Date: 19990303
Docket: 98-159-UI
BETWEEN :
2885981 CANADA INC.,
doing business under the name VENTILATION R. ROBINSON,
Appellant,
and
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent,
and
RENÉ CAYA,
MONIQUE GAGNON,
Interveners.
Amended reasons for judgment
Tardif, J.T.C.C.
[1] This is an appeal brought as a result of notices of
assessment dated April 24 and June 2, 1997, for
the years 1996 and 1997. The assessments were issued for
non-payment of unemployment insurance and employment insurance
premiums in respect of Monique Gagnon and René Caya, the
interveners in this case.
[2] Monique Gagnon and René Caya testified in support
of the appeal. They explained the origins of the company 2885981
Canada Inc., doing business under the name Ventilation R.
Robinson (the “company”).
[3] At the outset, Ms. Gagnon stated that during the periods
in issue Serge Robinson had been a fictitious shareholder.
The evidence established that this characterization was
essentially based on Ms. Gagnon's lack of understanding
of the nature of the participation of each of the
shareholders.
[4] Thus, according to the interveners, the fact that Serge
Robinson was not physically involved or active in the day-to-day
operations of the company made him what they termed a fictitious
shareholder.
[5] Neither Mr. Caya nor Ms. Gagnon seemed to be able to make
the distinction between shareholder status and employee status,
and accordingly, in their view, that fact that Mr. Robinson did
not work for the company meant that they could say and conclude
that he was a fictitious shareholder. The term
“inactive” would, in the circumstances, have been
more appropriate, although even then it would not have been a
legally sound characterization, since the evidence clearly
established that Mr. Robinson fulfilled his responsibilities as a
director.
[6] This misinterpretation was undoubtedly to blame for the
incorrect information obtained from the Human Resources
Development Canada office when the company was first formed.
Ms. Gagnon apparently said at that time that only
Mr. Caya and she would be involved in the company’s
affairs, and accordingly the answer they were given was that they
therefore could not hold insurable employment with the company,
given that they would not be available and assuming as well that
they would control more than 40 per cent of the shares.
[7] In order to determine whether employment is insurable, it
is of course important to analyze all of the terms and conditions
of the performance of the work, but it is also necessary to have
regard to other factors, particularly if the employment in
question is held by the shareholders of a company. The same
contract of employment may or may not result in insurability,
depending on the percentage of voting shares held or controlled
by the shareholder whose employment it is.
[8] In the instant case, the evidence established that the
interveners and Serge Robinson had each held one third of the
issued voting shares until November 14, 1997. It was also
established that each of them had invested $40,000 and that none
of the shareholders had in law or in fact waived the voting
rights associated with the number of shares he or she held.
[9] Ms. Gagnon explained that Mr. Caya and she received a
predetermined annual salary based on the economic activities of
the company. Her salary was lower than Mr. Caya’s. She
essentially handled all of the administrative and accounting
duties, while Mr. Caya was responsible for the performance of the
contracts on the work sites.
[10] Ms. Gagnon said very clearly that they reported to
Serge Robinson regarding administration; each month, she
gave him the financial report that she has prepared. Mr. Caya
stated that he saw Mr. Robinson very frequently on the work
sites. It was also shown that Mr. Robinson had always enjoyed the
rights and privileges associated with the shares he held; he was
fully entitled to share in any profits there might be. His
signature was required in banking matters.
[11] Consequently, there is no doubt that each of the
shareholders had full control of the rights associated with his
or her shares in the company. No one of them had any ascendancy
over the others that might lend credence to the idea that the
rights conferred by the shares held had been renounced or
waived.
[12] Hence, the work performed both by Ms. Gagnon and by
Mr. Caya was subject to the power of control held by the
company, which benefited from the work they did. Since each was
perfectly aware of the nature of the work he or she had to do, it
was not necessary to have a foreman to supervise them; they
performed the work in accordance with their knowledge and skills,
and reported on that work to the company by means of monthly
reports.
[13] Serge Robinson, in his capacity as shareholder-director,
was entitled to get involved at any time, as were Ms. Gagnon and
Mr. Caya also. It is important to understand that the
shareholder-directors of a company may wear two different
hats.
[14] In fact and in law, Serge Robinson wore a single hat: he
was manager of the company’s affairs, in that he held one
third of its shares, which allowed him to question, supervise and
control the manner in which the work was performed by the
shareholder-workers, namely Ms. Gagnon and Mr. Caya.
[15] As for Ms. Gagnon and Mr. Caya, each wore two different
hats, one being that of an employee of the company and the other,
identical to Mr. Robinson’s, being that of
shareholder-director.
[16] It seems that the interveners made no distinction between
the two capacities. Of course, it may be difficult to understand
how an employee can at the same time be a boss, in proportion to
the shares that he or she controls, but it is nonetheless a fact
that it can be so.
[17] On this point, the work that the interveners did, as the
person in charge of administration and accounting in Ms.
Gagnon’s case, and as the person in charge of performance
of the contracts on the work sites in Mr. Caya’s case, was
done under genuine contracts of service in that they worked for
the company; they received fixed remuneration for their work and
were subject to the company’s right and power of control
over that work. The fact that the right of control was
essentially theoretical and that the interveners never felt that
they were subordinate to the authority of the company in terms of
how they performed their work, changes nothing as regards the
real nature of the corporate structure and the company’s
right to control and supervise the work performed by the
interveners in their capacity as workers.
[18] Their work was performed using the materials and
equipment supplied by the company, which alone could incur losses
and make profits.
[19]On October 2, 1997, Serge Robinson
offered to sell the shares he held in the company. On
October 10, 1997, the interveners agreed to purchase
Serge Robinson’s shares.
[20]On November 14, 1997, René Caya
and Monique Gagnon each purchased 33 shares in the appellant
company, as a result of which each of them held 50 percent
of the company’s issued voting shares. Consequently, the
interveners each controlled more than 40 percent of the
company’s voting shares.
[21]Although nothing changed in terms of the work
performed by René Caya and Monique Gagnon
as of November 14, 1997, their employment became uninsurable
by the mere fact that they each then controlled 50 percent
of the voting shares, that is, more than 40 per cent. Although
the agreement for the sale of
Mr. Robinson’s shares states that the transfer
was to be retroactive to January 31, 1997, there was no
evidence adduced showing that Mr. Robinson had transferred the
rights associated with his shares before the date on which they
accepted his offer, namely October 10, 1997. They formally
accepted the offer by means of a transfer executed before a
notary on November 14, 1997. It should therefore be concluded
that Mr. Robinson continued to act as the owner of the shares in
question until his offer to sell was accepted on October 10,
1997.
[22]For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed on
the basis that the employment held by Ms. Gagnon and Mr.
Caya was insurable within the meaning of the Act from January 1,
1996 to October 10, 1997, after which period the
interveners’ employment was no longer insurable. The
assessments must be revised accordingly.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 21st day of April 1999.
“Alain Tardif”
J.T.C.C.
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
Translation certified true on this 3rd day of February
2000.
Erich Klein, Revisor