Date: 20040511
Docket: T-2134-03
Citation: 2004 FC 705
Montréal, Quebec, May 11, 2003
Present: RICHARD MORNEAU, ESQ., PROTHONOTARY
BETWEEN:
JAMES TIMMONS
Applicant
and
COGECO CABLE SYSTEMS INC.
(formerly UMG Telecommunications Inc.)
and
COMMUNICATIONS, ENERGY AND
PAPERWORKERS UNION OF CANADA
Respondents
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] The Court has before it three motions pursuant to Rule 369 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998.
[2] One motion is by the applicant, a self-represented litigant, for an order to extend the time to file his Application Record and to have this case specially managed.
[3] The other two motions are brought separately by the respondents. The respondent Cogeco Cable Systems Inc. (Cogeco) has brought a motion to strike the applicant's Application on the basis, inter alia, that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear it.
[4] For its part, the respondent Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP) has brought a motion to strike the applicant's Application on the basis that the applicant lacks the status to bring this application.
Background
[5] The applicant was an employee of UMG Cable Telecommunications Inc. (UMG), a company subsequently purchased by Cogeco.
[6] On March 13, 2000, the CEP filed an unfair labour practice complaint with the Canada Industrial Relations Board (CIRB) alleging that UMG had retaliated against certain employees in response to the trade union's organizing campaign.
[7] On or about March 30, 2000, UMG terminated the applicant. The CEP amended its unfair labour practice complaint to include reference to the applicant's termination
[8] On January 30, 2001, the CIRB issued its decision with respect to the CEP's unfair labour practice complaint. As part of the remedy, the CIRB ordered that the applicant be reinstated with compensation less any amounts earned in mitigation.
[9] On March 5, 2001, the CEP and Cogeco participated in settlement discussions with a mediator, Ms. Louisa Davie (Davie), regarding a series of outstanding matters between the parties. The CEP and Cogeco settled a number of matters, including the issue of the applicant's reinstatement and compensation. Ms. Davie issued a consent Award dated March 5, 2001.
[10] By letter dated July 18, 2003, the applicant contacted Davie regarding the consent Award. On October 14, 2003, Davie issued a decision that she was without jurisdiction to deal with the applicant's request, as only the parties to the consent Award - the CEP and Cogeco - could request her further involvement.
[11] On November 14, 2003, the Applicant launched his Application herein to judicial review the October 14, 2003 Davie decision.
Analysis
[12] I shall deal first with the motion to strike brought by the CEP. The issue to be determined under that motion is whether the applicant has the legal status to seek judicial review of the Davie decision.
[13] As noted, the parties to all the relevant proceedings - both before the CIRB and Ms. Davie - were the trade union (CEP) and the employer (UMG and later Cogeco).
[14] The courts have consistently held that an individual lacks the standing to bring an application for judicial review of an arbitration award, where the parties to the arbitration are the trade union and the employer.
Noël v. Société d'énergie de la Baie James (2001), 271 N.R. 304 (S.C.C.)
Yashin v. National Hockey League (2001), 192 D.L.R. (4th) 747 (Ontario S.C.O.)
Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 59 v. Saskatoon (City) (2001), 207 Sask. R. 222 (Sask. C.A.)
Nicholson v. East Prince Regional Health Authority (1998), 167 Nfld. & P.E.I. R. 351 (P.E.I. S.C.)
Technical University of Nova Scotia v. Collins (1990), 97 N.S.R. (2d) 76 (N.S.S.C.T.D.).
[15] Therefore, in light of the foregoing, I am of the view that it is clear and obvious that the applicant herein lacks the standing or status to bring his Application.
[16] Consequently, it is hereby ordered that the applicant's Application is struck out, with costs of $100 to the respondent C.E.P.
[17] Considering the above conclusion, it is not necessary that the Court deal with the motion to strike out brought by the respondent Cogeco or the applicant's motion for an extension of time and for case management. For greater certainty, had the Court dealt with the applicant's motion, it would have denied it based on the reasons raised by the respondents in their motion records in response.
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Richard Morneau
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Prothonotary
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