Date: 20050311
Docket: IMM-6278-04
Citation: 2005 FC 348
MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC, MARCH 11, 2005
Present: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE LUC MARTINEAU
BETWEEN:
SAHILA ALLEG
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] This is an application for judicial review under section 72 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the IRPA) of a decision of the Immigration Appeal Division (the Appeal Division) of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) dated June 21, 2004 wherein the Appeal Division determined that the appeal filed by the applicant should be discontinued based on a lack of jurisdiction.
[2] Sahila Alleg, the applicant is a Canadian citizen. She is married to Khelil Hamida (the sponsoree). The sponsoree was born in Algeria on May 21, 1970. On April 30, 1995, the sponsoree came to Canada with a false French passport. On May 3, 1995, the sponsoree made a refugee claim. On March 18, 1998, the IRB found the sponsoree not to be a refugee within the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (the Convention) definition, being excluded under paragraph 1F(a) as a person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes. The sponsoree made an application for leave and for judicial review. On June 11, 1998, this Court denied leave for judicial review since the sponsoree did not file a record.
[3] On January 30, 1999, the applicant married the sponsoree. On September 15, 1999, the applicant submitted an application to sponsor the sponsoree. On September 20, 1999, the sponsoree made a request for a visa exemption under humanitarian and compassionate grounds and an application for pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA). On April 25, 2001, a PRRA officer concluded that the sponsoree would not face persecution, torture or risk to life or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment upon his return in Algeria. On May 7, 2001, an Immigration Officer allowed the sponsoree's request for visa exemption. Consequently, the said request was thereafter treated as a sponsoree application for permanent residence within Canada. On the same day, the IRB found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the sponsoree is a person who has committed an offence referred to in any of sections 4 to 7 of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24 (the CAHWC Act). Consequently, the IRB rejected the sponsored application for permanent residence within Canada since he was found to be inadmissible to Canada under paragraph 19(1)(j) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 (the former Act).
[4] On May 7, 2002, the applicant filed a notice of appeal to the Appeal Division of the IRB pursuant to subsection 77(3) of the former Act. The IRPA came into force on June 28, 2002. On May 6, 2004, the respondent filed a motion before the Appeal Division seeking the discontinuance of the applicant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the basis of section 196 of the IRPA, a transitional provision which purports to discontinue certain appeals to the Appeal Division that were made before the IRPA came into force. More precisely, the respondent filed a notice of discontinuance on the basis that the applicant (then appellant) was the sponsor of a foreign national, the sponsoree, who had been refused on security grounds as defined in subsection 320(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (the Regulations).
[5] The hearing of May 10, 2004 was adjourned for a period of three weeks to permit written submissions concerning section 196 of the IRPA. However, the applicant's counsel did not submit any written submissions regarding section 196 of the IRPA. On June 21, 2004, the Appeal Division agreed with the respondent that the appeal should be discontinued for lack of jurisdiction. The Appeal Division held that from the language of section 196, the statutory scheme of the IRPA, the object of Parliament enacting the IRPA and section 196 in particular, it is evident that section 196 is applicable to sponsorship appeals and that it constitutes an exception to section 192 of the IRPA.
[6] The specific issue in this judicial review is whether sponsorship appeals for permanent residence status are subject to section 196 of the IRPA and whether, as a result, such appeals are discontinued when the sponsoree cannot be admitted on security grounds and the applicant has not been granted a stay. More particularly, the Court is asked to determine whether section 196 of the IRPA apply only to appeals made under subsections 70(1) or (2) of the former Act or whether it also include appeals made by sponsors under subsection 7(3) of the former Act.
[7] The applicant relies on Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Sohal, 2004 FC 660, [2004] F.C.J. No. 813 (F.C.) (QL) to affirm that the Appeal Division's decision to discontinue the applicant's appeal was made in error. Moreover, the applicant argues that, where vested rights are at stake, a tribunal is obliged to use the interpretation of the law which is most favourable to the person concerned. In Sohal, supra, Chief Justice Lutfy decided that section 196 did not apply to sponsorship appeals. In coming to this conclusion, the Chief Justice noted that a sponsor could never be granted a discretionary stay. In his view, this suggested that Parliament only intended to remove the right of appeal for "removal order appellants" under section 70 of the former Act.
