Date: 20060512
Docket: IMM-5387-05
Citation: 2006 FC 588
Ottawa,
Ontario, May 12, 2006
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE MR.
JUSTICE
SHORE
BETWEEN:
MIGUEL ANGEL ALEGRIA MONROY
MICHELLE ALEGRIA YANEZ
LUIS ANGEL ALEGRIA YANEZ
PATRICIA YANEZ FRANCO
ANA KAREN ALEGRIA YANEZ
Applicants
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
[1]
How could
the Board exercise its special expertise without the slightest direct reference
to excerpts or at least citations from documents from the Board’s own Documentation
Centre concerning the conditions in the country in question?
[2]
The Court
set aside the Board’s decision, given that it ignored the evidence on record (Padilla
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1991), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1,
[1991] F.C.J. No. 71 (QL)).
NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDING
[3]
This is an
application for judicial review under subsection 71(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001 c. 27 (Act) of a decision of the
Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (Board) dated August 24, 2005, by which it was decided that
the applicants were not Convention refugees or persons in need of protection
within the meaning of sections 96 and 97 of the Act.
FACTS
[4]
The applicants,
Miguel Angel Alegria Monroy, his spouse, Patricia Yanez Franco, and their three
minor children, Ana Karen Alegria Yanez, Michelle Alegria Yanez and Luis Angel
Alegria, Yanez, are citizens of Mexico.
The claims of the spouse and children are based on that of Alegria Monroy, the principal
claimant.
[5]
Alegria
Monroy was allegedly threatened, beaten together with his spouse and confined for
having refused to cooperate with a group of persons who wanted to use his
services as a taxi driver for illegal business purposes.
[6]
They
arrived in Canada on March 29, 2005 and applied
for protection from Canada at that time.
IMPUGNED DECISION
[7]
The Board
concluded that Alegria Monroy and his family had not met the burden of
establishing in a clear and convincing manner that the Mexican state was unable
to ensure their protection.
[8]
Alternatively,
the Board concluded that Alegria Monroy and his family had an internal flight
alternative within Mexico
City.
ISSUES
[9]
This
application raises the following issues:
1. Did the Board commit a
reviewable error in concluding that the applicants did not show that the Mexican
state was unable to protect them?
2. Did the Board commit a
reviewable error in concluding that the applicants had an internal flight
alternative in Mexico
City?
ANALYSIS
Standard of review
[10]
The Board
has well-known expertise in fact-finding, especially in the assessment of the
credibility of persons claiming refugee status and of the availability of
protection from the country of origin (Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, [1998] S.C.J. No. 46 (QL)).
[11]
This Court
has repeated on numerous occasions that the standard of patent unreasonableness
applies to the Board’s decisions (Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1283 (QL), at paragraphs 9-15; Moore
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 1772
(QL), at paragraphs 8-9; Tvauri v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 1188 (QL), at paragraphs 10-11; Wen v.
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No. 907
(QL)).
[12]
The issue
of whether there is an internal flight alternative is also a question of fact.
Therefore, the applicable standard of review is patent unreasonableness (Chorny
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 999, [2003]
F.C.J. No. 1263 (QL), at paragraphs 9-10; E.H.S. v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1325, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1606 (QL), at
paragraph 10; Urgel v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2004 FC 1777, [2004] F.C.J. No. 2171 (QL), at paragraph 13; Dillon v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 381, [2005] F.C.J. No.
463 (QL), at paragraph 7; Ali v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2004 FC 1591, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1912 (QL), at paragraph 18).
State protection
[13]
In its
reasons, the Board reviewed the case law and noted the general principles
governing the matter of state protection. These principles may be summarized as
follows. There is a presumption that a state is able to protect its citizens,
and it is up to persons claiming refugee protection to rebut this presumption through
clear and convincing evidence. (Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward,
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, [1993] S.C.J. No. 74 (QL), at paragraph 50). It is not
necessary for state protection to be perfect (Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)
v. Villafranca
(1992) 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 130 (F.C.A.), [1992] F.C.J. No. 1189 (QL), at
paragraph 7). It is up to persons claiming refugee protection to exhaust all
possible recourses in their country before applying for international
protection (Kadenko c. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
(1996), 143 D.L.R. (4th) 532 (F.C.A.), [1996] F.C.J. No. 1376 (QL), at
paragraph 5).
[14]
In this
case, Alegria Monroy and his family have discharged the burden of proof on them.
