Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development) v. Leavitt, 2005 FC 664

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2005 FC 664

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Date: 20050512

Dockets: T-1511-04

T-1512-04

Citation: 2005 FC 664

Ottawa, Ontario, this 12^th day of May, 2005

PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE SNIDER

BETWEEN:

MINISTER OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

Applicant

- and -

DAHL LEAVITT

Respondent

- and -

EDA LEAVITT

Respondent

REASONS FOR ORDER

SNIDER J.

[1] In this application, the Minister of Human Resources Development (the "Minister") seeks judicial review of two decisions of the Review Tribunal ("RT") dated July 14, 2004, and made pursuant to the Old Age Security Act (the "OAS Act"). In these decisions, the RT allowed the appeals of the Respondents from a decision of the Minister by which their benefits under the OAS Act were reduced.

Issues

[2] This application raises the following issues:

1) Did the RT err by concluding it had jurisdiction to hear this appeal from the Minister's decision directing that the Respondents' GIS benefits be reduced?

2) If the RT had jurisdiction, did the RT err in concluding that the Respondents' benefits should not be reduced after Eda returned to the matrimonial home?

Preliminary Matter

[3] The Respondents advised this Court in writing that they did not wish to appear to make oral or written submissions in this proceeding. At the oral hearing of this matter, I advised counsel for the Minister that, in light of the particular circumstances of this case, I would prefer to determine this application on the basis of the written record. The Minister agreed not to make oral representations beyond her written Memorandum of Fact and Law. Accordingly, submissions of the Minister were confined to the correction of certain factual errors of an administrative nature and the provision of a few pages of missing or unclear documents. No oral submissions on the merits were made and I proceeded to decide this unusual case on the basis of the written record.

Background

[4] The Respondents, Dahl Leavitt and Eda Leavitt, were married some 64 years ago; they are now in their early 80s. On February 10, 2003, Eda was moved into a long-term care facility because her health had deteriorated to the point where she was no longer able to care for herself. She did not do well there, suffering depression and several injuries from falls taken when she tried to walk without assistance. On August 6, 2003, Dahl moved Eda back into the matrimonial home so that he could oversee her care personally. He arranged to have paid help with her care.

[5] Both Respondents qualified for, and receive, Guaranteed Income Supplement benefits ("GIS benefits"). During the time Eda was in the care facility, the Minister was satisfied that the Leavitts were "involuntarily separated" and "directed", pursuant to s. 15(3)(b) of the OAS Act, that the Leavitts be "considered and dealt with as though the person did not have a spouse". This meant that the GIS benefit for each was increased slightly - equivalent to being single. By letter dated September 18, 2003, the Leavitts were advised that they were no longer "involuntarily separated". As a result of this direction, the GIS benefit dropped back to the original level and an overpayment of $381.46 for the month of September 2003 was created. Dahl Leavitt's request to the Minister for reconsideration was denied by letter dated October 30, 2003. At this stage, the Leavitts appealed this decision to the RT.

The RT Decision

[6] In its two decisions dated July 14, 2004, the RT acknowledged that the Minister's decision to pursue recovery of the overpayment was outside its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the decisions addressed only the continuing entitlement of the Leavitts to GIS benefits as single persons rather than as spouses. The RT carefully reviewed the facts of this case and the relevant statutory provisions. They noted the words of s. 15(3)(b) of the OAS Act which states:

(3) Where an application for a supplement in respect of any payment period has been made by a person, the Minister may, after any investigation of the circumstances that the Minister considers necessary, direct that the application be considered and dealt with as though the person did not have a spouse or common-law partner on the last day of the previous payment period, in any case where

(b) the Minister is satisfied that the person, as a result of circumstances not attributable to the person or the spouse or common-law partner, was not living with the spouse or common-law partner in a dwelling maintained by the person or the spouse or common-law partner at the time the application was made.

