Date: 20040406
Docket: IMM-5286-02
Citation: 2004 FC 531
Ottawa, Ontario, this 6th day of April 2004
Present: THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE DAWSON
BETWEEN:
VIATCHESLAV GARIEV
IRINA GARIEVA
ANNA GARIEVA
DARIA DANILTCHENKO
Applicants
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] Mr. Viatcheslav Gariev is a citizen of Belarus. He presently resides and works in Cyprus as a computer programmer. In August 1998, he submitted an application for permanent residence in Canada in the independent category. His wife and two daughters were included as dependents in his application. His application was subsequently approved, subject to satisfactory conclusion of security, criminal and medical checks.
[2] On October 17, 2002, an immigration counsellor ("officer") at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow determined that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Gariev was a member of the GRU (Russian Military Intelligence) which is an organization that has engaged in acts of espionage. It followed from this conclusion that there were reasonable grounds upon which to believe that Mr. Gariev was a member of the inadmissible class of persons described in paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c.27 ("Act"). Section 34(1) provides:
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34(1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for
[...]
(f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).
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34(1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour raison de sécurité les faits suivants_:
[...]
f) être membre d'une organisation don't il y a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu'elle est, a été ou sera l'auteur d'un acte visé aux alinéas a), b) ou c).
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[3] Mr. Gariev brings this application for judicial review of the decision that he is inadmissible on security grounds.
[4] These reasons deal with both the Minister's application under section 87 of the Act for the non-disclosure of information considered and relied upon by the officer, and the merits of the application for judicial review.
THE APPLICATION FOR NON-DISCLOSURE
[5] Section 87 of the Act permits, among other things, the Minister in the course of a judicial review application to apply to a judge for the non-disclosure of information considered by an officer in the course of determining whether a foreign national who has applied for a visa or other document is inadmissible. The procedure to be followed on such an application is the procedure provided in section 78 of the Act, modified to the extent that no summary of the withheld information need be provided to the party opposite to the Minister and there is no prescribed time limit within which the judge must examine the information. The procedure is to be further modified as the circumstances require. For ease of reference sections 87 and 78 of the Act are set out below, as is section 11 of the Act which is specifically referred to in section 87 and which is applicable to the facts of this application.
| 87(1) The Minister may, in the course of a judicial review, make an application to the judge for the non-disclosure of any information with respect to information protected under subsection 86(1) or information considered under section 11, 112 or 115.
87(2) Section 78, except for the provisions relating to the obligation to provide a summary and the time limit referred to in paragraph 78(d), applies to the determination of the application, with any modifications that the circumstances require.
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87(1) Le ministre peut, dans le cadre d'un contrôle judiciaire, demander au juge d'interdire la divulgation de tout renseignement protégé au titre du paragraphe 86(1) ou pris en compte dans le cadre des articles 11, 112 ou 115.
87(2) L'article 78 s'applique à l'examen de la demande, avec les adaptations nécessaires, sauf quant à l'obligation de fournir un résumé et au délai.
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| 78. The following provisions govern the determination:
(a) the judge shall hear the matter;
(b) the judge shall ensure the confidentiality of the information on which the certificate is based and of any other evidence that may be provided to the judge if, in the opinion of the judge, its disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person;
(c) the judge shall deal with all matters as informally and expeditiously as the circumstances and considerations of fairness and natural justice permit;
(d) the judge shall examine the information and any other evidence in private within seven days after the referral of the certificate for determination;
(e) on each request of the Minister or the Solicitor General of Canada made at any time during the proceedings, the judge shall hear all or part of the information or evidence in the absence of the permanent resident or the foreign national named in the certificate and their counsel if, in the opinion of the judge, its disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person;
(f) the information or evidence described in paragraph (e) shall be returned to the Minister and the Solicitor General of Canada and shall not be considered by the judge in deciding whether the certificate is reasonable if either the matter is withdrawn or if the judge determines that the information or evidence is not relevant or, if it is relevant, that it should be part of the summary;
(g) the information or evidence described in paragraph (e) shall not be included in the summary but may be considered by the judge in deciding whether the certificate is reasonable if the judge determines that the information or evidence is relevant but that its disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person;
(h) the judge shall provide the permanent resident or the foreign national with a summary of the information or evidence that enables them to be reasonably informed of the circumstances giving rise to the certificate, but that does not include anything that in the opinion of the judge would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person if disclosed;
(i) the judge shall provide the permanent resident or the foreign national with an opportunity to be heard regarding their inadmissibility; and
(j) the judge may receive into evidence anything that, in the opinion of the judge, is appropriate, even if it is inadmissible in a court of law, and may base the decision on that evidence.
