Date: 20060428

Dockets: IMM-4866-05 and IMM-7355-05

Citation: 2006 FC 536

Ottawa, Ontario, the 28^th day of April 2006

PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BLAIS

 

BETWEEN:

BACHAN SINGH SOGI

Applicant

and

 

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

Respondent

 

 

REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER

 

[1]               In connection with this application for judicial review (cases IMM-4866-05 and IMM‑7355‑05), the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (the respondent) filed a motion requesting non-disclosure of security information.

 

[2]               In reply to this non-disclosure application, Bachan Singh Sogi (the applicant) submitted a notice of a constitutional question and filed his memorandum in which he challenged the constitutionality of sections 78, 86 and 87 of the Act.

RELEVANT FACTS

 

[3]               The applicant is a citizen of India who came to Canada in May 2001. On October 8, 2002, the Board ruled that the applicant was inadmissible to Canada as there were reasonable grounds to believe that he was a member of a terrorist organization, namely an extremist Sikh organization known as Babbar Khalsa International (the BK).

 

[4]               The Federal Court dismissed the application for judicial review of that decision and the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from that judgment. The Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal the latter judgment.

 

[5]               The applicant has been in detention for over three and a half years, that is, since August 8, 2002. The Board has maintained the applicant’s detention based on secret reports, information or evidence to which the applicant and his counsel do not have access, and through private ex parte hearings.

 

[6]               When the Minister reviewed the grounds for detention held on November 29, 2002, he asked the Board to consider the same information from classified sources submitted at the inquiry on August 15, 2002.

 

[7]               The applicant objected to this request and challenged the constitutionality of subsection 86(1) of the Act. On April 4, 2003, the Board rejected the constitutional arguments raised by the applicant. Accordingly, it allowed the Minister’s request pursuant to subsection 86(1) of the Act and ordered that the classified information in question not be disclosed.

 

[8]               On July 11, 2005, the applicant submitted a new notice of constitutional question to the Board, in which he challenged the constitutionality of sections 78, 86, 112 and 113 of the Act together with sections 54 to 60 of the Act and the regulatory provisions. The applicant argued that these provisions infringed sections 7, 9, 12 and 15 of the Charter as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatments or Punishments.

 

[9]               On November 23, 2005, the Board made a separate decision on this point which rejected the constitutional arguments raised by the applicant. It is that decision which is at issue in this application for judicial review (Court docket No. IMM-7355-05).

 

[10]           Additionally, the applicant is seeking judicial review of the Board’s decision of July 26, 2005, ordering that the applicant be kept in detention for a maximum period of 30 days (Court docket No. IMM-4866-05).

 

[11]           The respondent filed a motion for non-disclosure of security information in the course of the application for judicial review at bar pursuant to section 87 of the Act. The applicant submitted a notice of constitutional question. He sought to challenge the constitutionality of sections 78, 86 and 87 of the Act.

 

[12]           In accordance with an agreement between the parties, therefore, the Court decided that the constitutional questions raised by the applicant would be the subject of a joint hearing separate from the other points at issue.

 

[13]           The notice of constitutional questions was validly served pursuant to the Act.

 

ISSUE

 

[14]           Do sections 78, 86 and 87 of the Act infringe the provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?

 

ANALYSIS

[15]           The respondent raised a preliminary question: he argued that the constitutionality of the provisions in question has already been confirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal, not only in Charkaoui (Re), [2005] 2 F.C.R. 299, 2004 FCA 421, but also in the context of the case at bar, in Sogi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA 212.

 

[16]           Therefore, the respondent argued that the applicant could not revisit the case to reopen the question of the constitutionality of sections 78, 86 and 87 of the Act, since once the constitutional validity of a provision has been confirmed, the issue cannot be reopened based on other arguments which could – and should – have been raised (Apotex Inc. v. Merck & Co., [2003] 1 F.C. 242, paragraph 26).

 

[17]           It was argued that the applicant could not invoke the fact that, in this case, sections 78, 86 and 87 of the Act were applied in the course of the inquiry held by the Board and the judicial review thereof, rather than in the course of the review of the grounds for detention and judicial review of the latter.