(3) Le ministre peut, après l'enquête qu'il estime nécessaire sur les circonstances, ordonner que la demande soit considérée comme présentée par une personne sans époux ou conjoint de fait le dernier jour de la période de paiement précédente dans l'un ou l'autre des cas suivants :

b) lui-même est convaincu que le demandeur, par suite de circonstances indépendantes de sa volonté et de celle de son époux ou conjoint de fait, n'habitait pas, à la date de la demande, avec celui-ci dans un logement entretenu par l'un ou l'autre.

[7] The RT notes that the OAS Act is intended to provide income support to elderly persons and, as remedial legislation, must be given "such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objectives". The RT comments that there is, since 2000, no definition of "spouse" in the statute and determined that they should "clarify the nature of the relationship". The tribunal appears to accept that Eda is the "legal spouse" of Dahl, but observes that "a marriage requires involvement in each other's lives, mutual support and sharing, creating a unit from two individuals". The RT also accepts that, upon her discharge from the nursing facility, Eda's address returned to that of the matrimonial home.

[8] Having analyzed the facts of the case before them, the RT opines that there is "not any indication of the deeper relationship referred to as marriage". In the RT's view, Eda was no longer participating in the marriage as a spouse because of her medical condition. The RT conclude that the Leavitts remain involuntarily separated and, therefore, should be treated as single persons in calculating the GIS benefits.

Issue #1: Did the RT have jurisdiction to deal with this appeal?

[9] The Minister submits that the RT has no authority to hear an appeal of the Minister's decision in this case. On a question of whether the RT had the authority to hear this appeal, the appropriate standard of review is correctness (Canada (Attorney General) v. Comeau 2004 FC 1034).

[10] The RT is limited to those express powers granted in s. 82 and s. 84 of the Canada Pension Plan ("CPP") and s. 27.1(1) and s. 28 of the OAS Act. These provisions are set out in full in Appendix A to these reasons. Pursuant to s. 27.1(2) and s. 28 of the OAS Act, an appeal to the RT is available regarding:

(a) whether benefits are payable to a person; or

(b) the amount of the benefit payable.

[11] In this case, the Minister argues that the Leavitts appealed to the RT from a discretionary decision, made pursuant to s. 15(3.1), which provides that:

A direction made under subsection (3) in respect of a payment period is deemed to be a direction made in respect of every subsequent period, but the Minister may, after any investigation of the circumstances that the Minister considers necessary, cancel the direction.

L'ordre donné en vertu du paragraphe (3) pour une période de paiement donnée continue de s'appliquer aux périodes de paiement subséquentes; toutefois, le ministre peut, après l'enquête qu'il estime nécessaire dans les circonstances, l'annuler.

[12] That provision contains a discretionary power of the Minister to issue and rescind a "direction" related to that with respect to how their GIS applications should be "dealt with" for the period after August 2003. This, the Minister submits, does not fall within the ambit of the Act.

[13] In my view, the Minister incorrectly characterizes the nature of the Minister's decision. In this case, the issue dealt with by the Minister, under both s. 15(3) and s. 15(3.1), relates to the amount of benefit payable to the Leavitts. Because of the Minister's direction, when Eda moved into the care facility, benefits to the Leavitts increased; because of the Minister's direction after Eda was moved back home, the amount of benefit payable decreased. Accordingly, it is within the mandate of the RT to consider an appeal of this decision.

[14] With respect to this issue, the Minister relies on a number of decisions which, arguably, limit jurisdiction of the RT. Having reviewed each of the cases referred to, I draw the following conclusions:

Where the Minister's decision concerns "the income or the income from a particular source or sources of an applicant or beneficiary . . . ", the appeal must be referred to the Tax Court of Canada and the RT has no authority to hear the appeal (Comeau);

The RT has jurisdiction to consider an appeal of a decision of the Minister that a pensioner and his spouse were no longer eligible for a spouse's allowance benefit because they were separated (Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development) v. Néron 2004 FC 101);

The RT has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from or to interfere with decisions of the Minister, made pursuant to s. 32 of the OAS Act, to forgive an overpayment (or to demand the repayment of an underpayment) made as the result of erroneous advice; these are not decisions respecting the amount of benefit payable (Pincombe v. Canada (Attorney General) [1995] F.C.J. No. 1320 (F.C.A.); Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development) v. Tucker 2003 FCA 278); and

No right of appeal lies to the RT where the appellant has not made a request for reconsideration pursuant to s. 27.1(1) of the OAS Act (Canada (Attorney General) v. Bannerman 2003 FCT 208).