[8] On the other hand, the Respondent contests this proposition and relies on Williams v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 662, [2004] F.C.J. No. 814 (F.C.) (QL), Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Bhalrhu, 2004 FC 1236, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1498 (F.C.) (QL) and Kang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 297, three recent decisions on this Court which have questioned Sohal, supra, to say that the Appeal Division did not err in concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the applicant's appeal.
[9] There is no dispute that, using the functional and pragmatic approach, the standard of review applicable to the impugned decision regarding the interpretation of section 196 of the IRPA is correctness (Williams, supra; Bhalrhu, supra; Kang, supra). I also adopt the standard of statutory interpretation proposed in Elmer A. Driedger, "Construction of Statutes", (1983), 2nd ed., Toronto, Butterworths, which has been adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Rizzo v. Rizzo Shoes Ltd., [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 at paragraph 21 and Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84 at paragraph 27) and consistently applied by the Federal Court of Appeal as well as this Court:
Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act and the intention of Parliament.
[10] The present application should be dismissed. For the reasons mentioned in the following paragraphs, I find that section 196 of the IRPA apply to both appeals made under subsections 70(1) or (2) of the former Act and appeals made by sponsors under subsection 77(3) of the former Act. It is useful to note that the relevant sections of the IRPA, the Regulations, as well as the former Act, are reproduced in annex.
[11] I have carefully considered the competing views regarding the proper interpretation of section 196 articulated by Phelan J. and Gauthier J. in Williams, supra, and Bhalrhu, supra, on the one hand, and by Lutfy C.J. in Sohal, supra, on the other. In this regard, I am in agreement with the following analysis made by Mactavish J. in Kang, supra, at paragraphs 25 to 30:
As the Federal Court of Appeal noted in Medovarski, in enacting IRPA, Parliament re-balanced the interests of public safety and individual rights by broadening the categories of persons who may be removed without an appeal to the IAD. To this end, section 64 is designed to limit the opportunities for admission to Canada for those involved in serious criminality, human rights violations or activities giving rise to national security concerns.
In other words, section 64 is intended to assist in ensuring the safety of Canadians and the security of Canadian society: Williams, at paras. 51 and 52. The section ensures that prospective immigrants who are not admissible for any of the reasons identified in sub-section 64(1) cannot do indirectly what they are not entitled to do directly: Bhalrhu, at para. 34.
As Justice Phelan noted in Williams, the close linkage of sections 196 and 64 suggests that section 196 is also intended to serve these objectives, and to limit the right to continue appeals under the new legislation.
This view of section 196 is borne out by the decision of Justice Pelletier in Medovarski. While he was dissenting on other grounds, he was clearly of the view that section 196 applied to sponsorship appeals: see Medovarski at paras. 88-91.
In coming to the conclusion that section 196 did not apply in the case of sponsorship appeals in Sohal, Chief Justice Lutfy found it significant that sponsors could never be granted a discretionary stay. In his view, this suggested that Parliament only intended to remove the right of appeal for "removal order appellants" under section 70 of the former Immigration Act.
In this regard, I prefer the reasoning of Justice Gauthier in Bhalrhu, where she found that the exclusion of appellants who have been granted a stay from the application of section 196 was done out of deference to the IAD. In her view, it did not follow that an appellant had to have the right to seek a stay in order to escape the reach of section 196. I agree.
[12] Like Mactavish J. in Kang, supra, I am satisfied that the interpretation of section 196 articulated in Williams, supra, and Bhalrhu, supra, properly reflects Parliament's intent in enacting this provision. I am also satisfied that the present application can be determined on examining the plain meaning of the words in section 196 of the IRPA. The appellant falls squarely into the conditions which must be met in order that an appeal be discontinued.
[13] Section 196 of the IRPA must be considered in its context and within the overall scheme of the legislation (Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2004] 4 F.C.R. 48 (F.C.A.); (leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada granted). Section 190 requires that existing proceedings under the former Act be conducted under the IRPA. Section 192 of the IRPA continues any appeal filed under the former Act. However, there are two exceptions which can be found in sections 196 and 197 of the IRPA. Both sections begin with "Despite section 192", which I conclude to mean "in spite of" or "notwithstanding". In addition, both provisions refer in particular to section 64 of the IRPA. In my opinion, the restrictions of the appellant's right to appeal under section 64 of the IRPA is the prime qualifier in section 196. Section 64 of the IRPA refers specifically to "sponsors". Consequently sections 196 and 197 of the IRPA were intended to affect the rights of appellants who are sponsors, such as the applicant, notwithstanding the continuation concept found at section 192 of the IRPA. The natural consequence of this legislative scheme is that existing rights may be affected, even adversely.
