Date: 20060907
Docket: IMM-7603-05
Citation: 2006 FC 1073
Ottawa, Ontario, September 7,
2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Phelan
BETWEEN:
MING
FANG CHEN
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND
IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
[1]
The
Immigration and Refugee Board (Board) denied the Applicant’s claim for refugee
protection brought on the basis of her involvement in illegal Falun Gong
activities in China. The
Applicant seeks judicial review of that decision principally challenging the
Board’s credibility finding that she would not have engaged in these activities
because of the risk of arrest and imprisonment.
II. Facts
[2]
The
Applicant claimed that she was employed by her uncle in China and, at that
time, did not engage in Falun Gong activities. At the request of her uncle, she
photocopied and delivered Falun Gong materials to two of her uncle’s friends.
She claimed that her father was arrested which caused her to flee to Canada where she
took up Falun Gong practice.
[3]
The
Board found the Applicant not to be a credible witness. It found her story
implausible because she knew that this might lead to her arrest and
imprisonment. Having made this credibility/plausibility find, the Board
discounted the rest of her story including her father’s imprisonment and the bona
fides of her conversion in Canada to Falun Gong.
[4]
The
Applicant raised three issues in this judicial review:
·
the
failure of the Board to inquire further into her Falun Gong belief and
practice;
·
the
failure to properly assess her conversion to Falun Gong; and
·
the
failure of the Board to properly consider and articulate its
credibility/plausibility finding. This issue is the principal issue in this
judicial review.
III. Analysis
[5]
On
the issue of further questioning as to her Falun Gong beliefs, there is no
obligation on the Board to engage in such questioning, particularly where an
applicant was represented, as she was, by counsel. (El Jarjouhi v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No 466 (QL))
[6]
The
Board did assess the Applicant’s recent conversion to Falun Gong but held that
she was not a bona fide practitioner and likely began her practice in Canada to advance
her refugee claim (Decision, page 3). The Board’s conclusions on this matter
are directly linked to its principal credibility/plausibility finding against
the Applicant.
[7]
As
to this credibility/plausibility finding that she did not engage in the
photocopying and distribution of Falun Gong materials due to the legal risks to
her, it is well established law that such findings are entitled to the highest
degree of curial deference. (Aguebor v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Citizenship) (1993), 160 N.R. 315; Chen v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 1194)
[8]
Contrary
to the Applicant’s submissions, the Board did articulate its reasons for this
key finding. It examined such factors as her age and relationship with her
uncle which might motivate her to copy and distribute. The Board also examined
such factors as the Chinese government’s practice of censorship, surveillance,
monitoring and arrest and detention.
[9]
It
is evident that against this background and given her personal lack of
commitment to Falun Gong, the Board concluded that this Applicant would not
likely be prepared to take the risk associated with assisting in the copying
and distribution of Falun Gong materials.
[10]
There
was ample evidence before the Board upon which it could conclude that the
Applicant’s story was not credible. This includes her own contradictory answers
that she was prepared to copy the Falun Gong materials because there was little
risk in so doing and her subsequent answer that, having done so, she had to
distribute the materials because of the high risk of possessing them.
[11]
In
my view, the Board had evidence from which it could reasonably conclude as it
did. Further, the Board sufficiently articulated its rationale for reaching
that conclusion.
[12]
Therefore,
this application for judicial review must be dismissed. There is no question
for certification.
JUDGMENT
IT IS ORDERED THAT this
application for judicial review is dismissed.
“Michael
L. Phelan”
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