[15] Considering this jurisprudence, I am satisfied that the RT has the jurisdiction to consider this decision of the Minister. The only line of cases that could be considered relevant in the least is the Pincombe line. However, I note that the issue dealt with by the Minister in those cases was one of forgiveness of or demand for repayment. That, in my view, is a purely discretionary decision and not one where the Minister has made a determination of whether a pensioner meets statutory criteria that qualify (or disqualify) the pensioner from obtaining a particular benefit. Such a determination, in my opinion, fits squarely within s. 27.1(1) as a decision "respecting the amount of any benefit that may be paid to that person" and may, accordingly, be the subject of an appeal to the RT.

Issue #2: Did the RT err in concluding that the Leavitts'benefits should not be reduced after Eda returned to the matrimonial home?

[16] As noted above, the RT concluded that the Leavitts, even though they were both in the matrimonial home and legally married, are involuntarily separated and continue to qualify for GIS benefits as though single. The Minister submits that this decision was patently unreasonable.

[17] The first question is normally to determine the applicable standard of review. In this case, the RT was dealing with the interpretation of certain provisions of the OAS Act, a matter for which the tribunal can claim no advantage over the Court. In addition, however, the RT was required to apply the facts to the relevant provisions of the statute. On balance, the decision as a whole would likely attract a degree of deference of reasonableness simpliciter. However, in my view, a full pragmatic and functional analysis is unnecessary since, on any standard, the decision cannot stand.

[18] The starting point of the analysis is s. 15(3)(b), set out in full above. It was under this provision that the Leavitts were paid GIS benefits as though single during Eda's stay at the care facility. The provision provides that the Minister can direct that a person can be dealt with "as though the person did not have a spouse" if the requirements of s. 15(3)(b) are met. There are two requirements set out in that paragraph:

the situation faced by the person is "as a result of circumstances not attributable to the person or spouse";

the person is "not living with the spouse . . . in a dwelling maintained by the person or spouse".

[19] The words of this provision are clear. As is seen from the record, Eda's move to the care facility was not a decision which either partner wanted; the circumstances were not attributable to either one of them. Further, while Eda was in the care facility, she was not living with Dahl in the family home; she was not living with her spouse in a dwelling maintained by either of them. The couple fell squarely within the parameters of s. 15(3)(b) and qualified for the GIS supplemental benefits. Upon her return to the matrimonial home, however, the situation changed. Eda was now living with her husband in the matrimonial home and appears not to fall within the ambit of s. 15(3)(b). On a plain reading of the statute, the Leavitts no longer qualify for the GIS single benefits and the Minister was correct to cancel his direction, pursuant to s. 15(3.1).

[20] In attempting to interpret the statutory provision beyond the clear words in s. 15(3)(b), the RT addressed the broader question of whether, on a "fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation", the provision ought to be read to allow the Leavitts to continue the single supplemental benefits.

[21] The RT first appeared to take comfort from the fact that the OAS Act no longer contained a definition of "spouse"; that definition was removed in 2000. The RT does not indicate how the removal of the definition of "spouse" would expand the meaning of the section. However, I assume that the tribunal felt that the lack of definition in the statute meant that it was not bound by any definition of spouse and could conclude, as it does, that "a marriage requires involvement in each other's lives, mutual support and sharing, creating a unit from two individuals". The RT concluded that the relationship between Eda and Dahl, due to the physical and mental state of Eda, is "not the mutual one contemplated by the use of the term spouse".

