Date: 19980928
Docket: T-437-98
BETWEEN:
CHRIS TSATSAKIS
Applicant
- and -
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
CULLEN J.:
[1] This hearing regards an application for judicial review of a decision of the Public Service Commission (the "Commission") dated February 11, 1998. By that decision, the Commission decided not to appoint Mr. Chris Tsatsakis (the "applicant") to the position of Correctional Supervisor and directed that the applicant"s name be removed from an eligibility list for Correctional Supervisor positions.
FACTS
[2] The applicant participated in a competition, held by Public Service Canada, for the position of Correctional Supervisor. Personal Suitability was one criterion on which the Merit Rating Board (the "Board") assessed each candidate. The Board gave the applicant a score of five (on a scale of one to five) in the area of Effective Interpersonal Relationships, a critical element for assessing an Applicant"s Personal Suitability. The competition resulted in an eligibility list of twenty-five candidates, dated September, 1996, which included the applicant.
[3] In December, 1996 and January, 1997, five individuals lodged complaints of harassment and abuse of authority against the applicant, who was performing his Correctional Supervisor duties on an acting basis. Mr. Pat Laverty investigated the complaints in January, 1997, concluding that there was some degree of harassment and abuse of power in three of the complaints. On January 31, 1997, the Deputy Warden of the Kingston Penitentiary concurred with Mr. Laverty"s recommendations to suspend the applicant for six days, remove him from his acting position and that the applicant attend harassment training. The Deputy Commissioner of the Correctional Service of Canada (the "CSC"), on May 30, 1997, reduced the suspension to four days because no finding could be made regarding one of the complaints. The remaining substantiated complaints regarded the applicant inferring that he would help two casual employees obtain permanent positions in exchange for alcohol. In his report, Mr. Laverty concluded that those comments were made jokingly.
[4] On May 30, 1997, the applicant received a written reprimand for two incidents: a decision regarding a shift change and the harassment of an employee by screaming at him. Those incidents were investigated by Ms. Debbie Davis in April, 1997. The applicant has filed three grievances regarding the disciplinary action taken against him, none of which have been resolved.
[5] On June 4, 1997 the Assistant Deputy Minister of the CSC approached the Public Service Commission (the "Commission") with a request to remove the applicant"s name from the aforementioned eligibility list. In response to that request, Helen Barkley, a Commission Designated Investigator (the "Investigator") conducted an investigation and the Commission conducted an informal hearing. The parties dispute the applicant"s objections to the informal nature of the proceedings at the hearing.
[6] At the hearing, the applicant argued, firstly, that the respondent failed to comply with a directive regarding harassment in the workplace issued by the Commissioner of CSC. The respondent argues that this fact is irrelevant to the present proceedings. The applicant also argued that the respondent had exhausted its jurisdiction to take further disciplinary action against the applicant after the suspension, removal from his acting position and recommendation of harassment training.
[7] Mr. Ross Toller, the Assistant Deputy Commissioner of the CSC, was the only witness to testify at the hearing. His evidence was based on Mr. Laverty"s and Ms. Davis"s investigative reports; he concluded that the applicant was no longer qualified to be a Correctional Supervisor because he was deficient in the area of personal suitability. Mr. Toller did not interview Mr. Laverty or Ms. Davis and did not conduct any independent investigations or interview any witnesses. The Investigator"s eventual decision relied on the evidence of Mr. Toller, Mr. Laverty and Ms. Davis, though it also referred to the applicant"s evidence. Furthermore, that decision did not refer to the applicant completing harassment training after the harassment allegations were made or the Deputy Warden of Kingston Penetentiary"s recognition of the applicant overcoming his weaknesses.
DECISION OF THE COMMISSION
[8] The Commission based its decision on the Investigator"s report. The report concluded that the applicant did not have the required qualifications to perform the duties of Correctional Supervisor. Relying on the investigation report and subsection 6(2) of the Public Service Employment Act1 (the Act"), the Commission directed that the applicant"s appointment to the position of Correctional Supervisor not be made and that his name be removed from the eligibility list for Correctional Supervisor positions.
ISSUES
[9] Did the Investigator err in law or act outside of her jurisdiction in the interpretation of the onus upon the respondent and her role under subsection 6(2) of the Act?
[10] Did the Investigator err in law or fail to observe principles of natural justice or procedural fairness by basing her decision upon the investigation reports of Mr. Laverty and Ms. Davis?
