HJ Heinz Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2003 FCT 250

Date: 20030227

Docket: T-1470-00

Neutral citation: 2003 FCT 250

BETWEEN:

                                           H.J. HEINZ COMPANY OF CANADA LTD.,

                                                                                                                                                      Applicant,

                                                                              - and -

                                                ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA,

                                                                                                                                                  Respondent.

                                                            REASONS FOR ORDER

LAYDEN-STEVENSON J.

[1]                 This matter arises out of an application, by H.J. Heinz Company of Canada Ltd. (Heinz), under the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1 (the Act). It concerns the decision of the president of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) by his delegate, the co-ordinator of Access to Information and Privacy, dated September 7, 2000.

[2]                 By letter dated August 15, 2000, CFIA informed Heinz, in accordance with section 27 of the Act, of the receipt of a request pursuant to the Act and of CFIA's identification of the records responsive to the request, but containing information concerning a third party (Heinz). CFIA invited Heinz to identify any information it wished to protect along with its explanation supporting non-disclosure.

[3]                 By letter dated September 1, 2000, Heinz made submissions to CFIA, pursuant to section 28, indicating that the records should not be disclosed because they fell within the descriptions contained in subsection 20(1) of the Act. CFIA determined that the applicant's justifications were insufficient to withhold all of the requested information and by letter dated September 7, 2000, CFIA informed Heinz of its intention to release the records, subject to certain redactions. Heinz commenced this application for review on September 27, 2000, pursuant to section 44 of the Act.

[4]                 Heinz alleges that the records contain financial, commercial, scientific and technical information that is confidential information supplied to CFIA by Heinz and has been treated consistently as confidential by Heinz. The applicant further alleges that the records contain information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result in material loss to Heinz and could reasonably be expected to prejudice the competitive position of Heinz. Lastly, Heinz alleges that the disclosure of the information in the records would not be in the public interest because it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment to such an extent that the public interest would clearly outweigh the importance of the financial loss and prejudice to the competitive position of Heinz. The applicant relies upon the evidence contained in the affidavit and attached exhibits of Becky McMullin sworn December 8, 2000.

[5]                 Heinz requests that the CFIA decision be set aside and that an order issue prohibiting disclosure of the records or, alternatively, that an order issue prohibiting the disclosure of the records without redaction of the third party information contained in the records. It also requests costs.

[6]                 By order of the Federal Court Trial Division dated December 7, 2001, any affidavits or documentary material marked as "confidential' by either party were ordered to be filed in sealed envelopes and treated as confidential and not available for review by the public without further order of the court. A similar provision was included regarding the transcripts of any cross-examination of affiants. Finally, any oral hearings with respect to this matter were ordered to be conducted in camera, subject to further order of the court. The applicant was granted an extension of time for the filing of supporting affidavits and documentary exhibits.

[7]                 Hence, the records of both the applicant and the respondent were filed in sealed envelopes and the hearing was conducted in camera. I presume that the respondent advised the party requesting the records in question of the application of Heinz. The requesting party did not take any part in the proceedings.

[8]                 The relevant statutory provisions are attached to these reasons as Schedule "A". Reference to specific provisions will be included where required for ease of reference and clarity.

[9]                 I begin with a review of basic principles. Subsection 2(1) of the Act contains its purpose, which is to provide the public with a right of access to information in records under the control of the government. Exceptions to that right of access should be limited and specific: Canada Packers Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Agriculture), [1989] 1 F.C. 47 (C.A.) (Canada Packers); Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403 (Dagg). Public access ought not be frustrated by the courts except in the clearest of circumstances. It is a heavy burden of persuasion that rests upon the party resisting disclosure: Maislin Industries Limited v. Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, [1984] 1 F.C. 939 (T.D.) (Maislin); Rubin v. Canada (Mortgage and Housing Corp.), [1989] 1 F.C. 265 (C.A.) (Rubin); Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Prime Minister), [1993] 1 F.C. 427 (T.D.). The standard of proof to be applied in reviewing exemptions under subsection 20(1) of the Act is that of a balance of probabilities: Northern Cruiser Co. v. Canada (1995), 99 F.T.R. 320n. (F.C.A.).

[10]            The applicant raises a preliminary issue and alleges that the records are not responsive to the request. While the initial request was for various documents pertaining to a variety of topics, the request was subsequently modified to include only "correspondence" related to specified topics.