[22] The first problem with the RT's assessment is with the inference the tribunal appears to draw from the deletion of the definition of spouse from the statute. At the same time that the definition of "spouse" was deleted, the term "common-law partner" was added. As currently worded, where the term spouse is used in the OAS Act, it is followed by the term common-law spouse. There is no intention, as would be argued by the RT, to extend the commonly understood meaning of "spouse" to include emotional ties or other measures of the strength or nature of the relationship. Rather, the intent was simply to avoid a definition of "spouse" that no longer accords with today's understanding of that term.

[23] The second problem with the RT's broad definition of spouse is that it goes far beyond the words of the statute and any reasonable interpretation. As worded, the statute already recognizes the hardship faced by pensioners when one of them is forced to leave the matrimonial home to obtain necessary care elsewhere. However, in s. 15(3.1), Parliament also determined that, upon the return of the partner to the home, there would be no continuing increase in benefits. Parliament could have chosen not to enact s. 15(3.1) or to have provided continuing GIS single benefits where the relationship between legal spouses was no longer one characterized by "involvement in each other's lives, mutual support and sharing, creating a unit from two individuals". Perhaps recognizing that it would be impossible to assess the meaningfulness of any relationship, Parliament chose to use objective criteria in s. 15(3)(b); if a person is a spouse, living in the matrimonial home, that person does not meet the requirements to receive the higher level of GIS benefits.

[24] The RT also states that "the legislation attempts to ameliorate the situation where one spouse is no longer able to reside in the conjugal relationship that is marriage". This statement is incorrect and does not accord with the clear words of the provision. The words of the statute do not speak of the pensioner's ability "to reside in the conjugal relationship that is marriage", but of the ability or inability to reside in the conjugal home. In other words, s. 15(3)(b) refers to the physical location of the pensioner and not to the nature of the relationship.

[25] A sense of the intention of Parliament can be gleaned from the remarks made on December 2, 1970 by the Honourable John C. Munro, then Minister of National Health and Welfare, during second reading of the Bill C-202, to amend the Old Age Security Act. With respect to the amendments that included the predecessor to the current s. 15(3)(b), he stated (House of Commons Debates, 3^rd Session, 28^th Parliament, Volume II, 1970, Dec. 2, 1970, p. 1693) that:

Other changes in the legislation have also been proposed to make it more equitable. . . . In cases where one spouse is in a hospital or nursing home and the other has to live alone with the same costs as a single person, that spouse can be treated as though he were single.

[26] The introduction of this provision and others was also addressed by the government of the day as follows:

This provision will assist in those cases where one spouse is in a hospital, a nursing home or other institution and the other spouse has to live alone with the same costs as a single person. (28^th Parliament, White Paper, Income Security for Canadians, Appendix I - "Guaranteed Income Security for the Aged", at p. 42).

[27] In both of these references, there is a statement that the provision is to apply where one spouse is not in the family home. While the issue of extra costs is addressed, this is described as a consequence of living alone and not as a stand-alone situation that requires assistance. I infer from this that the objective of the legislation was to address the situation where one partner was in a hospital or nursing home or other care facility. The situation contemplated by Parliament was one where the partners were forced into living in separate residences and not one where the partners were no longer in a "conjugal relationship that is marriage".

[28] Given the clear words of s. 15(3)(b), the overall scheme of the OAS Act and the intent of Parliament, the only possible conclusion is that the Leavitts do not satisfy the requirements to receive GIS benefits as though they were not married or not living in the same family home. The Minister, in determining that the Leavitts no longer qualified for the additional GIS benefits, was correct. The RT, in concluding that they did and in allowing the appeal from the Minister's directions, erred.

[29] The defect in the RT's analysis is readily apparent on the face of the record. It does not take any "significant searching or testing to find the defect" (Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Competition Act) v. Southam Inc. [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, at para. 57). While I do not necessarily agree that the standard is one of patent unreasonableness, the decision of the RT that held an alternative view cannot be maintained even on the highest standard of review. It follows that it cannot stand on any standard of review.

Conclusion

[30] In conclusion, I can appreciate the value the RT is placing on the nature of the relationship within a marriage and the high regard with which they view it. I can also understand the RT's wish to find a way to provide financial support to this elderly couple who are in need. However, in this case, there is no question that they are married and now living in the same residence and, thus, do not meet the requirements of s. 15(3)(b).

