Date:
20010313
Docket:
1999-3865-EI
BETWEEN:
CENTRE DU CLAVIER
ALLARD INC.,
Appellant,
and
THE MINISTER OF
NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
Reasons for
Judgment
Somers,
D.J.T.C.C.
[1] This appeal was heard at
Montréal, Quebec, on January 30, 2001.
[2] In a letter dated June 22, 1999,
the Minister of National Revenue (the "Minister")
informed the appellant of his decision upholding the assessment
of November 5, 1998, in the amount of $8,891.81 with respect to
employment insurance premiums on the grounds that the employment
held by the workers met the requirements of a contract of service
and, therefore, there was an employer-employee relationship
between the appellant and the workers during the period at
issue.
[3] Subsection 5(1) of the Employment Insurance Act
reads in part as follows:
5(1) Subject to subsection (2), insurable employment
is
(a)
employment in Canada by one or more employers, under any express
or implied contract of service or apprenticeship, written or
oral, whether the earnings of the employed person are received
from the employer or some other person and whether the earnings
are calculated by time or by the piece, or partly by time and
partly by the piece, or otherwise;
. .
.
[4] The burden of proof is on the
appellant. It must show on a balance of probabilities that the
Minister's decision is wrong in fact and in law. Each
case falls to be decided on its own facts.
[5] In making his decision, the
Minister relied on the following facts, which were either
admitted or denied:
[TRANSLATION]
(a) The appellant
operated a business selling and repairing various musical
instruments. (admitted)
(b) The appellant
also offered music lessons to its customers. (denied)
(c) The appellant
operated two stores, one in Joliette and one in Repentigny.
(admitted)
(d) The appellant
advertised that it sold and repaired musical instruments and
offered music lessons. (admitted)
(e) The appellant
employed two groups of workers: sales clerks, who worked on the
appellant's premises according to
the schedule set by the appellant, and dance, music and voice
teachers.
(denied)
(f) Cynthia
Allard was a sales clerk in the appellant's dance apparel
boutique. She was paid $8.00 an hour. (denied)
(g) Robert
Corbeil was a sales clerk, instrument repairman and occasional
deliveryman. He worked on an as-called basis at the Galeries
Joliette. (denied)
(h) Line
Côté was a sales clerk and taught piano, keyboard
and organ at the Repentigny branch. In addition, she handled
purchasing and calculated the teachers' class time.
(denied)
(i) Johanne
Gauthier was a sales clerk and handled the clerical work at
Repentigny. She was paid $8.00 an hour by the appellant.
(denied)
(j) Michel
Ménard was a sales clerk, made deliveries and also
renovated the appellant's premises when necessary. He was
paid $450.00 a week by the appellant regardless of the number of
hours he worked. (denied)
(k)
Jean-François Beauséjour taught trumpet. He was
paid $10.00 an hour by the appellant. (denied)
(l) Martin
Bélisle taught guitar. He was paid $12.00 an hour by the
appellant. (denied)
(m) Louise Desroches
taught piano. She claimed that she was paid directly by the
students. (denied)
(n) Annie
Desrosiers taught violin. She was paid $12.00 an hour by the
appellant. (denied)
(o) Sophie
Desrosiers taught keyboard, organ and piano. She was paid $12.00
an hour by the appellant. (denied)
(p)
Sébastien Dufour taught guitar. He was paid $14.00 an hour
by the appellant. (denied)
(q) Martin
Gingras taught guitar. He was paid between $10.00 and $12.00 an
hour by the appellant. (denied)
(r) Magalie
Giroux taught voice. (denied)
(s) Jean-Marc
Juneau taught guitar. He was paid $16.50 an hour by the
appellant. (denied)
(t)
François Leblanc taught the piano accordion. He was paid
$6.00 a half-hour by the appellant. (denied)
(u) Louise Lebrun
taught voice. She was paid $21.50 an hour by the appellant.
(denied)
(v) Isabelle
Massicotte was a music teacher. (denied)
(w) Josée
Massicotte taught classical piano. (denied)
(x)
Jean-François Rondeau taught percussion. He was paid $11.00 an hour by the
appellant. (denied)
(y) All 25
workers provided services to the payer under a contract of
service. (denied)
(z) The students
were the appellant's, and the appellant determined class
schedules. (denied)
(aa) The fees for the lessons
were determined by the appellant, and only the appellant could
give a discount on the fees (discount for months paid in
advance). (denied)
(bb) The students paid the
appellant for the lessons. (denied)
(cc) Only students who had
paid for their lessons could attend the classes.
