man".
[Footnotes omitted]
[49] In the case at bar, the plaintiff submitted to the Refugee Division a psychological assessment which supported her assertion that her reaction to the repeated violence occasioned by her husband was entirely consistent with the battered woman syndrome.
[50] The Refugee Division mentioned that it had considered the aforementioned guideline but concluded that it did not apply in the present circumstances.
[51] I consider that part of the Refugee Division's decision may be considered as not having demonstrated the degree of knowledge, understanding and sensitivity required in the case like the one at bar, especially regarding the plaintiff's testimony and her conduct.
[52] For example, the Refugee Division found that the plaintiff's credibility was vitiated because although she mentioned, on one hand, that she had been tortured and persecuted and that her life was in danger, she voluntarily agreed to travel abroad with her husband rather than remaining at home or going to take refuge with her family in order to obtain security and support. In the Refugee Division's view, the plaintiff had every opportunity to get away from her husband and did not do so. Further, she did not claim refugee status on any of the occasions when she went to the U.S. Finally, the Refugee Division did not believe that the plaintiff's life was in danger as she suggested, since she had travelled with her husband after receiving several threats, and there was accordingly no subjective fear.
[53] On the question of seeking help, the Refugee Division considered her credibility was vitiated because she did not know of any women's groups, and additionally, the fact that she mentioned that the women's groups could not help her when she had never tried to contact any of those groups and had no information about them undermined her credibility.
[54] The quotations from the Refugee Division's decision may show that the Division did not
demonstrate the degree of knowledge, understanding and sensivity required, which may lead us to conclude that the Refugee Division committed a reviewable error in assessing the plaintiff's statement and conduct.
[55] However, in light of all the other reasons given by the Refugee Division for arriving at the conclusion that the plaintiff was not credible, I cannot come to the conclusion that this error was sufficient to justify intervention by this Court.
[56] The Refugee Division's findings on the other questions do not relate to the battered woman syndrome and are not patently unreasonable based on the evidence presented to the Division. The conclusions have to do with the plaintiff's statements about her husband's conduct, which were regarded by the Refugee Division as contradictory and not credible. The Division also considered that her explanations about the attempted kidnapping were entirely lacking in credibility.
[57] So far as her explanations about her marital status are concerned, the plaintiff did not persuade the Court that the Refugee Division was mistaken in its findings that she was not in the process of separating from her husband. It was entirely plausible for the Refugee Division to reach the conclusion that it did, namely that the plaintiff was not credible on this point.
2. Did the Refugee Division commit a reviewable error in basing its decision on evidence filed after the hearing without the plaintiff's express consent?
[58] The plaintiff argued that the Refugee Division could not admit evidence outside the hearing unless the claimant had expressly consented.
[59] In Sorogin v. M.C.I, [1999] F.C.J. No. 630 (F.C.T.D.), Tremblay-Lamer J. said:
However, as counsel for the respondent submits, subsection 69.1(4) was repealed after Lawal, so in his opinion, it would now be acceptable to have a more informal procedure, whereby evidence may be filed outside a hearing where the parties consent to such a procedure and where the rules of natural justice are observed by allowing the claimant to comment on that evidence.
The repeal of subsection 69.1(4) certainly relaxed the rule established by Lawal, since the panel is no longer required to hold a hearing in the claimant's presence. Parliament thus prefers a more flexible procedure. In my view, as long as the rules of procedural fairness are observed and the parties consent, the scheme of the Act allows for proceeding in this manner, since Parliament expressly provided that the Refugee Division is not bound by the formal rules of evidence.
While reopening the hearing is always the most appropriate procedure, the circumstances might be such that this procedure would be impracticable or would prevent the panel from acting expeditiously. I therefore accept a departure from this procedure provided that the applicant consents to it and is not prejudiced by it in any way. However, should the applicant object to it, the panel should reopen the hearing.
[60] Further, in Yassine v. M.C.I. (1994), 172 N.R. 308 (F.C.A.), the Federal Court of Appeal indicated:
It must also be noted that no objection was taken to the procedure that the Presiding Member adopted for receiving the additional information. That procedure consisted of a direction of November 20, 1990 that the Refugee Hearing Officer make copies of the material available to the appellant's legal counsel and of giving such counsel a period of two weeks within which to submit representations by way of "reply". That procedure was followed. No such reply was submitted. Nor did the appellant raise an objection of any kind as to this way of proceeding. That surely was the time to raise an objection and to ask the panel to reconvene the hearing, assuming that the information could not otherwise be received. The appellant was then in possession of all of the new information and was aware that the panel intended to take notice of it. Not only was no objection made at that time, which I would regard as the "earliest practicable opportunity" to do so (In re Human Rights Tribunal and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, [1986] 1 F.C. 103 (C.A.), per MacGuigan J., at pages 113-14), the appellant remained silent until after the Refugee Division's decision was released on April 18, 1991. Thus, even if a breach of natural justice did occur, I view the appellant's conduct as an implied waiver of that breach.
[61] It appeared that the disputed document (Exhibit P-11) was discussed at the hearing by the chairperson of the Refugee Division and the latter realized that he did not have it with him: it was an information document on divorce procedure obtained from Bangladesh. The said document was sent to counsel for the plaintiff after the hearing, on December 22, 1999. The plaintiff had until January 4, 2000 to file her written arguments. Additional evidence was filed but no comment on Exhibit P-11 was received by the Refugee Division.
[62] The plaintiff did not object to the filing of this exhibit and also did not ask that the hearing be reopened. It seems clear that the plaintiff had an opportunity both to respond to the document and to ask that the hearing be reopened and chose not to do so.
[63] I consider that in the circumstances the Refugee Division has not in any way infringed a rule of natural justice.
[64] This application for judicial review is accordingly dismissed.
[65] The plaintiff submitted the following question for certification:
[TRANSLATION]
Should the Refugee Division take the battered woman syndrome into account in assessing the behaviour of female refugee status claimants who say they are battered women?
[66] Referring to the written submissions of the defendant, and in particular Bula v. M.E.I., A-794-92, of June 16, 1994, in which Noël J.A. stated:
As a tribunal specializing in the assessment of refugee status claims, the Division must decide the merits of applications before it. Expert testimony can be very useful in certain areas; however, it is a piece of evidence like any other, and it is up to the Division to decide how much weight it should given [sic].
[67] I agree both with Noël J.A. and with counsel for the defendant that the question is one of fact in each case and that no question of general importance is involved.
[68] Accordingly, the question will not be certified.
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
February 13, 2001
Certified true translation
Suzanne M. Gauthier, LL.L. Trad. a.
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
COURT No.: IMM-1774-00
STYLE OF CAUSE: SULTANA NUR NIGER BEGUM
MOHAMMAD RUSLAAN HOSSAIN
v.
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING: MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC
DATE OF HEARING: JANUARY 31, 2001
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER BY: BLAIS J.
DATED: FEBRUARY 13, 2001
APPEARANCES:
WILLIAM SLOAN FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
MICHEL PÉPIN FOR THE DEFENDANT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
WILLIAM SLOAN FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC
MORRIS ROSENBERG FOR THE DEFENDANT
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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