[31] I appreciate that this is an unfortunate situation for the Leavitts who face difficult times at this stage of their lives but I cannot conclude otherwise.

[32] The Minister does not seek costs in this application. In my discretion, I agree that each party should bear its own costs. An order will issue in respect of each of these files reflecting these reasons.

"Judith A. Snider"

_____________________________

Judge

APPENDIX A

Section 27.1 and section 28 of the Old Age Security Act 27.1 (1) A person who is dissatisfied with a decision or determination made under this Act that no benefit may be paid to that person, or respecting the amount of any benefit that may be paid to that person, may, within ninety days after the day on which the person is notified in the prescribed manner of the decision or determination, or within such longer period as the Minister may either before or after the expiration of those ninety days allow, make a request to the Minister in the prescribed form and manner for a reconsideration of that decision or determination. (2) The Minister shall, without delay after receiving a request referred to in subsection (1), reconsider the decision or determination, as the case may be, and may confirm or vary it and may approve payment of a benefit, determine the amount of a benefit or determine that no benefit is payable and shall without delay notify the person who made the request in writing of the Minister's decision and of the reasons for the decision. 28. (1) A person who makes a request under subsection 27.1(1) and who is dissatisfied with the decision of the Minister in respect of the request, or, subject to the regulations, any person on their behalf, may appeal the decision to a Review Tribunal under subsection 82(1) of the Canada Pension Plan.(2) Where, on an appeal to a Review Tribunal, it is a ground of the appeal that the decision made by the Minister as to the income or income from a particular source or sources of an applicant or beneficiary or of the spouse or common-law partner of the applicant or beneficiary was incorrectly made, the appeal on that ground shall, in accordance with the regulations, be referred for decision to the Tax Court of Canada, whose decision, subject only to variation by that Court in accordance with any decision on an appeal under the Tax Court of Canada Act relevant to the appeal to the Review Tribunal, is final and binding for all purposes of the appeal to the Review Tribunal except in accordance with the Federal Courts Act. (3) Where a decision is made by a Review Tribunal in respect of a benefit, the Minister may stay payment of the benefit until the later of (a) the expiration of the period allowed for making an application under the Federal Courts Act for judicial review of the decision, and (b) where Her Majesty has made an application under the Federal Courts Act for judicial review of the decision, the month in which all proceedings in relation to the judicial review have been completed. ¼ Section 82 and section 84 of the Canada Pension Plan 82. (1) A party who is dissatisfied with a decision of the Minister made under section 81 or subsection 84(2), or a person who is dissatisfied with a decision of the Minister made under subsection 27.1(2) of the Old Age Security Act, or, subject to the regulations, any person on their behalf, may appeal the decision to a Review Tribunal in writing within 90 days, or any longer period that the Commissioner of Review Tribunals may, either before or after the expiration of those 90 days, allow, after the day on which the party was notified in the prescribed manner of the decision or the person was notified in writing of the Minister's decision and of the reasons for it. (2) A Review Tribunal shall be constituted in accordance with this section. (3) The Governor in Council shall appoint a panel of between one hundred and four hundred persons resident in Canada, in such a way that, at any given time, (a) at least twenty-five per cent of the members of the panel are members of the bar of a province; (b) at least twenty-five per cent of the members of the panel are persons qualified to practise medicine or a prescribed related profession in a province; and (c) there are members of the panel from every region of Canada.