Federal Court Reports
McCabe v. Canada (Attorney General) (T.D.) [2001] 3 F.C. 430
Date: 20010409
Docket: T-398-00
Neutral Citation: 2001 FCT 309
BETWEEN:
BARRY McCABE
Applicant
- and -
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
TREMBLAY-LAMER J.:
[1] This is an application for judicial review made under section 18.1 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-7 ("the Act") of a recommendation made by the National Parole Board ("the Board") relating to the applicant's application for escorted temporary absences ("ETA's").
[2] The applicant is serving a life sentence at Mission Institution for the manslaughter of his mother. He has been incarcerated since January 8, 1993.
[3] On June 27, 1999, the applicant made a request for ETA's so that he could attend the Long-Term Inmates Now in the Community Program ("LINC"). Such requests are made to the institutional head (warden), pursuant to subsection 17(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c.20 ("the CCRA").
[4] The institutional head consulted the Board on the appropriateness of the applicant's request. On October 15, 1999, the Board conducted a hearing into the request, which was attended by the applicant.
[5] During the hearing, one of the Board Members referred to a Report to Crown Counsel, which was presumably part of the police investigation into the homicide of the applicant's mother. In the report, a police officer speculated that the applicant's offence included sexual assault. The applicant was questioned about the allegation by the Board, though a copy of the report was not shared with the applicant prior to the hearing.
[6] That same day, the Board issued a "recommendation" to the institutional head that the applicant's request be denied. The following portion of the Board's findings are particularly relevant:
You [the applicant] are serving a Life (maximum) sentence for Manslaughter. You strangled and stabbed your mother to death. There was physical evidence that she had been sexually assaulted. At the time of your arrest and for many years after, you showed no evidence of remorse for this crime. You also adamantly deny sexually assaulting her though you refused to provide a sample for DNA testing that could have exonerated you for this aspect of the crime. [...]. [Applicant's Record, Vol. I, Tab 3 at 114-15].
[7] On October 19, 1999, the Board released its recommendation to two different media outlets.
[8] On November 9, 1999, the institutional head denied the applicant's request as follows:
The National Parole Board was consulted about Escorted Temporary Absences for Mr. McCabe. The Board recommended negatively. The concern was that Mr. McCabe has just begun to acknowledge his problems, and begin therapy to work on his problems. The Board felt that Mr. McCabe needed further therapy and treatment.
It was revealed at the Unit Board 1999-11-09 that Mr. McCabe had recently stopped his one to one sessions with the psychologist. It has become apparent that there are problems that must be addressed before this case can be considered ready for conditional release.
The Escorted Temporary Absence is not approved. [Ibid. at 120].
[9] On February 28, 2000, the applicant filed an application for judicial review to this Court.
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[10] Federal Court Act:
| 2. (1) In this Act,
[...]
"federal board, commission or other tribunal" means any body or any person or persons having, exercising or purporting to exercise jurisdiction or powers conferred by or under an Act of Parliament or by or under an order made pursuant to a prerogative of the Crown, other than any such body constituted or established by or under a law of a province or any such person or persons appointed under or in accordance with a law of a province or under section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867;
18. (1) Subject to section 28, the Trial Division has exclusive original jurisdiction
(a) to issue an injunction, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus or writ of quo warranto, or grant declaratory relief, against any federal board, commission or other tribunal; and
(b) to hear and determine any application or other proceeding for relief in the nature of relief contemplated by paragraph (a), including any proceeding brought against the Attorney General of Canada, to obtain relief against a federal board, commission or other tribunal.
18.1 (1) An application for judicial review may be made by the Attorney General of Canada or by anyone directly affected by the matter in respect of which relief is sought.
(2) An application for judicial review in respect of a decision or order of a federal board, commission or other tribunal shall be made within thirty days after the time the decision or order was first communicated by the federal board, commission or other tribunal to the office of the Deputy Attorney General of Canada or to the party directly affected thereby, or within such further time as a judge of the Trial Division may, either before or after the expiration of those thirty days, fix or allow.