(denied)
(dd) The number of students
assigned to each teacher was determined by the appellant on the
basis of student registration and each teacher's
availability. (denied)
(ee) When the teachers gave
lessons, they themselves determined their work techniques and
what method they would follow, depending on the students'
needs and their level. (denied)
(ff) Some
teachers had signed agreements with the appellant.
(denied)
(gg) According to the
agreement, the appellant undertook
-
to provide a room
equipped with the instruments required for the type of
instruction involved,
-
to provide a dance
studio equipped with a sound system and barres for
practice,
-
to provide all of
the teacher's students,
-
to provide the
advertising required to attract new student
registrations,
- to provide administrative
services, including scheduling lessons, organizing groups, and
looking after the telephone and registrations.
(denied)
(hh) According to the
agreement, the teacher undertook
-
to indicate at the
beginning of the session the times that he or she would be
available and to abide by those times,
-
to provide
professional instruction (learning content) in accordance with
the appellant's criteria,
-
to adhere to the
teaching schedules and to make no changes without prior
authorization,
- to notify management of any
problems with
students or
parents, in accordance with the rules of the school,
-
to collect the
money for his or her classes and complete the attendance
sheets,
-
to complete a
progress report for each student in accordance with the
school's teaching criteria,
-
to participate in
the school's various activities, such as the end-of-year
recital, the festival and exhibitions. (denied)
(ii) In 1997, the
appellant made no employment insurance premium source deductions
for the people on the list appended to this Reply as an integral
part thereof. (denied)
(jj) During the
year at issue, there was a contract of service between the
appellant and the workers. (denied)
[6] The appellant operated a business
selling and repairing various musical instruments and also
offered music lessons to its customers on its premises in
Joliette and Repentigny, Quebec.
[7] The appellant advertised in the
telephone directory as follows: [TRANSLATION] "Sale and
rental of new and used musical instruments, Music School, Dance
School, Music Awareness 3 years and over, Sheet Music"
(Exhibit I-1).
[8] To accommodate its customers, the
appellant offered the opportunity to take music lessons with a
teacher. The appellant had a list showing the teachers who were
available to teach music and indicating as well their
specialties. Following discussion with the customer, the
appellant would find a teacher to give music lessons. It was the
teacher who determined the level of instruction to give the
customer after assessing his or her musical knowledge. Each
teacher, according to his or her testimony, determined the
teaching method jointly with the customer.
[9] There was a written or oral
agreement with each teacher, and each was paid a different hourly
rate.
[10]
The appellant collected the money from the customers every two
weeks, and paid the teachers according to the number of hours
they had taught. The teacher undertook to ensure the
customers' regular attendance at the music classes. Each
teacher gave the appellant a statement of the hours he or she had
worked; if the customer did not pay, the teacher was not paid by
appellant.
[11]
Daniel Allard, the owner of the appellant, acknowledged that a
written contract had been signed with Sébastien Dufour, a
teacher (Exhibit I-2).
[12]
That contract provides the following particulars:
[TRANSLATION]
Centre du
Clavier Allard undertakes
-
to provide a music room equipped with the instruments
required-piano, organ or guitar and music stands-for the type of
instruction involved,
-
to provide a dance
studio equipped with a sound system and barres for
practice,
-
to provide all of
the teacher's students,
-
to provide the
advertising required to attract new student
registrations,
-
to provide
administrative services, including scheduling lessons, organizing
groups, and looking after the telephone and
registrations,
-
to pay
Sébastien Dufour at the rate of $12.00/hour for
teaching and $12.00/hour for general work, or in accordance with
the special conditions set out hereinafter.
The
employer or teacher Sébastien Dufour
undertakes
-
to indicate at the
beginning of the session the times that he will available and to
abide by those times: Thursday, Friday,
Saturday,
-
to provide
professional instruction (learning content) in accordance with
the criteria of Centre du Clavier Allard,
-
to adhere to the
teaching schedules and to make no changes without prior
authorization,
-
to notify
management of any problems with students or parents, in
accordance with the rules of the school,
-
to collect the
money for his classes, complete the attendance sheets and deposit
forms, and advise management if there are any collection
problems,
-
to complete a
progress report for each student in accordance with the
school's teaching criteria,
-
to participate in
the school's various activities, such as the end-of-year
recital, the festival and exhibitions. . . .