[11]            Heinz submits that section 4 of the Act dictates that access shall be provided "on request". Relying on Cistel Technology Inc. v. Canada (Correctional Service), 2000 FCT 253, [2002] F.C.J. No. 328 (Cistel), it submits that the records in issue are not "correspondence" and do not come within the scope of the request.

[12]            In Cistel, McKeown J. determined that a payment voucher and a task request/ authorization were not invoices. Since the request related to invoices, the aforementioned documents lay outside the scope of the request. Heinz regards "correspondence" as meaning "letters" whereas the respondent characterizes it as "communication". At the hearing, Heinz agreed that if the respondent's interpretation was found to be correct, its argument in this respect must fail.

[13]            The Oxford English Dictionary, 2^nd ed. provides a number of definitions for "correspondence" including:

The action or fact of corresponding or answering to each other in fitness or mutual adaptation, congruity, harmony, agreement . . .

Relation of agreement, similarity, or analogy . . .

Of persons and things: vital, practical or active communication . . .

The letters that pass between correspondents; also, letters contributed to a news paper or journal

[14]            Thus, while "correspondence" includes letters, it is not so restricted and it indeed includes communication. Heinz concedes that it has placed all of its eggs in one basket with respect to this argument and it is readily apparent that its argument must fail.

[15]            The next issue relates to section 19 of the Act which provides:

[16]            The definition in section 3 of the Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 defines personal information as being information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in any form including ... the name of the individual where it appears with other information relating to the individual (paragraph i). The definition contains a number of additional examples of personal identification as well as specific exceptions to the definition, none of which apply here.

[17]            Heinz maintains that section 8 of the Privacy Act provides for certain circumstances in which personal information that falls within the definition of section 3 may nonetheless be disclosed, but that none of those circumstances are applicable in this case. Therefore, the interaction of the provisions requires CFIA to refuse to disclose any information about an identifiable individual in the absence of the person's consent unless the information is in the public domain.

[18]            The respondent, on the other hand, contends first, that it is not open to the applicant to raise exemptions other than those set out in section 20 of the Act and second, that the applicant cannot invoke section 19 of the Act in this application. The respondent submits that the application is brought pursuant to section 44 of the Act and that provision confers on a third party a right to apply for review of a decision of the head of a government institution in relation to the proposed release of records under the Act. However, this right of review is provided only to third parties who receive notice pursuant to subsections 28(1) or 29(1) of the Act. Here, the relevant provision is subsection 28(1), which is triggered only when notice is given to a third party under section 27. Subsection 27(1), in turn, provides for notice to the third party only in circumstances where the head of the government institution intends to disclose records that may contain information described in subsection 20(1) of the Act i.e., third party information. Briefly stated, it is argued that section 44 provides a right of review where a third party seeks to prevent disclosure of confidential information protected by subsection 20(1). Section 44 does not go further and does not confer the right to oppose disclosure on the basis of any other exemption or exclusion under the Act, including section 19. Parliament has provided a third party with a very specific right of review. That right is consistent with the scheme of the Act and the protection afforded a third party's confidential information.

[19]            The respondent's submission, pared to its core, is that sections 27, 28 and 44 of the Act constitute a complete code whereby the third party is provided recourse to the court to seek protection, but no more. The codification does not confer a right to receive notice, to make submissions or to seek review, except in the case of the confidential information described in section 20 of the Act. The respondent relies on Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Supply and Services) (1990), 107 N.R. 89 (F.C.A.) (Saint John Shipbuilding) to support its position.

[20]            Determination of this issue requires an appreciation and awareness of the exemption provisions of the Act. The Act contains two types of exemptions, mandatory (sections 13, 19, 20, 24) and discretionary (sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23). In the case of mandatory exemptions, the only decision to be made is whether the record comes within the description that the Act requires be exempted from disclosure. In the case of discretionary exemptions, two decisions are necessary: first, does the record come within the description that is contemplated by the statutory exemption invoked in a particular case; and second, if it does, should the record nevertheless be disclosed: The Information Commissioner of Canada v. The Prime Minister of Canada, supra.