(4) A person shall be appointed to the panel pursuant to subsection (3) for a term of at least two but not exceeding five years and is eligible for re-appointment on the expiration of his term. (5) The Governor in Council shall appoint a Commissioner of Review Tribunals and a Deputy Commissioner of Review Tribunals, each for a term of at least two but not exceeding five years, and the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner are eligible for re-appointment on the expiration of their respective terms. (6) In the event of the absence or incapacity of the Commissioner of Review Tribunals or if the office of Commissioner is vacant, the Deputy Commissioner of Review Tribunals has all the powers of the Commissioner. (7) Each Review Tribunal shall consist of three persons chosen by the Commissioner from among the members of the panel referred to in subsection (3), subject to the following requirements: (a) the Commissioner must designate a member of the bar of a province as the Chairman of the Review Tribunal; and (b) where the appeal to be heard involves a disability benefit, at least one member of the Review Tribunal must be a person qualified to practise medicine or a prescribed related profession in a province. (8) An appeal to a Review Tribunal shall be heard at such place in Canada as is fixed by the Commissioner, having regard to the convenience of the appellant, the Minister, and any other person added as a party to the appeal pursuant to subsection (10). (9) The Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and members of Review Tribunals shall be paid such reasonable remuneration and travel and living expenses in connection with the operation of Review Tribunals as are fixed by the Minister. (9.1) An appellant shall be paid such reasonable travel and living expenses incurred in Canada in connection with the hearing of the appeal as are fixed by the Minister. (9.2) Notwithstanding subsection (9.1), where an appellant is successful, the appellant shall be paid such reasonable travel and living expenses in connection with the hearing of the appeal as are fixed by the Minister. (9.3) Any person added as a party to the appeal pursuant to subsection (10) shall be paid such reasonable travel and living expenses in connection with the hearing of the appeal as are fixed by the Minister. (10) Where an appeal is made to a Review Tribunal in respect of (a) a survivor's pension payable to the survivor of a deceased contributor, (b) a division of unadjusted pensionable earnings under section 55, 55.1 or 55.2, or(c) an assignment of a contributor's retirement pension under section 65.1 and in the Minister's opinion a person in addition to the appellant may be directly affected by the decision of the Review Tribunal, the Minister shall notify the Commissioner of all such persons, and the Commissioner shall add as a party to the appeal any such person who is not already a party thereto. (11) A Review Tribunal may confirm or vary a decision of the Minister made under section 81 or subsection 84(2) or under subsection 27.1(2) of the Old Age Security Act and may take any action in relation to any of those decisions that might have been taken by the Minister under that section or either of those subsections, and the Commissioner of Review Tribunals shall thereupon notify the Minister and the other parties to the appeal of the Review Tribunal's decision and of the reasons for its decision. (12) A decision of the majority of the members of a Review Tribunal is a decision of the Tribunal. ¼ 84. (1) A Review Tribunal and the Pension Appeals Board have authority to determine any question of law or fact as to (a) whether any benefit is payable to a person, (b) the amount of any such benefit,(c) whether any person is eligible for a division of unadjusted pensionable earnings, (d) the amount of that division, (e) whether any person is eligible for an assignment of a contributor's retirement pension, or (f) the amount of that assignment, and the decision of a Review Tribunal, except as provided in this Act, or the decision of the Pension Appeals Board, except for judicial review under the Federal Courts Act, as the case may be, is final and binding for all purposes of this Act. (2) The Minister, a Review Tribunal or the Pension Appeals Board may, notwithstanding subsection (1), on new facts, rescind or amend a decision under this Act given by him, the Tribunal or the Board, as the case may be.		