Alegria Monroy alleged that he had been attacked on several occasions and
kidnapped and that his wife had also been attacked, but they never reported the
incidents to the police and they never consulted a lawyer because of the
situation they described.
[15]
Alegria
Monroy gave two reasons for his failure to request protection from the
authorities: his attackers allegedly told him they had contacts with the police
and members of the government, and the police themselves are corrupt.
[16]
In ignoring
the documentary evidence on record, the Board erred in fact and in law.
[17]
First
of all, the Court underlines the fact that the applicants’ credibility was not
called into question.
[18]
The Board
rendered its decision solely on the basis of the facts that would allow it to reject
the applicants’ claim and did not analyze the rest of the evidence.
[19]
Relevant
evidence was not considered, and this evidence was clear and convincing (Fok
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration),
A-881-90, [1993] F.C.J. No. 800 (F.C.A.) (QL).
[20]
The Board
wrote that, in De Baez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 785, [2003] F.C.J. No.
1020 (QL), the Court stated that the actions of some police officers
does not obviate the need to seek protection from the authorities.
[21]
But
unfortunately, without having made any distinction, the Board did not consider
information request MEX42974.EF, dated October 27, 2004, which mentions the existence
of a “blue brotherhood” code within the police.
[22]
Informational
memorandum MEX42974.EF, dated October 27, 2004, mentions the following:
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A
researcher based at the Centre for Research and Economic Study (Centro de
Investigacion y Docencia Economicas, CIDE) in Mexico City and specializing in
public security issues in Mexico stated in 14 September 2004
correspondence that
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Une
chercheuse du Centre de recherches et d’études économiques (Centro de Investigacion
y Docencia Economicas — CIDE) à Mexico, se spécialisant dans la sécurité
publique au Mexique, a déclaré dans une communication écrite du
14 septembre 2004 que
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[traduction]
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[n]obody is willing to talk about it,
and I don't know of any serious studies, but there are many rumours about the
existence a “brotherhood” (hermandad in Spanish), or several distinct
ones, in Mexican police forces. I had never heard of a brotherhood that might
span different levels of police forces (state and federal, [for instance]),
but it does not surprise me. Indeed, unfortunately, I find the scenarios [of
police covering up or refusing to prosecute various crimes against other
police officers] completely credible, although nearly impossible to prove or
disprove.
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[p]ersonne ne veut en parler et je ne
connais aucune recherche sérieuse sur le sujet, mais il existe nombre de
rumeurs sur l’existence d’une « fraternité » (hermandad en
espagnol) ou de plusieurs fraternités distinctes au sein des forces
policières du Mexique. Je n’ai jamais entendu parler d’une fraternité qui
s’étendrait à différents niveaux de corps de police (étatique et fédéral,
[par exemple]), mais cela ne me surprend pas. En effet, je pense
malheureusement que ces scénarios [selon lesquels les policiers se couvrent
l’un l’autre ou refusent de poursuivre un autre policier] sont totalement
crédibles, mais presque impossibles à prouver ou à réfuter.
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In
13 October 2004 correspondence, the co-director of the academic-led
research organization Democracy, Human Rights and Security (Democracia,
Derechos Humanos y Seguridad, DDHS) based in Mexico City and specializing in
police and public security issues in Mexico (DDHS n.d.) stated that the only
information about an informal blue brotherhood among the police which was
made public concerns the local Federal District police force. The co-director
further noted that sources within the police have told her that “if necessary”
police officers protect one other by, for example, tampering with evidence in
a case; however, this “information is extremely difficult to confirm”
(DDHS 13 Oct. 2004).
|
Dans
une communication écrite du 13 octobre 2004, la co-directrice de
l’organisme de recherche Démocratie, Droits de la personne et Sécurité
(Democracia, Derechos Humanos y Seguridad — DDHS), établi à Mexico et dirigé
par des universitaires, laquelle est spécialiste de la sécurité publique et
de la police à Mexico (DDHS s.d.), a déclaré que la seule information
publique sur une fraternité bleue informelle au sein de la police concernait
le corps de police local du District fédéral. La co‑directrice a ajouté
que des sources au sein de la police lui avaient dit [traduction]
« [qu’]au besoin » les policiers se protégeaient entre eux, par
exemple, en altérant des preuves; toutefois, cette [traduction] « information
est extrêmement difficile à confirmer » (DDHS 13 oct. 2004).