[11] Did the Investigator err in law or act beyond her jurisdiction by permitting the respondent to impose more than one penalty upon the applicant for the same offence?
[12] Did the Investigator err in law or exceed her jurisdiction in interpreting subsection 6(2) of the Act as permitting her to assess whether the applicant was qualified for the position of Correctional Supervisor, based upon the incidents of harassment that had occurred subsequent in time to the placement of the applicant"s name on the eligibility list?
[13] Did the Investigator err in law or exceed her jurisdiction by failing to determine that the actions of the respondent were disciplinary in nature?
[14] Did the Investigator base her decision on erroneous findings of fact without regard to the material before her?
ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR
Section 6 of the Act
[15] Subsections (2) and (3) of section 6 of the Act provide as follows:
| (2) Where the Commission is of the opinion
(a) that a person who has been or is about to be appointed to or from within the Public Service pursuant to the authority granted by it under this section does not have the qualifications that are necessary to perform the duties of the position the person occupies or would occupy, or
(b) that the appointment of a person to or from within the Public Service pursuant to the authority granted by it under this section has been or would be in contravention of the terms and conditions under which the authority was granted,
the Commission, notwithstanding anything in this Act but subject to subsection (3), shall revoke the appointment or direct that the appointment not be made, as the case may be, and may thereupon appoint that person at a level that in the opinion of the Commission is commensurate with the qualifications of that person
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(2) Par dérogation aux autres dispositions de la présente loi mais sous réserve du paragraphe (3), la Commission révoque ou empêche la nomination - externe ou interne - d"une personne èa un poste de la fonction publique lorsque, selon elle :
a) cette personne ne possède pas les qualités nécessaires pour s"acquitter des fonctions du poste auquel elle a été - ou est sur le point d"être - nommée en vertu d"une délégation de pouvoirs accordée au titre du présent article;
b) la nomination contrevient aux conditions fixées à la délégation de pouvoirs par laquelle elle a été autorisée.
La Commission peut ensuite nommer cette personne à un niveau qu"elle juge en rapport avec ses qualifications.
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| (3) An appointment to or from within the Public Service may be revoked by the Commission pursuant to subsection (2) only on the recommendation of a board established by the Commission to conduct an inquiry at which the employee and the deputy head concerned, or their representatives, shall be given an opportunity to be heard.
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(3) Dans le cas d"une nomination - interne ou externe -, l"exercice par la Commission du pouvoir de révocation prévu au paragraphe (2) est subordonné à la recommandation d"un comité chargé par elle de faire une enquête au cours de laquelle le fonctionnaire et l"administrateur général en cause, ou leurs représentants, ont l"occasion de se faire entendre.
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[16] The applicant submits that the Commission erred in law by determining whether the respondent"s decision regarding the applicant"s personal suitability was reasonable rather than determining personal suitability itself. According to the applicant, subsection 6(2) provides the Commission with the authority to determine personal suitability. The applicant interprets subsection 21(1) of the Act2 as a barrier to the Commission reviewing the suitability of a candidate. The respondent contends that it complied with section 6 by, after hearing the parties, relying on the department"s recommendation under subsection 6(3) to decide whether the applicant lacked qualifications. The respondent submits that the provision is silent regarding the initiation of an investigation, though it is clear that the Commission must conduct the investigation. Furthermore, there are no procedural rules by which the Commission must abide other than to ensure that the parties are heard.
[17] In McCarthy v. Attorney General of Canada3, the court concurred with the lower court"s ruling that the appellant could not avail herself of the section 21 appeal procedure because she was challenging a revocation of her place on an eligibility list rather than appealing the selection of a person based on lack of merit. In Roxanne T. Hilton v. Attorney General of Canada4, Madame Justice Reed held that under the "...relevant legislation (e.g. the Public Service Employment Act , the Financial Administration Act and the Public Service Staff Relations Act)..."5, only the Commission has the authority to revoke or make appointments; management simply recommends revocation.
[18] In my opinion, the applicant has erroneously used section 21 to colour the authority provided by section 6 of the Act. McCarthy supports the idea that the Commission"s responsibilities under those two provisions are independent. A reading of the provisions leads one to conclude that in the case at bar, the Commission"s actions must be gauged by referring to section 6 rather than section 21. Under subsection 6(2), the Commission must only be "...of the opinion..." that the person appointed or about to be appointed is unqualified for the job, after which it shall revoke the appointment; subsection 6(3) prescribes that the subsection 6(2) opinion to revoke should be initiated by "...a board established by the Commission." The Commission must also give the parties an opportunity to be heard.