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78. Les règles suivantes s'appliquent à l'affaire_:
a) le juge entend l'affaire;
b) le juge est tenu de garantir la confidentialité des renseignements justifiant le certificat et des autres éléments de preuve qui pourraient lui être communiqués et dont la divulgation porterait atteinte, selon lui, à la sécurité nationale ou à la sécurité d'autrui;
c) il procède, dans la mesure où les circonstances et les considérations d'équité et de justice naturelle le permettent, sans formalisme et selon la procédure expéditive;
d) il examine, dans les sept jours suivant le dépôt du certificat et à huis clos, les renseignements et autres éléments de preuve;
e) à chaque demande d'un ministre, il examine, en l'absence du résident permanent ou de l'étranger et de son conseil, tout ou partie des renseignements ou autres éléments de preuve dont la divulgation porterait atteinte, selon lui, à la sécurité nationale ou à la sécurité d'autrui;
f) ces renseignements ou éléments de preuve doivent être remis aux ministres et ne peuvent servir de fondement à l'affaire soit si le juge décide qu'ils ne sont pas pertinents ou, l'étant, devraient faire partie du résumé, soit en cas de retrait de la demande;
g) si le juge décide qu'ils sont pertinents, mais que leur divulgation porterait atteinte à la sécurité nationale ou à celle d'autrui, ils ne peuvent faire partie du résumé, mais peuvent servir de fondement à l'affaire;
h) le juge fournit au résident permanent ou à l'étranger, afin de lui permettre d'être suffisamment informé des circonstances ayant donné lieu au certificat, un résumé de la preuve ne comportant aucun élément dont la divulgation porterait atteinte, selon lui, à la sécurité nationale ou à la sécurité d'autrui;
i) il donne au résident permanent ou à l'étranger la possibilité d'être entendu sur l'interdiction de territoire le visant;
j) il peut recevoir et admettre en preuve tout élément qu'il estime utile - même inadmissible en justice - et peut fonder sa décision sur celui-ci.
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| 11(1) A foreign national must, before entering Canada, apply to an officer for a visa or for any other document required by the regulations. The visa or document shall be issued if, following an examination, the officer is satisfied that the foreign national is not inadmissible and meets the requirements of this Act.
11(2) The officer may not issue a visa or other document to a foreign national whose sponsor does not meet the sponsorship requirements of this Act.
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11(1) L'étranger doit, préalablement à son entrée au Canada, demander à l'agent les visa et autres documents requis par règlement, lesquels sont délivrés sur preuve, à la suite d'un contrôle, qu'il n'est pas interdit de territoire et se conforme à la présente loi.
11(2) Ils ne peuvent être délivrés à l'étranger dont le répondant ne se conforme pas aux exigences applicables au parrainage.
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[6] The legislation provides that on an application made pursuant to section 87, the judge designated to hear the matter must insure the confidentiality of the information in question, so long as the judge is of the opinion that its disclosure would be "injurious to national security or to the safety of any person". For brevity, I shall use the phrase "injurious to national security or safety" in these reasons when referring to this provision.
[7] The judge must deal with the application as informally and expeditiously as the circumstances and considerations of natural justice permit. The judge is obliged on the request of the Minister to hear all of the information which the Minister asserts cannot be disclosed in the absence of the affected foreign national and his or her counsel. If the judge is of the opinion that disclosure of the information would be injurious to national security or safety, an order will issue allowing the Minister's application. The information then forms part of the record before the Court on the application for judicial review, and is not disclosed to the applicant or his or her counsel.
