Date: 20040225
Docket: IMM-4074-02
Citation: 2004 FC 333
Toronto, Ontario, this 25th day of February, 2004
Present: The Honourable Mr. Justice Mosley
BETWEEN:
RAJVIR SINGH
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] This is an application for judicial review of the decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the "Board"), reasons dated July 25, 2002. The Board determined that Rajvir Singh (the "applicant") was not a Convention refugee. Mr. Singh seeks an order setting aside the Board's decision and an order remitting the matter back for reconsideration by a different Board.
BACKGROUND
[2] Mr. Singh, a citizen of India, alleges a well-founded fear of persecution based on his political opinion. He is a Sikh from the Patiala region of Punjab, India. He joined the Akali Dal (Mann) (the "ADM"), also known as the Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar) and Akali Dal (Amritsar), political party in 1992. According to his Personal Information Form ("PIF"), he first had problems with the Punjab police in 1992 when he was tutoring the son of an alleged Khalistani militant. He was arrested by the police, questioned and detained for two days. He was released after his father paid a bribe.
[3] In May 1994, he participated in a peaceful rally to draw attention to excessive police behaviour and was arrested, along with fourteen others. He claims that he was detained for one week, beaten and released upon payment of a bribe.
[4] Mr. Singh was again arrested on September 10, 1995 following a police crackdown on politically active people after the assassination of Beant Singh, the Chief Minister of Punjab. He claims that he was beaten regularly during his three month detention. He was never charged or brought before a magistrate and all attempts by a lawyer to free him failed until his father paid a bribe and the applicant promised to report every two weeks for one year.
[5] From late 1996 until late 1997, the applicant lived with his uncle in Uttar Pradesh. At the end of 1997, he returned to Punjab. Mr. Singh claims that he was arrested again in September 1998 and accused of having links to militants. He was detained and ill-treated for ten days and was again released upon payment of a bribe, with a reporting condition of every other Monday for a year.
[6] According to the applicant, the police raided his farm on the eve of Independence Day 1999 to arrest him. He went into hiding for the next four months and then went to Uttar Pradesh where he remained until arrangements were made by his father and his uncle for him to come to Canada. He arrived in Canada on March 27, 2001 and claimed Convention refugee status the following day. At his hearing, held on May 27, 2002, Mr. Singh told the Board that while he was in hiding in India and since his arrival in Canada, the police had visited his home and asked for him.
The Board's Decision
[7] The Board found the Mr. Singh lacked credibility and that his claim failed on subjective and objective grounds. The Board also concluded that, pursuant to subsection 69.1(9.1) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 (the "former Act"), there was no credible basis for his claim, as it found that there was no credible or trustworthy evidence upon which a positive decision could have been made. The applicant's testimony was inconsistent, implausible and varied in several key areas with the objective evidence disclosed at the hearing. The Board noted that it found Mr. Singh evasive and, in some cases, he failed to answer questions posed to him.
[8] Alternatively, the Board found that Mr. Singh had a viable internal flight alternative. The Board did not elaborate on this alternative finding, stating that it was unnecessary to do so given its adverse credibility conclusions.
[9] In particular, the Board found that the applicant's account of his September 10, 1995 arrest was not credible because there was no mention in the documentary evidence of the involvement or arrest of members of the ADM in connection with the assassination of Beant Singh. As a result, the Board found that any and all events flowing from the applicant's account relative to the September 1995 incident, including police harassment and loss of business caused by the police, to be unreliable evidence.
[10] The Board found that it was not plausible that the applicant was told by his uncle to keep a low profile as his uncle did not want his neighbours to get suspicious of his prolonged visit in 1996 and 1997. The documentary evidence endorsed the proposition that it was very unlikely that a local citizen would report a newcomer to the local police even if there was reason to suspect the newcomer was wanted by the police. In addition, there is no law restricting the movement of Sikhs in India.
[11] The Board also found Mr. Singh's testimony regarding the raid on his farm by the police on the eve of Independence Day 1999 inconsistent. At the hearing, the applicant testified that the police came to his neighbour's farm, which was inconsistent with his PIF narrative and also implausible given that the applicant was still required to report to the police every other Monday. As a result, it was not credible that the police would need to go to his or his neighbour's farm to arrest him since they would have access to him on any reporting day.