[13]
The terms and conditions set out in this contract are
substantially the same as those described by the teachers who
testified at the hearing of this case. The teachers taught a few
hours a week in accordance with the agreement with the
appellant's customers.
[14]
The teachers gave the lessons in the space provided by the
appellant. Musical instruments were also provided by the
appellant. Teachers would occasionally bring their own
instruments, such as a violin, to the appellant's premises.
The teacher could, jointly with the customer, change the number
of hours of instruction required by that customer.
[15]
Admittedly, the teachers provided their services for only a few
hours a week. They could do other things elsewhere, either
involving themselves in activities at home or continuing their
education. At the hearing of this case, a number of teachers
described substantially the same working conditions.
[16]
There were 25 workers, most of whom were teachers providing their
services on the appellant's premises. Daniel Allard, the
owner of the appellant, admitted that the other teachers, who did
not testify, were employed under the same working conditions as
those who did testify.
[17]
A contract of service is a contract under which one party, the
servant or employee, agrees, for either a period of time or
indefinitely, and either full time or part time, to work for the
other party, the master or the employer; it does not normally
envisage the accomplishment of a specified amount of work but
does normally contemplate the servant putting his personal
services at the disposal of the master during some period of
time.
[18]
A contract for services is a contract under which the one party
agrees that certain specified work will be done for the other; it
does normally envisage the accomplishment of a specified job or
task and normally does not require that the contractor do
anything personally.
[19]
In Wiebe Door Services Ltd. v M.N.R., 87 DTC 5025, the
Federal Court of Appeal properly distinguished a contract of
service from a contract for services by examining the whole of
the various elements which constitute the relationship between
the parties and recognized the following four basic criteria for
distinguishing a contract of service from a contract for
services:
(a) the degree of control
exercised by the employer;
(b) ownership of the
tools;
(c) chance of profit and risk of
loss;
(d) the degree of
integration.
(a) The degree of
control
[20]
The appellant hired the teachers subject to certain constraints:
they had to give the lessons on the appellant's premises and
indicate the times they were available and abide by those times.
However, there was some flexibility, allowing teachers to alter
the schedule on occasion, but any changes had to be made with the
consent of the customer and the appellant. It was the appellant
who ultimately determined the class schedule. The fact that the
teachers had some discretion over the method they would use had
no effect on the appellant's control over the teachers. It is
the right to exercise control and not the actual exercise of
control that is relevant. Based on the evidence as a whole, there
was a contract of service according to this criterion.
(b) Ownership of
tools
[21]
The appellant provided the premises for giving the music lessons.
Seven or eight rooms were available for the teachers and
customers. Some instruments were furnished by the appellant to
facilitate the instruction. The customers were the
appellant's, not the teachers'. Advertising was provided
and paid for by the appellant. Although some of the teachers
provided musical instruments, this fact is not decisive because
the appellant also provided some instruments in addition to the
premises where the lessons were given. On the basis of this
criterion, it is reasonable to conclude that the contract was a
contract of service.
(c) Chance of profit and risk of
loss
[22]
The teachers were paid at an hourly rate according to their level
of excellence and they incurred no expenses other than for
transportation to the appellant's premises. The
teachers were not paid if the customers did not pay the
appellant; however, the evidence did not disclose that this
situation had actually occurred. The appellant handled the
collection of the money from the customers and paid the teachers
every two weeks according to a fixed hourly rate. It is true
that, if the teachers taught fewer hours, their pay was less, but
the whole of the profits or losses from the business were the
appellant's. Daniel Allard testified that he had an annual
turnover of $500,000 and that 15% of those revenues came from the
lessons given by the teachers. The evidence showed that the
teachers had no chance of profit or risk of loss. According to
this criterion, there was a contract of service.
(d) Integration
[23]
The teachers were hired by the appellant to give music lessons on
its premises. The appellant offered those services to its
customers. The lessons were offered under the establishment's
name. This part of the business's commercial activities could
not exist without the teachers' contribution. Accordingly,
the Court is able to conclude that the teachers formed, on a
part-time basis, an integral part of the business.
[24]
The agreement between the parties does not necessarily determine
the nature of the workers' employment. The fact that source
deductions were not made or that paid vacations were not given
does not necessarily mean that a contract for services is
involved.
[25]
There were 25 workers who provided services to the appellant,
most of them being music teachers. Counsel for the appellant
admitted to the Court that the worker Cynthia Allard was on
salary.