 

[18]           This distinction is said not to have any impact on the constitutionality of sections 78, 86 and 87. Essentially, the Board member and the judge on judicial review apply the same procedure in both cases, namely that set out in section 78 of the Act, with the necessary modification.

 

[19]           This preliminary question, that the constitutional question may already have been heard and disposed of, is a very significant one and I come to the same conclusion as counsel for the respondent in this regard, as I shall explain below.

 

Do sections 78, 86 and 87 of the Act infringe the provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?

 

 

[20]           Section 78 of the Act authorizes a designated judge of the Federal Court to consider, in private and in the absence of the applicant, his counsel and the public, the protected security information which is the basis for the certificate signed by the Ministers pursuant to section 77 of the Act.

 

 

 

[21]           Section 86 of the Act provides that this same procedure shall apply at a hearing before the Immigration and Refugee Board:

 

 

[22]           Section 87 of the Act authorizes the Court to continue prohibiting disclosure in the course of an application for judicial review of all or part of the security information considered by the Board, disclosure of which the latter has already been prohibited pursuant to subsection 86(1) of the Act:

 

 

 

(i) Interference with the principle of judicial independence and impartiality

[23]           The applicant argued that, like judges of the Court, members of the Board lose their independence and impartiality simply because they only have one opinion, that of the Minister, during private ex parte hearings held pursuant to sections 78, 86 and 87 of the Act.

[24]           As mentioned by the respondent, the applicant ignored the implications of his position; in the final analysis, he argued that the courts could never proceed in private and ex parte except in very special situations, though it was very difficult for the applicant to describe these precisely. If he were right, the courts would not be able to issue a search warrant or authorize the interception of communications by electronic means. A well-settled case law would have to be summarily overruled.

 

[25]           Institutional bias “presupposes that a well-informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – would have a reasonable apprehension of bias in a substantial number of cases. In this regard, all factors must be considered, but the guarantees provided for in the legislation to counter the prejudicial effects of certain institutional characteristics must be given special attention” (2747-3174 Québec Inc. v. Québec (Régie des permis d’alcool), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919, at paragraph 44).

 

[26]           The applicant’s argument rests on a single inference: these two decision-makers are neither independent nor impartial if they are not apprised of the contrary opinion of the applicant or his counsel. The applicant did not even discuss the relevant provisions of the Act, did not put them in their context and he ignored the balance struck by Parliament between the right of the applicant to defend himself and the public interest in the non-disclosure of certain information in pursuit of the broader objective of national security.

 

[27]           The applicant thus completely ignores national security; in Charkaoui, the Court of Appeal rejected a similar argument put forward by the appellant therein (Charkaoui (Re), supra, at paragraphs 4 and 100). The Supreme Court has noted that any challenge to the integrity of the judicial system must be based on concrete evidence rather than assumptions or hypotheses (Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 91, at paragraphs 13 and 15).

 

[28]           As counsel for the respondent noted, the applicant Sogi himself in the Federal Court of Appeal last year, in 2005 (Sogi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 1 F.C.R. 171, 2004 FCA 212), considered that only Federal Court judges had the necessary independence and jurisdiction to determine the public interest in the confidentiality of certain information, which he submitted was not the case with members of the Immigration Division. I will return below to the matters already considered by the Court of Appeal in the applicant’s previous case in the Federal Court of Appeal.

 

[29]           The Court of Appeal has already held that members of the Immigration Division have the independence required by section 86 of the Act, and in this regard Marshall Rothstein, J.A., has explained that, so long as the process remains under the control of a Federal Court judge in relation to the revewing of confidential records, the process established by the Act is still consistent with the rules of fundamental justice (Sogi, supra, at paragraphs 19, 20 and 21). Also with reference to the impartiality argument, the latter was rejected in Ahani v. Canada, [1995] 3 F.C. 669, at 696 (T.D.), aff. at (1996), 201 N.R. 233 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal denied [1996] S.C.C.A. No. 496. It should also be added that several judges have had to rule on evidence presented ex parte and in private, and more specifically on the duties of the Minister during the process and the active participation of the judge himself in the process of assessing the evidence.