[12] The Board outlined a number of times when the applicant was evasive and non-responsive and drew a negative inference from his failure to respond to legitimate questions. In further support of its adverse credibility findings, the Board also pointed to the applicant's lack of knowledge regarding the ADM party and politics in Punjab and to the fact that high profile members of the ADM party remained in Punjab without incident. The Board also doubted the authenticity of certain documentation tendered by Mr. Singh, namely, his driver's licence, and letters from a lawyer and a president of the ADM, describing his problems with the police. The Board assigned these documents no probative value.
APPLICANT'S SUBMISSIONS
[13] The applicant submits that the Board based its credibility findings on ill-drawn or otherwise unreasonable inferences that were not supported by the evidence. The Board erred by failing to deal with the persecution faced by him at the hands of the police, not because of his membership in the ADM party, but simply because the police are corrupt, brutal and above the law. The applicant argues that this claim of persecution was supported by the evidence, including the references in the applicant's PIF and testimony to the police accusations that he had links to terrorists. He also submits that the Board ignored his evidence on at least five occasions, and its findings were consequently not supported by the evidence.
[14] The applicant argues that the Board also erred by failing to consider documentary evidence brought forward by him which was material to his claim and which potentially refuted the Board's conclusions regarding implausibility. The applicant here relies on Leung v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 81 F.T.R. 303, Sivasamboo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] 1 F.C. 741 (T.D.), among others.
[15] Finally, the applicant argues that the conduct of the Board suggests that its mind was pre-decided on the outcome of this case. The applicant says that his evidence was ignored, misconstrued and grossly distorted by the Board to suit its resolve of finding him not credible. The applicant questions whether the Board had reason to believe that he had come as a refugee from Punjab as a means to enter Canada or whether, on the basis of previous Board history of Punjabi claimants, the Board unconsciously imposed a somewhat higher credibility level than would otherwise have been warranted. In support of this submission, the applicant cites Abubaker v. Canada (Solicitor General) (1993), 70 F.T.R. 74.
RESPONDENT'S SUBMISSIONS
[16] The respondent submits that the Board did not err in its adverse credibility findings. In the absence of perverse or capricious findings of fact by the Board that are central to its decision to refuse a refugee claim, this Court should not interfere with the Board's findings: Miranda v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 437 (T.D.) (QL). The respondent also argues, relying on Sheikh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 3 F.C. 238 (C.A.), that the Board's negative credibility findings extended to all of the applicant's evidence and allegations.
[17] Furthermore, the respondent submits that the applicant's characterization of the Board's credibility determination ignores the adverse findings of credibility based on the applicant's demeanour. Findings of credibility with respect to observations made by the Board of the Applicant's demeanour during testimony are unassailable on judicial review in the absence of perverseness: Sun v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 636 (T.D.) (QL); Ankrah v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 385 (T.D.) (QL).
[18] Considering the evasiveness of the applicant's testimony and the numerous and serious discrepancies in that testimony, the respondent submits that it was reasonably open to the Board to determine that Mr. Singh had not provided credible and trustworthy evidence upon which he could have been found to be a Convention refugee.
[19] Finally, the respondent submits that the applicant's allegations of bias are speculative and cannot seriously be entertained on the mere accusation that the Board made a reviewable error.
ISSUES
[20] 1. Did the Board err by misconstruing or ignoring the evidence or by failing to refer to all of the documentary evidence in reaching its adverse credibility findings?
2. Are any of the Board's credibility findings patently unreasonable and if so, were they material to the negative decision?
3. Is there a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the Board?
ANALYSIS
[21] In my opinion, the Board did not err by failing to specifically refer to the documentary evidence highlighted by the applicant. One error of the Board in this regard is noted below, however, I am not persuaded that it was material to the final outcome. The Board need not refer to every piece of evidence and is presumed to have considered all the evidence before it, even if not explicitly mentioned, unless the contrary can be shown: see Hassan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992), 147 N.R. 317 (C.A.) and Florea v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 598 (C.A.)(QL).
[22] The decisions relied on by the applicant in this area are not applicable to his case, for several reasons. In Leung, supra, the Court held that the Board's negative credibility findings were based almost exclusively on implausibility findings, rather than findings of inconsistencies and contradictions in an applicant's testimony, or an applicant's demeanour in testifying. That is not the situation here. Further, decisions such as Ahortor v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 65 F.T.R. 137, are distinguishable from the present case as there, the court found that the Board's negative inferences were not grounded in the evidence itself and the board had not presented valid grounds for disbelieving the applicant's testimony and explanations.