(3) On an application for judicial review, the Trial Division may
(a) order a federal board, commission or other tribunal to do any act or thing it has unlawfully failed or refused to do or has unreasonably delayed in doing; or
(b) declare invalid or unlawful, or quash, set aside or set aside and refer back for determination in accordance with such directions as it considers to be appropriate, prohibit or restrain, a decision, order, act or proceeding of a federal board, commission or other tribunal.
(4) The Trial Division may grant relief under subsection (3) if it is satisfied that the federal board, commission or other tribunal
(a) acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or refused to exercise its jurisdiction;
(b) failed to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness or other procedure that it was required by law to observe;
(c) erred in law in making a decision or an order, whether or not the error appears on the face of the record;
(d) based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it;
(e) acted, or failed to act, by reason of fraud or perjured evidence; or
(f) acted in any other way that was contrary to law.
|
|
2. (1) Les définitions qui suivent s'appliquent à la présente loi.
[...]
« office fédéral » Conseil, bureau, commission ou autre organisme, ou personne ou groupe de personnes, ayant, exerçant ou censé exercer une compétence ou des pouvoirs prévus par une loi fédérale ou par une dordonnance prise envertu d'une prérogative royale, à l'exclusion d'un organisme constitué sous le régime d'une loi provinciale ou d'une personne ou d'un groupe de personnes nommées aux termes d'une loi provinciale ou de l'article 96 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867.
18. (1) Sous réserve de l'article 28, la Section de première instance a compétence exclusive, en première instance, pour :
a) décerner une injonction, un bref de certiorari, de mandamus, de prohibition ou de quo warranto, ou pour rendre un jugement déclaratoire contre tout office fédéral;
b) connaître de toute demande de réparation de la nature visée par l'aliniéa a), et notamment de toute procédure engagée contre le procureur général du Canada afin d'obtenir réparation de la part d'un office fédéral.
18.1 (1) Une demande de contrôle judiciaire peut être présentée par le procureur général du Canada ou par quiconque est directement touché par l'objet de la demande.
(2) Les demandes de contrôle judiciaire sont à présenter dans les trente jours qui suivent la première communication, par l'office fédéral, de sa décision ou de son ordonnance au bureau du sous-procureur général du Canada ou à la partie concernée, ou dans le délai supplémentaire qu'un juge de la Section de première instance peut, avant ou après l'expiration de ces trente jours, fixer ou accorder.
(3) Sur présentation d'une demande de contrôle judiciaire, la Section de première instance peut :
a) ordonner à l'office fédéral en cause d'accomplir tout acte qu'il a illégalement omis ou refusé d'accomplir ou don't il a retardé l'exécution de manière déraisonnable;
b) déclarer nul ou illégal, ou annuler, ou infirmer et renvoyer pour jugement conformément aux instructions qu'elle estime appropriées, ou prohiber ou encore restreindre toute décision, ordonnance, procédure ou tout autre acte de l'office fédéral.
(4) Les mesures prévues au paragraphe (3) sont prises par la Section de première instance si elle est convaincue que l'office fédéral, selon le cas:
a) a agi sans compétence, outrepassé celle-ci ou refusé de l'exercer;
b) n'a pas observé un principe de justice naturelle ou d'équité procédurale ou toute autre procédure qu'il était légalement tenu de respecter;
c) a rendu une décision ou une ordonnance entachée d'une erreur de droit, que celle-ci soit manifeste ou non au vu du dossier;
d) a rendu une décision ou une ordonnance fondée sur une conclusion de fait erronée, tirée de façon abusive ou arbitraire ou sans tenir compte des éléments don't il dispose;
e) a agi ou omis d'agir en raison d'une fraude ou de faux témoinages;
f) a agi de toute autre façon contraire à la loi.
|
| |
|
|
[11] Corrections and Conditional Release Act:
| 2.(1) In this part,
[...]