 

[30]           It is quite clear that both the decision-maker at the Immigration Division level and the Federal Court judge have a duty to exhaustively examine and to scrutinize in detail evidence brought before them ex parte and in private. They must assess its relevance, reliability and probative value and consider the existence or absence of corroboration, the consistency and coherence of the evidence and the source thereof. The assessment of the reliability of the evidence may depend on the credibility of the witnesses and the reliability of the sources. Persons who have signed affidavits will be questioned; witnesses appearing in person may also be examined, together with counsel both for the Department of Justice and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service on their written argument. (See: Almrei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] F.C.J. No. 1994 (QL), 2005 FC 1645, at paragraph 281; Harkat (Re) (2005), 261 F.T.R. 52, 2005 FC 393, at paragraphs 93 and 97, aff. at 2005 FCA 285, [2005] F.C.A. No. 1467; Almrei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2004] 4 F.C.R. 330, 2004 FC 420, at paragraphs 59 and 60, aff. at [2005] 3 F.C.R. 142, 2005 FCA 54.)

 

[31]           In Charkaoui (Re), [2004] 3 F.C.R. 32, 2003 FC 1419, Simon Noël J. reviewed a list of non‑exhaustive but strict criteria that must be taken into account when the decision-maker is assessing the evidence submitted to him or her ex parte:

In order to carry out this difficult task, the designated judge has access to all the information on which the Ministers’ decisions are based, without exception. The designated judge can even examine additional information if counsel for the Ministers submit any (paragraph 78(j) of the IRPA). The Ministers’ representatives are even under a duty to inform the designated judge of any facts that could be prejudicial to the Ministers’ case. In Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3, Arbour J. notes that the duty of disclosure is much greater when Parliament has authorized hearings in the absence of a party:

 

As mentioned before, when making ex parte submissions to the reviewing court, the government institution is under a duty to act in utmost good faith and must make full, fair and candid disclosure of the facts, including those that may be adverse to its interest.

 

Designated judges preside over hearings and hear the Minister’s witnesses. They examine witnesses themselves as the need arises. They examine the documents carefully to determine which information is related to security and which information is not. In order to do so, they examine, among other things, the sources of the information, the way in which it was obtained, the reliability of the sources and the method used, and whether it is possible to corroborate the information by other means. Designated judges take account of the fact that the information was obtained in confidence from a source in Canada or a foreign source, or that the information is already in the public domain. They ask the Ministers’ representatives about the quality of the investigation and inquires into whether the events can be interpreted differently. They decide which information can be disclosed to the person concerned and provides a summary of the evidence containing nothing which would, if disclosed, be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person. The summary must enable the person concerned to be reasonably informed of the circumstances giving rise to the signing of the certificate, the issuance of the warrant of arrest and the detention.

 

After the person concerned receives the summary in question and other relevant documents, the designated judge holds one or more hearings where the person concerned is given the opportunity to be heard. The hearing can pertain to the reasonableness of the certificate, the continued detention or both. At the hearing, the Ministers and the person concerned have the opportunity to call witnesses, submit documentary evidence and make oral as well as written submissions.

 

[32]           The applicant’s argument that the judge may be influenced by the evidence presented to the Court by counsel at the ex parte hearing could be described as self-evident: indeed, the applicant appears to fear the influence which counsel for the respondent may exercise at the time the evidence is presented ex parte, and also to suggest that the possibility of exerting influence must be excluded, a suggestion which seems unrealistic. It is clear that, when counsel appear before a tribunal on behalf of parties, they are going to try to influence the Court and lead it to incline in their favour. What matters is not to see whether one or other counsel is trying to influence the decision-maker but rather to examine the procedure established and the action taken by the decision-maker to ensure that he or she gets to the heart of the matter in analyzing the evidence and remains impartial in such analysis.