[23] And finally, cases such as Markovskaia v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 86 F.T.R. 74 and Cepeda-Gutierrez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 157 F.T.R. 35, have found that a decision of the Board will be vitiated when the Board has failed to mention evidence that was so central and probative to the applicant's claim, and in contradiction to the Board's own conclusions, that omitting reference to such evidence in the reasons raises an apprehension that the decision was based on factual findings made without regard to the evidence before it. Justice Evans, as he then was, provides a good summary of the principles involved with this issue at paragraphs 14-17 of Cepeda-Gutierrez, supra:
It is well established that section 18.1(4)(d) of the Federal Court Act does not authorize the Court to substitute its view of the facts for that of the Board, which has the benefit not only of seeing and hearing the witnesses, but also of the expertise of its members in assessing evidence relating to facts that are within their area of specialized expertise. In addition, and more generally, considerations of the efficient allocation of decision-making resources between administrative agencies and the courts strongly indicate that the role to be played in fact-finding by the Court on an application for judicial review should be merely residual. Thus, in order to attract judicial intervention under section 18.1(4)(d), the applicant must satisfy the Court, not only that the Board made a palpably erroneous finding of material fact, but also that the finding was made "without regard to the evidence": see, for example, Rajapakse v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 649 (F.C.T.D.); Sivasamboo v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 1 F.C. 741 (F.C.T.D.).
The Court may infer that the administrative agency under review made the erroneous finding of fact "without regard to the evidence" from the agency's failure to mention in its reasons some evidence before it that was relevant to the finding, and pointed to a different conclusion from that reached by the agency. Just as a court will only defer to an agency's interpretation of its constituent statute if it provides reasons for its conclusion, so a court will be reluctant to defer to an agency's factual determinations in the absence of express findings, and an analysis of the evidence that shows how the agency reached its result.
On the other hand, the reasons given by administrative agencies are not to be read hypercritically by a court (Medina v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1990), 12 Imm. L.R. (2d) 33 (F.C.A.)), nor are agencies required to refer to every piece of evidence that they received that is contrary to their finding, and to explain how they dealt with it (see, for example, Hassan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992), 147 N.R. 317 (F.C.A.). That would be far too onerous a burden to impose upon administrative decision-makers who may be struggling with a heavy case-load and inadequate resources. A statement by the agency in its reasons for decision that, in making its findings, it considered all the evidence before it, will often suffice to assure the parties, and a reviewing court, that the agency directed itself to the totality of the evidence when making its findings of fact.
However, the more important the evidence that is not mentioned specifically and analyzed in the agency's reasons, the more willing a court may be to infer from the silence that the agency made an erroneous finding of fact "without regard to the evidence": Bains v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 63 F.T.R. 312 (F.C.T.D.). In other words, the agency's burden of explanation increases with the relevance of the evidence in question to the disputed facts. Thus, a blanket statement that the agency has considered all the evidence will not suffice when the evidence omitted from any discussion in the reasons appears squarely to contradict the agency's finding of fact. Moreover, when the agency refers in some detail to evidence supporting its finding, but is silent on evidence pointing to the opposite conclusion, it may be easier to infer that the agency overlooked the contradictory evidence when making its finding of fact.
[24] In the present case, the Board found that the applicant's testimony was contradictory, inconsistent and evasive. It did not believe his testimony that the police were targeting him and that he had been arrested on a number of occasions. The evidence which the applicant claims was not considered by the Board cannot counter the Board's clear and multiple negative credibility findings, therefore, the fact that it was not referred to in the Board's reasons is not a reviewable error. Furthermore, the evidence which the applicant claims was ignored by the Board is general in nature and does not directly undermine the Board's credibility findings and is not akin to the situation described in Cepeda-Gutierrez, supra.
[25] The applicant submits that the Board erred by failing to deal with the persecution he faced at the hands of the police, which was supported by the documentary evidence and his testimony that the police accused him of having terrorist links each time they arrested him. In my opinion, contrary to the applicant's submission, he did not state in his PIF that he was accused of having terrorist links every time he was arrested. Rather, he stated that after his September 1998 arrest, he was accused of having militant links. There is no mention in his PIF of any other such accusations. In his testimony before the Board, at page 144 of the tribunal record, the applicant stated that the police thought he had links to terrorists, but did not specifically mention accusations by the police.
