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[OFFICIAL ENGLISH
TRANSLATION]
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Citation: 2003TCC481
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Date: 20030909
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Docket: 97-1978(UI)
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BETWEEN:
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MICHAEL BOLAND,
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Appellant,
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
NATIONAL REVENUE,
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Respondent.
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Counsel for
the Appellant: François Landry
Counsel for
the Respondent: Pierre-Paul Trottier
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered orally from the
bench at the close of proceedings
on May 27, 2003, at
Blanc-Sablon, Quebec)
Garon,
C.J.T.C.C.
[1] This
is an appeal from a decision of the Minister of National Revenue dated
August 21, 1997, according to which the appellant's employment during the
period from August 30 to September 12, 1992, was not insurable on the
ground that there was no contract of service between the appellant and the
payer, J.F.S. Construction Ltée.
[2] The
reasons of the Minister of National Revenue in support of his decision of
August 21, 1997, are stated in the Reply to the Notice of Appeal. One of
those reasons was that "the payer had no control over the appellant's
work." That ground was dropped at the hearing of this appeal. The second
reason was that the appellant did not work during the period in issue but
rendered services to the payer during another period prior to the period in
issue, but on the same site and involving the same work.
[3] It
appears from the above that the only point at issue following the hearing of
this appeal is whether the appellant worked during the two weeks in question.
Counsel for the respondent did not contend that the number of hours of work was
so small during a given week, for example, that his employment would not have
been insurable for the purposes of the old act, that is to say the Unemployment
Insurance Act.
[4] The
various assumptions in support of the Minister's decision in appeal are stated
in paragraph 5 of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal. That paragraph reads
as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
5. In making his decision, the respondent, the
Minister of National Revenue, relied in particular on the following facts:
(a) the payer was
incorporated in 1976 but commenced its operations in 1989;
(b) the payer operated a construction business;
(c) Jules Landry was the sole shareholder of
the payer;
(d) the payer's
offices were located in Lourdes de Blanc‑Sablon;
(e) the appellant
worked at La Tabatière, 200 km from Blanc‑Sablon;
(f) the only means of
transportation between the appellant's place of work and the payer's offices
were boats and aircraft;
(g) the payer did not
go to the places of work because the economic costs were too high;
(h) the appellant's duties
were to do earthwork, prepare cement and install fence posts;
(i) the payer had no
control over the appellant's work;
(j) according to the
payer's payroll journal, the appellant worked 45 hours from Monday to
Saturday in the first week and 48 hours from Monday to Saturday in the
second;
(k) the appellant
needed two weeks to qualify for employment insurance benefits;
(l) the appellant did
not work all the days, as indicated in the payroll journal;
(m) the appellant did
not work on the days when the weather was bad;
(n) over a number of
weeks, the appellant banked hours which are recorded in the payroll journal
over two weeks;
(o) the payer's
payroll journal does not reflect the days actually worked by the appellant;
(p) the appellant
mentioned that he had worked with Terry Nadeau, Christopher Green and
Brian McKinnon;
(q) Terry Nadeau
purportedly worked for the payer from August 3 to 8, 1992,
Christopher Green from October 19 to November 14, 1992, and
Brian McKinnon purportedly did not work for the payer in 1992;
(r) in their statutory
declarations, Terry Nadeau, Christopher Green and Brian McKinnon
did not say they had worked with the appellant;
(s) the period
purportedly worked by the appellant does not coincide with the period actually
worked.
[5] Subparagraphs 5(b),
(d), (e), (h), (j) and (p) of the Reply were admitted. Subparagraphs (a)
and (c) were neither admitted nor denied. Subparagraphs (f), (k), (m), (q)
and (r) were denied as drafted, but they were substantially admitted subject to
explanations or additional information, as the case might require. The other
subparagraphs of paragraph 5 of this pleading were simply denied.