 

[33]           Counsel for the Department of Justice did not participate in the making of the decision; they are responsible for defending the interests of the government and of the public and when they appear before the Court to discuss evidence ex parte they must justify the non-disclosure and have a duty to submit and explain facts candidly and impartially, including facts which are adverse to their case, with complete good faith, as determined by the case law. (Application pursuant to s. 83.28  Criminal Code (Re), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248, 2004 SCC 42, at paragraphs 93 to 95 and 98; Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 75, at paragraphs 27 and 47; Charkaoui (Re), [2005] 2 F.C.R. 299, 2004 FCA 421, at paragraph 79.)

 

[34]           If it so happens that the Immigration Division member made an error in his analysis leading to the decision on non-disclosure, the applicant still has the right to seek judicial review of the Immigration Division member’s decision so that it may be re-examined by a Federal Court judge. Once again, this process was described by Rothstein J.A. of  the Federal Court of Appeal, as he then was, in Sogi as entirely consistent, legitimate and in compliance with the constitutional rights of the parties (Sogi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), supra, at paragraph 24).

 

[35]           It is worth adding that the standard of review which applies at the time the Federal Court examines the legality of a decision by an Immigration Board member is that of correctness; in other words, the Minister must persuade the Court that the decision was the only one which the Immigration Board member could have made. If there is an error in the decision or the process, the decision will simply be referred back to the Immigration Division for re-consideration, which once again provides additional security.

 

[36]           Therefore, I have no hesitation in dismissing the applicant’s argument regarding the decision-maker’s independence and impartiality.

(ii) Exclusion of evidence and non-compliance with principles of fundamental justice

[37]           The applicant alleged that sections 78, 86 and 87 infringe the rights guaranteed by the Charter in that they violate the principles of natural justice, by depriving him of the right to be informed of the other party’s evidence, to cross-examine and to have a public hearing.

 

[38]           The respondent submitted that the principles of fundamental justice are not carved in stone. On the contrary, it is the context – which the applicant completely ignores – that determines the application of the principles of fundamental justice to a given case (Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), supra, at paragraph 39, relying on Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, at page 743). The context may warrant the weighing of the interests of the government and of the individual, and thus, by implication, the limiting of the disclosure of evidence (Ruby, at paragraph 40). The right to be informed of the other party’s evidence so as to respond to it and to put forward any evidence favourable to his case may thus be restrictively defined, in exceptional circumstances, when interests that depart from those of the applicant are involved.

 

[39]           In the case at bar, the applicant refused to recognize what the appellant in Ruby admitted: the government has a legitimate interest in protecting information the disclosure of which would adversely affect national security. Already in Chiarelli, the Supreme Court recognized that this concern was a valid one and warranted preventing the party concerned from having access to evidence which in other contexts he might have been able to have (Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, supra, at page 745).

 

[40]           Sections 86 and 87 incorporate section 78 as to the review of the grounds of detention and judicial review of the decision made following that review. Therefore, the constitutionality of section 78 determines the constitutionality of the sections directly referred to in it.

 

[41]           In Sogi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2004] 2 F.C.R. 427, W. Andrew MacKay J. said at paragraph 67:

Finally, I am not persuaded that the process here followed, pursuant to subsection 44(2), sections 86 and 87, is contrary to the principles of fundamental justice, and though it adversely affects the physical liberty and the psychological security of the applicant, that process is excepted from infringing section 7 of the Charter.

 

[42]           This judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal the latter judgment (Sogi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 354.

 

[43]           Dealing with security certificates, Noël J.A. concluded in Charkaoui (Re), [2004] 3 F.C.R. 32, 2003 FC 1419, supra, that sections 76 to 85 of the Act were consistent with the principles of fundamental justice referred to in section 7 of the Charter:

 

In my opinion, the procedure established by sections 76 to 85, 77, 78 and 82 of the IRPA takes the existence of opposing interests into consideration and strikes an acceptable balance between those interests. The fact that a designated judge is involved in striking this balance adds credibility to the procedure and ensures objectivity in achieving the result.

 

. . .