[21]            The procedure to be followed regarding mandatory and discretionary exemptions is articulated in Canadian Jewish Congress v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1996] 1 F.C. 268 at 280, 281:

If the exemption provision was mandatory, then there is only one type of decision: the factual decision as to whether the material comes within the description of the exempting provision. There is no second type of decision, as if the material is found to fall within the description, then the head of the institution is obligated to refuse disclosure. If a decision made under a mandatory exemption provision were to come before this Court for review . . . then firstly the Court would have to go through the record and determine whether or not the Minister was authorized to refuse disclosure. In so doing, the Court is effectually reviewing the factual decision. If the Court determined the Minister was in fact not authorized to refuse disclosure, then the Court would have to make an appropriate order. In the case of a mandatory exemption, an order for disclosure of the record would be an appropriate order if the Court determined the Minister had erred in the factual decision. The Act is clear in those cases that the material shall not be disclosed if falling within the exemption and the material shall be disclosed if it does not.

If the exemption provision in question is a discretionary provision, then there are two decisions to be reviewed by the Court . . .    Firstly, as in the case of a mandatory exemption, the Court shall review the record to determine if the head of the institution erred in the factual decision as to whether or not the requested information fell within the exempting provision. If the Court determines the material does fall within the exemption, then the Court must review the discretionary decision of the head of the institution. However . . . the Court must only consider whether or not the discretion was properly exercised, but should not itself attempt to exercise the discretion de novo. If the Court finds the discretion was properly exercised, an appropriate order is simply to uphold the decision of the head of the institution to refuse disclosure. However, the determination of an appropriate order becomes somewhat more complicated if the Court finds the discretion was improperly exercised. If the Court strikes down the discretionary decision of the head of the institution, then the question arises as to whether it is appropriate for the Court to then proceed to make this discretionary decision, thereby exercising the discretion itself, or whether the Court ought to refer the matter back to the head of the institution to exercise his/her discretion properly.

[22]            Regarding the application of the section 19 mandatory exemption, the position of the Minister has been less than consistent. In Maislin, Société Gamma Inc. v. Canada (Secretary of State) (1994), 79 F.T.R. 42 (Société Gamma) and Air Atonabee Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Transport) (1989), 27 F.T.R. 194 (Air Atonabee), all of which are relied on by the respondent here, albeit in other respects, the Minister conceded that section 19 information was exempt. While it may be said that Maislin and Air Atonabee preceded Saint John Shipbuilding, Société Gamma did not. The respondent relies on the following passage from Saint John Shipbuilding:

Two minor points should be mentioned in closing. First, the appellant suggested that the material ordered to be released was in some respects different from what had been requested; the short answer to that is that the appellant's interest, as third party intervenor in a request for information, is limited to those matters set out in subsection 20(1), and it has no status to object that the government may have given more or less than it was asked for. Secondly, the appellant urges that, because this is a defence contract, the Court should be specially reticent in releasing information. On this we can do no better than to quote the Judge:

Under s. 15 of the Act the Respondent has the discretionary authority to refuse to disclose any record if its release could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the defence of Canada. The Respondent does not purport to act under that section of the Act but under s. 20. I agree that my review is limited to the considerations set out in s. 20 of the Act and that the matter of national security is irrelevant to this hearing.

[23]            It is submitted that from this passage emerges a proposition that, when dealing with section 20 of the Act, the other mandatory exemptions of the Act are to be ignored. With respect, I cannot subscribe to such an interpretation nor do I believe that the Court intended any such thing. The comments above must be considered in the context in which they were made. First, the remarks were restricted to the appellant's argument that the released material was not responsive to the request. In that context (and not in relation to mandatory exemptions contained in the Act), it appears that the third party is limited to those matters set out in subsection 20(1) and cannot be heard to complain that the government gave more or less than what was requested. I do not view the excerpt, when viewed in its proper context, as a blanket prohibition against the use of the other mandatory exclusions of the Act merely because section 20 is invoked. I am reinforced in my view when regard is had to Siemens Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Public Works and Government Services) (2001), 213 F.T.R. 125, aff'd. (2002), 21 C.P.R. (4^th) 575 (F.C.A.) (Siemens) about which I will have more to say in short order. Second, and to the extent that it is necessary to do so, I note that the comments regarding section 15 of the Act relate to a discretionary exemption rather than a mandatory one. The procedural implications relative to the distinction between mandatory and discretionary exemptions have been delineated above.