[26]
Robert Corbeil testified that he provided services to the
appellant in 1997. He said he had a business, which he carried on
under the name of Robert Musique Inc. However, he
stated that, during the period at issue, he worked in the
appellant's store as a sales clerk and an instrument
repairman; he also did deliveries. When he made deliveries, his
transportation expenses were paid by the appellant. He worked 20
to 25 hours a week. Moreover, he still works for the appellant.
For November and December 1997, he said he received approximately
$2,000 from the appellant, which paid him with cheques made out
to Robert Musique Inc. There is no need to analyse all of the
facts in the light of the decision in Wiebe Door Ltd.,
supra, because it is quite obvious that Robert Corbeil was
employed by the appellant under a contract of service. The method
of payment for the services provided, namely through cheques made
out to Robert Musique Inc., does not alter the nature
of the contract.
[27]
Michel Ménard, another worker, stated that he provided
services to the appellant during the period at issue and said
that he was a jack of all trades. He did plumbing and maintenance
work and also worked in the appellant's store as a sales
clerk. He was paid $400 a week for 25 to 40 hours of work. The
appellant recorded the hours he worked and his income was
adjusted at the end of the year. In 1997, he earned $22,000 of
which $19,000 was from the appellant. He admitted that the
appellant was never billed for the services he rendered. The
cheques were made out to Michel Ménard Enregistré.
This method of payment did not affect the nature of the contract;
the evidence clearly establishes that Michel Ménard
provided services to the appellant under a contract of
service.
[28]
Taking all of the circumstances into account, the 25 workers
employed by the appellant during the period at issue held
insurable employment. The workers and the appellant were bound by
a contract of service within the meaning of paragraph
5(1)(a) of the Employment Insurance Act.
[30]
The appeal is dismissed and the Minister's decision is
confirmed.
Signed at Ottawa,
Canada, this 13th day of March 2001.
D.J.T.C.C.
Cases cited
by the appellant:
- Wiebe Door
Services Ltd. v. The Minister of National Revenue,
87 DTC 5025
- Augusto H.
Martinez v. Her Majesty the Queen, 96 DTC
2017
- John Henry
Avison v. The Minister of National Revenue,
52 DTC 284
- Richard Bass
v. The Minister of National Revenue,
87 DTC 666
- Jay E.
Campbell v. The Minister of National Revenue, CFPL
Television, 87 DTC 47;
- Bernice
Bradford v. The Minister of National Revenue, 88 DTC
1661
- Hôpital
St-Luc c. Québec (Ministère du Revenu), [1992]
R.D.F.Q. 1, J.E. 92-1304, D.F.Q.E. 92F-69
Cases cited
by the respondent:
- Wiebe Door
Services Ltd. v. M.N.R.,
[1986] 3 F.C. 553 (F.C.A.)
- Gallant v.
M.N.R., A-1421-84
(F.C.A.), May 22, 1986
- Thomas Alexander
McPherson v. M.N.R.,
(1989) N.R. 91
- M.N.R. v.
Standing, A-857-90
(F.C.A.), September 29, 1992
- Hennick v.
Canada, [1994] T.C.J.
No. 407 (T.C.C.)
- Hennick v.
Canada, [1995] F.C.J.
No. 294 (F.C.A.)
- Ecole de Musique
aux Petits Oiseaux Inc. c. M. R. N., [1988] A.C.I. No. 415 (T.C.C.)
- Widdows (c.o.b.
Golden Ears Entertainment) v. Canada, [1999] T.C.J. No. 119 (T.C.C.)
- Ludmer v.
Canada, [1995] 2 F.C. 3
(F.C.A.)
Translation
certified true
on this 31st
day of July 2002.
Erich Klein,
Revisor
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
1999-3865(EI)
BETWEEN:
CENTRE DU CLAVIER
ALLARD INC.,
Appellant,
and
THE MINISTER OF
NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
Appeal heard on January
30, 2001, at Montréal, Quebec, by
the Honourable Deputy
Judge J. F. Somers
Appearances
Counsel for the
Appellant:
Jacques Renaud
Counsel for the
Respondent:
Simon Petit
JUDGMENT
The appeal is dismissed and the Minister's decision is
confirmed in accordance with the attached Reasons for
Judgment.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada,
this 13th day of March 2001.
D.J.T.C.C.
Translation
certified true
on this 31st
day of July 2002.
Erich Klein,
Revisor