Date: 20011019
Docket: T-729-00
Neutral Citation No. 2001 FCT 1142
BETWEEN:
RAYMOND DESLOGES
Applicant
- and -
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
ASSESSMENT OF COSTS - REASONS
Charles E. Stinson
Assessment Officer
[1] The Applicant sought judicial review of a decision of the Veterans Review and Appeal Board denying his application for a medical pension. The Court quashed the decision with costs including a direction that the Applicant, "as a self-represented litigant, is not entitled to counsel fees, but is entitled to disbursements in accordance with Tariff B". I directed that this matter be addressed by the service and filing of written materials. The only items in issue are $21.50 for parking and $234.24 for transportation. Disbursements for registry fees ($100.00), photocopying ($71.57), printing ($57.96) and registered mail ($5.26) were conceded.
The Applicant's Position
[2] The Applicant's evidence is that the only available receipt is for $6.25 for parking at National Defence Headquarters to inspect and copy relevant records, and that the balance of the $21.50 for parking addressed attendance on several dates at the Respondent's office and at the Registry to serve and file documents and obtain precedent copies. The Applicant asserted that he did not claim for the day of the hearing of the judicial review as his spouse drove him to Court. The Applicant's evidence is that the $234.24 is based on $0.32 per kilometre, a reasonable rate used by the federal government to reimburse its employees, for two, one, ten and five return visits to Veterans Affairs, National Defence Headquarters, the Registry's plus the Respondent's offices and the post office. The Applicant asserted that he did not claim travel expenses for the day of the hearing of the judicial review as his spouse drove him to Court and they were able to conduct personal business as well.
[3] The Applicant noted the Respondent's position that he is not entitled to travel expenses because he is not a legal counsel. He conceded that, as a self-represented litigant, he did not incur counsel fees, but argued that he is entitled to all legitimate costs incurred in advancing the litigation. The Applicant argued that the eligibility of expenses is not a function of the legal qualifications of the individual performing the tasks, and that it is logical and reasonable that a self-represented litigant performing the same tasks as counsel in the preparation, submission, and presentation of a case should have the same entitlement as counsel to eligible disbursements. The Applicant argued that United Terminals Ltd. v. M.N.R. [1990] 2 F.C. D-15 (Taxing Off.) concluded client travel expenses are allowable if necessary, and that Sonammas Compania Maritima S.A. v. "Netuno" (The) 1995, 102 F.T.R. 181 (T.D.) concluded that litigation in this Court sometimes necessitates travel and that all parties must expect to have to indemnify the associated costs. The Applicant argued that this latter case supports the proposition that all parties, and not just legal counsel, are entitled to travel expenses.
The Respondent's Position
[4] The Respondent argued that the Court limited disbursements to those that are in accordance with Tariff B. The Respondent noted that section 3(1) of Tariff A and section 3(a) (note: I think the reference likely is to section 1(3)(a)) of Tariff B permit travel expenses for witnesses. The Respondent noted that item 24 of Tariff B permits counsel fees for travel by counsel. The Respondent argued that, as the Applicant is neither a witness nor legal counsel, he is not entitled to travel expenses. The Respondent noted that Lavigne v. Canada (Human Resources Development) (1998), 229 N.R. 205 held that a self-represented litigant is not entitled to counsel fees. The Respondent noted that United Terminals, supra, and Sonammas Compania, supra, are not relevant since the parties in both cases were represented by counsel.
Assessment
[5] Tariff A 3(1) is a formula for travel expenses for witnesses. However, consistent with my conclusion at para. [10] in Feherguard Products Ltd. v. Rocky's of B.C. Leisure Ltd. [1994] F.C.J. No. 2012 that "the best way to administer the scheme of costs in litigation is to choose positive applications of its provisions as opposed to narrower and negative ones", I do not think Tariff A 3(1) precludes travel expenses for other participants in litigation. The reference in Tariff B 1(3)(a) to payments to witnesses under Tariff A simply particularizes a category, but it does not address or limit other disbursements such as travel expenses for non-witnesses. I concluded in Garry Lloyd Ager v. International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers et al. [1999] F.C. No. 909 (Q.L.) at para. [7], and in ITV Technologies, Inc. v. WIC Television Ltd. T-1459-97 on January 12, 2000, at para [26], that the wording of item 24 does not preclude assessment of an associated disbursement for travel in the absence of a direction of the Court.
[6] A disbursement is a payment by either side in litigation to a disinterested third person for a service, not falling within the professional expertise of a solicitor (except in limited circumstances: see Reasons dated July 29, 1999, in T-1941-93, James L. Ferguson v. Arctic Transportation Ltd. et al.) which is reasonable and necessary to advance the litigation. Disbursements are usually paid through a party's solicitor, but they are sometimes paid directly by the client under the supervision of the solicitor having conduct. Tariff B authorizes disbursements, but does not prohibit categories of disbursements. Here, the Applicant had to perform the tasks advancing the litigation and pay the associated disbursements directly. There is no reason to preclude his travel expenses, if reasonable and necessary to advance the litigation, as they would not have been incurred but for this litigation. His proof for the travel expenses is less than absolute. For example, the details of what was served or filed on each trip are not there. Some trips were to educate himself on procedure by obtaining precedents. In matters such as Canadian Olympic Association v. USA Hockey Inc. et al. , A-472-97, February 22, 2001, 2001 FCA 32, I have allowed computer-assisted research, but for conservative amounts. Here, the evidence is unclear whether a lesser number of trips might have been possible. Process service firms and couriers are common tools used by law firms and the charges for those services are generally allowed as disbursements in costs. There are two rates for travel reimbursement used in the public service: currently, in Ontario, $0.42.5 per kilometre for the employer requested rate, and $0.13.0 per kilometre for the employee requested rate. I apply my conclusions in Carlile v. The Queen, 97 D.T.C. 5284 and allow a total of $110.00 for parking and transportation. The Applicant's Bill of Costs, presented at $490.53, is assessed and allowed at $344.79.
(Sgd.) "Charles E. Stinson"
Assessment Officer
Vancouver, B.C.
October 19, 2001
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-729-00
STYLE OF CAUSE:Raymond Desloges v. AGC
ASSESSMENT IN WRITING WITHOUT PERSONAL APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
REASONS FOR ASSESSMENT OF COSTS BY: CHARLES E. STINSON
DATED: OCTOBER 19, 2001
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada FOR THE RESPONDENT
Ottawa, Ontario
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