[8] If, however, the judge concludes that all or a portion of the information could be disclosed because such disclosure would not be injurious to national security or safety, the information is to be returned to the Minister. If this is done, such information does not form part of the record before the Court on the application for judicial review. Alternatively the Minister may decide that he or she does not require the return of the information, in which case the information would be disclosed, and would form part of the public record before the Court.
[9] In the present case, the tribunal record filed pursuant to Rule 17 of the Federal Court Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, SOR/2002-232, contained 8 pages where some information had been redacted (pages 2, 43, 113, 114 and 155 to 158). Further, 12 pages had been removed in their entirety (pages 125 to 136). Together the redacted material is referred to in these reasons as the "confidential information".
[10] The Minister filed on the public record the application for non-disclosure of the confidential information. The application was supported by an affidavit also filed on the public record which confirmed that the officer had relied upon classified information in reaching his decision and which asserted that such information must be protected so that it should not be disclosed to the applicants, their counsel or the public. The affidavit also stated that the application would be supported by a "secret affidavit [which] explains the basis for the non-disclosure of the information". A confidential affidavit was later filed.
[11] The Minister's application was scheduled to be heard on January 9, 2004, and counsel for the applicants was notified of the time and place of the section 87 application. Prior to the oral hearing of the section 87 application, a supplemental confidential affidavit was filed on the Minister's behalf.
[12] On January 9, 2004, counsel for the applicants and the Minister appeared and each made submissions in open court with respect to the section 87 application on the basis of the public record. Thereafter, the Court sat in camera in the absence of the applicants and their counsel for the purpose of hearing the submissions of counsel for the Minister upon the confidential affidavits. Prior to January 9, 2004, the Court had read the confidential affidavits. Because this application took place, at least in part, in the absence of the applicants and their counsel, I will describe in some detail the process followed by the Court in dealing with this application in the absence of the applicants and their counsel.
[13] While subsection 78(c) of the Act permits as informal and expeditious a process as the circumstances and considerations of fairness and natural justice permit, in my view, these in camera proceedings are, in the normal case, not to be conducted informally. Court was therefore opened in the usual fashion by a registry officer, formal submissions were made by counsel for the Minister, and the submissions were based entirely upon the evidentiary record before the Court.
[14] When considering whether disclosure of the confidential information would be injurious to national security or to the safety of persons, the principles applied were those articulated in Henrie v. Canada (Security Intelligence Review Committee) (1988), 53 D.L.R. (4th) 568; affirmed 88 D.L.R. (4th) 575. There, Mr. Justice Addy wrote at pages 578 and 579:
[...] in security matters, there is a requirement to not only protect the identity of human sources of information but to recognize that the following types of information might require to be protected with due regard of course to the administration of justice and more particularly to the openness of its proceedings: information pertaining to the identity of targets of the surveillance whether they be individuals or groups, the technical means and sources of surveillance, the methods of operation of the service, the identity of certain members of the service itself, the telecommunications and cypher systems and, at times, the very fact that a surveillance is being or is not being carried out. This means for instance that evidence, which of itself might not be of any particular use in actually identifying the threat, might nevertheless require to be protected if the mere divulging of the fact that C.S.I.S. is in possession of it would alert the targeted organization to the fact that it is in fact subject to electronic surveillance or to a wiretap or to a leak from some human source within the organization.
It is of some importance to realize than an "informed reader", that is, a person who is both knowledgeable regarding security matters and is a member of or associated with a group which constitutes a threat or a potential threat to the security of Canada, will be quite familiar with the minute details of its organization and of the ramifications of its operations regarding which our security service might well be relatively uninformed. As a result, such an informed reader may at times, by fitting a piece of apparently innocuous information into the general picture which he has before him, be in a position to arrive at some damaging deductions regarding the investigation of a particular threat or of many other threats to national security. He might, for instance, be in a position to determine one or more of the following: (1) the duration, scope intensity and degree of success or of lack of success of an investigation; (2) the investigative techniques of the Service; (3) the typographic and teleprinter systems employed by C.S.I.S.; (4) internal security procedures; (5) the nature and content of other classified documents; (6) the identities of service personnel or of other persons involved in an investigation. [underlining added]
[15] Applying those principles to the confidential information and to the evidence adduced by the Minister, I was satisfied that disclosure of the redacted information contained in pages 2, 43, 155, 156 and 157 of the tribunal record would be injurious to national security or safety.