[19] In the case at bar, the Commission complied with section 6 of the Act. After the Assistant Deputy Minister of the Correctional Service of Canada approached the Commission with a request to remove the applicant"s name from the eligibility list, thus triggering the Commission to provide its opinion regarding the applicant"s qualifications, the Board held an informal hearing. The procedure followed at that hearing did not violate section 6, which does not provide the process for hearing. Thus I would conclude that the respondent complied with section 6 and dismiss this ground of appeal.
THE DESIGNATED INVESTIGATOR"S BASIS FOR DECISION
[20] The applicant submits that the Commission erred in law or failed to observe principles of natural justice or procedural fairness by basing her decision upon Mr. Laverty"s and Ms. Davis" investigation reports. It claims that a tribunal may violate the duty of procedural fairness and principles of natural justice, both of which are applicable in the adversarial proceeding contemplated here, where there is no first-hand evidence challengeable by cross-examination. The circumstances did not warrant the admission of hearsay evidence given the necessity and reliability tests, and the opportunity to challenge evidence and call one"s own witnesses does not compensate for the admission of hearsay evidence. The respondent submits that tribunals are not prevented from admitting hearsay evidence and have the discretion to assign weight to such evidence. Furthermore, the respondent claims that the reports were reliable and notes that the applicant has not proved their unreliability and relies on the reports himself. As for necessity, the respondent submits that oral testimony is necessary where there is no basis for the board to make a recommendation under subsection 6(3). A requirement of oral testimony in front of the Commission would force it to repeat the investigations conducted by the CSC pursuant to the Act"s statutory scheme. In the alternative, the respondent claims that the Commission"s decision was not based solely on secondary evidence because a senior officer of CSC gave evidence and was cross-examined.
[21] There is contradictory Federal Court of Appeal case law regarding hearsay evidence and its effect on the principles of natural justice. In Canada (Attorney General) v. Mills6, the Court set aside a decision of the Chief Umpire which allowed an appeal from a decision where the Board accepted hearsay evidence. The Court specifically sanctioned the Chief Umpire admitting hearsay evidence at the hearing, which admission was justified by relying on the claimant"s knowledge of the evidence well before the hearing and the claimant"s failure to ask for leave to cross-examine witnesses at the hearing. In Willette v. R.C.M.P.7, the Court ruled that the failure to provide the authors of documents for cross-examination violated the principles of natural justice despite there being no written procedure requiring the authors" attendance and the opportunity for the applicant to call the authors as his own witnesses. This was especially true given that the evidence relied upon was conflicting and contradictory in may respects. Finally, in Sutton v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission)8 ("Sutton"), I held that the principles of natural justice were violated where the respondent produced only one of four members of a Selection Board, each of whom were in consensus on a departmental reply relied upon by the Appeal Board, for cross-examination. At paragraph 29, I stated:
"While I recognize that the Appeal Board does not have the power to compel the attendance of witnesses, I believe that the principle of natural justice required, in this case, that each of the four members of the Selection Board be made available for cross-examination...It may well be that such cross-examination would not offer any relevant facts that would sway the Chairman"s mind. That is not the issue. The question, in issues of natural justice, is whether the potential for change is there. I am convinced it is, in all the circumstances."
That Sutton regarded section 21 of the Act rather than section 6 is of no consequence, since the only procedural requirement under both provisions is that the parties "...shall be given an opportunity to be heard."
[22] With respect, the Commission violated the principles of natural justice at the hearing. If the respondent called the authors of the reports to testify, the applicant would have had the opportunity to cross-examine them; there is at least a chance that the Commission would have decided the case differently if the authors of those reports were cross-examined.
[23] The respondent also argues that the evidence met the necessity and reliability criteria for the admission of hearsay evidence, as set out in R. v. Khan9 and followed in subsequent jurisprudence. With respect, unfortunately the respondent has misinterpreted the law regarding the admission of hearsay evidence in two respects. Firstly, it submits that the applicant did not prove that the evidence was unreliable. This argument reverses the onus regarding reliability: it is the party which seeks to introduce hearsay evidence that must prove its reliability. Secondly, the respondent argues that oral testimony was not necessary in the case at bar. Again the respondent is confused; rather than proving that oral testimony is not necessary, the respondent must prove that it is necessary to admit the hearsay evidence.