Paragraphe 27.1 et article 28 de la Loi sur la Sécuritéde la vieillesse 27.1 (1) La personne qui se croit lésée par une décision de refus ou de liquidation de la prestation prise en application de la présente loi peut, dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours suivant la notification par écrit de la décision, ou dans le délai plus long que le ministre peut accorder avant ou après l'expiration du délai de quatre-vingt-dix jours, demander au ministre, selon les modalités réglementaires, de réviser sa décision. (2) Le ministre étudie les demandes dès leur réception; il peut confirmer ou modifier sa décision soit en agréant le versement de la prestation ou en la liquidant, soit en décidant qu'il n'y a pas lieu de verser la prestation. Sans délai, il notifie sa décision et ses motifs. 28. (1) L'auteur de la demande prévue au paragraphe 27.1(1) qui se croit lésé par la décision révisée du ministre -- ou, sous réserve des règlements, quiconque pour son compte -- peut appeler de la décision devant un tribunal de révision constitué en application du paragraphe 82(1) du Régime de pensions du Canada. (2) Lorsque l'appelant prétend que la décision du ministre touchant son revenu ou celui de son époux ou conjoint de fait, ou le revenu tiré d'une ou de plusieurs sources particulières, est mal fondée, l'appel est, conformément aux règlements, renvoyé pour décision devant la Cour canadienne de l'impôt. La décision de la Cour est, sous la seule réserve des modifications que celle-ci pourrait y apporter pour l'harmoniser avec une autre décision rendue aux termes de la Loi sur la Cour canadienne de l'impôt sur un appel pertinent à celui interjeté aux termes de la présente loi devant un tribunal de révision, définitive et obligatoire et ne peut faire l'objet que d'un recours prévu par la Loi sur les Cours fédérales. (3) Le ministre peut surseoir au versement de la prestation qui fait l'objet d'un appel en application du présent article jusqu'à l'expiration du délai prévu par la Loi sur les Cours fédérales pour demander une révision judiciaire. Dans le cas où Sa Majesté a présenté telle demande, le sursis se prolonge jusqu'au mois au cours duquel se terminent les procédures découlant de cette demande de révision. ¼ Article 82 et article 84 du Régime de pensions du Canada 82. (1) La personne qui se croit lésée par une décision du ministre rendue en application de l'article 81 ou du paragraphe 84(2) ou celle qui se croit lésée par une décision du ministre rendue en application du paragraphe 27.1(2) de la Loi sur la sécuritéde la vieillesse ou, sous réserve des règlements, quiconque de sa part, peut interjeter appel par écrit auprès d'un tribunal de révision de la décision du ministre soit dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours suivant le jour où la première personne est, de la manière prescrite, avisée de cette décision, ou, selon le cas, suivant le jour où le ministre notifie à la deuxième personne sa décision et ses motifs, soit dans le délai plus long autorisé par le commissaire des tribunaux de révision avant ou après l'expiration des quatre-vingt-dix jours. (2) Un tribunal de révision est constitué conformément au présent article. (3) Le gouverneur en conseil nomme de cent à quatre cents personnes qui, résidant au Canada, feront partie d'une liste qui doit en tout temps répondre aux critères suivants: a) au moins vingt-cinq pour cent de ceux qui font partie de la liste doivent appartenir à un barreau provincial; b) au moins vingt-cinq pour cent de ceux qui font partie de la liste doivent être des personnes habiles à pratiquer la médecine ou une profession connexe prescrite dans une province; c) il y a, dans cette liste, des représentants de chacune des régions du Canada. (4) Une personne faisant partie de la liste établie en application du paragraphe (3) y est nommée pour une période qui peut varier entre deux et cinq ans et elle peut y être nommée de nouveau après l'expiration de cette période. (5) Le gouverneur en conseil nomme, pour un mandat qui peut varier entre deux et cinq ans, un commissaire et un commissaire-adjoint des tribunaux de révision et, après l'expiration de leur mandat respectif, ceux-ci peuvent être nommés à nouveau. (6) En cas d'absence ou d'empêchement du commissaire des tribunaux de révision, ou de vacance de son poste, le commissaire-adjoint assume les responsabilités du commissaire. (7) Un tribunal de révision se compose de trois personnes qui, provenant de la liste visée au paragraphe (3), sont choisies par le commissaire en fonction des exigences suivantes : a) le commissaire doit désigner, comme président du tribunal, un membre du barreau d'une province; b) dans les cas où l'appel concerne une question se rapportant à une prestation