[24]            Additionally, while the notice provision in section 27 refers specifically to the provisions of section 20, there is no such reference in section 28. It provides that the third party may make "representations" as to why the record or the part thereof should not be disclosed and there are no stated restrictions as to the representations available to the third party provided, of course, they are relevant to the issue of disclosure. Further, in Tridel Corp. v. Canada Mortgage and Housing Corp. (1996), 115 F.T.R. 185, Campbell J. interpreted the excerpt from Saint John Shipbuilding as follows:

I read this passage as authority for the proposition that a s. 44 review is limited to the information proposed to be released. I do not believe that the passage can be extended to restrict the arguments on fact and law that can be made regarding the proposed release of particular information.

[25]            It is noteworthy that in both Cyanamid Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare) (1992), 148 N.R. 147 (F.C.A.) and Chippewas of Nawash First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs) (1999), 251 N.R. 220 (F.C.A.), the Court of Appeal entertained arguments, by a third party, that were outside the ambit of subsection 20(1). Finally, in Siemens, McKeown J. determined that the Minister's proposed release of documents requested under the Act was prohibited by subsection 24(1) of the Act.    Subsection 24(1) is a mandatory exemption regarding the disclosure of information that is restricted by or pursuant to any provision set out in Schedule II of the Act. Section 30 of the Defence Production Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. D-1 is incorporated by reference in Schedule II of the Act and that section prohibits disclosure of information with respect to an individual business that has been obtained under or by virtue of the Defence Production Act without the consent of the individual carrying on business. The bottom line is that McKeown J. determined that section 30 of the Defence Production Act constitutes a statutory provision designated under the statutory prohibition exemption set out in section 24 of the Act. In the result, the information could not be disclosed. I note in passing that the subsection 19(1) information was considered, by the Minister, to be exempt.

[26]            On appeal, the trial decision in Siemens was affirmed. The argument advanced was that section 44 (review of the decision to disclose) of the Act limits the jurisdiction of the court such that section 24 (mandatory exemption) cannot be invoked to prevent disclosure. In summarily dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal stated, "We are unable to interpret s. 44 in this way".

[27]            Based on the reasoning in Siemens, it seems to me that if the mandatory exemption provided in section 24 of the Act is available to a third party, so too must be the mandatory exemption provided for in section 19. To hold otherwise, in my view, would yield an irrational and illogical result and one that is contrary to the principles of statutory interpretation articulated in Rizzo and Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 and subsequent authorities. I therefore conclude, for the reasons stated, that the mandatory exemption in section 19 of the Act applies in section 44 proceedings, where relevant to the proposed disclosure.

[28]            I turn now to the argument arising from subsection 20(1) of the Act, which provides:

[29]            The applicant relies heavily on Air Atonabee and argues that the records in issue constitute confidential financial, commercial, scientific or technical information such that CFIA should refuse to disclose pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(b) of the Act. The records include information pertaining to the operations of a commercial enterprise or information that relates or pertains to matters of finance or commerce. Heinz alleges that all the hallmarks of confidentiality, as articulated in Air Atonabee, are present here. Specifically, Heinz submits that: the information is treated as confidential business secrets, is not published and is not accessible to the public; the information was communicated in the expectation that it would be kept in confidence; the relationship that Heinz maintains with CFIA and Health Canada is strong and open thereby enabling the applicant to engage in frank discussions; the relationship is important to the preservation of public safety as well as public confidence in food products; and, guarded discussions between Heinz and CFIA are not in the interests of the Canadian public.

[30]            The respondent alleges that Heinz falls short of the requirements to substantiate an exemption under paragraph 20(1)(b). The evidence of the third party does not adequately support a determination that the specific information sought to be exempted is commercial, financial, scientific or technical. Regarding confidentiality, the respondent submits that it must be established objectively and it has not been so established. An expectation of confidentiality or the fact that the applicant has maintained the material in a confidential manner is only one aspect of the test. Finally, the information must be provided to the government institution by the third party. Here, the respondent contends that the information was created by CFIA.

[31]            A review under section 44 is a review de novo: Air Atonabee. The standard of proof respecting subsection 20(1) is that of a balance of probabilities: Northern Cruiser.

[32]            The applicant must satisfy four requirements to establish that an exemption from disclosure is warranted:

(1)        the information is financial, commercial, scientific or technical;

(2)        the information is confidential;

(3)        the information was supplied to the government institution by a "third party", and

(4)        the information was treated consistently in a confidential manner.