[16] Counsel for the Minister conceded that information redacted on page 158 of the tribunal record should be disclosed to the public and the applicants because the information had previously been disclosed on the public record.
[17] With respect to the balance of the confidential information, the evidence did not satisfy me that disclosure of all of the remaining confidential information would be injurious to national security or safety. I was not satisfied of this because of information which already appeared on the public record, and also because some of the evidence contained in the confidential affidavits consisted of blanket statements claiming that disclosure of some of the confidential information would be injurious to national security or safety.
[18] In my view, what is required in order for a judge to properly consider an application under section 87 of the Act is not a mere assertion of conclusions. Rather, admissible evidence (whether factual or expert, if given by an appropriately qualified expert) is required which the Court may weigh and assess for itself so as to be satisfied whether disclosure of the information would be injurious to national security or safety within the meaning of section 87 of the Act.
[19] While I was of the view that some of the confidential information could safely be disclosed and therefore should be returned to the Minister, I was also of the view that some of the confidential information could not be disclosed. As well, I was unable to conclude on the evidence whether a portion of the confidential information could be safely disclosed.
[20] The nature of an in camera proceeding conducted in the absence of a party is such that the Court must avoid the situation, or the appearance of the situation, where a party is given a number of opportunities to meet its evidentiary burden. However, at the same time, the Court is obliged by statute to ensure the confidentiality of information if its disclosure would be injurious to national security or safety.
[21] Further, the Court cannot order disclosure of information put before it by the Minister on an application brought under section 87 of the Act. Rather, the Minister must be afforded the opportunity to have information returned and not used where the Court has not been persuaded that the disclosure of the information would be injurious to national security or safety, the Minister does not accept that conclusion and the Minister wishes the information returned rather than have it disclosed.
[22] There is, in my view, a further relevant consideration. That is the public interest in open decision-making and public scrutiny of the decision-making process. The public interest requires the fullest public evidentiary record which is possible.
[23] Therefore, on January 9, 2004, after hearing the submissions of counsel for the Minister, I advised counsel that I found the evidence to be insufficient with respect to pages 113, 114 and 125 to 136 of the tribunal record. Counsel for the Minister then advised that her preliminary instructions were to seek the return of the confidential information contained on those pages. Taking all of the considerations set out in the above paragraphs into account, I adjourned the Minister's application for the purpose of allowing counsel for the Minister to obtain instructions whether to have the confidential information contained in pages 113, 114 and 125 to 136 returned, or whether to file further evidence that would allow the Court to form its own conclusion on that part of the confidential information where the evidence did not permit a decision to be made as to whether it could safely be disclosed.
[24] The application was continued on January 30, 2004, on an in camera basis in the absence of the applicants and their counsel. The applicants were notified of the adjournment and of the re-scheduled date. On January 30, 2004, the Court heard submissions from counsel for the Minister based upon a further confidential affidavit that had been filed and which dealt specifically with each portion of the confidential information. This evidence allowed the Court to assess the evidence and consider for itself what portions of the confidential information could be disclosed without being injurious to natural security or safety.
[25] Having considered that evidence and the submissions of counsel for the Minister, I concluded that all of pages 114, 131 to 133, 135 to 136 and 158 could be disclosed without being injurious to national security or safety. I further concluded that while some information on pages 113, 125 to 130 and 134 could not be disclosed, more information could be disclosed than appeared in the redacted tribunal record.
[26] Counsel for the Minister was so advised during the hearing on January 30, 2004. The Minister's counsel then confirmed that the Minister would not seek the return of the specific information which the Court had concluded could safely be released. The Court ordered that:
1. The application was allowed with respect to pages 2, 43, 155, 156 and 157 of the tribunal record so that the material redacted on those pages should not be disclosed to the applicants, their counsel or the public.
2. The application was disallowed with respect to pages 114, 131, 132, 133, 135, 136 and 158 of the tribunal record so that those pages were to form part of the public record in their entirety.
3. The application was allowed in part with respect to pages 113, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130 and 134 of the tribunal record. Those pages were to be redacted as reflected in the pages which were attached as an appendix to the Court's order of that date.
