Yamba v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), docket IMM-4953-97

Date: 19981106

Docket: IMM-4953-97

BETWEEN:

     YAMBA ODETTE WA YAMBA,

     BIABOLA KARINE YAMBA,

     BALOWA MARIE CLAIRE YAMBA and

     BMWIBWA CHRISTIE MUYUMBA,

     Applicants,

     - and -

     THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION,

     Respondent.

     REASONS FOR ORDER

MULDOON, J.

[1]      The applicants seek relief by way of this Court's quashing of the decision rendered by the I.R.B.'s Convention Refugee Determination Division (hereinafter the CRDD or the board) on October 27, 1997, in files nos. U96-02578, -02565, -02567, -02579, whereby the applicants were determined by the board not to be Convention refugees.

Facts

[2]      The applicants are three sisters, and Wa Yamba Yamba's daughter, Mbwibwa Christie Muyumba. They are all citizens of the former or "old Zaire", which was ruled by Mobutu.

[3]      The CRDD reviewed the evidence in the following manner:

La demanderesse Wa Yamba Yamba a témoigné qu'elle n'a aucun profil politique. Par contre, son mari était membre du Parti lumumbiste unifié (PALU). Ses activités consistaient à participer à des réunions, à s'occuper du protocole, à distribuer des tracts et à assurer le bon déroulement des manifestations.

Le 29 juillet 1995, son mari ainsi que ses beaux-frères, Guillaume Kalala (le mari de Balowa Yamba) et Hughes Kukenge (le mari de Biabola Yamba), auraient participé à la manifestation du PALU. Seul son mari serait rentré à la parcelle vers 17 h 00. La manifestation du PALU aurait été réprimée avec violence par les militaires. Son mari a raconté que chacun s'est dirigé de son côté et qu'il pensait que les deux autres étaient de retour à la parcelle. Vers 20 h 00, des commandos ont fait irruption dans la parcelle. Ils ont commencé à tabasser son mari. Elle a témoigné que les militaires ont également fouillé la maison tout en demandant où sont les documents secrets. Les militaires ont trouvé des tracts du PALU sur la personne de son mari. Ensuite, un des commandos aurait exigé que son mari ait des relations sexuelles avec la demanderesse et ses soeurs devant les militaires. Selon le FRP de la demanderesse, son mari aurait refusé. Un des commandos aurait pris la demanderesse pour la violer. Son mari a essayé de s'emparer d'une arme et un commando tira sur lui au bras gauche. Son mari tomba inconscient. Les commandos ont ensuite violé la demanderesse et ses soeurs. Ils ont ensuite amené la demanderesse et ses soeurs dans une Jeep; son mari fut amené dans une autre Jeep. Ils furent amenés à la prison de la Garde civile.

La demanderesse et ses soeurs furent placées dans une cellule. Elle a témoigné qu'on refusait de les relâcher tant qu'elles ne leur disaient pas l'endroit où son mari gardait des documents secrets du parti PALU. Elles seraient demeurées en détention pendant trois mois. Vers la fin d'octobre 1995, avec la complicité des soldats, M. Jean Kyaku Kyaku (un membre du parti PALU) les aida à s'évader de la prison. La demanderesse et ses soeurs étaient en cachette dans une maison sûre dans la zone de Kindele pendant trois mois. M. Kyaku Kyaku cherchait toujours leur mari. La demanderesse a témoigné que M. Kyaku Kyaku a fait les démarches nécessaires afin que la demanderesse, ses deux soeurs, et sa fille, Mbwibwa Muyumba, puissent quitter le pays. La demanderesse, Wa Yamba Yamba, et sa fille, Mbwibwa Muyumba, ont quitté le Zaïre le 3 janvier 1996.

La demanderesse n'a aucune nouvelle de son mari ni de ses beaux-frères depuis son arrivée au Canada. D'ailleurs, il n'y a pas de nouvelles concernant les enfants qui se trouvaient à Mbuji-Mayi. La demanderesse a témoigné avoir fait des démarches auprès du représentant du parti PALU à Montréal au mois de décembre 1996 concernant la situation de leurs maris et de leurs enfants. Il a donné suite à leur demande deux semaines plus tard. Bien qu'il aurait contacté le parti PALU au Zaïre, il n'a pas pu avoir des nouvelles concernant le sort de leurs maris ni de leurs enfants.