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While
the Research Directorate could not find documentary sources on whether an
informal “blue brotherhood” exists across different levels of police forces
in Mexico, media sources of 2002 and 2004 reported on a clandestine group of
senior police officers within the Federal District's Public Security
Secretariat (Secretaria de Seguridad Publica, SSP) called La Hermandad which has
apparently been in existence for over twenty years in Mexico City (La
Jornada 15 June 2002; Christian Science Monitor
23 Oct. 2002; El Sol de Mexico 10 Aug. 2004;
Todito.com 26 Aug. 2004; Independent
5 Sept. 2004).
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Même
si aucune information indiquant si une [traduction] « fraternité
bleue » s’étend à différents niveaux de corps de police au Mexique n’a
pu être trouvée parmi les sources documentaires consultées par la Direction
des recherches, des sources médiatiques de 2002 et de 2004 ont signalé
l’existence d’un groupe clandestin d’agents supérieurs de la police au sein
du Secrétariat de la sécurité publique (Secretaria de Seguridad Publica —
SSP) du District fédéral, groupe appelé La Hermandad, qui existerait depuis
plus de vingt ans à Mexico (La Jornada 15 juin 2002; The Christian
Science Monitor 23 oct. 2002; El Sol de Mexico
10 août 2004; Todito.com 26 août 2004; Independent
5 sept. 2004).
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According
to the Independent, it is believed that La Hermandad connects criminal
gangs with senior-level authorities, who then benefit from illegal activities
such as drug trafficking and extortion (5 Sept. 2004). Another
newspaper reported that La Hermandad apparently exerts considerable control
over police operations in Mexico City and reportedly collects a portion of
the bribes taken by police officers working there (Christian Science
Monitor 23 Oct. 2002).
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Selon
l’Independent, La Hermandad établirait des relations entre des gangs
de criminels et des autorités supérieures qui, par la suite, bénéficieraient
d’activités illégales comme le trafic de stupéfiants et l’extorsion
(5 sept. 2004). Un autre journal a signalé que La Hermandad
exercerait un contrôle considérable sur les opérations policières à Mexico et
recueillerait une partie des pots-de-vin acceptés par les policiers y
travaillant (The Christian Science Monitor 23 oct. 2002).
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[23]
In its
2005 Report, Amnesty International explained the following:
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Arbitrary
detention, torture and ill-treatment by police remained widespread,
particularly at state level. The authorities failed to combat these practices
effectively or to ensure judicial remedy to victims.
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Cette
année encore la police, notamment au niveau des États, a eu très largement
recours à la détention arbitraire, à la torture et à d’autres mauvais
traitements. Les autorités n’ont pas combattu efficacement ces pratiques et
n’ont pris aucune mesure pour que les victimes bénéficient d’une voie de
recours.
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[24]
In the Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2004 “Mexico”, the following was
mentioned:
. . .
There were no reports of politically
motivated disappearances; however, there were credible allegations of police
involvement in kidnappings for ransom . . . .
. . .The head of the PGR's anti-organized crime unit (SIEDO)
announced that members of the Chihuahua State Judicial Police (PJE) had carried
out the forced disappearances and killings at the behest of the Juarez drug
cartel. The authorities arrested 13 PJE agents and 4 more were at large at
year's end.
. . .
[T]he police regularly obtained
information through torture, prosecutors used this evidence in courts, and the
courts continued to admit as evidence confessions extracted under torture. Many
victims were afraid to report or follow through on complaints against the
police, thereby hampering prosecution of the perpetrators.
. . .
The authorities rarely punished officials
for torture, which continued to occur in large part because confessions are the
primary evidence in many criminal convictions. Many human rights groups linked
torture to the prevalence of arbitrary detention and claimed that torture often
follows an arbitrary arrest, sometimes without a warrant, as police or
prosecutors attempt to justify the detention by securing a confession to a
crime . . . .
. . .
Police corruption was a problem. Police
have been involved in kidnappings, armed robbery, and extortion, as well as
protection of criminals and drug traffickers. From January to July, in Mexico City alone, 140 policemen were
charged for various crimes, compared with 502 in 2003. In April, the Governor
of Morelos State dismissed all 552 state policemen after the arrest of two top
officers for allegedly protecting drug dealers.