[27] It would, in my view, have been preferable for the Minister to have provided a fuller evidentiary record from the outset. Where the total non-disclosure of a record or portion of a record is sought, as the Minister sought in this case, it would nonetheless be prudent and proper for the Minister to also provide specific information as to why the disclosure of each specific item of information would be injurious to national security or safety.
[28] Notwithstanding the initial failure of the Minister to do so, in this case I was satisfied that allowing the further confidential affidavit to be filed was necessary in order for the Court to be able to conclude for itself what information could safely be released while still complying with the Court's mandate to ensure the confidentiality of information put before the Court where its disclosure would be injurious to national security or safety. Further, maximizing the extent of disclosure to the applicants provides greater fairness to them and promotes the openness of this Court's proceeding and the most transparent review possible of the decision at issue.
[29] Having dealt with the section 87 application, I turn now to the application for judicial review.
THE APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
(i) Background Facts
[30] On his application for permanent residence, Mr. Gariev disclosed his prior military service in what he referred to as Military Unit 20701.
[31] Mr. Gariev was interviewed at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow on April 14, 1999 and re-interviewed in December 1999 in order to obtain more information on the nature of his military service.
[32] On October 4, 2002, Mr. Gariev was requested to attend a further interview to be held on October 17, 2002 with the officer. The officer has sworn an affidavit filed in this proceeding. In it the officer swears that at the October 17, 2002 interview he informed Mr. Gariev that he had received information, based primarily upon Mr. Gariev's application for permanent residence and his own oral statements made during the course of processing his application, which led the officer to believe that Mr. Gariev was inadmissible to Canada on security grounds, by reason of his former membership in the GRU. Specifically, Mr. Gariev was advised that the information the office received led him to believe that Military Unit 20701 was a component of the GRU.
[33] The officer also swears that when confronted with this information Mr. Gariev did not deny the substance of the new information, but rather attempted to minimize his complicity in the proscribed activities attributed to him. The counsellor swears that Mr. Gariev declared that his duties were limited to developing software of a peripheral, administrative support nature. Mr. Gariev suggested that if he were to be refused permanent residence in Canada all citizens of the former Soviet Union should be refused in like manner, because all citizens served the KGB during the period. Mr. Gariev is also said to have stated that all mathematicians were recruited to work in encryption.
[34] In this application for judicial review Mr. Gariev has sworn in his affidavit the following about his military experience:
3. I was gifted in mathematics as a child and for this reason I was sent to a special secondary school in the former Soviet Union which specialized in mathematics. I was the top student at the school and for this reason when I graduated I was offered a prestigious place at the university-level Higher School of the KGB (the Institute of Cryptography, Communication, and Information Science) in Moscow, Russia. I attended this university from 1984 to 1989 when I graduated with a degree in applied mathematics. While a student at university I was never a member of the KGB or GRU. However, I was a member of the Soviet army.
4. Upon graduation from university in August 1989 I was assigned to work as an officer in Military Unit 20701 which was based in Minsk, Belarus. I served in Military Unit 20701 from August 1989 to December 1992 when I received a discharge from the army and entered civilian life. At the time of my discharge from the army I held the rank of chief lieutenant.
5. Military Unit 20701 was a separate military unit which belonged to and was under the command of the Belarussian Military District of the army of the Soviet Union. Military Unit 20701 did not belong to nor was it a part of the Soviet military intelligence which later became the Russian military intelligence (The proper name for the former Soviet military intelligence or present Russian military intelligence when translated into English is "Main Intelligence Department of the Ministry of Defence", and is commonly known by its Russian acronym which in English is "GRU". I will refer to it in my affidavit as "GRU".). I wish to emphasize that Military Unit 20701 was organizationally distinct and separate from the GRU and the KGB.
6. I was an officer in the Soviet army, however, I was never an officer in the GRU or the KGB. Indeed, I was never a member of either the GRU or the KGB.
7. Military Unit 20701 provided technical support in the areas of mathematical and statistical analysis and computer science for cryptography. It received requests from outside organizations such as GRU to develop computer programs or mathematical algorithms according to specified parameters and requirements. For example, my personal responsibilities were to develop computer programs, primarily in the PL/1 software language, in accordance with specifications that I was given.