"institutional head", in relation to a penitentiary, means the person who is normally in charge of the penitentiary;
17. (1) Where, in the opinion of the institutional head,
(a) an inmate will not, by reoffending, present an undue risk to society during an absence authorized under this section,
(b) it is desirable for the inmate to be absent from penitentiary, escorted by a staff member or other person authorized by the institutional head, for medical, administrative, community service, family contact, personal development for rehabilitative purposes, or compassionate reasons, including parental responsibilities,
(c) the inmate's behaviour while under sentence does not preclude authorizing the absence, and
(d) a structured plan for the absence has been prepared, the absence may, subject to section 746.1 of the Criminal Code and subsection 140.3(2) of the National Defence Act, be authorized by the institutional head
(e) for an unlimited period for medical reasons, or
(f) for reasons other than medical,
(i) for a period not exceeding five days, or
(ii) with the Commissioner's approval, for a period exceeding five days but not exceeding fifteen days.
|
|
2. (1) Les définitions qui suivent s'appliquent à la présente partie.
[...]
"institutional head", in relation to a penitentiary, means the person who is normally in charge of the penitentiary;
17. (1) Sous réserve de l'article 746.1 du Code criminel et du paragraphe 140.3(2) de la Loi sur la défense nationale, le directeur du pénitencier peut autoriser un délinquant à sortir si celui-ci est escorté d'une personne -- agent ou autre -- habilitée à cet effet par lui lorsque, à son avis_:
a) une récidive du délinquant pendant la sortie ne présentera pas un risque inacceptable pour la société;
b) il l'estime souhaitable pour des raisons médicales, administratives, de compassion ou en vue d'un service à la collectivité, ou du perfectionnement personnel lié à la réadapta- tion du délinquant, ou pour lui permettre d'établir ou d'entretenir des rapports familiaux notamment en ce qui touche ses responsabilités parentales;
c) la conduite du détenu pendant la détention ne justifie pas un refus;
d) un projet structuré de sortie a été établi.
La permission est accordée soit pour une période maximale de cinq jours ou, avec l'autorisation du commissaire, de quinze jours, soit pour une période indéterminée s'il s'agit de raisons médicales.
|
| |
|
|
[12] Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, C-46:
| 746.1 [...]
(2) Subject to subsection (3), in respect of a person sentenced to imprisonment for life without eligibility for parole for a specified number of years pursuant to this Act, until the expiration of all but three years of the specified number of years of imprisonment,
[...]
(c) except with the approval of the National Parole Board, no absence with escort otherwise than for medical reasons or in order to attend judicial proceedings or a coroner's inquest may be authorized under either of those Acts.
|
|
746.1 [...]
(2) Sous réserve du paragraphe (3), en cas de condamnation à l'emprisonnement à perpétuité assortie, conformément à la présente loi, d'un délai préalable à la libération conditionnelle, il ne peut être accordé, sauf au cours des trois années précédant l'expiration de ce délai_:
[...]
c) de permission de sortir avec escorte, sous le régime d'une de ces lois, sauf pour des raisons médicales ou pour comparution dans le cadre de procédures judiciaires ou d'enquêtes du coroner, sans l'agrément de la Commission nationale des libérations conditionnelles.
|
| |
|
|
ISSUES
[11] The issues to be addressed in this application are:
A) Does the Federal Court have jurisdiction to review the Board's recommendation?
B) If so, was it within the Board's jurisdiction to issue a recommendation under the circumstances of this case?
C) If so, did the Board deny the applicant procedural fairness or base its recommendation on an erroneous finding of fact?
D) Did the Board act beyond its jurisdiction in releasing its recommendation to the media?
ANALYSIS
A) Does the Federal Court have jurisdiction to review the Board's recommendation?
[12] The key issue in this dispute involves this Court's jurisdiction to review the Board's recommendation. Once this is answered, the other issues can be addressed in short order.
[13] The issue is whether the Board in this particular context was acting as a "federal board, commission or other tribunal" within the meaning of sections 2, 18 and 18.1 of the Federal Court Act. This question was specifically dealt with by this Court in Steele v. Canada (National Parole Board), [1998] F.C.J. 1428 (T.D.) (QL). The inmate in that case was similarly seeking judicial review of the Board's recommendation against his request for ETA's. The Court determined that since the Board was not exercising a statutory power, its recommendation was not a reviewable decision:
[para7] Clearly, section 746.1 [of the Criminal Code] does not apply to this applicant who has been incarcerated since January 18, 1985, with a ten year parole ineligibility. Thus, it was not for the Board but for the institutional head to decide whether or not escorted temporary absences ought to be granted to the applicant. Consequently, as alleged by the respondent, the Board was not exercising a jurisdiction provided by a federal act and was therefore "not acting as a federal board, commission or other tribunal" within the meaning of sections 2, 18 and 18.1 of the Federal Court Act. Section 2 of the Federal Court Act defines "federal board, commission or other tribunal" as meaning "any body or any person or persons having, exercising or purporting to exercise jurisdiction or powers conferred by or under an Act of Parliament or by or under an order made pursuant to a prerogative of the Crown".