SUPPLEMENTARY DISCIPLINE
[24] The applicant submits that the Designated Investigator erred in law or acted beyond her jurisdiction by permitting the respondent to impose more than one penalty upon the applicant for the same offence. It cites the "well established labour law principle" that employers can not impose more than one penalty for the same offence, noting that nothing in the legislation derogates from this principle. The respondent"s basis for argument is that the Commission"s mandate does not include disciplinary matters; its actions in the case at bar simply addressed whether the applicant had the necessary qualifications. Individual governmental departments are responsible for disciplining their employees according to a different statutory regime. Furthermore, the respondent claims that each of the applicant"s authorities were decided in a context where the employer disciplined its employee; here a separate body exercised a statutory obligation which did not regard discipline.
[25] In my view, it is true that the case law cited by the applicant to support the rule which the respondent has allegedly violated does not apply to this context. The Commission is a specialized parliamentary agency that administers the Act and is responsible for the appointment of qualified persons.10 Furthermore, discipline is not part of its mandate. In Blagdon v. Public Service Commission11, the Federal Court of Appeal described a matter before the Commission as
| "...a process for the assessment of the qualifications of the candidates for a position and for the rating of them according to their respective merits as they appeared...".12 |
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The matter before the Commission was simply a process to remove the applicant from the eligibility list because of lack of qualifications and did not constitute supplementary discipline.
HARASSMENT OCCURRING AFTER THE APPLICANT"S INCLUSION ON THE ELIGIBILITY LIST
[26] The applicant submits that the Designated Investigator erred in law or exceeded her jurisdiction by interpreting subsection 6(2) of the Act to permit her to assess the applicant"s qualifications based on incidents of harassment which occurred after the applicant was placed on the eligibility list. It urges a restrictive interpretation of subsection 6(2) so that the Board exercises its duties only when the section 10 merit principle, that appointments to or from within the Public Service shall be based on selection according to merit, is violated. It claims that the applicant"s inclusion on the list was an appointment, and as such one must necessarily base any questions regarding the applicant"s qualifications on incidents which occurred before the appointment. A broader interpretation of subsection 6(2), and thus the Commission"s functions, would result in the Commission infringing on the jurisdiction of the Public Service Staff Relations Board, in front of which an employee can grieve a demotion. Finally, the applicant cites Johnson v. Canada (Attorney General)13 ("Johnson"), which states that the merit principle, upon which subsection 6(2) is based, does not require every appointment to be continually under review; the respondent submits that the case on which the applicant relies took place in a different context because it contemplated section 21 of the Act, which does not address an individual"s qualifications. Furthermore, the respondent submits that an individual who is placed on a priority list is a person who is "...about to be appointed" within paragraph 6(2)(a ) and that one must read the provision to allow the Commission to consider discipline before an individual is appointed. The respondent also contends that preventing the Board from considering incidents that arise after the establishment of an eligibility list would be inconsistent with the wording of subsection 6(2), which contemplates revocation before and after an individual"s appointment to a position. If the Board were not allowed to consider incidents which occur after an individual"s appointment, the wording within subsection 6(2) allowing revocation after appointment would be superfluous.
[27] In my view, there are two issues to address before resolving this argument. Firstly, one must consider the construction of paragraph 6(2)(a). I would agree that in the case at bar, the applicant was "...a person who...[was] about to be appointed...from within the Public Service" since he occupied a position on the eligibility list. By including individuals who were not actually appointed, Parliament likely meant to expand subsection 6(2) to encompass situations such as that of the applicant, who occupied the eligibility list. From its reasons, it is clear that the Commission, meanwhile, directed that "...the appointment not be made...". If the Commission were prevented from considering incidents that occur after an individual attains the "about to be appointed" status (i.e. occupies an eligibility list) but before an actual appointment, there would be no reason to include persons about to be appointed within the group of persons to whom the provision applies. Secondly, one must ask whether Johnson , in which the court states that appointments cannot be continuously under review, is distinguishable because that decision regarded section 21 of the Act rather than section 6. I do not believe that the case at bar is distinguishable from Johnson on this ground; if it were, individuals who are appointed to or from within the Public Service are subject to different selection criteria than those who appeal a "closed competition" appointment under section 21. However, I do believe that Johnson is distinguishable in this case because the applicant here had not yet been appointed.