[26] I am of the view that the Board properly addressed this issue. The following extract from the Board's reasons indicates that the Board considered whether the Applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution by the police in India and concluded that there was simply no credible evidence to support that claim. At page 8 of its reasons, the Board stated as follows:
When the panel views the totality of the evidence, we conclude that the claimant is totally lacking in credibility and that his claim fails on both the subjective and objective tests. His lack of credibility negates his subjective fear... and key segments of his testimony are rebutted by the objective evidence. While conceding that the police do, indeed arrest young Sikhs from time to time in order to extract bribes (to supplement their meagre incomes), a point raised by counsel in his submissions and concurred by the documentary evidence, the claimant has failed to persuade the panel that he has been such a person....
[27] Mr. Singh next contends that the Board erred by ignoring evidence which stated that police round up those with previous police records before important days in order to maintain order. At the hearing, the applicant testified that the police starting arresting people on the eve of Independence Day 1999 in order to stop terrorism. When he heard of these raids, he hid at his neighbour's farm so the police could not find him. In his PIF, the applicant failed to mention that he was at his neighbour's farm when the police came to arrest him.
[28] The Board drew a negative inference from the applicant's inconsistent testimony regarding the police's attempt to arrest him on this occasion. The Board found that if he were at his neighbour's farm he could not have known that the police were coming to arrest him. In addition, the Board found it was not credible that the police would need to go to his farm in order to arrest him because the applicant was still subject to the reporting condition. As a result, the police had access to him on any reporting day.
[29] In my view, the applicant's argument on this ground is also without merit. He refers to a piece of documentary evidence that addresses "history sheeters" and "habitual offenders" who are "rounded up whenever something untoward happens" (Response to Information Request IND30757.E, Applicant's Record at 38). The same information is contained in Response to Information Request IND26376.EX, located at page 57 of the Applicant's Record. This document states that "every police station will have a history sheeters' list of local suspects, so that when there is a major security disruption, such as the assassination of Beant Singh, typically the police will pull in everyone on the list."
[30] Mr. Singh has failed to point to documentary evidence which supports the proposition that the police round up those with police records before important days. My review of the documentary evidence fails to reveal anything which supports the applicant's proposition.
[31] The Board did make one error, and ignored or misconstrued evidence before it related to the arrest of those in the ADM party. The Board concluded that the applicant had not alleged that others from the ADM party, with high profiles, had been arrested. At pages 8-9 of its reasons the Board commented:
...It is noteworthy that with all his alleged problems due to his involvement in the Akali Dal (Mann) party, there has been no mention in his PIF or oral testimony about high profile members of that party being arrested along with him, not even the purported author of the letter mentioned earlier. It is, indeed, strange that this individual remains in the Punjab without mentioning any danger to himself but espouses the dangers being faced by the claimant who, as far as we can ascertain, holds no office in the party.
[32] In his PIF, the applicant stated that many ADM party members were arrested after the assassination of Beant Singh. At the hearing, the applicant testified that after the assassination of Beant Singh, the leader of his party, Simarjit Singh Mann, and all the active members of the ADM were arrested. At page 142 of the tribunal record the applicant stated that many people that belonged to ADM were wanted by the police in India. The Presiding Member responded, at pages 142 and 143, as follows:
PRESIDING MEMBER: Did you - sir, would you confine your testimony to yourself, please? You are the person here applying for refugee status. We haven't seen any of these people. Please confine your answers to questions asked about you.
Based on the Presiding Member's comment above, and the applicant's testimony regarding other ADM members, I am of the view that the Board erred in noting that the applicant did not maintain that other, high profile ADM party members were arrested along with him.
[33] However, in my opinion, the Board's comment on this point was not central to its final, negative determination. I am satisfied that the other credibility findings of the Board, challenged by the applicant in this judicial review, are not patently unreasonable and therefore are not open to review. Such findings support the Board's final determination, and it is not the place of this court to interfere when a non-material error of the Board is found. As a result, it cannot be said that the Board based its decision on this finding or that this error was material to its final decision: Miranda, supra.
