Date: 20010515
Docket: 2000-4852-IT-I
BETWEEN:
DON COBER,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Bowman, A.C.J.
[1]
These appeals are from assessments for the years 1990 to
1998.
[2]
Only the years 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1996 are properly before the
court. The appeals for 1990, 1997 and 1998 are quashed because no
notice of objection was filed. The appeals for 1994 and 1995 are
also quashed because the notice of objection was filed outside
the 90 day period and it is now too late to apply for an
extension of time.
[3] I
have in other cases criticized the excessive use of the
expression no reasonable expectation of profit
("NREOP"). It is often ritually chanted as a
substitution for analysis. This does not however mean that the
concept can be ignored in an appropriate case. Where losses are
consistently incurred for 10 or 20 years with no indication that
the end is in sight the notion of NREOP may be of some limited
utility in cases where it is alleged that an activity is in
reality a hobby rather than a business.
[4]
The appellant in the years in question was a public school
principal and has had a distinguished career in education. He
retired in 1995.
[5]
He bought his first horse in 1964. In 1972 he bought some land in
King Township. Since that time he has bought, raised, sold, bred,
raced and shown horses. He is extraordinarily knowledgeable about
horses, and has bought and sold many horses over the years, some
of which have won races. At no time since the beginning of his
involvement with horses has he ever shown a net profit.
[6]
The following table sets out the losses which he has incurred
between 1987 and 1998.
YEAR
GROSS
INCOME
NET FARMING LOSSES
1987
$15,000 ($12,995)
1988
$36,120 ($10,063)
1989 $
6,310 ($25,727)
1990 $
NIL ($33,876)
1991 $
4,464 ($36,470)
1992 $
4,169 ($35,045)
1993 $
NIL ($24,868)
1994 $
NIL ($18,539)
1995 $
8,925 ($12,260)
1996 $ 1,700[1]
($16,729)
1997 $
NIL ($12,978)
1998 $
4,050 ($16,230)
[7]
Even before 1987 he was losing money on the horse operation.
[8]
To his credit the appellant claimed expenses very conservatively
and claimed only the restricted farm loss under section 31
of the Income Tax Act.
[9]
Nonetheless, I have concluded that where losses extend over the
period that these do with no likelihood of coming to an end in
the foreseeable future this cannot really be regarded as a
business. No reasonable businessperson having regard only to the
possibility of profit would continue to put money into this
operation. Sooner or later one must decide to cut one's
losses and give up what is patently an uneconomic endeavour. I do
not think that it is realistic or reasonable to go on incurring
losses of this magnitude with no end in sight. To expect to write
off such losses against other income is equally unrealistic. This
activity is in my view a hobby, not a business.
[10] The only
reservation I have about this conclusion is the decision in
Kuhlmann et al. v. The Queen, 98 DTC 6652, where
the Federal Court of Appeal, in an oral judgment reversed a
finding of fact of this court and held that two wealthy medical
practitioners, husband and wife, were entitled to write off
against the income from their practice of medicine, enormous
losses incurred in raising, racing and breeding horses.
[11] What I
said about Kuhlmann in Rai v. The Queen,
99 DTC 562 at 564, is equally applicable here.
[15] I would have
had no difficulty in dismissing the appeal based on the evidence
and the cases I have cited above, as well as the many other cases
that have been decided in this area of the law. Nonetheless, the
recent decision of the Federal Court of appeal (Décary,
Létourneau, JJ.A. and Chevalier, D.J.A.) in Kuhlmann et
al. v. The Queen, 98 DTC 6652 could arguably be
taken as overruling all previous decisions of all courts on the
question of reasonable expectation of profit. The Federal Court
of Appeal stated at page 6656 that:
Both counsel agreed that for an expectation of profit to be
reasonable, it had to be not "irrational, absurd and
ridiculous". In the case at bar, the burden was on the
Minister to establish on a balance of probability that the
expectation of profit was irrational, absurd or ridiculous.
Clearly, in our view, the Minister did not succeed and the Tax
Court Judge could not have found otherwise had he applied the
proper legal principles.
[16] In that case
two medical persons who had extremely high incomes claimed
enormous losses from the horse business. Mogan, J. had held that
the respondent (who bore the onus of proof because of a change of
approach taken at trial) had met the onus of proof and
established a prima facie case that the activity had no
reasonable expectation of profit, and was operated for personal
satisfaction rather than for profit.
[17] The Federal
Court of Appeal in an oral judgment from the bench allowed the
appeal.
[18] The decision
essentially overruled a finding of fact made by the trial judge
based on his appreciation of the evidence.1
[19] If it is now
a principle of law, following Kuhlmann, that a taxpayer
can establish that he or she, in carrying out what purports to be
a commercial activity, had a "reasonable expectation of
profit", and therefore a business, by simply showing that
the expectation was "not irrational, absurd and
ridiculous". I would have to allow this appeal, because Mr.
Rai's expectation of earning profits was neither irrational,
absurd nor ridiculous. It is not unheard of for people to make
money raising and racing horses. Depending on the circumstances,
the chances of earning a profit may be, I should think, easily as
good as they are in many other risky enterprises such as drilling
wildcat wells, or prospecting for gold. Nonetheless, I think that
for a business to exist there has to be something more than an
absence of irrational, absurd and ridiculous expectations. I do
not read the Kuhlmann decision as suggesting
otherwise.
[20] I would
prefer to read the passage quoted from the Federal Court of
Appeal decision as reflecting the possibly hasty adoption of a
proposition agreed to by counsel and therefore not thoroughly
explored in argument rather than the enunciation of a new
principle that in effect overrules over twenty years of
jurisprudence.
[21] The appeals
are dismissed.
__________________
1 It is well settled that an appellate court should
treat findings of fact by a trial judge with great deference, and
should not interfere with such findings unless they are palpably
wrong, perverse or based on no evidence. Schwartz v. The
Queen, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 254 at 278-283; Beaudoin-Daigneault
v. Richard, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 2 at 8-9; Janiak v.
Ippolito, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 146 at 151; MDS Health Group
Ltd. v. R., [1997] 1 C.T.C. 111 at 115; Flexi-Coil Ltd. v.
R., [1996] 3 C.T.C. 57 at 60; cf. Cana Construction Co. v.
The Queen, [1996] 3 C.T.C. 11, per Décary, J.
(dissenting) at 13.
[12] I have
concluded that Mr. Cober was not engaged in a business.
Rather his activity in raising, racing, showing and breeding
horses was a hobby.
[13] The
appeals from assessments for 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1996 are
dismissed. The other appeals are quashed.
Signed at Toronto, Canada, this 15th day of May 2001.
"D.G.H. Bowman"
A.C.J.