[para8] It follows that the "decision" of the Board is not a decision reviewable by this Court and it is not necessary therefore to pursue the other issues.
[14] The respondent's argument generally mirrors this reasoning. The applicant has been incarcerated since January 8, 1993 with a life sentence without specified parole eligibility. Subsection 746.1(2) of the Criminal Code is therefore not engaged because the requested ETA's would not occur more than three years before the specified number of years of imprisonment. There is no statutory requirement under such circumstances for the institutional head to obtain the Board's approval with respect to an ETA application. The ultimate authority to make the decision, as provided under subsection 17(1) of the CCRA, lies with the institutional head. The Board was not acting under statutory authority, but simply under policy set by the Commissioner of Corrections. As such, it was not acting as a "federal board" within the meaning of the Federal Court Act.
[15] With respect, I do not accept such a restrictive interpretation of a "federal board". In my opinion, the narrow reading of the Court's jurisdiction suggested by the respondent would limit judicial review to administrative decisions made pursuant to a statutory power. This would effectively preclude review of ultra vires administrative acts that are the very subject of remedies provided for under section 18.
[16] I fully agree with the applicant that the purpose of the definition of a "federal board" in subsection 2(1) of the Federal Court Act is to distinguish between types of bodies not types of actions. The Federal Court Act applies to bodies that derive their powers from Acts of Parliament. Once a body is found to have powers conferred by an Act of Parliament, then all actions of that body affecting the rights of an individual are subject to judicial review.
[17] This question was addressed by Evans J. in Markevich v. Canada (Treasury Department), [1999] 3 F.C. 28, where he considered whether a title concerning unpaid taxes issued by Revenue Canada was subject to judicial review under section 18.1 of the Federal Court Act. He concluded that the definition of a "federal board" in subsection 2(1) of the Federal Court Act is satisfied as long as the administrative act in question is undertaken by a person or body having statutory powers: Markevich, ibid. at paras.11-13 (F.C.T.D.).
[18] In the present case, the National Parole Board is clearly granted statutory authority under Part II of the CCRA. Thus, the National Parole Board when exercising or purporting to exercise this statutory power is a "federal board" as defined by section 2 of the Federal Court Act.
[19] The respondent further submits that the recommendation made by the National Parole Board is not even "a decision" within the meaning of section 18.1 of the Federal Court Act. Again, I disagree.
[20] In my view, this reasoning is put into question by the Federal Court of Appeal's recent decision in Krause v. Canada, [1999] 2 F.C. 476 (C.A.). In the underlying application for judicial review, the appellants in that case were seeking orders of mandamus, prohibition and declaration with respect to accounting procedures which they alleged violated requirements under the Public Service Superannuation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-36, and the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-17. For purposes of the appeal, the Court had to consider whether an application for such remedies is subject to the 30-day time limit stated in subsection 18.1(2). In answering this question, the Court addressed the scope of subsection 18.1(1), which permits "anyone directly affected by the matter in respect of which relief is sought" to bring an application for judicial review. It determined that "matter" is not limited to "decisions or orders", but includes any matter in respect of which a remedy may be available under section 18. Stone J.A. concluded that:
[para24] I am satisfied that the exercise of the jurisdiction under section 18 does not depend on the existence of a "decision or order." In Alberta Wilderness Assn. v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries & Oceans), [(1997), 26 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 238 (F.C.T.D.), at pp. 241-242] Hugessen J. was of the view that a remedy envisaged by that section "does not require that there be a decision or order actually in existence as a prerequisite to its exercise." In the present case, the existence of the general decision to proceed in accordance with the recommendations of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants does not, in my view, render the subsection 18.1(2) time limit applicable so as to bar the appellants from seeking relief by way of mandamus, prohibition and declaration. Otherwise, a person in the position of the appellants would be barred from the possibility of ever obtaining relief under section 18 solely because the alleged invalid or unlawful act stemmed from a decision to take the alleged unlawful step. That decision did not of itself result in a breach of any statutory duties. If such a breach occurred it is because of the actions taken by the responsible Minister in contravention of the relevant statutory provisions.
