Date: 19991110
Docket: 97-3756-IT-I
BETWEEN:
LORNE W. MARTIN,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Bowman J.T.C.C.
[1] These appeals are from assessments for the appellant's
1994 and 1995 taxation years.
[2] Following an investigation by the Ontario Provincial
Police into alleged drug dealing by the appellant — an
investigation that resulted in a conviction — material
relating to the appellant's financial affairs was given to
the Department of National Revenue and was analyzed by an
investigator, Mr. Michael L. Towns, of that department.
Correspondence between Mr. Towns and the appellant ensued.
The result was the issuance of net worth assessments for the
years 1994 and 1995.
[3] It is not necessary for me to repeat what has been said
about net worth assessments in other cases. The statutory basis
is found in subsections 152(4) and 152(7) of the Income Tax
Act. The effect of subsection 152(7) has been articulated in
Dezura v. Minister of National Revenue, [1948]
Ex. C.R. 10; Morrow v. The Queen, 92 DTC 6380;
Kerr v. The Queen, 89 DTC 5348; Chernenkoff v.
Minister of National Revenue, 49 DTC 680 and Ramey v. The
Queen, 93 DTC 791. The means of determining a taxpayer's
income by the net worth method is necessarily somewhat arbitrary
and imprecise and it is used only as a last resort.
[4] Here Mr. Towns followed the traditional method of
determining (or attempting to determine) the appellant's net
worth at the beginning and end of each year in question and
adding to the difference his expenditures. His task was not made
easier by the aggressive and combative attitude shown by the
appellant, who addressed Mr. Towns in his letters as
"Mr. Inquisitor" or "Mr. Freudian
Special".
[5] The best way of challenging a net worth assessment is to
show what one's true income is, or prove that the income is
in fact what was declared in the income tax return. In the
appeals from net worth assessments that I have seen this is never
done. Rather, the far more unsatisfactory method is followed
whereby the appellant attempts to chip or whittle away at the
components of the net worth assessment.
[6] That is what Mr. Martin attempted to do here.
[7] In 1994 and 1995, the appellant declared $8,916.87 and
$24,052.99 in income. In reassessing the appellant for those
years, the Minister increased his income by $22,964 and $9,790
respectively.
[8] The appellant's principal arguments against the net
worth assessment centred on Mr. Towns' determination of his
expenditures and his assumption that they were attributable to
unreported income. Specifically he made the following
arguments:
(a) Mr. Towns' addition of the expenditures was
arithmetically wrong. I invited him to put in some evidence to
this effect, but he did not do so.
(b) Mr. Towns failed to give effect to his allegation that he
had received gifts from a rich uncle, who died in 1995. The
identity of this individual and the amount and timing of the
gifts were not established. Generally speaking, when one attempts
to challenge a net worth assessment on the basis of the
generosity of a rich uncle it is a good idea to establish the
identity of the benefactor and the extent of his largesse.
(c) Mr. Towns failed to give effect to a settlement of
$675,574.87 that the family received in 1986 in a malpractice
action against some doctors and a hospital. The appellant
received about $7,000 to $8,000 and his mother received about
$25,000. What happened to the rest was never made clear. His
mother died in 1987 and had $25,000 in her bank account. The
appellant inherited a substantial portion of her estate, although
the size of the estate was not put in evidence. The appellant was
the executor and stated that in that position had his
mother's $25,000 "to play with".
None of these amounts was shown to be the source of the funds
necessary to fund his expenditures in 1994 and 1995.
(d) Mr. Towns failed to take into account moneys that the
appellant had saved from his income earned in 1987 to 1993.
Apparently, he earned and declared a total of about $240,000 over
those seven years. There is no evidence that he saved any of
these amounts or used his savings to fund his expenditures in
1994 and 1995. In fact, the net worth assessment proceeded on the
basis that at the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1994 he had no
cash on hand or bank accounts other than one containing $30.99.
If, as he alleges, he had substantial savings which he held in
cash in a sock or beneath his mattress, he did nothing to correct
Mr. Towns' assumption to the contrary and he did not
establish before me that he had any such reserves of cash.
(e) Mr. Towns did not give effect to his contention that he
had lottery winnings. I saw no evidence of lottery winnings.
(f) Mr. Towns failed to give effect in determining his credit
card payments that formed part of his expenditures that he was
paying one credit card account out of another one. He did not
establish that this ever happened.
[9] In short, there is no basis upon which I can find that the
appellant has demonstrated any error in the assessments, with one
exception. In determining the expenditures of the appellant in
1995, Mr. Towns included $1,642.40 as a payment to Wayne Larsen
Enterprises Inc., an automobile repair business. In fact, the
payment appears to have been made by a cheque from Zurich
Insurance Company. The expenditures for 1995 and therefore the
appellant's income as assessed by the Minister should be
reduced accordingly by $1,642.40.
[10] The appeal for 1994 is dismissed. The appeal for 1995 is
allowed and the assessment is referred back to the Minister of
National Revenue for reconsideration and reassessment to reduce
the appellant's income by $1,642.40.
[11] There will be no order for costs.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 10th day of November 1999.
"D.G.H. Bowman"
J.T.C.C.