[6] The
appellant stated categorically in his testimony that he had worked the two
weeks in question, and he provided details on the nature of his work and the
persons who he said had worked with him during that period. The appellant
signed a statutory declaration on March 15, 1995, which was substantially
consistent with his testimony on most of the questions addressed in it. That
statutory declaration, drafted by Louise Pineau, could not be read by the
appellant because he did not have a sufficient level of education to read or
write.
[7] The
payroll record kept by the employer and the pay cheque dated September 19,
1992, show the appellant's work weeks ending respectively on September 5
and 12, 1992. The record of employment states August 30, 1992, as the
first work day and September 12, 1992, as the last. That documentation was
produced at the hearing.
[8] Jerry Landry,
the son of the sole shareholder of the payer, mentioned in particular that, on
August 8, 1992, he had left the job site where the appellant was to work
later. He said that the appellant had worked two or three weeks later in
August. He added that he did not know the appellant very well and that his
father, the directing mind of the payer, had never met him; at best, his father
might have spoken to the appellant by telephone during the period. He confirmed
that it was his father who had prepared the pay record and the record of
employment concerning the appellant. It was his father as well who signed the
pay cheque made out to the appellant. In Mr. Landry's view, this
documentation accurately reflected the actual situation with regard to the appellant's
employment during the period in issue.
[9] Lise Chouinard
also testified for the respondent. At the relevant time, she worked in
investigations at the Department of Human Resources Development. She did not
handle the appellant's case in particular, but rather similar cases involving
the same payer. She filed various documents, including the statutory
declarations of the appellant and Terry Nadeau. The employee of the Human
Resources Development Department who conducted the investigation concerning the
appellant was unable to testify, for a valid reason, in the first segment of
this hearing.
Analysis
[10] The
respondent emphasized certain contradictions between the appellant's statutory
declaration and his testimony at the hearing, on the one hand, and between
Terry Nadeau's statutory declaration and testimony and certain parts of
the evidence, on the other. I note in passing that only the last 14 lines
on the second page of Terry Nadeau's statutory declaration concern the
work performed in August 1992 on the job site here in question. These
contradictions, which in many cases had a neutral effect on the point at issue
could nevertheless have an influence on the question of credibility. I am
thinking in particular of the testimony concerning the presence of certain
other employees of the payer at the time the appellant rendered services to the
payer in the context of the work done to build a fence in a certain school yard
in La Tabatière. Neither Jerry Landry nor Terry Nadeau
contradicted the appellant's testimony that he had worked for the payer from
August 30 to September 12, 1992. However, they were unable to say the
exact dates of the appellant's period of employment.
[11] Furthermore,
the documentary evidence, in the form of the pay record and the record of
employment, confirms the appellant's position. The date of the pay cheque,
September 19, 1992, and the date on which that cheque was cashed at the
La Tabatière Caisse populaire, September 21, 1992, are entirely
consistent with the appellant's version. In addition, the president and sole
shareholder of the payer had no interest in making special arrangements to
favour the appellant. He did not know him or, at best, knew him very little.
Furthermore, Jerry Landry, the son of the president of the payer, did not
know the appellant very well either, even though it was he who had retained the
appellant's services for the payer and was apparently the foreman of the
payer's employees who worked on the job site in question over a period of time
in 1991 and 1992.
[12] In the
final analysis, the issue in this case is the appellant's credibility. I am
prepared to accept the appellant's testimony after examining his conduct with a
great deal of care. I attribute certain contradictions to lapses in his memory
as a result of the passage of time. It should be recalled, for example, that
the appellant's statutory declaration of March 15, 1995, was made some two
and a half years after the appellant's period of employment. There is also the
fact that the appellant went to the job site in question long before his period
of employment started, not to work, but to talk, in particular with his friend,
Terry Nadeau, who was employed by the payer on that same site.
[13] Having
regard to the above remarks, I conclude that the appellant did in fact work for
the payer during the period in issue.
[14] The
appeal is accordingly allowed, and the appellant's employment during the period
from August 30 to September 12, 1992, is insurable.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 9th day of
September 2003.
C.J.T.C.C.