8. Military Unit 20701 did not carry out any espionage itself or any surveillance of any kind. Indeed, technically it was not possible to carry out such activities because the unit lacked the necessary equipment to intercept signals. In the event of war, there were contingency plans for Military Unit 20701 to take on a more active role. However, there was never any war when I served in the Soviet military, and therefore this never happened.
9. Military Unit 20701 did not belong to the GRU and it was not part of the GRU organizational structure. However, it was required to report to the GRU in response to requests from the GRU for the development of computer programs and mathematical algorithms which had to be developed according to precise specifications determined by the GRU.
(ii) Standard of Review
[35] The parties agreed that on the basis of the existing jurisprudence the standard of review to be applied to the officer's determination is that of patent unreasonableness.
(iii) Analysis
[36] Section 33 of the Act provides rules of interpretation to be applied to section 34 of the Act. Section 33 provides that the facts that constitute inadmissibility under section 33 include facts for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that they have occurred, are occurring or may occur.
[37] It is accepted by the parties that the GRU is an organization that engages or has engaged in acts of espionage against democratic governments. Therefore, Mr. Gariev argues in paragraph 1 of his reply memorandum that in order for the officer "to have determined that [he] was caught by para. 34(1)(f) of the [Act] he had to have had a bona fide belief in a serious possibility based on credible evidence that the principal Applicant was a direct member of the GRU or that Military Unit 20701 was part of the GRU organization."
[38] The Minister accepted in oral argument that this was the applicable test. I, too, am satisfied that this is the appropriate test to be applied. As I wrote in Yao v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 741 at paragraph 28:
The standard of proof required to establish reasonable grounds for a belief is a standard of proof that connotes "a bona fide belief in a serious possibility based on credible evidence". See: Chiau v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 2 F.C. 297 (C.A.) at paragraph 60. It is not necessary for the Minister to establish either actual membership in an espionage agency, or actual acts of espionage.
[39] In the present case, the public record discloses that the following evidence was before the officer:
1. Mr. Gariev declared his activities as a computer programmer during his military service with Military Unit 20701.
2. The officer had information that Mr. Gariev had admitted in his earlier interviews at the embassy that it was the GRU that had selected and assigned him to a unit involved in intercepting and deciphering communications from Europe. Mr. Gariev said that his job was to develop a computer program to help in the decryption process.
3. The officer received information that led him to believe that Military Unit 20701 was a component of the GRU.
4. When the officer put the information he had received to Mr. Gariev, Mr. Gariev did not deny the substance of the new information.
5. Mr. Gariev told the officer that all mathematicians were recruited to work in encryption.
[40] In addition, the officer had before him the confidential information.
[41] On the basis of the totality of the material before the officer, I am satisfied that the officer's conclusion that Mr. Gariev was inadmissible to Canada under paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act was neither unreasonable nor patently unreasonable. There was credible evidence before the officer upon which he could form a bona fide belief in a serious possibility that Mr. Gariev was a direct member of the GRU or that Military Unit 20701 was part of the GRU. The evidence as a whole supported more than a flimsy suspicion that Mr. Gariev was a direct member of the GRU or that Military Unit 20701 was part of the GRU.
[42] As I have found no reviewable error, the application for judicial review will be dismissed. Counsel posed no question for certification and I am satisfied that no question arises on this record.
ORDER
[43] IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
For reasons set out above, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
"Eleanor R. Dawson" Judge
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record
DOCKET: IMM-5286-02
STYLE OF CAUSE: VIATCHESLAV GARIEV, ET AL.
Applicants
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
Respondent
PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO, ONTARIO
DATE OF HEARING: MONDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2004
REASONS FOR ORDER BY: DAWSON, J.
DATED: TUESDAY, APRIL 6, 2004
APPEARANCES BY: Mr. Dan Miller
For the Applicants
Ms. Pamela Larmondin
For the Respondent
SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Mr. Dan Miller
Barrister and Solicitor
Toronto, Ontario
For the Applicants
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
For the Respondent
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