 

I have come to the same conclusion. The procedure established by sections 76 to 85 of the IRPA complies with the principles of fundamental justice referred to in section 7 of the Charter.

 

[44]           In Harkat (Re), 2004 FC 1717, Eleanore R. Dawson J. agreed with the holdings arrived at in Charkaoui (Re), [2004] 3 F.C.R. 32, and in Sogi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1429, regarding sections 76 to 85 of the Act and the principles of fundamental justice guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter:

 

In Charkaoui, supra at paragraph 107, Mr. Justice Simon Noël concluded that the procedure established by sections 76 to 85 of the Act complies with the principles of fundamental justice guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter.  More recently, in Sogi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2004), 322 N.R. 2 (F.C.A.); leave to appeal dismissed [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 354 the Federal Court of Appeal found that the procedure whereby a member of the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board may, in making an admissibility decision, take into account security intelligence information without disclosing it to the affected individual, conforms to the principles of fundamental justice so that section 7 of the Charter is not violated.

 

In both Charkaoui and Sogi, supra, significant reliance was placed upon the decision of Madam Justice McGillis in Ahani, supra.  In Ahani, the constitutional validity of the predecessor legislation was upheld.

 

It follows from this jurisprudence, at least for the purpose of this motion, that any alleged violation of Mr. Harkat’s section 7 Charter rights arises not from the legislative scheme, but from the particular circumstances of this case.

 

For the reasons set out above, I have not been persuaded that there is anything in the circumstances of this case that renders the Court incapable of properly balancing and protecting Mr. Harkat’s rights so as to provide a hearing that conforms with the principles of fundamental justice.

 

[45]           Dawson J.’s judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Harkat (Re), 2005 FCA 285, [2005] F.C.A. No. 1467:  

Counsel for the appellant admits that Justice Dawson stated, quite correctly, that she was bound in this matter by the decision of this Court made in Charkaoui upholding the constitutionality of the provisions of the IRPA.

 

The appellant submits that the decision in Charkaoui was in error and that sections 78 to 80 of the IRPA violate Section 7 of the Charter.

 

The constitutionality of sections 78 to 80 of the IRPA, including the need for the appointment of a Special Advocate, have already been decided in this Court’s decision in Charkaoui.

 

The appellant has not demonstrated any manifest error which would justify this Court in departing from its decision in Charkaoui and its more recent decision in Almrei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 F.C.A. 54; [2005] F.C.J. No. 213.

 

While the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal from the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal in Charkaoui, on August 25, 2005, this of itself is not a ground for this Court to decide this question anew.

 

Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

 

[46]           The Court of Appeal confirmed that, in the light of national security considerations, Parliament may justifiably depart from the general principles of fundamental justice. Therefore, I have no hesitation in rejecting the applicant’s argument based on a breach of the principles of fundamental justice.

 

(iii) Prolonged and indefinite detention despite risk of torture in event of removal

[47]           It is not necessary to deal immediately with the constitutional arguments related to the prolonged and indefinite detention of the applicant despite evidence of a risk of torture in the event of removal, as has been alleged, and this issue will simply be examined at the hearing on the merits of the two joint applications for judicial review.

 

CONCLUSION

[48]           Therefore, I have no hesitation in ruling that the arguments put forward by the applicant are redundant in that, firstly, they have already been dealt with by the courts, both by the Federal Court and by the Federal Court of Appeal, and it is to be noted that the Supreme Court of Canada has refused to intervene, and that secondly, the same question was disposed of in Sogi: whatever counsel for the applicant may say, this entire matter has already been ruled on and decided and the instant application is merely a fresh attempt to have examined constitutional questions which were the basis of the preceding application in the Court, which was dismissed both by my colleague MacKay J. and by the Federal Court of Appeal.