[21] The Court recognized that this Court's jurisdiction is not limited to reviewing "decisions", but includes review of administrative acts to which section 18 remedies might apply.
[22] On the authority of Krause and a related decision in Alberta Wilderness Assn. v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), [1999] 1 F.C. 483 at para. 6 (C.A.), I find that this Court has jurisdiction to consider whether the Board acted ultra vires or misused its authority in issuing a recommendation against the applicant.
[23] The respondent finally argues that the Board's recommendation is not reviewable because it is not a "final decision that disposes of a substantive question". I find no merit in this argument. As a principle of administrative law, non-dispositive decisions are reviewable if they affect the subject's interests. As has been pointed out in D. J. M. Brown and J. M. Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Canvasback Publishing, 1998), at paragraph 2:4420, the scope of judicial review "has broadened to include a decision that was fully determinative of the substantive rights of the party, even though it may not be the ultimate decision of the tribunal".
[24] The Ontario Court of Appeal dealt with the issue of whether the requirements of procedural fairness apply to non-dispositive determinations in Re Abel et al. and Advisory Review Board (1980), 31 O.R. (2d) 520. The Advisory Review Board was charged with annually reviewing the case of patients in psychiatric facilities detained under the authority of a warrant of the Lieutenant-Governor. It then provided written recommendations to the Lieutenant-Governor in Council. At 532-33, the Court stated:
In Martineau (No. 2), supra, Dickson J. said at pp. 622-3 S.C.R., p. 373 C.C.C., p. 405 D.L.R.:
In my opinion, certiorari avails as a remedy wherever a public body has power to decide any matter affecting the rights, interests, property, privileges or liberties of any person.
In my view, the [Advisory Review] Board has power to decide such a question. Grange J. observed (24 O.R. (2d) 279 at p. 292, 46 C.C.C. (2d) 342 at p. 356, 97 D.L.R. (3d) 304 at p. 318):
The Lieutenant Governor is, of course, not bound to act upon the recommendations in the report, but I do not think I go too far -- indeed I think I only state the obvious -- when I say that a patient's only hope of release lies in a favourable recommendation by the Board.
Just as the Lieutenant-Governor need not act upon the Board's report so the Board need not act upon the information and reports of the officer in charge, but there can be no question that these will influence the Board and may in many cases be decisive. If counsel for the patient seeks, as he must, to represent his client properly, one can well understand his desire, even his imperative need, to examine such reports.
I agree completely with these comments, but I would go even further. The whole purpose of the establishment of an advisory review board was to create an independent body, bringing to its task a considerable and varied expertise of its own, and likely to develop quickly an even greater expertise with the kind of problem assigned to it, with the hoped-for result that no one would be kept indefinitely in a mental institution, half- forgotten, and with his situation unreviewed except by the staff of the institution. It is inherent in the conception and operation of such a board that its recommendations will virtually always be accepted [...]
[25] Citing Re Abel, the Federal Court of Appeal drew the same conclusion in Kampman v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1996] 2 F.C. 798 (C.A.):
[para58] Before turning to the issue of adequate alternative remedies, there are two subsidiary issues to be addressed. The first is whether the case at bar can be distinguished from Knight on the basis that the deputy head's decision to recommend the respondent's release from the Public Service was not a "final" decision. In my view it cannot. There is much jurisprudence to the effect that a decision does not have to be final in order for a duty of fairness to attach. As expressed by H. W. R. Wade in Administrative Law, 6th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) at pages 570-571, the power to recommend can also import the duty to be fair:
Natural justice is concerned with the exercise of power, that is to say, with acts or orders which produce legal results and in some way alter someone's legal position to his disadvantage. But preliminary steps, which in themselves may not involve immediate legal consequences, may lead to acts or orders which do so. In this case the protection of fair procedure may be needed throughout, and the successive steps must be considered not only separately but also as a whole. The question must always be whether, looking at the statutory procedure as a whole, each separate step is fair to persons affected.