[14] It is trite law that it is permissible for the Parliament to deny the right to appeal (Canada (Secretary of State) v. Luitjens, [1992] F.C.J. No. 319 (F.C.A.) (QL)). In the event that Parliament had intended that vested rights were to be preserved notwithstanding the new legislation, it could simply have said so. Moreover, it is consistent and logical that Parliament would not want sponsors to enjoy greater benefits than those available to sponsoree applicants for landed status. The benefits of landed status can well long survive beyond the relationship which gave rise to the sponsorship. Parliament was simply ensuring that which cannot be done directly cannot be accomplished indirectly. It is clear that section 64 of the IRPA, while referring to sponsors and permanent residents, is not directed primarily at the objective of family unification. In fact, section 64 of the IRPA is designed to limit the opportunity for admission to Canada by those which have been found to be inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality. That objective is to be attained whether the inadmissible persons appeal directly themselves of by means of a sponsor. Section 64 of the IRPA is focussed primarily, if not exclusively, on the objective of safety of Canadians and the security of Canadian society. By linking section 64 and section 196 so closely, I conclude that section 196 is also intended to serve that objective.
[15] Consequently, I find that the applicant's argument regarding the exclusion of sponsorship appeals from the application of section 196 would not respect the intention of the Parliament and give full effect to the words used by the Parliament in the said provision.
[16] The applicant has proposed the following question for certification :
Does section 196 of the IRPA apply only to appeals made under section 70(1) or (2) of the former Act or does it include appeals made by sponsors under section 77 of the former Act?
[17] For the reasons already mentioned and with all due respect for the contrary view expressed in Sohal, supra, I have already answered the question and found in this regard that section 196 of the IRPA clearly applies to sponsorship appeals and that the Appeal Division's decision is correct. That said, I am not satisfied that the proposed question is of general importance. I note, in this regard, that Gauthier J. in Bhalrhu, supra, precisely refused to certify an almost identical question while Mactavish J. in Kang, supra, declined to certify any question relating to the same issue basically because the transitional provisions in the IRPA apply to a limited number of cases.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that the present application for judicial review be dismissed.
"Luc Martineau"
Judge
| 63. (1) A person who has filed in the prescribed manner an application to sponsor a foreign national as a member of the family class may appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division against a decision not to issue the foreign national a permanent resident visa.
(...)
64. (1) No appeal may be made to the Immigration Appeal Division by a foreign national or their sponsor or by a permanent resident if the foreign national or permanent resident has been found to be inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality.
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), serious criminality must be with respect to a crime that was punished in Canada by a term of imprisonment of at least two years.
(...)
190. Every application, proceeding or matter under the former Act that is pending or in progress immediately before the coming into force of this section shall be governed by this Act on that coming into force.
192. If a notice of appeal has been filed with the Immigration Appeal Division immediately before the coming into force of this section, the appeal shall be continued under the former Act by the Immigration Appeal Division of the Board.
196. Despite section 192, an appeal made to the Immigration Appeal Division before the coming into force of this section shall be discontinued if the appellant has not been granted a stay under the former Act and the appeal could not have been made because of section 64 of this Act.
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63. (1) Quiconque a déposé, conformément au règlement, une demande de parrainage au titre du regroupement familial peut interjeter appel du refus de délivrer le visa de résident permanent.
(...)
64. (1) L'appel ne peut être interjeté par le résident permanent ou l'étranger qui est interdit de territoire pour raison de sécurité ou pour atteinte aux droits humains ou internationaux, grande criminalité ou criminalité organisée, ni par dans le cas de l'étranger, son répondant.
(2) L'interdiction de territoire pour grande criminalité vise l'infraction punie au Canada par un emprisonnement d'au moins deux ans.
(...)
190. La présente loi s'applique, dès l'entrée en vigueur du présent article, aux demandes et procédures présentées ou instruites, ainsi qu'aux autres questions soulevées, dans le cadre de l'ancienne loi avant son entrée en vigueur et pour lesquelles aucune décision n'a été prise.