 

[49]           The usual practice of the courts is as follows: when counsel decides to raise a question of a constitutional nature, he or she must comply with the required procedure: in this respect, the constitutional question was already put forward by previous counsel at a hearing before the Immigration Board member in July 2002. A lengthy decision supported by reasons rejected these constitutional arguments relating to the non-disclosure of part of the evidence against the applicant Sogi on April 4, 2003. At that time, the Minister’s application on non-disclosure was allowed and the Board ordered that the classified information in question not be disclosed. It appears that there was no application for judicial review of the said decision, which still remains valid. It was not until three years later, on July 11, 2005, that a new application was made to the Board with a new notice of constitutional questions again citing breaches of sections 7, 9, 12 and 15 of the Charter.

 

[50]           Once again, in a decision supported by reasons, the Board dismissed this application, and that decision is now challenged by way of an application for judicial review in this Court. Counsel for the applicant argued that she may revisit this question as many times as she likes if the constitutional questions raised are different. I disagree. It seems wrong to the Court to say that parties have a permanent and unlimited right of appeal or review to raise constitutional questions when said questions have already been raised in the same case. In the case at bar, the factual situation has not changed, since Mr. Sogi’s personal situation flowing from the decision as to exclusion from Canada has not changed and he has been in detention since July 2002. All the constitutional questions, both on the first occasion in summer 2002 and the second in summer 2005, could have been raised at the same time. Am I to understand that, if the applicant meets with failure, he may again in a few months submit a new application based on other more elaborate grounds essentially claiming the same thing, namely that the Court should declare to be unconstitutional both the process set out in the Act in sections 78 et seq. and the sections themselves, in particular the provisions of sections 78, 86 and 87? I do not agree with such an approach: counsel for the parties must make their choice and stick to their arguments; they will always have an opportunity to make new motions and rely on new grounds if the situation changes, which is definitely not the case at present.

 

[51]           This is quite clearly a new attempt based essentially on the same questions already disposed of both by the Federal Court of Appeal and by the Immigration Board, in particular in the case of the applicant himself in a lengthy decision supported by reasons by Rothstein J.A. in 2005 (upholding the judgment of MacKay J. of the Federal Court), as well as in decisions of member Ladouceur on April 4, 2003, judicial review of which the applicant did not even seek, and in the decision of the Board dated November 23, 2005.

 

[52]           As suggested by counsel for the respondent, such an approach cannot be justified, as counsel for the applicant argued, by the fact that she was taking the place of other counsel after three years and had not only a right but a duty to intervene by raising a new constitutional question: in fact, this constitutes a form of abuse of process which in the circumstances is not acceptable.

 

[53]           The constitutional arguments raised by the applicant are therefore rejected with costs, whatever the outcome of the case.

 

ORDER

 

            THE COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES THAT:

 

1. The constitutional arguments opposing the respondent’s motion for non-disclosure of certain documents are rejected;

 

2. The constitutional arguments raised in relation to the other questions in paragraphs 28, 29, 30 and 31 will be examined when the judicial review application is heard on the merits;

 

3. The general issues listed in paragraphs 32 and 33 will also be argued at the hearing on the merits;

 

4. The parties will return to court at 9:30 am on May 2 in Montréal to decide on further action to be taken in the matter;

 

5. In any event, the parties will return before this court at 9:30 am on May 31 next in Montréal for a hearing.

 

 

 

 

 

 

“Pierre Blais”

 

 

 

 

 

 

Certified true translation

François Brunet, LLB, BCL

FEDERAL COURT

 

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

 

 

 

DOCKETS:                                                          IMM-4866-05 and IMM-7355-05

 

STYLE OF CAUSE:                                            BACHAN SINGH SOGI  v. MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

 

 

PLACE OF HEARING:                                      Montréal, Quebec

 

DATE OF HEARING:                                        April 18, 2006

 

REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER BY:  The Honourable Mr. Justice Blais

 

DATED:                                                               April 28, 2006

 

 

APPEARANCES:

 

Johanne Doyon	FOR THE APPLICANT
François Joyal Ian Demers	FOR THE RESPONDENT

 

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

 

Doyon & Associés Montréal, Quebec	FOR THE APPLICANT
John H. Sims, Q.C. Deputy Attorney General of Canada	FOR THE RESPONDENT