[. . .]
In general, however, the courts are favourable to the observance of natural justice in the making of preliminary investigations and reports which may lead to serious legal consequences to some person.
[para59] In short, where the power to recommend or advise holds the potential for significantly adverse consequences for the person concerned, as herein, it is clear that a duty to act fairly can arise: see Munro (Re) (1993), 105 D.L.R. (4th) 342 (Sask. C.A.); Abel et al. and Advisory Review Board et al., (Re) (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 279 (Div. Ct.), affd (1980), 31 O.R. (2d) 520 (C.A.); and J. M. Evans, ed., de Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th ed. (London: Stevens and Sons, 1980) at pages 233-237.
[26] In the present case, the Board's recommendation plays a prominent if not determinative part of the institutional head's negative decision, supra:
The National Parole Board was consulted about Escorted Temporary Absences for Mr. McCabe. The Board recommended negatively. The concern was that Mr. McCabe has just begun to acknowledge his problems, and begin therapy to work on his problems. The Board felt that Mr. McCabe needed further therapy and treatment.
It was revealed at the Unit Board 1999-11-09 that Mr. McCabe had recently stopped his one to one sessions with the psychologist. It has become apparent that there are problems that must be addressed before this case can be considered ready for conditional release.
The Escorted Temporary Absence is not approved.
[27] Moreover, the Board's opinion was obviously important to the warden since he requested it in the absence of any statutory requirement to do so. I am satisfied that the recommendation was sufficiently prejudicial to the applicant's interests to warrant judicial scrutiny. It is hard to imagine that the Warden would have granted the applicant's request in the face of a negative recommendation from the Board.
B) Was it within the Board's jurisdiction to issue a recommendation under the circumstances of this case?
[28] The applicant submits that the Board acted without jurisdiction in issuing a recommendation to the institutional head. It is pointed out that in Steele, supra, at para. 7., Dubé J. found that the Board was in fact acting without jurisdiction:
[...] the Board was not exercising a jurisdiction provided by a federal act and was therefore "not acting as a federal board, commission or other tribunal" within the meaning of sections 2, 18 and 18.1 of the Federal Court Act.
[29] It is a fundamental principle of public law that all governmental action be supported by a grant of legal authority: D.J. Brown and J.M. Evans, supra, at 13–1. I find no provision of the CCRA that grants the Board power to conduct hearings, review evidence, find facts or issue recommendations with respect to requests for ETA's. Subsection 17(1) clearly gives the institutional head the decision-making authority subject to the caveat in section 746.1 of the Criminal Code. As noted by the respondent, that provision does not apply here because the requested ETA would not occur more than three years before the specified number of years of imprisonment. There is no statutory requirement under such circumstances for the institutional head to obtain the Board's approval with respect to an ETA application. Thus with respect to the Board's lack of jurisdiction, I agree with Dubé J.'s finding in Steele, supra.
C) Procedural Fairness and erroneous finding of fact.
[30] Since it has been determined that the Board acted beyond its jurisdiction in issuing the recommendation, it is unnecessary to consider what procedural or substantive requirements are required in this case.
D) Did the Board act beyond its jurisdiction in releasing its recommendation to the media?
[31] Pursuant to subsection 144(2) of the CCRA the Board may release its decisions to the public subject to certain conditions. The respondent concedes that if the Board's recommendation is not a "decision", it should not have been released and agrees with the applicant that the proper remedy is an order prohibiting the Board from releasing its recommendations in similar circumstances.
[32] Considering my conclusion that the recommendation is not a valid expression of statutory power, the order requested by the applicant is granted.
DISPOSITION
[33] The judicial review is granted.
[34] This Court declares that the National Parole Board acted without jurisdiction on issuing the recommendation.
[35] The recommendation being invalid, the Court orders that the National Parole Board remove all copies of the recommendation from the applicant's files at the National Parole Board.
[36] The Court declares that the National Parole Board acted without jurisdiction in releasing the recommendation to the media.
"Danièle Tremblay-Lamer"
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
April 9, 2001.
Email this Content