Docket: 2008-1293(IT)I
BETWEEN:
MARSHA LUTZ,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
____________________________________________________________________
Appeal heard on July 21, 2009, at Hamilton, Ontario.
Before: The Honourable
Justice Patrick Boyle
Appearances:
|
For the appellant:
|
The
appellant herself
|
|
Counsel for the respondent:
|
Hong Ky (Eric) Luu
|
____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
The appeal from the reassessment made under
the Income Tax Act with respect to
the appellant’s 2006 taxation year is dismissed without costs in accordance with the reasons given from the Bench.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 3rd day of September 2009.
"Patrick Boyle"
Citation: 2009 TCC 436
Date: 20090903
Docket: 2008-1293(IT)I
BETWEEN:
MARSHA LUTZ,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered from the Bench on July 21, 2009, in Hamilton, Ontario
and modified for clarity and accuracy.)
Boyle J.
[1]
In 2006, Ms. Lutz
was living with her common-law partner Zane Goldhawk. They had commenced
living together in March 2005. Each of them brought a child to their new
relationship.
[2]
For 2006, each of them
claimed a personal tax credit for their own child as a wholly dependent person
under paragraph 118(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act (the “Act”).
[3]
The Crown’s position is
that subsection 118(4) is determinative. Subsection 118(4) generally precludes
two taxpayers from claiming either for the same dependent or in respect of the
same domestic establishment.
[4]
The sole issue in this
case is one of statutory interpretation or more properly, the confusion created
by the provisions of the Act in subsection 118(4).
[5]
The taxpayer’s position
is that subsection 118(4) refers to clause 118(1)(b)(i)(B) and,
since the taxpayer based her claim under clause (A) of subparagraph 118(1)(b)(i),
the restriction in subsection 118(4) does not apply to her.
[6]
The Crown points out
that subsection 118(4) is not referring to clause (b)(i)(B) of
subsection 118(1) but is referring to factor B in the formulaic equation
set out in subsection 118(1).
[7]
I agree with the Crown
that, on a careful reading, this is indeed the case. It is certainly far from
clear on a first reading of subsection 118(4) and the confusion results
from the unfortunate fact that there is a clause (B) in the definition of
factor B.
[8]
The Crown’s position is
not only correct in law, it is also consistent with the intention of the dependent
persons restrictions. The taxpayer’s position was only ever a technical one.
[9]
For these reasons, the
taxpayer’s appeal is dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 3rd day of September 2009.
"Patrick Boyle"
CITATION: 2009 TCC 436
COURT FILE NO.: 2008-1293(IT)I
STYLE OF CAUSE: MARSHA LUTZ v. HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
PLACE OF HEARING: Hamilton,
Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: July 21, 2009
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: The
Honourable Justice Patrick Boyle
DATE OF JUDGMENT: September 3, 2009
APPEARANCES:
|
For the appellant:
|
The appellant herself
|
|
Counsel for the respondent:
|
Hong Ky (Eric) Luu
|
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For the appellant:
Name:
Firm:
For the
Respondent: John H. Sims, Q.C.
Deputy
Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Canada