Date:
20030710
Docket:
IMM-831-03
Citation:
2003 FC 865
BETWEEN:
THE MINISTER
OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION,
Applicant,
-
and -
STEPHEN
MICHAEL JAMES AMBROSE,
Respondent.
REASONS FOR ORDER
LAYDEN-STEVENSON J.
[1]
At the conclusion of the hearing of this matter on July 8, 2003, I
allowed, from the bench, the application for judicial review. These are my
reasons for so doing.
[2]
In a decision dated January 27, 2003, a member of the Immigration
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the tribunal member) determined
that the respondent, Stephen Ambrose, was a flight risk and that his presence
in Canada was likely to endanger the public. Seven days later, on February 3,
2003, the same tribunal member ordered the respondent released from detention
despite concluding that he had not changed his mind regarding the likelihood of
danger and the unlikelihood of appearance. The applicant Minister took issue
with the decision of February 3, 2003, and sought judicial review of it.
[3]
The respondent filed a notice of appearance on February 20, 2003. On
February 27th, he was served at the Westmorland Institution, by
facsimile and by courier, with the applicant’s application record. He did not
file a respondent’s record. He appeared at the hearing with the intention of
making representations. While counsel for the Minister advanced a formal
objection to the respondent’s status to address the court, the objection was
not strenuously argued. The respondent indicated that he had discussed his
proposed attendance with the case presenting officer in the Halifax regional
office. Counsel did not suggest that the Minister would be prejudiced in any
way if the respondent were permitted to make oral representations. I was
satisfied with the respondent’s explanation for his failure to file a motion
record and I determined that in the interests of justice, Mr. Ambrose should be
permitted to address the court. I also indicated that if he raised issues that
counsel felt required further submissions, I would grant time for the
preparation and filing of them. In the end, counsel did not feel that any
further submissions were necessary. The respondent, in many respects, agreed
with the position taken by the Minister.
[4]
The respondent is one of five British subjects convicted on October 16,
2001, of conspiring to commit an indictable offence contrary to paragraph 465
(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. 46. They conspired
to import 2.5 tons of cannabis resin into Canada contrary to subsection 6(1) of
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19. The
offence carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. The respondent
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to seven years and eight months in a federal
institution.
[5]
A report, pursuant to section 27 of the former Immigration Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 (the Act) regarding the respondent, was forwarded to the
deputy minister and on June 11, 2002, the respondent was ordered detained
pursuant to subsection 105(1) of the Act. On June 28, 2002, the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 17 (IRPA), came into force.
A removal order was issued on October 31, 2002. Subsection 50(b) of IRPA
prohibits the applicant from effecting removal of the respondent until his
sentence is completed.
[6]
The respondent became eligible for day parole on January 25, 2003, but
remained in detention pursuant to the subsection 105(1) order. A 48 hour
detention hearing was held on January 27, 2003. It was at this hearing that
the tribunal member determined that the respondent constituted a danger to the
public and a flight risk and ordered his continued detention. The tribunal
member also indicated that the respondent could not be eligible for day parole
due to amendments to the Corrections and Conditional Release Act,
S.C. 1992, c. 20 (CCRA) and that it would not be necessary to have further
review hearings.
[7]
The applicant Minister’s case presenting officer requested a 7 day
detention review hearing. The hearing occurred on February 3, 2003. It was
at the latter hearing that the tribunal member found that Mr. Ambrose posed a
threat to Canadian society and was a flight risk, but ordered his release. The
tribunal member did so based on his interpretation of amendments to the CCRA,
specifically section 128, subsection (4). He concluded that the “day parole has
become inoperative”. On February 20, 2003, the decision of the tribunal member
was stayed by order of this court, pending determination of the within
application.
[8]
The first task for a reviewing judge on a judicial review application is
to determine the applicable standard of review: Dr. Q v. College of
Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, 2003 SCC 19, (2003) 223
D.L.R. (4th) 599. In the circumstances of this particular matter,
the decision was based on an erroneous finding of fact made in a perverse or
capricious manner and without regard to the material that was before the
tribunal member. Thus, it must be set aside whether the applicable standard is
patent unreasonableness, reasonableness simpliciter, or correctness.