192. S'il y a eu dépôt d'une demande d'appel à la Section d'appel de l'immigration, à l'entrée en vigueur du présent article, l'appel est continué sous le régime de l'ancienne loi, par la Section d'appel de l'immigration de la Commission.
196. Malgré l'article 192, il est mis fin à l'affaire portée en appel devant la Section d'appel de l'immigration si l'intéressé est, alors qu'il ne fait pas l'objet d'un sursis au titre de l'ancienne loi, visé par la restriction du droit d'appel prévue par l'article 64 de la présente loi.
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| 320. (1) A person is inadmissible under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act on security grounds if, on the coming into force of this section, the person had been determined to be a member of an inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)(e), (f) to (k) of the former Act.
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320. (1) La personne qui, à l'entrée en vigueur du présent article, avait été jugée appartenir à une catégorie visée à l'un des alinéas 19(1)(e) à g) et k) de l'ancienne loi est interdite de territoire pour raison de sécurité sous le régime de la Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés.
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| 70. (1) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), where a removal order or conditional removal order is made against a permanent resident or against a person lawfully in possession of a valid returning resident permit issued to that person pursuant to the regulations, that person may appeal to the Appeal Division on either or both of the following grounds, namely,
(a) on any ground of appeal that involves a question of law or fact, or mixed law and fact; and
(b) on the ground that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the person should not be removed from Canada.
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70. (1) Sous réserve des paragraphes (4) et (5), les résidents permanents et les titulaires de permis de retour en cours de validité et conformes aux règlements peuvent faire appel devant la section d'appel d'une mesure de renvoi ou de renvoi conditionnel en invoquant les moyens suivants :
a) question de droit, de fait ou mixte;
b) le fait que, eu égard aux circonstances particulières de l'espèce, ils ne devraient pas être renvoyés du Canada.
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| (2) Subject to subsections (3) to (5), an appeal lies to the Appeal Division from a removal order or conditional removal order made against a person who
(a) has been determined under this Act or the regulations to be a Convention refugee but is not a permanent resident; or
(b) seeks landing or entry and, at the time that a report with respect to the person was made by an immigration officer pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(a), was in possession of a valid immigrant visa, in the case of a person seeking landing, or a valid visitor's visa, in the case of a person seeking entry.
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(2) Sous réserve des paragraphes (3) à (5), peuvent faire appel devant la section d'appel d'une mesure de renvoi ou de renvoi conditionnel :
a) les non-résidents permanents qui se sont vu reconnaître le statut de réfugié au sens de la Convention aux termes de la présente loi ou de ses règlements;
b) les personnes qui, ayant demandé l'admission, étaient titulaires d'un visa de visiteur ou d'immigrant, selon le cas, en cours de validité lorsqu'elles ont fait l'objet du rapport visé à l'alinéa 20(1)a).
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| (3) An appeal to the Appeal Division under subsection (2) may be based on either or both of the following grounds:
(a) on any ground of appeal that involves a question of law or fact, or mixed law and fact; and
(b) on the ground that, having regard to the existence of compassionate or humanitarian considerations, the person should not be removed from Canada.
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(3) Les moyens que peuvent invoquer les appelants visés au paragraphe (2) sont les suivants :
a) question de droit, de fait ou mixte;
b) le fait que, pour des raisons d'ordre humanitaire, ils ne devraient pas être renvoyés du Canada.
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| (3.1) No appeal may be made to the Appeal Division by a person with respect to whom a certificate has been filed under subsection 40.1(1) where it has been determined, pursuant to paragraph 40.1(4)(d), that the certificate is reasonable.
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(3.1) Ne peut faire appel devant la section d'appel la personne à l'égard de laquelle il a été décidé, en application de l'alinéa 40.1(4)d), que l'attestation visée au paragraphe 40.1(1) est raisonnable.
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| (4) A person described in subsection (1) or paragraph (2)(a) against whom a deportation order or conditional deportation order is made may appeal to the Appeal Division on any ground of appeal that involves a question of law or fact, or mixed law and fact, where the person is
(a) a person, other than a person described in subsection (5), with respect to whom a certificate referred to in subsection 40(1) has been issued; or
(b) a person, other than a person described in subsection (3.1), who has been determined by an adjudicator to be a member of an inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)(e), (f), (g), (j) or (l).
