Date: 20011220
Docket: 1999-2164-IT-G
BETWEEN:
GERRI MOORE,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasonsfor
Judgment
O'Connor, J.T.C.C.
[1]
These appeals were heard at Edmonton, Alberta on
October 29, 30 and 31, 2001.
[2]
There are essentially seven issues, namely:
1.
Were the reassessments in question for the years 1991, 1992 and
1993 statute-barred as contemplated in subsection 152(4) of the
Income Tax Act ("Act"); they will be
statute-barred unless the taxpayer or person filing the returns
in question made any misrepresentation attributable to neglect,
carelessness or wilful default or has committed any fraud in
filing the returns or supplying information under the
Act.
In my opinion, the Respondent bears the onus of establishing
that the Appellant has made a misrepresentation as contemplated
in subsection 152(4) or committed a fraud. It is my opinion, that
that onus has been discharged at least to the extent of
establishing misrepresentation. The Appellant may have been naive
in following the advice of her bookkeeper but nevertheless there
was misrepresentation and consequently the reassessments in
question were not statute-barred.
2.
The second issue is whether the Minister was correct in imposing
penalties as contemplated in subsection 163(2) of the Act.
Under that subsection a person who knowingly or under
circumstances amounting to gross negligence has made or has
participated in, assented to or acquiesced in the making of a
false statement or omission in a return is liable for penalties.
The onus, once again, is on the Respondent and, in my opinion,
that onus was not met. I am of the view that the Appellant was
not grossly negligent nor did she otherwise fit the conditions
contemplated in subsection 163(2). The result is that the
penalties were wrongly levied, and are to be deleted from the
reassessments.
3.
The third issue is whether the Appellant carried on her film
production operations and her media services as an independent
contractor with the Saskatchewan Council of Cultural
Organizations ("SCCO") and Sask Film in
partnership with her husband, Steve Moore, in 1992 and 1993 or as
a sole proprietor. In 1991, the Appellant did not treat her
husband as her partner but rather paid him as a subcontractor
carrying out TV and film production operations. The Appellant
explained she did not fully appreciate the relationship in 1991
but realized the extent of her husband's participation in
1992 and 1993 and determined it constituted a partnership.
Having considered all of the evidence, I am satisfied that the
Appellant's income in 1992 and 1993 was earned by the
partnership carried on between her husband and herself. It was
the evidence of the Appellant that in the 1991 and 1992 years all
her income was derived from her media consulting services as an
independent contactor with SCCO and Sask Film. However her
husband contributed to this source of income by carrying out
certain managerial duties away from the premises of these
entities. The husband was also responsible for much of the
paperwork that went into the business, the preparation of returns
and in fact he incurred most of the expenses throughout the years
in question relative to the film and TV production operation. He
travelled frequently in efforts to get business and make the
production operation successful. It was also established that a
small amount of income in 1993 derived from the TV and film
production ventures of the Appellant and her husband.
Considerable evidence was led on the nature and scope of these
production ventures but I do not consider it necessary to review
that in detail. Suffice it to say that during the years in
question the Appellant had her income mainly from SCCO and
Sask Film in her role as an independent contractor but at
the same time she was carrying on with her husband these various
production ventures and incurring considerable expense in
attempting to bring the ventures to a profitable state.
4.
The fourth issue concerns whether the Appellant had a reasonable
expectation of profit, which involves an analysis of whether, in
the years in question, she had a source of income via the alleged
partnership.
On the issue of reasonable expectation of profit and source of
income although the Appellant was furnished with an office at the
premises of SCCO and Sask Films and was entitled to reimbursement
of certain expenses, precise details of the expenses reimbursed
were not presented in any detail. On balance although two
separate businesses were being carried on, they were carried on
by the Appellant in partnership with her husband under the name
"Moonstar Productions" and, in my opinion, the
Appellant in 1991 and the partnership in 1992 and 1993 had a
reasonable expectation of profit. Reference is made to the
agreement between Sask Film and Moonstar Productions at Tab 9 of
Exhibit A-1.
5.
The fifth issue is whether all of the expenses claimed were
actually incurred for the businesses and were reasonable in the
circumstances.
As to that issue, the Appellant had the onus and, in my
opinion, not all of the expenses claimed were adequately proven.
In particular, I was not satisfied with the explanation given as
to the cost of goods sold in 1992 and 1993 in the amounts of
$12,011.44 in 1992 and $12,611.00 in 1993. The Appellant and the
partnership were not producing and selling goods. Consequently
the total allowable expenses are to be reduced by $12,011.44 in
1992 and $12,611.00 in 1993.