La demanderesse a peur de rentrer dans l'ex-Zaïre malgré que le régime de Mobutu est déchu. L'insécurité générale règne à Kinshasa sous le régime de [Laurent] Kabila. Aussi, elle n'a toujours aucune nouvelle concernant son mari, un membre du parti PALU. Elle a ajouté que Kabila n'accepte pas les partis politiques et que les membres des partis d'opposition sont toujours arrêtés. Elle a peur d'être arrêtée car son mari est membre du parti PALU"

(Tribunal Record, vol. 1, pp. 000003 to 000006)

[4]      The applicants Biabola Karine Yamba and Balowa Marie Claire Yamba also testified to the same effect. All applicants testified that they fear returning to old Zaire's territory now called the Democratic Republic of Congo, more or less under the control of Laurent Kabila. They say they cannot be safe from persecution of the kind they described under the conditions currently prevailing in their former country's territory.

[5]      The applicants claim refugee status based on imputed political opinion and membership in a social group, namely family membership.

[6]      The CRDD decision narrates continuous incidents of violence and upheaval tantamount to civil war in Kinshasa and throughout the new République démocratique du Congo. Mr. Kabila who has installed himself as both head of State and head of government presides over an unruly force or armed party called the Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo (AFDL) which as noted above appears to be murderous and savage especially toward women and girls. So the board recited at pp. 000008 and 000009 observations derived from documents referred to in footnotes 14 and 19, inter alia.

The CRDD's decision

[7]      The board expressed themselves, finally, at p. 000014, in the following manner:

Eu égard à l'ensemble de la preuve, il incombe au tribunal de déterminer si les demanderesses ont actuellement raison de craindre d'être persécutées dans la RDC. La preuve susmentionnée indique que le parti PALU a organisé une manifestation non-autorisée au moins de juillet 1997 contre le nouveau pouvoir et que cette manifestation a été réprimée avec violence par les soldats de l'AFDL. Nous notons que les partis d'opposition ne sont pas en soient [sic] interdits par le nouveau pouvoir. De plus, la preuve documentaire ne démontre pas que les membres des partis d'opposition sont à risque uniquement en raison de leur appartenance à un parti d'opposition. Nous notons dans le cas d'espèce que les demanderesses ont témoigné n'avoir aucune nouvelle récente quant à la situation actuelle de leurs maris respectifs. D'ailleurs, les demanderesses n'ont aucun profil politique personnel au sein du parti PALU. Le tribunal est d'avis qu'il n'y a pas de preuve probante suffisante au dossier pour conclure que certains éléments de l'AFDL s'intéresseraient aux demanderesses en tant que membres de famille de membres d'opposition du temps du mobutisme dans l'éventualité de leur retour dans leur pays d'origine. À la lumière de l'ensemble de la preuve, le tribunal est d'avis qu'il n'existe pas de possibilité raisonnable que les demanderesses soient persécutées par certains éléments de l'AFDL sous le gouvernement de Kabila, en raison des motifs inter-reliés de leurs opinions politiques imputées et de leur appartenance à un groupe social, à savoir la famille, si elles retournent dans leur pays d'origine.

Par conséquent, la Section du statut de réfugié déclare donc que les demanderesses, Wa Yamba Yamba, Mbwibwa Muyumba, Balowa Yamba et Biabola Yamba, ne sont pas des réfugiées "au sens de la Convention".

[8]      The CRDD's lack of a sympathetic of even humane approach is mirrored by their substantive lack of a valid appreciation of what they wrote. The board notes that in July, 1997, just about three months prior to rendering their decision, a PALU demonstration was suppressed with violence. PALU is no friend of the new government, the board could truly have concluded. The present applicants are three wives (if not widows) and a daughter of staunch PALU supporters. Yet, one can savour the quintessential insouciance or profound naïveté in the CRDD's conclusion "qu'il n'existe pas de possibilité raisonnable que les demanderesses soient persécutées par certains éléments de l'AFDL sous le gouvernement de Kabila * * *".

Considerations of Law

[9]      Although the CRDD based the impugned decision on changed country conditions it did not appear to accord attention to subsections 2(2) and (3) of the Immigration Act. They provide:

2.(2) A person ceases to be a Convention refugee when

(a) the person voluntarily reavails himself of the protection of the country of his nationality;

(b) the person voluntarily reacquires his nationality;

(c) the person acquires a new nationality and enjoys the protection of the country of that new nationality;

(d) the person voluntarily re-establishes himself in the country that the person left, or outside of which the person remained, by reason of fear of persecution; or

(e) the reasons for the person's fear of persecution in the country that the person left, or outside of which the person remained, cease to exist.