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(4) Les moyens d'appel sont limités aux questions de droit, de fait ou mixtes dans le cas d'appels relatifs à une mesure d'expulsion ou d'expulsion conditionnelle interjetés par les personnes, visées au paragraphe (1) ou aux alinéas (2)a) ou b), qui, selon le cas :
a) ont fait l'objet de l'attestation prévue au paragraphe 40(1), sauf si elles sont visées au paragraphe (5);
b) appartiennent, selon la décision d'un arbitre, à l'une des catégories non admissibles visées aux alinéas 19(1)e), f), g), j) ou l), sauf si elles sont visées au paragraphe (3.1).
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| (5) No appeal may be made to the Appeal Division by a person described in subsection (1) or paragraph (2)(a) or (b) against whom a deportation order or conditional deportation order is made where the Minister is of the opinion that the person constitutes a danger to the public in Canada and the person has been determined by an adjudicator to be
(a) a member of an inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)(c), (c.1), (c.2) or (d);
(b) a person described in paragraph 27(1)(a.1); or
(c) a person described in paragraph 27(1)(d) who has been convicted of an offence under any Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of ten years or more may be imposed.
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(5) Ne peuvent faire appel devant la section d'appel les personnes, visées au paragraphe (1) ou aux alinéas (2)a) ou b), qui, selon la décision d'un arbitre :
a) appartiennent à l'une des catégories non admissibles visées aux alinéas 19(1)c), c.1), c.2) ou d) et, selon le ministre, constituent un danger pour le public au Canada;
b) relèvent du cas visé à l'alinéa 27(1)a.1) et, selon le ministre, constituent un danger pour le public au Canada;
c) relèvent, pour toute infraction punissable aux termes d'une loi fédérale d'un emprisonnement maximal égal ou supérieur à dix ans, du cas visé à l'alinéa 27(1)d) et, selon le ministre, constituent un danger pour le public au Canada.
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| (6) Where the Appeal Division directs that the execution of a deportation order or conditional deportation order be stayed, the direction is of no effect and, notwithstanding subsection 74(2), the Appeal Division may not review the case, where the Minister is of the opinion that the person has breached the terms and conditions set by the Appeal Division and that the person constitutes a danger to the public in Canada and the person has been determined by an adjudicator to be
(a) a member of an inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)(c), (c.1), (c.2) or (d);
(b) a person described in paragraph 27(1)(a.1); or(c) a person described in paragraph 27(1)(d) who has been convicted of an offence under any Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of ten years or more may be imposed.
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(6) Malgré le paragraphe 74(2), la section d'appel ne peut réexaminer le cas -- l'ordonnance de sursis visant la mesure de renvoi ou de renvoi conditionnel cessant alors d'avoir effet -- si, selon le ministre, la personne n'a pas respecté les conditions du sursis et constitue un danger pour le public au Canada et que, selon la décision d'un arbitre, elle :
a) appartient à l'une des catégories non admissibles visées aux alinéas 19(1)c), c.1), c.2) ou d);
b) relève du cas visé à l'alinéa 27(1)a.1);
c) relève, pour toute infraction punissable aux termes d'une loi fédérale d'un emprisonnement maximal égal ou supérieur à dix ans, du cas visé à l'alinéa 27(1)d).
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| 77. (1) Where a person has sponsored an application for landing made by a member of the family class, an immigration officer or a visa officer, as the case may be, may refuse to approve the application on the grounds that
(a) the person who sponsored the application does not meet the requirements of the regulations respecting persons who sponsor applications for landing, or
(b) the member of the family class does not meet the requirements of this Act or the regulations,
and the person who sponsored the application shall be informed of the reasons for the refusal.
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77. (1) L'agent d'immigration ou l'agent des visas, selon le cas, peut rejeter une demande parrainée d'établissement présentée par un parent pour l'un ou l'autre des motifs suivants -- dont doit être alors informé le répondant :
a) le répondant ne remplit pas les conditions fixées par les règlements;
b) le parent ne remplit pas les conditions fixées par la présente loi et ses règlements.
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| (2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), where an application for landing made by a member of the family class is refused on the grounds that the member of the family class is a person described in any of paragraphs 19(1)(c.1) to (g), (k) and (l), the person who sponsored the application shall be informed of those grounds but not of the reasons on which those grounds are based.