d'invalidité, au moins un membre du tribunal doit être une personne habile à pratiquer la médecine ou une profession connexe prescrite dans une province. (8) Un appel auprès d'un tribunal de révision est entendu à l'endroit du Canada que fixe le commissaire, compte tenu de ce qui convient à l'appelant, au ministre et aux mis en cause en application du paragraphe (10). (9) Le commissaire, le commissaire-adjoint et les membres des tribunaux de révision reçoivent, selon ce que fixe le ministre, la rémunération et les frais raisonnables de déplacement et de séjour qui se rapportent aux activités des tribunaux de révision. (9.1) L'appelant est indemnisé des frais de déplacement et de séjour, fixés par le ministre, entraînés par l'audition de l'appel et faits au Canada. (9.2) Malgré le paragraphe (9.1), dans le cas où l'appel est accueilli, l'appelant est indemnisé des frais de déplacement et de séjour, fixés par le ministre, entraînés par l'audition de l'appel. (9.3) Toute personne mise en cause à un appel conformément au paragraphe (10) est indemnisée des frais de déplacement et de séjour, fixés par le ministre, entraînés par l'audition de l'appel. (10) Dans les cas où un appel auprès du tribunal de révision se rapporte : a) à une pension de survivant payable au survivant d'un cotisant décédé; b) au partage des gains non ajustés ouvrant droit à pension en application de l'article 55, 55.1 ou 55.2; c) à une cession de la pension de retraite d'un cotisant en application de l'article 65.1, et que, de l'avis du ministre, une personne autre que l'appelant peut être directement touchée par la décision du tribunal de révision, le ministre donne au commissaire un avis mentionnant l'ensemble de ces personnes et le commissaire met alors en cause celles qui, parmi ces personnes, ne sont pas déjà parties aux procédures d'appel. (11) Un tribunal de révision peut confirmer ou modifier une décision du ministre prise en vertu de l'article 81 ou du paragraphe 84(2) ou en vertu du paragraphe 27.1(2) de la Loi sur la sécuritéde la vieillesse et il peut, à cet égard, prendre toute mesure que le ministre aurait pu prendre en application de ces dispositions; le commissaire des tribunaux de révision doit aussitôt donner un avis écrit de la décision du tribunal et des motifs la justifiant au ministre ainsi qu'aux parties à l'appel. (12) Une décision de la majorité des membres d'un tribunal de révision emporte décision du tribunal. ¼ 84. (1) Un tribunal de révision et la Commission d'appel des pensions ont autorité pour décider des questions de droit ou de fait concernant : a) la question de savoir si une prestation est payable à une personne; b) le montant de cette prestation; c) la question de savoir si une personne est admissible à un partage des gains non ajustés ouvrant droit à pension; d) le montant de ce partage; e) la question de savoir si une personne est admissible à bénéficier de la cession de la pension de retraite d'un cotisant; f) le montant de cette cession. La décision du tribunal de révision, sauf disposition contraire de la présente loi, ou celle de la Commission d'appel des pensions, sauf contrôle judiciaire dont elle peut faire l'objet aux termes de la Loi sur les Cours fédérales, est définitive et obligatoire pour l'application de la présente loi. (2) Indépendamment du paragraphe (1), le ministre, un tribunal de révision ou la Commission d'appel des pensions peut, en se fondant sur des faits nouveaux, annuler ou modifier une décision qu'il a lui-même rendue ou qu'elle a elle-même rendue conformément à la présente loi.

FEDERAL COURT

NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET: T-1511-04 & T-1512-04

STYLE OF CAUSE: Minister of Human Resources

Development v. Dahl Leavitt

and Eda Leavitt

PLACE OF HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario

DATE OF HEARING: May 9, 2005

THE COURT ANNOUNCED AT THE HEARING THAT THIS MATTER WOULD BE DEALT WITH IN WRITING

REASONS FOR ORDER

AND ORDER: The Honourable Madam Justice Snider

DATED: May 12, 2005

APPEARANCES:

Ms. Laura Dalloo FOR APPLICANT

No appearances FOR RESPONDENTS

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Ms. Laura Dalloo FOR APPLICANT

Ottawa, Ontario

Mr. Dahl Leavitt & Ms. Eda Leavitt FOR RESPONDENTS

(SELF-REPRESENTED)

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Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development) v. Leavitt, 2005 FC 664

Citations2005 FC 664

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2005 FC 664