Date: 20040825
Docket: 04-T-39
Citation: 2004 FC 1177
Montréal, Quebec, August 25, 2004
Present: RICHARD MORNEAU, PROTHONOTARY
BETWEEN:
VARTAN KAZAZIAN
Applicant
and
SOLICITOR GENERAL FOR CANADA
Defendant
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] Pursuant to the terms of subsection 30(1) of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, S.C. 2000, c. 17 (the Act), the applicant had ninety (90) days to appeal a decision by the defendant under section 27 of the Act by way of an action in this Court.
[2] It is clear and undisputed that the applicant did not file his action within that time.
[3] Through this motion, the applicant is asking this Court to extend the time period.
Analysis
[4] Although the applicant now raises a favourable factual backdrop to justify his delay in acting, i.e. that his former counsel had not acted within the 90-day period as the applicant had instructed him to act, that factual backdrop - as well as any other even more advantageous situation which could be advanced - could not in any way enable this Court to extend the 90-day limit of subsection 30(1) of the Act since this Court simply does not have jurisdiction to extend that time limit, which the legislature intended to be absolute.
[5] The relevant parts of section 30 of the Act, i.e. subsections 30(1) and (2), contain language, mutatis mutandis, similar to subsections 135(1) and (2) of the Customs Act, R.S. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.), as amended.
[6] Juxtaposed, these provisions read as follows:
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135. (1) A person who requests a decision of the Minister under section 131 may, within ninety days after being notified of the decision, appeal the decision by way of an action in the Federal Court in which that person is the plaintiff and the Minister is the defendant.
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135. (1) Toute personne qui a demandé que soit rendue une décision en vertu de l'article 131 peut, dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours suivant la communication de cette décision, en appeler par voie d'action devant la Cour fédérale, à titre de demandeur, le ministre étant le défendeur.
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(2) The Federal Courts Act and the rules made under that Act applicable to ordinary actions apply in respect of actions instituted under subsection (1) except as varied by special rules made in respect of such actions.
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(2) La Loi sur les Cours fédérales et les règles prises aux termes de cette loi applicables aux actions ordinaires s'appliquent aux actions intentées en vertu du paragraphe (1), sous réserve des adaptations occasionnées par les règles particulières à ces actions.
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30.(1) A person who requests a decision of the Minister under section 25 may, within 90 days after being notified of the decision, appeal the decision by way of an action in the Federal Court in which the person is the plaintiff and the Minister is the defendant.
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30.(1) La personne qui a présenté une demande en vertu de l'article 25 peut, dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours suivant la communication de la décision, en appeler par voie d'action devant la Cour fédérale à titre de demandeur, le ministre étant le défendeur.
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(2) The Federal Courts Act and the rules made under that Act that apply to ordinary actions apply to actions instituted under subsection (1) except as varied by special rules made in respect of such actions.
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(2) La Loi sur les Cours fédérales et les règles prises aux termes de cette loi applicables aux actions ordinaires s'appliquent aux actions intentées en vertu du paragraphe (1), avec les adaptations nécessaires occasionnées par les règles propres à ces actions.
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[7] In Dawe v. Canada, [1994] F.C.J. No. 1327, the Federal Court of Appeal made the following remarks regarding this Court's inability to extend the time limit in subsection 135(2) of the Customs Act, supra. At paragraphs 10 and 18 of that decision, the Court states:
10. Subsection 135(2) of the Act simply makes the Federal Court Rules applicable to actions that have already been instituted within the time limit established by subsection 135(1). It constitutes no statutory authority to use the Rules to enlarge or abridge the time prescribed therein. Unlike subsection 56(1) of the Trade Marks Act R.S. 1985, c. T-13 [See Note 2 below] for example, subsection 135(1) of the Customs Act does not empower the Court to enlarge the limitation period fixed by Parliament.
Note 2: Subsection 56(1) reads:
An appeal lies to the Federal Court from any decision of the Registrar under this Act within two months from the date on which notice of the decision was dispatched by the Registrar or within such further time as the Court may allow, either before or after the expiration of the two months.
18. . . . a limitation period is dictated by very fundamental principles relating to an efficient and proper administration of justice. Litigation has to come to an end so that judgments and decisions can be enforced. Limitation periods are designed to achieve that end and cannot be ignored. Nor, as I have already pointed out, can they be waived or extended in the absence of a clear statutory provision: Rules of Court cannot be used to enlarge or abridge the time prescribed by a statute [See Note 5 below].
Note 5: Duzs v. Duzs [1973] 3 W.W.R. 394 (Alta. C.A.); Re Fair and Toronto (1930) 3 D.L.R. 76 (Ont. C.A.).
[8] These principles in Dawe definitely apply to the situation before us.
[9] For these reasons, the applicant's motion for an extension of time is dismissed with costs.
Prothonotary
Certified true translation
Kelley A. Harvey, BA, BCL, LLB
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: 04-T-39
STYLE OF CAUSE: VARTAN KAZAZIAN
Applicant
and
SOLICITOR GENERAL FOR CANADA
Defendant
PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal, Quebec
DATE OF HEARING: August 23, 2004
REASONS FOR ORDER: RICHARD MORNEAU, PROTHONOTARY
DATE OF REASONS: August 25, 2004
APPEARANCES:
Arnold Lechter FOR THE APPLICANT
Jacques Mimar FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Arnold Lechter FOR THE APPLICANT
Montréal, Quebec
Morris Rosenberg FOR THE RESPONDENT
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
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