DISCIPLINARY ACTION
[28] The applicant submits that the Designated Investigator erred in law or exceeded her jurisdiction by failing to determine that the respondent"s actions were disciplinary in nature. It contends that the applicant"s removal from the eligibility list related to alleged misconduct and was therefore disciplinary. The applicant cites the Financial Administration Act14, which governs discipline and demotions and does not sanction demotion for disciplinary reasons or for misconduct. The respondent argues that the applicant"s argument is out of context, because the applicant"s removal from the eligibility list was not a demotion. Placement on the priority list was not a promotion because it created no vested right to or guarantee of attaining the position of Correctional Supervisor; therefore removal from the list was not a demotion. In the alternative, the respondent submits that the Commission"s exercise of power under subsections 6(2) and 6(3) is not a demotion because the authority to demote is found in other federal legislation. It reiterates its arguments that subsections 6(2) and (3) address the absence of qualifications and employment generally rather than discipline and that those provisions do not address the authority to demote, which is a labour law issue. Therefore there is no overlap with the Treasury Board"s exercise of its disciplinary functions provided under the Financial Administration Act .
[29] The respondent relies on Canada (A.G.) v. Public Service Alliance of Canada15 to support its argument that the Treasury Board and Commission operate in two distinct spheres. In my opinion, that decision is not completely relevant to the case at bar. The Supreme Court of Canada did indeed recognize a dichotomy between those federal bodies, ruling that the Treasury Board creates employment positions within the public service while the Commission appoints individuals to those positions. It did not, however, distinguish on the basis of the Commission assessing qualifications and the Treasury Board addressing disciplinary issues.
[30] To determine those bodies"s functions, it is instructive to refer to the statutes which set out their duties. Firstly, section 5 of the Public Service Employment Act16 sets out the Commission"s functions:
5. The Commission shall
(a) appoint or provide for the appointment of qualified persons to or from within the Public Service in accordance with the provisions and principles of this Act;
(b) operate and assist deputy heads in the operation of staff training and development programs in the Public Service;
(c) engage competent persons to assist the Commission in the performance of its duties;
(d) [Repealed, 1992, c. 54, s. 4]
(e) report to the Governor in Council on such matters arising out of or relating to the administration or operation of this Act and the regulations as the Commission considers desirable; and
(f) perform such other duties and functions with reference to the Public Service as are assigned to it by the Governor in Council.
5. La Commission_:
a) conformément aux dispositions et principes énoncés dans la présente loi, nomme ou fait nommer à un poste de la fonction publique des personnes qualifiées, appartenant ou non à celle-ci;
b) met en oeuvre ou aide les administrateurs généraux à mettre en oeuvre des programmes de formation et de perfectionnement du personnel au sein de la fonction publique;
c) engage des personnes compétentes pour se faire aider dans l'accomplissement de ses fonctions;
d) [Abrogé, 1992, ch. 54, art. 4]
e) fait rapport au gouverneur en conseil sur les questions liées à l'application de la présente loi et de ses règlements qu'elle estime opportunes;
f) s'acquitte des autres missions touchant à la fonction publique que lui confie le gouverneur en conseil.
Paragraph 11(2)(f) of the Financial Administration Act provides the Treasury Board with the authority to "...establish standards of discipline in the public service...". One might argue that the Public Service Employment Act does not expressly limit the Commission"s functions beyond those provided within the legislation, thus allowing the Commission to exercise disciplinary functions. However, Parliament has indeed delegated disciplinary powers specifically to the Treasury Board; therefore, in my view, the power to demote lies with the Treasury Board and the Commission"s revocation of the applicant from the eligibility list was not a demotion.
ERRONEOUS FINDING OF FACT
[31] The applicant"s final argument is that the Designated Investigator based her decision on an erroneous finding of fact without regard to the material before her. It claims that the Designated Investigator accepted facts from the Davis and Laverty reports and ignored the applicant"s arguments, including the respondent"s violation of a Directive on Harassment and evidence from the Merit Rating Board, which directly supported the applicant"s claim that he was qualified for the position. According to the applicant, the Designated Investigator"s findings were patently unreasonable given the evidence forwarded by the applicant. The respondent replies, firstly, that there is no evidential foundation for the applicant"s submission that the Commission ignored the applicant"s evidence. Furthermore, evidence regarding breaches of internal directives and the guidelines of Correctional Services is irrelevant when such issues are clearly not within the Commission"s mandate. Finally, it argues that the Court should show some deference to the Commission"s findings of fact.