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(2) Toutefois, si le motif du refus de la demande d'établissement parrainée tient au fait que le parent appartient à l'une des catégories visées aux alinéas 19(1)c.1) à g), k) ou l), le répondant est informé de ce fait mais non des raisons qui ont amené cette conclusion.
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| (3) Subject to subsections (3.01) and (3.1), a Canadian citizen or permanent resident who has sponsored an application for landing that is refused pursuant to subsection (1) may appeal to the Appeal Division on either or both of the following grounds:
(a) on any ground of appeal that involves a question of law or fact, or mixed law and fact; and
(b) on the ground that there exist compassionate or humanitarian considerations that warrant the granting of special relief.
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(3) S'il est citoyen canadien ou résident permanent, le répondant peut, sous réserve des paragraphes (3.01) et (3.1), en appeler devant la section d'appel en invoquant les moyens suivants :
a) question de droit, de fait ou mixte;
b) raisons d'ordre humanitaire justifiant l'octroi d'une mesure spéciale.
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| (3.01) No appeal lies to the Appeal Division under subsection (3) in respect of a person
(a) with respect to whom a certificate has been filed under subsection 40.1(1) where it has been determined, pursuant to paragraph 40.1(4)(d), that the certificate is reasonable; or
(b) who is a member of an inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)(c), (c.1), (c.2) or (d) where the Minister is of the opinion that the person constitutes a danger to the public in Canada.
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(3.01) Ne peut faire appel devant la section d'appel le répondant du parent :
a) à l'égard duquel il a été décidé, en application de l'alinéa 40.1(4)d), que l'attestation visée au paragraphe 40.1(1) est raisonnable;
b) qui appartient à l'une des catégories non admissibles visées aux alinéas 19(1)c), c.1), c.2) ou d) et, selon le ministre, constitue un danger pour le public au Canada.
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| (3.1) No appeal lies to the Appeal Division under subsection (3) on any grounds referred to in paragraph (3)(a) where the Canadian citizen or permanent resident who has sponsored the application for landing that is refused pursuant to subsection (1) resides in a province that has entered into an agreement pursuant to section 108 whereby the province has sole responsibility for establishing and applying financial criteria in relation to sponsors if
(a) the refusal is based on the rejection of the person's application for sponsorship by an official of that province on the grounds that the person failed to meet those criteria or failed to comply with any prior undertaking concerning the sponsorship of any application for landing; and
(b) the laws of that province provide the person with a right to appeal the rejection of the person's application for sponsorship.
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(3.1) Dans le cas où une province, aux termes d'un accord conclu en vertu de l'article 108, exerce seule la responsabilité de la fixation et de l'application des normes financières relatives aux demandes d'engagement, le répondant ne peut en appeler, en invoquant un des moyens prévus à l'alinéa (3)a), du refus de l'agent d'immigration ou de l'agent des visas d'octroyer le droit d'établissement à un parent en raison du rejet par le fonctionnaire provincial compétent de sa demande d'engagement, au motif soit qu'il ne satisfait pas aux normes financières de la province où il réside, soit qu'il a manqué à un engagement antérieur, si la législation de la province accorde un droit d'appel au répondant du rejet de sa demande d'engagement.
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| (3.2) With respect to any appeal referred to in subsection (3),
(a) the Minister may make an application to the Federal Court -- Trial Division, in camera, and in the absence of the appellant and any counsel representing the appellant, for the non-disclosure to the appellant of information obtained in confidence from the government or an institution of a foreign state or from an international organization of states or an institution thereof;
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(3.2) Dans le cadre de l'appel prévu au paragraphe (3) :
a) le ministre peut présenter à la Section de première instance de la Cour fédérale, à huis clos et en l'absence de l'intéressé et du conseiller le représentant, une demande en vue d'empêcher la communication à l'intéressé de renseignements obtenus sous le sceau du secret auprès du gouvernement d'un État étranger, d'une organisation internationale mise sur pied par des États étrangers ou l'un de leurs organismes;
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| (b) the Court shall, in camera, and in the absence of the appellant and any counsel representing the appellant,
(i) examine the information, and
(ii) provide counsel representing the Minister with a reasonable opportunity to be heard as to whether the information should not be disclosed to the appellant on the grounds that the disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of persons;
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b) la Section de première instance de la Cour fédérale, à huis clos et en l'absence de l'intéressé et du conseiller le représentant :
(i) étudie les renseignements,
(ii) accorde au représentant du ministre la possibilité de présenter ses arguments sur le fait que les renseignements ne devraient pas être communiqués à l'intéressé parce que cette communication porterait atteinte à la sécurité nationale ou à celle de personnes;
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| (c) the information shall be returned to counsel representing the Minister and shall not be considered by the Appeal Division in making its determination on the appeal if, in the opinion of the Court, the disclosure of the information to the appellant would not be injurious to national security or to the safety of persons; and
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c) ces renseignements doivent être remis au représentant du ministre et ne peuvent servir de fondement à la décision de la section d'appel sur l'appel si la Section de première instance de la Cour fédérale détermine que leur communication à l'intéressé ne porterait pas atteinte à la sécurité nationale ou à celle de personnes;
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| (d) if the Court determines that the information should not be disclosed to the appellant on the grounds that the disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of persons, the information shall not be disclosed but may be considered by the Appeal Division in making its determination.
