|
2004-3986(IT)I
|
|
BETWEEN:
|
|
VICTORIA GARLINSKI,
|
|
Appellant,
|
|
and
|
|
|
|
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
|
|
Respondent.
|
____________________________________________________________________
Appeal heard on March 22, 2005, at Winnipeg,
Manitoba,
|
By: The Honourable Justice E.A. Bowie
|
|
|
|
Appearances:
|
|
For the Appellant:
|
The Appellant herself
|
|
Counsel for the Respondent:
|
Penny Piper
|
____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
The purported appeals from reassessment of tax made under the
Income Tax Act for 1999, 2001, 2002 and 2003 taxation
years are quashed.
The appeal from the reassessment of tax made under the
Act for 2000 taxation year is dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th of March, 2005.
Bowie J.
|
Citation: 2005TCC220
|
|
Date: 20050329
|
|
Docket: 2004-3986(IT)I
|
|
BETWEEN:
|
|
VICTORIA GARLINSKI,
|
|
Appellant,
|
|
and
|
|
|
|
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
|
|
Respondent.
|
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BowieJ.
[1] Ms. Garlinski has appealed her
income tax assessments for the taxation years 1999, 2000, 2001,
2002 and 2003. Her Notice of Appeal is not easily understood, but
it does put in issue whether she was entitled, in filing her
income tax return for the year 2000, to claim a deduction under
subsection 146(5) of the Income Tax Act[1] (the Act)
for a registered retirement savings plan (RRSP) premium in
respect of that year in the amount of $5,000.
[2] Counsel for the Respondent moved
at the opening of the hearing to quash the appeals in respect of
the years 1999, 2001, 2002 and 2003 on the basis that no notice
of objection had been filed for any of those years. That fact was
established by the affidavit of Jacqueline Sedor filed in support
of the motion, and it was not contested by the Appellant. The
only notice of objection to which she referred in her evidence
was a letter dated August 9, 2002, and it constituted an
objection only to her assessment for the 2000 taxation year. That
letter did make reference to the year 2001, however the Appellant
had not claimed any RRSP deduction when filing for 2001;
moreover, whether as a result of that letter or not, she was
reassessed for 2001 on September 3, 2002 to allow her a $2,000
RRSP deduction for that year, and there is no evidence that she
filed any notice of objection after that date in relation to any
year other than 2000. In fact, the evidence establishes that
there was none. It is well-settled that there can be no appeal of
an assessment unless the taxpayer has first sent a notice of
objection to the Minister of National Revenue. That is the effect
of subsection 159(1) of the Act. The appeals for the years
1999, 2001, 2002 and 2003 are therefore quashed.
[3] I turn now to consider the appeal
from the reassessment for the taxation year 2000. In filing her
return, the Appellant claimed and was allowed a deduction of
$5,000 from her income for a RRSP premium in that year. She was
subsequently reassessed on April 7, 2003 to disallow this
deduction. The Minister's position in reassessing the Appellant
was that she did not present evidence that she had in fact paid
any such $5,000 premium.
[4] In the course of her evidence, the
Appellant presented five exhibits that were intended to establish
the payment of this premium. None of them have that effect,
however. Her bank statement does establish that she purchased a
guaranteed investment certificate from the Royal Bank for $5,000.
However, neither it nor any of the other exhibits establishes
that the GIC was registered pursuant to section 146 of the
Act. The Appellant testified that she had instructed the
Bank personnel that this GIC should be registered, and I have no
reason to doubt that evidence. The Appellant, of course, bears
the burden of proof in this appeal. If the GIC was in fact
registered then it should have been a relatively simple matter to
obtain proof of that from the bank, and yet she has not been able
to do so.
[5] As I understand the Appellant, she
blames the bank for not carrying out her instructions to register
the certificate, or perhaps for refusing to provide her with the
necessary form to prove its registration if in fact it was
registered. I am not, of course, in a position to express any
view on her dispute with the bank and its staff. My jurisdiction
does not extend beyond deciding whether she has established that
she paid the premium that she claimed in respect of a registered
plan. The evidence simply does not discharge the burden of proof,
and so I must dismiss the appeal.
[6] The appeal for the taxation year
2000 is dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of March, 2005.
Bowie J.
|
COURT FILE NO.:
|
2004-3986(IT)I
|
|
STYLE OF CAUSE:
|
Victoria Garlinski and Her Majesty the Queen
|
|
PLACE OF HEARING:
|
Winnipeg, Manitoba
|
|
DATES OF HEARING:
|
March 22, 2005
|
|
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:
|
The Honourable Justice E.A. Bowie
|
|
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
|
March 29, 2005.
|
|
Counsel for the Appellant:
|
The Appellant herself
|
|
Counsel for the Respondent:
|
Penny Piper
|
|
For the Respondent:
|
John H. Sims, Q.C.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Canada
|
[1]
R.S.
1985 c.1 (5th supp.), as amended.