[32] In my view, the Designated Investigator did not ignore evidence submitted by the applicant and did not base its decision "...on an erroneous finding of fact that it made...without regard to the material before it..."17. The applicant cites Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Rifou18 ("Rifou"), where the erroneous fact upon which the Adjudicator relied was that the respondent"s job function did not involve handling money when a performance review document clearly stated that her duties involved selling various negotiable instruments. Though the Adjudicator referred specifically to the respondent"s work record in his decision, the court concluded that in failing to take notice of the portion of the record regarding the handling of money, the Adjudicator "...based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact that it made...without regard for the material before it."19
[33] In Morneault v. Canada (Attorney General)20 ("Morneault"), a recent judgment of Madame Justice Reed, the court said:
"When the question is one of the correctness of a finding of fact, deference is paid to the decision-maker who hears the evidence first hand. This is so even when there is a full right of appeal from the decision. Also relevant in determining the applicable standard [of review] is the statutory context within which the decision-making authority is found; that is, whether there is a privative clause, an absence of legislative direction with respect to a right of review or appeal, a statutory right of judicial review, or a full right of appeal."21
The case at bar is distinguishable from Rifou, where the Adjudicator"s finding of fact was unsupported and entirely inconsistent with the documentary evidence. The Commission in this case had ample support for its factual determinations and the Investigator specifically took note of the applicant receiving "...the highest possible rating for his effective interpersonal relationships..."22 and a performance review assessing his performance as a Staff Instructor at a Correctional Staff College. Furthermore, and based on Morneault, the court must defer to the Commission"s findings of fact.
CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION
[34] In my view, this application should be accepted because the Commission accepted hearsay evidence without providing the applicant with an opportunity to cross-examine the authors of the investigative reports. This clearly violated the principles of natural justice. Therefore under paragraph 18.1(3)(b) of the Federal Court Act, I would refer the decision of the Commission back for determination.
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
September 28, 1998. J.F.C.C.
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1 R.S.C. 1985, c. P-32 as amended.
2 21. (1) Where a person is appointed or is about to be appointed under this Act and the selection of the person for appointment was made by closed competition, every unsuccessful candidate may, within the period provided for by the regulations of the Commission, appeal against the appointment to a board established by the Commission to conduct an inquiry at which the person appealing and the deputy head concerned, or their representatives, shall be given an opportunity to be heard.
21. (1) Dans le cas d"une nomination, effective ou imminente, consécutive à un concours interne, tout candidat non reçu peut, dans le délai fixé par règlement de la Commission, en appeler de la nomination devant un comité chargé par elle de faire une enquête, au cours de laquelle l"appelant et l"administrateur général en cause, ou leurs représentants, ont l"occasion de se faire entendre.
3 [1981] 1 F.C. 309 (F.C.A.).
4 T-223-97, January 9, 1998 (F.C.T.D.).
5 supra, at paragraph 4.
6 [1984] F.C.J. No. 917 (F.C.A.).
7 [1985] 1 F.C. 423 (F.C.A.).
8 [1994] F.C.J. No. 202.
9 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531.
10 See Ferguson, Mary (ed.), Federal Guidebook: A Guide to the Canadian Federal Government and its Decision-Makers , 1996, J-K Carruthers Limited, Perth, at pg. 61-1, Law, Barbara (ed.), 1998 Canadian Source Book, 1997, Southam Inc., Don Mills, at 16-93 and McMenemy, John, The Language of Canadian Politics, 1995, Wilfred Laurier University Press, Waterloo, at 239.
11 [1976] 1 F.C. 615 (F.C.A.).
12 Ibid at 617.
13 [1998] F.C.J. No. 191 (F.C.T.D.).
14 R.S.C. 1985 c. F-10 as amended.
15 [1991] 1 S.C.R. 614.
16 R.S.C. 1985 c. P-33 as amended.
17 Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. F-7, s. 18.1(4)(d).
18 [1986] 3 F.C. 486 (F.C.A.).
19 supra at 497.
20 [1998] F.C.J. No. 501 (F.C.T.D.).
21 supra at para 58.
22 Investigation pursuant to Section 7.1 of the Public Service Employment Act , Applicant"s Application Record, TAB 2, page 19.
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