[34] Moving to the applicant's submissions that the Board erred in its credibility findings, I agree with the respondent that the Board's adverse credibility findings were reasonably open to it. A high level of deference should be accorded to the decisions of the Board made on the basis of credibility findings: Aguebor v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 160 N.R. 315 (F.C.A.). As a result, the appropriate standard of review is patent unreasonableness, which means that findings of credibility must not be based on erroneous findings of fact made in a perverse manner, or without regard for the evidence before it: Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, s. 18.1(4)(d), Sivasamboo, supra, and Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999), 173 F.T.R. 280.
[35] Unless it is shown that the Board's inferences and conclusions are so unreasonable that they could not have been drawn, or the Board appears to have drawn them capriciously or without regard to the evidence, this Court should not interfere, whether or not it agrees with those inferences: Oduro v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 66 F.T.R. 106 and Aguebor, supra. Further, the Board must give reasons for this finding in clear and unmistakable terms: Hilo v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] F.C.J. No. 228 (C.A.) (QL).
[36] In the present case, the Board was entitled to decide adversely with respect to the applicant's credibility on the basis of contradictions and inconsistencies in his testimony and between his testimony and other evidence before it: Aguebor, supra. The Board's reasons are also detailed and clear as to why it made its negative credibility findings.
[37] The Board found Mr. Singh to be evasive and non-responsive to some of the questions posed to him, for example: when questioned why his hosts would put themselves at risk by hiding him (transcript, tribunal record at 114-15), whether he was regarded as a high profile terrorist by the police (transcript, tribunal record at 115-16) and whether he had any new information about the ADM party (transcript, tribunal record at 150).
[38] The applicant submits that the Board was overzealous in attacking his credibility, particularly since he was testifying through an interpreter: Attakora v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989), 99 N.R. 168 (F.C.A.). In my opinion, while the cautionary words of Hugessen J.A. are important to keep in mind, the situation as described in Attakora, supra, did not occur in the present case. I am not satisfied that the Board in this case was overzealous or microscopic in questioning the applicant. In Attakora, supra, Hugessen J.A. stated as follows at pages 168-169:
After his arrest the applicant claimed to have escaped custody through a hole in a platform which served as a primitive lavatory in his place of detention. He described the hole as being about the size of a soccer ball. The comparison is a homely one and hardly lends itself to microscopic analysis. The Board seized upon it with enthusiasm, however, and found that it could not be true. ...
...
I have mentioned the Board's zeal to find instances of contradiction in the applicant's testimony. While the Board's task is a difficult one, it should not be over-vigilant in its microscopic examination of the evidence of persons who, like the present applicant, testify through an interpreter and tell tales of horror in whose objective reality there is reason to believe.
[39] In my view, the Board did not engage in a microscopic examination of the applicant's testimony when it determined him to be evasive and non-responsive to questions. Rather, the applicant's evasive and non-responsive answers are apparent from the transcript. This Court has held that negative credibility findings made by reference to the Board members' observations of an applicant's demeanour during testimony are "unassailable on judicial review in the absence of perverseness": Sun, supra at para. 7. As stated above, the Board members' observations are supported by the transcript and are not perverse.
[40] The applicant also takes issue with the fact that the Board did not accept his explanation for the extended expiry date on his driver's licence. The Board found his testimony regarding his driver's licence not credible. The applicant's driver's licence was purportedly valid for twenty-four years.
[41] At the hearing, the applicant testified that driver's licences are usually valid for five or ten years, but some are valid for twenty years (tribunal record at 129). When questioned about the lengthy validity period of his own driver's licence, the applicant explained that licences were made like that (tribunal record at 130). He elaborated by explaining that licences were issued for ten years and for longer periods as well. He was able to obtain a licence that was valid for twenty-four years because he had a recommendation from someone and he paid money (tribunal record at 130-31). The applicant did not clarify who "someone" was. When asked if licences were usually issued for multiples of five years, Mr. Singh stated he was uncertain (tribunal record at 132). He then stated that the twenty-four year validity period on his licence was a mistake (tribunal record at 133), that he did not notice this mistake or know how many years the licence was valid for (tribunal record at 133-34), that he requested a long term licence (tribunal record at 134) and that he must have seen the expiry date when he first received the licence (tribunal record at 134).
[42] I agree with the respondent that given the large number of inconsistencies in the applicant's testimony regarding his driver's licence, the Board was not required to accept his explanations for the extended expiry date on that licence. The Board was entitled to base its adverse credibility findings on the contradictions and inconsistencies in the applicant's testimony related to his driver's licence: Aguebor, supra, Alizadeh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 11 (C.A.) (QL).