[33]            With respect to the first requirement, MacKay J., in Air Atonabee determined that dictionary meanings provide the best guide and, "it is sufficient for purposes of s. 20(1)(b) that the information relates or pertains to matters of finance, commerce, science or technical matters as those terms are commonly understood". Here, some of the information in the records constitutes information regarding the Heinz operation in both its production of products and its management strategy. However, not all of the information qualifies as being commercial, financial, scientific or technical. The applicant's arguments, therefore, are relevant only with respect to those portions of the records that satisfy the first requirement.

[34]            Regarding confidentiality, the following excerpts from Air Atonobee summarize the conditions that the applicant must meet to satisfy the second requirement.

The second requirement under subsection 20(1)(b), that the information be confidential, has been dealt with in a number of decisions. These establish that the information must be confidential in its nature by some objective standard which takes account of the content of information, its purposes and the conditions under which it was prepared and communicated (per Jerome A.C.J., in Montana, supra, at page 25). It is not sufficient that the third party state, without further evidence, that it is confidential (see e.g., Merck Frosst Canada Inc., supra; Re Noel and Great Lakes Pilotage Authority Ltd. et al. (1987), 45 D.L.R. (4^th) 127 (F.C.T.D.)). Information has not been held to be confidential, even if the third party considered it so, where it has been available to the public from some other source (Canada Packers Inc. v. Minister of Agriculture, [1988] 1 F.C. 483 (T.D.) and related cases, appeal dismissed with variation as to reasons on other grounds, [1989] 1 F.C. 47 (F.C.A.)), or where it has been available at an earlier time or in another form from government (Canada Packers Inc., supra; Merck Frosst Inc., supra). Information is not confidential where it could be obtained by observation albeit with more effort by the requester (Noel, supra). As outlined by Jerome A.C.J. in earlier cases dealing with subsection 20(1)(b):

It is not sufficient that [the applicant] considered the information to be confidential     . . . It must also have been kept confidential by both parties and must not have been otherwise disclosed, or available from sources to which the public has access. (Maislin Industries Ltd. v. Minister for Industry, Trade and Commerce et al. [1984] 1 F.C. 939, 10 D.L.R. (4^th) 417, 80 C.P.R. (2d) 253 (T.D.) at p. 257 (C.P.R.); (DMR Associates v. Minister of Supply and Services (1984), 11 C.P.R. (3d) 87 at 91 (F.C.T.D.). . .

This review leads me to consider the following as an elaboration of the formulation by Jerome A.C.J. in Montana, supra, that whether information is confidential will depend upon its content, its purposes and the circumstances in which it is compiled and communicated, namely:

a) that the content of the record be such that the information it contains is not available from sources otherwise accessible by the public or that could not be obtained by observation or independent study by a member of the public acting on his own,

b) that the information originate and be communicated in a reasonable expectation of confidence that it will not be disclosed, and

c) that the information be communicated, whether required by law or supplied gratuitously, in a relationship between government and the party supplying it that is either a fiduciary relationship or one that is not contrary to the public interest, and which relationship will be fostered for public benefit by confidential communication.

[35]            Here, I am satisfied that, with few possible exceptions, the information in question is not available from sources accessible by the public. Regarding the information that was provided by Heinz, I find that it originated in and was communicated in a reasonable expectation of confidence that it would not be disclosed. As in Air Atonabee, I am also satisfied, on the evidence, that "while the relationship is not one of special confidence in which all the records should be exempt from disclosure, it is consistent with the public interest and the relationship would be fostered for the benefit of the public by treating as confidential those communications, which originate with the applicant, where the applicant has considered them confidential. Thus, the third party is enabled and encouraged to be open and frank with inspectors where its understanding regarding the restricted purposes and circulation of its communications is recognized and respected". In short, I conclude that the requirement of confidentiality in this matter falls squarely within the reasoning of Air Atonabee. In coming to that determination, I have had particular regard to paragraphs 13-17, 19, 20, 29, 30, 34, 37, 40, 44 and 45 of the affidavit of Becky McMullin.

[36]            Concerning the respondent's position regarding the third requirement, that the records were created by CFIA, paragraph 20(1)(b) relates not to all confidential information but only to that which has been supplied to a government institution by a third party: Canada Packers.

