Date: 20060410
Docket: IMM-712-05
Citation: 2006 FC 413
BETWEEN:
MENA GUIRGUIS, MARIE GOORGY,
MONICA GUIRGUIS, MALAK GUIRGUIS
Applicants
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
GIBSON J.
INTRODUCTION
[1] The Applicants are husband and wife and their two children. They are citizens of Egypt and are Coptic Christians. They arrived in Canada on the 14th of January, 2004 and shortly thereafter claimed Convention refugee status in Canada or protection equivalent to that afforded by Convention refugee status. In a decision dated the 10th of January, 2005, the Refugee Protection Division (the "Board") of the Immigration and Refugee Board denied their claims. These reasons follow the hearing of a portion of an application for judicial review of the decision of the Board.
BACKGROUND
[2] As earlier noted, the Applicants are Coptic Christians and citizens of Egypt. They relate that they occupied an apartment in Alexandria, Egypt in a building which had a mosque on its main floor. The Applicants allege that the mosque came to be dominated by fundamentalists. In late September of 2003, the Applicant Malak, who was then six years of age, apparently drew the ire of an individual attending the mosque. Malak was assaulted by the individual and sustained a gash to his lip that required two stitches.
[3] In October of 2003, the adult male Applicant, while he was in his automobile, had the windshield smashed by a rock thrown by a bearded man wearing a galabia. The Applicant was not injured. Later the same month, the adult female Applicant alleges that a fundamentalist threw acid on her, injuring her legs. The Applicants apparently reported none of the incidents to the police and the adult female Applicant did not seek medical attention.
[4] The Applicants allege that, later on the same day that the adult female Applicant was attacked, a Muslim woman visited her and insisted that she become a Muslim or face death. That same evening, the Applicants abandoned their apartment in Alexandria and moved to a flat in Mansoura owned by the adult female Applicant's father. The Applicants arranged for visas to facilitate their travel to Canada. They also arranged for airline tickets. Very shortly after booking their flights to Canada the adult female Applicant alleges that she received a telephone call with a threatening message that she and her family would not be able to hide from the fundamentalists.
THE DECISION UNDER REVIEW
[5] Counsel for the Applicants, before the Board, objected to "reverse order questioning", sometimes referred to as the Chairperson's Guideline 7 issue. The Board determined to proceed by way of "reverse order questioning". That decision was before this Court on this judicial review and was, or will be, determined by a different Judge following a separate hearing on issues arising out of "reverse order questioning".
[6] The Board examined the issue of country conditions for Coptic Christians in Egypt at some length. It noted:
The documents disclosed by the Refugee Protection Officer report that there are two schools of thought on the issue of Copts in Egypt. According to a number of United States senators, supported by international Coptic groups in the United States, Canada and elsewhere, Copts are persecuted in Egypt. On the other hand, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights has called the charges exaggerated and unsubstantiated. The Council of Churches of NYC also claims that Coptic Christians are not persecuted in Egypt.
[7] On the issue of country conditions for Coptic Christians, the Board concluded:
On the whole, while I find that the documentary evidence supports the allegation that Coptic Christians in Egypt face discrimination, I am not of the view that the documentary evidence supports the proposition that Coptic Christians are persecuted. The documentary evidence is, to be sure, conflicted. However, it is my opinion that while the preponderance of evidence establishes that Coptic Christians may face discrimination in Egypt, it does not amount to persecution, as outlined in section 96 of IRPA, or the level of mistreatment envisioned by section 97(1) of IRPA.
[8] The Board then turned to an examination of the evidence regarding the Applicants' alleged experiences. It determined the evidence of the adult Applicants concerning their alleged experiences at the hands of fundamentalists not to be credible or trustworthy. With respect to the rock-throwing incident, the Board determined the event to be nothing more than a random traffic incident. It determined the male adult Applicant's identification of the rock-thrower as a fundamentalist to be implausible. The Board found the adult female Applicant's evidence regarding the alleged acid-throwing incident to be "extremely vague" and rejected it in the absence of independent evidence such as a medical or police report.
[9] In the result, as earlier noted, the Board rejected the Applicants' claims to protection.
THE ISSUES
[10] Apart from the "reverse order questioning" or Chairperson's Guideline 7 issues, counsel for the Applicants urged that the Board erred in a reviewable manner by misconstruing or ignoring evidence relating to the rock-throwing incident, the acid-throwing incident and the process by which the Applicants obtained their Canadian Visitor's Visas, and further erred in the assessment of country conditions in Egypt for Coptic Christians by failing to give due consideration to the evidence that favoured the Applicants' allegation that Coptic Christians are persecuted in Egypt.
ANALYSIS
[11] It was not in dispute before the Court that the standard of review of a decision of the Board in respect of the issues summarized above is patent unreasonableness. In Conkova v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Justice Pelletier, then of the Trial Division, wrote at paragraph 5 of his reasons,
...the issue here is the CRDD's [here the Board's] assessment of the evidence, a matter clearly within its mandate and its expertise. The view which the CRDD took of the evidence was one which could reasonably be taken, just as the opposing view could also reasonably be taken. The evidence, as is so often the case, is ambiguous and equivocal. Some elements support the applicants' position, others undermine it. The CRDD's task is to consider all the elements (which does not require that specific mention be made of every piece of evidence which is reviewed) to weigh it and to come to a conclusion. As long as its conclusion is not one which is wrong on its face, it is not patently unreasonable. ....In this case, the conclusion to which the CRDD arrived is not wrong on its face, even though others might come to a different conclusion. There is no reason for this Court to intervene.
[some text and citations omitted]
I am satisfied that precisely the same might be said on the facts of this matter, both with regard to the evidence of the adult Applicants relating to alleged encounters with fundamentalists and with regard to the Board's assessment of the documentary evidence before it with regard to country conditions for Coptic Christians in Egypt. Similarly, I am satisfied that it was open to the Board to reject the explanation provided for the Applicants' reliance on an abandoned address in connection with their applications for Canadian Visitor's Visas.
[12] More particularly with regard to the country conditions documentation, I conclude that the following extract from the decision of my colleague Justice Snyder in Gavoci v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) is directly on point:
In the case before me, the alleged error relates to omission from the decision of explicit reference to certain passages from some of the documentary evidence. Given the circumstances, the Board's assurances that it had considered all of the evidence together with its explicit references to the nature of the contrary evidence was sufficient. The situation falls within the following statement by Justice Evans in Cepeda-Guitierrez, at para. 16:
A statement by the Agency in its reasons for decision that, in making its findings, it considered all the evidence before it, will often suffice to assure the parties, and a reviewing court, that the agency directed itself to the totality of the evidence when making its findings of fact.
[an earlier citation with respect to Cepeda-Guitierrez omitted]
CONCLUSION
[13] Based on all of the foregoing, and in particular on the extracts from the authorities cited, I am satisfied that, against a standard of review of patent unreasonableness, the decision of the Board on the issues here under review was open to it, notwithstanding that a differently constituted Board, reviewing all of the documentary evidence before it and having heard the testimony of the adult Applicants, might have come to a different conclusion.
[14] In the result, this application for judicial review will be dismissed to the extent that it is based on issues other than those related to "reverse order questioning" or Chairperson's Guideline 7 that were here before the Court. Neither counsel recommended certification of a question. I am satisfied that no serious question of general importance that would be dispositive of the issues here before the Court arises. Thus, no question will be certified.
"Frederick E. Gibson"
Ottawa, Ontario
April 10, 2006.
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