[43] The Board assigned no probative value to the two letters tendered by the applicant in support of his identity and his problems with the police. In addition to finding these letters self-serving, the Board found that the information contained in them were false. In particular, the letters allegedly support the applicant's account of his two arrests, however, the Board found that one of his arrests had been rebutted by the documentary evidence, and the other arrest was found, on a balance of probabilities, to have been fabricated by the applicant. The Board also noted documentary evidence indicating that obtaining false documents in India was a relatively simple process.
[44] The applicant submits that the Board erred in rejecting these letters because they were self-serving and also erred by failing to give the appropriate weight to a professional legal opinion: Zapata v. Canada (Solicitor General), [1994] F.C.J. No. 1303 (T.D.) (QL). However, contrary to his submission, these letters were not rejected solely because they were self-serving. Rather, the Board gave these letters no weight because it concluded that they contained false information. Given the contradictions between the applicant's testimony, the documentary evidence and the inconsistencies and implausibilities within his testimony, I am of the view that this conclusion was reasonably open to the Board.
[45] I agree with the respondent that Zapata, supra is of little assistance here. In that case, Gibson J. stated at paragraph 17 that the Board erred in its "cavalier dismissal of the professional opinion" of a psychiatrist and the paper. However, in this case, the Board had clear reasons to doubt the veracity of the letter from the lawyer, namely the Board's previous finding that the applicant's account of being arrested had been fabricated, and the documentary evidence regarding forged documents. The fact that the applicant disagrees with the weight given to the evidence by the Board is not a reviewable error: Brar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1986] F.C.J. No. 346 (C.A.) (QL).
[46] At page two of its reasons, the Board found that Mr. Singh had a viable internal flight alternative ("IFA"). At page 9 of its reasons, the Board stated that "[t]he panel considered but did not think it necessary to address IFA given the nature of its adverse credibility findings. The panel finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the claimant can safely return to the Punjab where there is no more than a mere possibility and/or not a reasonable chance that he will be persecuted for a Convention reason."
[47] The applicant submits that the Board erred in this conclusion because it ignores the documentary evidence which shows that Sikhs cannot move around without fear. The respondent submits that the Board did not err in its IFA finding since it determined that it was unnecessary to evaluate it, given the nature of its adverse credibility findings.
[48] In my view, since the Board stated several clear reasons for not finding the applicant's testimony credible and concluded that he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in India, it was not necessary for the Board to address the issue of a potential IFA.
[49] Finally, I agree with the respondent that Mr. Singh's submissions on the allegations of bias are speculative. He appears to base his bias argument on allegations that the Board ignored and misconstrued the evidence before it and made credibility findings not supported by the evidence before it. The decision of Abubaker, supra, relied on by the applicant is of no assistance as it relates to credibility findings made in error and does not address the issue of bias.
[50] In my view, the allegation by an applicant that the Board committed a reviewable error is by no means sufficient to answer in the affirmative the well-established test for a reasonable apprehension of bias, namely whether an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically would think it more likely than not that the Board failed to approach the assessment of the applicant's claim with an open and impartial mind: [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369">Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. v. National Energy Board et al., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, at 394-395 and Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at 849-850. My review of the transcript and the reasons does not reveal anything that would support the applicant's claim that a reasonable apprehension of bias is raised on the part of the Board.
[51] In light of the analysis above, this application for judicial review is dismissed. No question for certification arises.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that this application for judicial review is dismissed. No question is certified.
"Richard G. Mosley"
J.F.C.
FEDERAL COURT
Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record
DOCKET: IMM-4074-02
STYLE OF CAUSE: RAJVIR SINGH
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
Respondent
PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO, ONTARIO
DATE OF HEARING: FEBRUARY 24, 2004
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER BY: MOSLEY J.
DATED: FEBRUARY 25, 2004
APPEARANCES BY:
Mr. Lawrence L. Band
FOR THE APPLICANT
Ms. Lisa Hutt
FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Mr. Lawrence L. Band
Toronto, Ontario
FOR THE APPLICANT
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Toronto, Ontario
FOR THE RESPONDENT
FEDERAL COURT
Date: 20040225
Docket: IMM-4074-02
BETWEEN:
RAJVIR SINGH
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER
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