(3) A person does not cease to be a Convention refugee by virtue of paragraph (2)(e) if the person establishes that there are compelling reasons arising out of any previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country that the person left, or outside of which the person remained, by reason of fear of persecution.

The law as enacted requires the CRDD to be astute in finding the facts correctly and in not misapprehending them.

[10]      An allegation of changed country conditions is resolved as a question of fact. So it was definitively pronounced by the Appeal Division of this Court in Yusuf v. M.E.I., (1995) 179 N.R. 11. The only test is derived from the definition of Convention refugee in section 2 of the Act, that is: Does the claimant presently - at the time of the CRDD hearing (and, one can say, within the previous few months) - have a well-founded fear of persecution?

[11]      So, the applicants aver, they are to be adjudged according to the full statutory definition of a Convention refugee, which requires a definite consideration of Act's provisions, 2(2)(e) and 2(3). Neither side in this litigation seems to have been satisfied that the board gave adequate and deliberate consideration of those statutory provisions which also define, or contribute to the definition of a Convention refugee. After all, the authorities in the RDC were violently suppressing a demonstration by PALU, of which the applicants' husbands were active supporters and which they helped to distribute propaganda, less than one month before the CRDD's hearing on August 11, 1997, as the CRDD itself noted in the impugned decision.

[12]      The applicants had to go (metaphysically) abroad to find authority for their proposition regarding the CRDD's obligation to consider the whole definition of Convention refugee in section 2 of the Act. It ought not to be necessary to find jurisprudence to show that the CRDD ought to do its job, when it is doing its job, but the Court agreed at the hearing to cast an eye on the case of Pillai v. Sec. State for Home Development, [1997] E.W.J. No. 293, p. 1, a judgment of the Court of Appeal for England and Wales. There, Lord Woolf, M.R. is reported at p. 10, thus:

If there is readily discernible an obvious point of Convention law which favours the applicant although he has not taken it, then the special adjudicator should apply it in his favour, but he should feel under no obligation to prolong the hearing by asking the parties for submissions on points which they have not taken but which could be properly categorized as merely arguable as opposed to obvious. Similarly, if when the Tribunal reads the Special Adjudicator's decision there is an obvious point of Convention law favourable to the asylum-seeker which does not appear in the decision, it should grant leave to appeal. If it does not do so, there will be a danger that this country will be in breach of its obligations under the Convention. When we refer to an obvious point we mean a point which has a strong prospect of success if it is argued. Nothing less will do.

This is a well-written statement of the obvious, that which courts frequently have to do, whether well-written or not.

[13]      It is obvious that the CRDD must consider all of the ingredients of the definition of "Convention refugee" when the facts evoke such consideration. Here it is apparent that the CRDD did not give that consideration of the facts, or grossly misinterpreted the facts which the CRDD recited in its decision without apparently considering or understanding them: the CRDD's decision was patently unreasonable. The evidence demonstrates compelling reasons, on the facts, for a different decision from the decision rendered. That decision is to be quashed and the applicants' refugee claims are to be remitted to the CRDD for determination anew, by a differently composed panel.

[14]      The respondent has proposed a serious question of general application which is determinative of this review, which alone the Court will consider. It is a question very similar to the question certified by Mr. Justice Cullen in Yong-Gueico v. M.C.I., 1997 (F.C.T.D.) which was:

Does the Refugee Division have an obligation in law to consider the application of Section 2(3) of the Immigration Act if the issue is not raised at the hearing by the parties to the hearing or by the Refugee Division? If so, what is the nature and extent of the obligation?

[15]      Research shows that the cited question was never brought to the Appeal Division. Therefore the last two of three questions pressed on behalf of the applicants would be germane here. However the Court declines to certify them, in comparison with the question proposed by the respondent which is:

In deciding whether or not an applicant has satisfied the requirements of the definition of Convention refugee in section 2 of the Immigration Act, is the CRDD under an obligation or duty to consider the requirements of paragraphs 2(2)(e) and 2(3) of the Immigration Act in sequence in deciding whether or not the requirements of paragraph 2(3) apply to the applicant, in the event that the CRDD has determined that there has been a change in country conditions?

This Court certifies the foregoing question, pursuant to rule 18 of the Federal Court Immigration Rules, SOR/93-22, SOR/98-235. The application to quash the CRDD's decision of October 27, 1997 is granted.

                                

                                 Judge

Ottawa, Ontario

November 6, 1998