Although the records here were created by CFIA, they contain information supplied by Heinz. It is only the latter that can be subject to a paragraph 20(1)(b) analysis.

[37]            The final requirement, that the records were treated consistently in a confidential manner by the third party, is obvious from the evidence and is not seriously challenged by the respondent.

[38]            The applicant also relies on paragraph 20(1)(c) and argues that disclosure of the records will result in a reasonable expectation of probable harm because it could reasonably be expected to result in material financial loss to the applicant or gain to a competitor, or could reasonably be expected to prejudice the competitive position of Heinz. In other words, disclosure would, it is alleged, result in a competitive advantage to an actual or potential competitor of Heinz and would result in financial detriment to Heinz.

[39]            The respondent argues contra and says that the applicant has not demonstrated a reasonable expectation of harm simply by affirming in an affidavit that disclosure would result in financial loss and interfere with contractual and other relations.

[40]            I agree with the respondent's position in relation to paragraph 20(1)(c). The threshold is probability, not possibility or speculation: Saint John Shipbuilding. There must exist, in the affidavit evidence, an explanation establishing that those outcomes are reasonably probable. Here, the evidence merely speculates as to probable harm and does not support the position that disclosure would result in a reasonable expectation of probable harm.

[41]            The applicant argues that the records proposed to be disclosed should not be disclosed and submits that redaction pursuant to section 25 is not possible because it would result in "disconnected snippets" such that severance would be unreasonable: Canada (Information Commissioner v. Canada (Solicitor General), [1988] 3 F.C. 551 (T.D.). However, in the alternative and in the event that the court should determine that the information could reasonably be severed, the applicant seeks to have 44 passages with which it takes issue removed from the 18 pages of documents.

[42]            In response, the respondent submits that once it is determined that certain passages are exempt, the head of the institution is required to determine if any part can reasonably be severed: Rubin. Here, the respondent has already severed the passages he considers to be exempt.

[43]            The court's obligation with respect to severance is found in section 51 of the Act. Here, I will delineate, in accordance with these reasons, the further passages that require severance. In doing so, I will use the letter references for the passages as assigned by the applicant. I note that the respondent conceded, prior to the hearing, that passages (d) and (l) should be severed. Additionally, counsel for the respondent agreed that, in the event that I should determine that section 19 is applicable, those passages to which section 19 applies would be severed. I therefore consider that the respondent has agreed to sever the following passages: (d), (l), (w) and the name in (qq).

[44]            I order that the following passages be severed:

(c), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (n), (r), (s), (t), (v), (y), from (bb) to (kk), both inclusive, as well as the first sentence only in (nn). Except as specifically referred to as severed herein, the records shall be disclosed.

[45]            The affidavits and documents contained in the records and filed on a confidential basis shall remain sealed pending the expiration of the appeal period or, if an appeal is taken, until disposition of that appeal.

[46]            The applicant has been substantially successful and will therefore have costs.

                                                           < < Carolyn Layden-Stevenson > >           

Judge

Fredericton, New Brunswick

February 27, 2003

                 FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

                     TRIAL DIVISION

   NAMES OF SOLICITORS AND SOLICITORS ON THE RECORD

COURT FILE NO.:             T-1470-00

STYLE OF CAUSE:             H.J. HEINZ CO. OF CANADA LTD v. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

PLACE OF HEARING:           OTTAWA, ONTARIO

DATE OF HEARING:            February 17, 2003

REASONS FOR ORDER BY:      The Honourable Madam Justice Layden-Stevenson

DATED:                       February 27, 2003

APPEARANCES:

Mr. Nicholas McHaffieFOR THE APPLICANT

Mr. Christopher RuparFOR THE RESPONDENT

SOLICITORS ON THE RECORD:

Stikeman ElliottFOR THE APPLICANT

Ottawa, Ontario

Mr. Morris RosenbergFOR THE RESPONDENT

Deputy Attorney General of Canada

                                           SCHEDULE "A"

                                                    to the

                   Reasons for Order dated February 27, 2003

                                                         in

                 H.J. HEINZ COMPANY OF CANADA LTD.    

                                                         v.

                      ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

                                                 T-1470-00

Access to Information Act,         Loi sur l'accès à l'information,

R.S.C. 1985, c. A1                         S.R.C. 1985, c. A-1

Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21       Loi sur la protection des renseignements

personnels, S.R.C. 1985, c. P-21