Date: 20050927
Docket: IMM-2177-05
Citation: 2005 FC 1319
Ottawa, Ontario, September 27, 2005
PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BLAIS
BETWEEN:
MANINDER SINGH
applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] This is an application for judicial review under section 72 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the Act) of a decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board), dated March 14, 2005, in which Mr. Maninder Singh (the applicant) was determined not to be a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97 respectively of the Act.
FACTS
[2] The applicant is a citizen of India, where he was a sales executive with an electronics company. His employment required him to travel often and on May 5, 2004, during one of those business trips, the applicant claims to have picked up two men on the side of the road. Shortly before arriving at a border checkpoint, the two men jumped out of the car and ran into the nearby bushes. The border guards having witnessed the scene stopped the applicant and searched his car.
[3] They found a bag containing weapons which the applicant claims belonged to the men who jumped out of his car. Not believing him, the police took him into custody and tortured him for two days. On May 8, 2004, with the help of a bribe from the village council and his family, the applicant was released on the condition that he report back to the station on June 10, 2004 with complete information on the two men who jumped out of his car, failing which he would be killed.
[4] After being treated for his injuries, the applicant made up his mind to leave India. On July 24, 2004, with the help of an agent and a fake passport, the applicant left India and arrived in Canada the same day.
ISSUE
[5] Did the Board err in its evaluation of the post-hearing evidence and in its overall determination that an Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) existed within India?
ANALYSIS
[6] It is clearly established that on questions of fact, the standard of review applicable to an IFA assessment by the Board is that of patent unreasonableness. (Ranganathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 2 F.C. 164 (C.A.); Kumar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 601, [2004] F.C.J. No. 731; Sivasamboo v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] 1 F.C. 741; Mohammed v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] F.C.J. No. 1217)
[7] The applicant therefore claims that the silence of the Board on exhibit P-11 renders the decision patently unreasonable. However, in the case of Florea v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1993] F.C.J. No. 598, the Federal Court of Appeal, at paragraph 1, held that the Board did not have to mention each and every piece of evidence brought before it:
The fact that the Division did not mention each and every one of the documents entered in evidence before it does not indicate that it did not take them into account: on the contrary, the tribunal is assumed to have weighed and considered all of the evidence presented to it unless the contrary is shown. As the tribunal's findings are supported by the evidence, the appeal will be dismissed.
[8] I must therefore determine whether the Board's findings are supported by the evidence presented to it, including the post-hearing documents submitted to it. Although the applicant claims that the new documents prove that he would be at risk of persecution regardless of where he moved within India, upon reading the whole document, I find many excerpts which contradict those assertions:
(...) Several say however, that the list of wanted militants has been winnowed down to "high-profile" individuals. (...)
Several observers suggest, though, that while Punjab police may be serious about pursuing Sikhs anywhere in India whom they view as hard-core militants, in practice only a handful of militants are likely to be targeted for such long-arm enforcement. While noting that Sikhs who are on police lists for past involvement with armed groups could be at risk even if not presently active, the Indian human rights attorney said in his May 2003 e-mail to the RIC that: "[t]he number of persons who figure in such lists is really very small and I do not think the police and intelligence agencies have in the last years been adding many names" (India human rights lawyer 4 May 2003).
A South Asia expert at the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research said that it is unlikely that Punjab police are currently pursuing many Sikhs for alleged militant activities given that the insurgency there was crushed in the early 1990s (U.S. DOS INR 25 Apr 2003).
As part of this effort to flesh out which Sikhs are most at risk of persecution. Several experts have suggested that only those considered by police to be high-profile militants are at risk.
(See page 20 and following the applicant's record - U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services report on India, dated May 16, 2003.)
[9] I have listed only a few of the many references to citizens of India being able to move about freely without fear of persecution. Therefore, although the applicant claims that the post-hearing report contradicts that of the UK Report which was quoted by the Board, it is also quite apparent that the document provided also supports the above mentioned document.
[10] Furthermore, based on the fact that the applicant has no official case against him, and admitted that he was not a high profile individual, it was not patently unreasonable for the Board to have determined that the applicant had an IFA in India.
[11] As for the applicant's submission that the Board should have placed more weight on document P-10 (the letter from a lawyer in India indicating that the applicant was on a list of suspected militant sympathizers), I would point out firstly that questions of weight are at the discretion of the Board (Hassan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] F.C.J. No. 946 (F.C.A.) and secondly, that the Board may prefer one piece of evidence over another, so long as its decision reflects that reasoning (Dudar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] F.C.J. No. 1733 at paragraph 30). In the present case, the Board stated that:
The tribunal gives no probative value to Exhibit P-10 which is believed to be self-serving. Conversely, it gives probative value to a respected international well-documented evidence, such as the UK Country Assessment, which contradicts Exhibit P-10.
(See page 3 of the Board's decision dated March 14, 2005.)
[12] For all of the above stated reasons, I am of the opinion that the Board properly evaluated the evidence before it and did not commit a patently unreasonable error in its evaluation of the evidence before it. Consequently, this judicial review must be dismissed.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application for judicial review be dismissed;
2. No question for certification.
"Pierre Blais"
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