Date: 20061212
Docket: IMM-951-06
Citation: 2006 FC 1487
Toronto, Ontario, December 12, 2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice von Finckenstein
BETWEEN:
TANIA
ELISA SEGURA CORTES
Applicant
and
THE
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
Tania Elisa Segura
Cortes (the “Applicant”), a citizen of Mexico, made a claim for Convention
refugee status and for protection based upon her fear of Luis Antonio Castillo
Flores (“Luis”), a former boyfriend, and the lack of adequate state protection
in Mexico.
[2]
The Applicant and Luis
lived together since September 2001. Their relationship deteriorated, he began
abusing her and would not let her leave the house without him. The Applicant
escaped to her cousin’s house on November 3, 2004. On the advice of counsel she
laid no charges. When Luis discovered and made new threats she decided to seek
protection in Canada. On April 23, 2005, she arrived in Canada and she sought asylum on May 12, 2005. She never
sought any help from officials in Mexico.
[3]
While the Applicant was
in Canada, her sister filed a complaint in Mexico City on July 17, 2005. The Police Report stated that an investigation would
be initiated but the Applicant testified that the police took no action.
[4]
The Immigration and Refugee Board (the
“Board”) denied her refugee
claim finding she had not established lack of state protection in Mexico.
[5]
The Applicant seeks to
set that decision aside arguing two points namely:
a.
that the Board failed to determine whether she fell
into the exception (for persons who failed to report their persecution to local
authorities) in A.G. Canada v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, and
b.
that the Board failed to address all the
evidence before it.
[6]
In my view this
application cannot succeed as the Applicant misunderstood the onus. The
relevant paragraph of Ward supra states:
50) The issue that arises, then, is how, in a practical
sense, a claimant makes proof of a state's inability to protect its nationals
as well as the reasonable nature of the claimant's refusal actually to seek out
this protection. On the facts of this case, proof on this point was
unnecessary, as representatives of the state authorities conceded their
inability to protect Ward. Where such an admission is not available, however,
clear and convincing confirmation of a state's inability to protect must be
provided. For example, a claimant might advance testimony of similarly situated
individuals let down by the state [page725] protection arrangement or the
claimant's testimony of past personal incidents in which state protection did
not materialize. Absent some evidence, the claim should fail, as nations should
be presumed capable of protecting their citizens. Security of nationals is,
after all, the essence of sovereignty. Absent a situation of complete breakdown
of state apparatus, such as that recognized in Lebanon in Zalzali, it should be assumed that the state is capable of
protecting a claimant.
[7]
The onus is on the
Applicant to establish lack of state protection. And in cases such as this,
where the Applicant did not seek help from local authorities she also has a
second onus to establish that she falls into the exception mentioned in Ward
as set out above. Applicant argues that it is up to the Board to determine
if she falls into the exception relying on Tufino (also known as M.L.R.T.)
v. Canada (MCI) 2005 FC 1690 where Campbell J. stated:
The Applicant
is a citizen of Mexico. On
the record produced before the RPD, there is cogent evidence going to prove
that the police in Mexico
fail to protect women who have suffered violence occurring in a relationship.
In its reasons, the RPD correctly found that the Applicant has an obligation to
seek state protection "unless it is objectively unreasonable to do
so" (Decision, p. 5). However, in rejecting the Applicant's claim for
protection under the IRPA, the RPD failed to apply this test which requires an
analysis of the reality of state protection in Mexico, and a determination as to whether the Applicant's reasons for not
seeking it are reasonable.
[8]
In my view, Tufino
cannot stand for that proposition as this would be a complete reversal of a
long line of jurisprudence on the issue of onus. I can only surmise that the
‘cogent evidence’ referred to in Tufino discharged the two onus that is
on the Applicant in such cases.
[9]
As far as the Board is failing
to address all the evidence before it, I note that the Board twice reiterated
that it had looked at all the evidence. Particularly, it had looked at the most
recent country reports from the IRB and the Department of State. In addition,
it freely acknowledged during the hearing that protection of women from
domestic violence was problematic in Mexico. However, it
looked at all of this in light of the failure of the Applicant to contact local
authorities. Under such circumstances the following excerpt from the order of
Heneghan J. in Palomares v. M.C.I. file number IMM-5447-05 is right on
point:
The Principal Applicant focuses her
arguments on the manner in which the Board dealt with the issue of state
protection, particularly the way in which it assessed the documentary evidence.
The problem with this position is that it
ignores the uncontradicted evidence that the Principal Applicant did not seek
state protection at any time during the period of cohabitation with her spouse
in Mexico. The Board heard her
evidence. It is mandated to weigh the evidence. It is not enough for the
Principal Applicant to refer to documentary evidence that, admittedly, paints a
mixed picture about the state response to domestic violence and say that the
Board committed a reviewable error in her case.
The conclusions of the Board were
reasonably open to it, in view of the evidence submitted, including the
personal testimony of the Principal Applicant. In the absence of an adequate
evidentiary foundation to support her arguments, there is no basis for judicial
intervention.
[10]
For all these reasons,
I find the Board’s decision was reasonable and this application cannot succeed.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that this application be dismissed.
“Konrad
W. von Finckenstein”
FEDERAL
COURT
NAMES
OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-951-06
STYLE OF CAUSE: TANIA
ELISA SEGURA CORTES v. THE
MINISTER
OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: December 12, 2006
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER: von FINCKENSTEIN J.
DATED: December 12, 2006
APPEARANCES:
Ron Shacter FOR
THE APPLICANT
Bridget O’Leary FOR
THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Maureen Silcoff
Barrister and Solicitor
Toronto, Ontario FOR
THE APPLICANT
John H. Sims, Q.C.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
FOR THE RESPONDENT