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d) si la Section de première instance de la Cour fédérale décide que cette communication porterait atteinte à la sécurité nationale ou à celle de personnes, les renseignements ne sont pas communiqués mais peuvent servir de fondement à la décision de la section d'appel sur l'appel.
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| (3.3) Where an application referred to in paragraph (3.2)(a) is made, the appeal to which the application relates shall not be commenced or, if commenced, shall be adjourned, until the Federal Court -- Trial Division has made a determination of the application.
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(3.3) La demande visée à l'alinéa (3.2)a) a pour effet de suspendre l'appel jusqu'à ce que la Section de première instance de la Cour fédérale rende une décision à son égard.
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| (4) The Appeal Division may dispose of an appeal made pursuant to subsection (3) by allowing it or by dismissing it, and shall notify the Minister and the person who made the appeal of its decision and the reasons therefor.
(5) Subject to subsection (6), where the Minister has been notified by the Appeal Division that an appeal has been allowed pursuant to subsection (4), the Minister shall cause the review of the application to be resumed by an immigration officer or a visa officer, as the case may be, and the application shall be approved where it is determined that the person who sponsored the application and the member of the family class meet the requirements of this Act and the regulations, other than those requirements on which the decision of the Appeal Division has been given.
(6) Where the Minister has been notified by the Appeal Division that an appeal has been allowed pursuant to subsection (4) and the Minister makes an application for leave to commence an application for judicial review in respect of that decision, the application of subsection (5) shall be stayed until the application is disposed of and, where leave is granted, until the judicial review proceeding has been heard and disposed of and all appeals therefrom have been heard and disposed of or the time normally limited for filing such appeals has elapsed.
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(4) La section d'appel peut faire droit à l'appel visé au paragraphe (3) ou le rejeter. Elle fait part de sa décision et de ses motifs au ministre et à l'appelant.
(5) Une fois avisé qu'il a été fait droit à l'appel, le ministre, sous réserve du paragraphe (6), fait poursuivre l'examen de la demande par un agent d'immigration ou un agent des visas. Celui-ci approuve la demande s'il est établi que le répondant et le parent satisfont aux exigences de la présente loi et de ses règlements, autres que celles sur lesquelles la section d'appel a rendu sa décision.
(6) La présentation d'une demande d'autorisation relative à la présentation d'une demande de contrôle judiciaire par le ministre de la décision de la section d'appel a pour effet de suspendre l'application du paragraphe (5) jusqu'au jugement sur la demande d'autorisation et, dans le cas où celle-ci est accueillie, jusqu'au jugement sur la demande de contrôle judiciaire ou jusqu'à la décision en appel de ce jugement ou à l'expiration du délai normal d'appel, selon le cas.
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FEDERAL COURT
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-6278-04
STYLE OF CAUSE: SAHILA ALLEG
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
PLACE OF HEARING: MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC
DATE OF HEARING: MARCH 1, 2005
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MARTINEAU
DATED: MARCH 11, 2005
APPEARANCES:
VIKEN G. ARTINIAN FOR THE APPLICANT
LISA MAZIADE FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
VIKEN G. ARTINIAN FOR THE APPLICANT
MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC
JOHN H. SIMS, Q.C. FOR THE RESPONDENT
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Montréal, Quebec
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