[25]
In the
report entitled Mexico: State Protection (December
2003–March
2005), the following was mentioned:
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Key
points discussed at a July 2004 conference on justice reform in Mexico,
sponsored by the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) and the Center for US-Mexican Studies, included statements that the
criminal justice system was “both ineffective and unfair” (CSIS
16 July 2004). At the conference, numerous national and
international justice reform experts claimed that in Mexico “[fewer] than 5 per cent of
crimes are investigated and [fewer than] 2 per cent go to trial”
(ibid.). Moreover, the criminal justice system was deemed unfair due to its
use of arbitrary detention, delays in trial and sentencing, “incarceration
without sentencing” or pretrial detention and “poor legal defence” (ibid.;
see also AI 28 Sept. 2004).
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Parmi
les points clés soulevés à une conférence sur les réformes judiciaires au
Mexique, tenue en juillet 2004 sous le parrainage des organisations
états-uniennes Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) et
Center for US-Mexican Studies, on trouve l’affirmation que le système de
justice pénale était [traduction] « à la fois inefficace et inéquitable »
(CSIS 16 juill. 2004). De nombreux spécialistes de la réforme
judiciaire aux niveaux national et international ont affirmé à la conférence
que [traduction] « moins de 5 p. 100 des crimes [faisaient] l’objet
d’une enquête et [que] moins de 2 p. 100 [étaient] jugés par les
tribunaux » (ibid.). Ils ont qualifié le système de justice pénale
d’inéquitable, lui reprochant des détentions arbitraires, des retards dans
les prononcés des peines et dans les procès, des [traduction] «
incarcérations sans prononcé de peine », des détentions préventives et de
[traduction] « mauvaises défenses juridiques » (ibid.; voir aussi AI
28 sept. 2004).
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[26]
The
following was mentioned in the Amnesty International 2005 Report:
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The
justice system continued to be misused, particularly at state level. The lack
of impartiality of the judiciary and the prosecution services resulted in
malicious prosecutions and unfair judicial procedures.
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Cette
année encore, des détournements du système judiciaire ont eu lieu, notamment
au niveau des États. Le manque d’impartialité des autorités judiciaires et
des services du ministère public a entraîné des poursuites malveillantes et
des procédures inéquitables.
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[27]
Accordingly,
in this case, the claimants’ fear was not denied by the Board. Moreover, the claimants
were considered credible. In addition, these are considerations that may be
verified independently from the applicants’ fear, and this is the very essence of
their fear. (Zalzali v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[1991] 3 F.C. 605, [1991] F.C.J. No. 341 (C.A.) (QL))
[28]
Without
evidence to the contrary, the applicant could not have been protected as was
explained by the Federal Court of Appeal in Rajudeen v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration),
[1984] F.C.J. No. 601 (F.C.A.) (QL).
[29]
The
applicants obviously cannot be protected, and Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, [1993]
S.C.J. No. 74 (QL), demonstrates that “ ‘[p]ersecution’ includes situations where the state is not in
strictness an accomplice to the persecution but is simply unable to protect its
citizens”.
[30]
The Handbook
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 1979 states
the following under the heading “and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country”:
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Being
unable to avail himself of such protection implies circumstances that
are beyond the will of the person concerned. There may, for example, be a
state of war, civil war or other grave disturbance, which prevents the
country of nationality from extending protection or makes such protection
ineffective . . . .
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Lorsqu’il
ne peut se réclamer de cette protection, cela tient à des circonstances
indépendantes de sa volonté. Il peut y avoir, par exemple, un état de guerre,
une guerre civile ou d’autres troubles graves qui empêchent le pays dont
l’intéressé a la nationalité de lui accorder sa protection ou qui rendent
cette protection inefficace…
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[31]
In Zalzali,
supra, the following was explained at paragraphs 16 and 17:
[T]he natural meaning of the words “is
unable” assumes an objective inability on the part of the claimant, and the
fact that “is unable” is, in contrast to “is unwilling”, not qualified by “by
reason of that fear”, seems to me to confirm that the inability in question is
governed by objective criteria which can be verified independently of the fear
experienced, and so independently of the acts which prompted that fear and
their perpetrators . . . .
[T]here can be persecution within the
meaning of the Convention even if the reprehensible acts are those of fellow
nationals, when the government is unable to protect the victim against what
they are doing . . . .
[32]
In Padilla,
supra, the Court set aside the Board’s decision because the Board ignored
the evidence on record.
[33]
It is clear
that the Board’s decision is patently unreasonable, considering the evidence it
had before it.
CONCLUSION
[34]
For these
reasons, the Court allows the application for judicial review.
ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS that
1. The application for judicial review be allowed;
2. The case be returned to a differently constituted
Board for rehearing and redetermination.
“Michel M.J. Shore”
Certified
true translation
Michael
Palles
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