Date: 199809098
Docket: IMM-1555-98
BETWEEN:
KARAMJIT SINGH SANGHA,
Applicant,
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION,
Respondent.
REASONS FOR ORDER
REED, J.
[1] The applicant seeks to have a decision of the Convention Refugee Determination Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the "Board") set aside. The issue is a narrow one. It is alleged that the Board did not undertake the analysis required by subsection 2(3) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2.
[2] That provision states:
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A person does not cease to be a Convention refugee by virtue of paragraph (2)(e) if the person establishes that there are compelling reasons arising out of any previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country that the person left, or outside of which the person remained, by reason of fear of persecution |
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Paragraph 2(2)(e) provides that a person ceases to be a Convention refugee when the reasons for the person's fear of persecution in the country from which he or she has fled cease to exist (i.e., changed country conditions). The analysis that a Board is to undertake pursuant to subsection 2(3) in such circumstances is described in Arguello-Garcia v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1997), 21 Imm.L.R. (2d) 285 (F.C.T.D.).
[3] The crucial issue in this case is the proper interpretation of the Board's reasons. It is agreed that the Board did not undertake a subsection 2(3) analysis. The question in dispute is whether the Board found that the applicant was at one time a convention refugee but then ceased to be so because of changed country conditions, or whether it found that he had never been a convention refugee and therefore it did not have to consider a subsection 2(3) analysis.
[4] There is an ambiguity in the Board's reasons arising from its statement that the applicant had an internal flight alternative ("IFA") in Delhi or Bombay "before he left India". Counsel for the applicant argues that implicit in that wording is a finding by the Board that at an earlier time the applicant did not have an IFA in Delhi or Bombay but that such became available as a result of changed country conditions. The relevant parts of the Board's decision read:
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The panel finds, based on a careful review of all the evidence before us, that an internal flight alternative was available to the claimant in Delhi or Bombay in mid-1996 when he left India. We further find that the claimant does not fall into any of the categories of persons at risk if he were to return to either of these locations today. Given this finding and the level of police interest in the claimant indicated by their past actions, we conclude that there is no reasonable chance that he would suffer persecution if he were to relocate to Delhi or Bombay, even if he were to come to the attention of the police in the course of returning to India and establishing himself in one of those cities. |
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Counsel for the claimant argued that there are compelling reasons why the claimant should not be returned to India today, given his past persecution and the contents of the medical report before the panel. However, given its finding that an internal flight alternative was available to the claimant before he left India, the panel concludes that the claimant does not fall within the ambit of Section 2(3) of the Immigration Act. |
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[5] There is nothing in the reasons to suggest that the Board, in using the words "before he left India" or "when he left India", was intending to signify a finding that there had been an earlier period of time in which an IFA to Delhi or Bombay was not available for this applicant. Nor is there anything in the transcript of the hearing or in the arguments that were made to the Board that could support such an interpretation of the Board's reasons. It is clear that the Board used the temporal descriptions in question because the applicant had not gone to Delhi until just before he left for Canada. Indeed, the applicant's present counsel argued before the Board, that to the extent changed country conditions were relevant, the relevant period of time was that between the date the applicant left India and the date of the Board's hearing. He argued that the conditions for the applicant had become worse. There is not a scintilla of support in the transcript or the arguments made to the Board for the interpretation that the applicant's counsel now urges on the Court.
[6] For the reasons given the application will be dismissed.
(Sgd.) "B. Reed"
Judge
Vancouver, British Columbia
September 8, 1998
FEDERAL COURT TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DATED: September 4, 1998
COURT NO.: IMM-1555-98
STYLE OF CAUSE: KARAMJIT SINGH SANGHA
v.
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING: Vancouver, BC
REASONS FOR ORDER OF REED, J.
dated September 8, 1998
APPEARANCES:
Mr. Paul Sandhu for Applicant
Ms. Brenda Carbonell for Respondent
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Kang & Company
North Delta, BC for Applicant
Morris Rosenberg for Respondent
Deputy Attorney General
of Canada
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