[9]
Section 128 of the CCRA was amended by section 242 of IRPA. The
amendments extinguished eligibility for day parole or unescorted temporary
absence with respect to those individuals subject to removal orders made
pursuant to IRPA. Under the former Act, if an individual subject to a
subsection 105(1) order was released by the National Parole Board on day
parole, the subsection 105(1) order would then become operative to continue the
detention and the detention would be reviewable under subsection 103(6)(c): Chaudry
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 1 F.C. 455
(C.A.). IRPA came into effect on June 28, 2002. Correctional Services Canada
(CSC) and Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) took the position that
section 128 could not apply to those individuals sentenced before June 28,
2002, absent changed circumstances such as the imposition of an additional
sentence on or after June 28th. In short, CSC and CIC proceeded on
the basis that the amendments did not apply retroactively. A case management
bulletin from CSC dated June 28, 2002, states that:
Offenders who are serving a sentence
at the time of coming into force of this new Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act will not be immediately affected by the amendments to section 128 of the
CCRA.
[10]
The tribunal member interpreted the amendments differently. He stated
as follows:
Contrary to the interpretation that
might have been given to these dispositions by Correctional Services or by
Immigration, I am of the opinion that what triggers the application of these
sections is the date at which the removal order is made.
[11]
In the concluding paragraphs of his decision, the tribunal member made
the following findings:
... You are considered to be an
undesirable alien who is to be removed from Canada because of your
wrongdoings. So, you have no right to rehabilitation from within Canada, you
have no right to reinsertion into the Canadian community. So, I have not
changed per se my mind on the likelihood and the unlikelihood of appearance.
I have however, as I stated earlier,
given it a second thought. In the perspective that you are presently not to be
released due to the simple operation of the law. My reading of these Sections
again is that the removal order is what triggers the coming into play of these
Sections and their application to your case. So, again saying that day-parole
has become inoperative and considering you are an inmate in a federal
penitentiary, I now decide that you do not pose, at this point in time, a
danger to the public in Canada nor is there any unlikelihood of appearance due
to your status of inmate and consequently, detention is not maintained in your
case, as you are again a person who is detained and who is serving a sentence.
So, today’s hearing is now terminated and it will be true now that there will
not be any further hearings.
[12]
In my view, I need not deal with the interpretation of section 128 of
the CCRA. It is clear that the tribunal member did not order continued
detention because he was of the view that the respondent would be detained in a
federal penitentiary in any event. That was not the case. In arriving at his
finding, the tribunal member ignored the initial approval of the respondent’s
day parole. He ignored the January 25, 2003 day parole eligibility document.
He chose to ignore the evidence as to the manner in which CSC approached the
issue of day parole for those sentenced prior to June 28, 2002. He ignored the
contents of the case management bulletin that was before him. He ignored the
fact that, despite his own views as to the interpretation of section 128 of the
CCRA, the respondent would be day paroled on January 25th. He
erroneously concluded that the respondent would be detained by CSC despite the
overwhelming evidence to the contrary that was before him.
[13]
Having reached this erroneous finding of fact, the tribunal member then
based his decision upon it. I conclude that the finding was patently
unreasonable and was made in a perverse or capricious manner. The finding
taints the decision. I therefore allowed the application for judicial review
and remitted the matter back for redetermination before a different member of
the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board by order dated
July 8, 2003.
<<Carolyn
Layden-Stevenson>>
Judge
Fredericton, New Brunswick
July 10, 2003
FEDERAL COURT
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-831-03
STYLE OF
CAUSE: The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
v. Stephen Michael James Ambrose
PLACE OF
HEARING: Halifax, Nova Scotia
DATE OF
HEARING: July 8, 2003
REASONS
FOR ORDER BY: Layden-Stevenson J.
DATED: July 10, 2003
APPEARANCES:
Stephen Michael James Ambrose FOR
APPLICANT
Melissa
Cameron FOR
RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada FOR
RESPONDENT