6.
The sixth issue is whether there was a rental loss incurred in
1993 of $14,850.14 and was it properly deductible.
With respect to this, I am satisfied that it should not be
allowed as the Appellant was not carrying on a rental operation.
She was a co-owner of the property in question with one
Maria Campbell, which they originally acquired in 1970 at a total
cost of $25,000.00 for purposes of putting on shows. However, in
1994 the said Maria Campbell essentially took over possession of
the property as her own residence and did not pay the Appellant
as her co-owner any rent. This is an unfortunate circumstance but
in my opinion clearly leads to the conclusion that there was no
rental operation being carried on in that year. In fact there was
no lease agreed upon.
7.
The seventh issue relates to the numerous other expenses claimed
and the lack of vouchers in several cases. Further were the
expenses reasonable? The evidence given by the Appellant's
husband with respect to certain expenses was incomplete and not
convincing. The Appellant's husband was questioned on two
large ledgers which taken together contain records measuring five
inches thick. One ledger contains details of numerous expenses.
The other ledger contains diary records. The Appellant's
husband selected some expenses and attempted to match the
expenses with what went on in the diary records, thus attempting
to correlate the two. Only certain expenses were selected as it
would have been impossible to review every expense and match it
with the diary records. The auditor presumably reviewed most
expenses and his unfavourable comments ("fictitious",
"overstated", "not vouchered", etc.) are
contained at Tab 7 of Exhibit A-1.
Notwithstanding the foregoing difficulties the auditor was
nevertheless satisfied to disallow only certain expenses and I
believe it correct to follow that approach.
[3]
Consequently the appeals are allowed and the matters are referred
back to the Minister of National Revenue for reconsideration and
reassessment on the following bases:
1.
The reassessments for 1991, 1992 and 1993 were not statute-barred
pursuant to subsection 152(4) of the Act.
2.
The Appellant is not liable for penalties pursuant to
subsection 163(2) of the Act.
3.
The various operations, although consisting of separate
activities were carried out by the Appellant and her husband in
partnership in 1992 and 1993.
4.
There was a reasonable expectation of profit.
5.
With respect to Schedule A of the Reply re 1991, audit correctly
allowed expenses of $5,298.94 to arrive at net income of
$56,951.06.
6.
With respect to Schedule B to the Reply re 1992 the cost of goods
sold, $12,011.40, was correctly disallowed making gross profit
$64,416. Audit allowed expenses of $3,833.40 and business use of
home of $1,332.01 to correctly arrive at net income after
adjustment of $59,250.59 which is to be divided equally between
the Appellant and her husband, Steve Moore.
7.
With respect to Schedule C to the Reply re 1993 the cost of goods
sold, $12,611 was correctly disallowed making gross profit
$70,418. Audit allowed expenses of $6,030.36 and business use of
home of $1,500 to arrive at net income after adjustment of
$62,887.74 which is to be divided equally between the Appellant
and her husband, Steve Moore.
8.
The claim for a $14,850.14 rental loss is denied for the reasons
set forth above.
[4]
Considering the divided results there shall be no costs.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 20th day of December,
2001.
"T. O'Connor"
J.T.C.C.
COURT FILE
NO.:
1999-2164(IT)G
STYLE OF
CAUSE:
Gerri Moore v. The Queen
PLACE OF
HEARING:
Edmonton, Alberta
DATE OF
HEARING:
October 29, 30 and 31, 2001
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BY:
The Honourable Judge T. O'Connor
DATE OF
JUDGMENT:
December 20, 2001.
APPEARANCES:
Counsel for the
Appellant:
R. Tim Hay
Counsel for the
Respondent:
R. Scott McDougall
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For the
Appellant:
Name:
Jon D. Gilbert
Firm:
Felesky Flynn
For the
Respondent:
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Canada
1999-2164(IT)G
BETWEEN:
GERRI MOORE,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on October 29, 30 and 31, 2001 at
Edmonton, Alberta by
the Honourable Judge Terrence O'Connor
Appearances
Counsel for the
Appellant:
R. Tim Hay
Counsel for the
Respondent:
R. Scott McDougall
JUDGMENT
The
appeals from the reassessments made under the Income Tax
Act for the 1991, 1992 and 1993 taxation years are allowed,
and the matters are referred back to the Minister of National
Revenue for reconsideration and reassessment in accordance with
the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 20th day of
December, 2001.
J.T.C.C.