Docket: 2008-3913(GST)I
BETWEEN:
MAXIM PARENTEAU,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
____________________________________________________________________
Appeal heard
on September 10, 2009, at Montréal, Quebec
Before: The Honourable Justice
Paul Bédard
Appearances:
|
For the Appellant:
|
The Appellant himself
|
|
Counsel for the Respondent:
|
Édith-Geneviève Giasson
|
____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
The appeal from the goods and services tax
assessment under Part IX of the Excise Tax Act, notice of
which is dated May 14, 2007 and bears the number
85279 8396 RT0001, is dismissed, in accordance with the attached
Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 15th day of October
2009.
"Paul Bédard"
Translation
certified true
on this 26th day
of November 2009.
Brian McCordick,
Translator
Citation: 2009 TCC 519
Date: 20091015
Docket: 2008-3913(GST)I
BETWEEN:
MAXIM PARENTEAU,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH
TRANSLATION]
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Bédard J.
[1]
This is an appeal from
an assessment made under Part IX of the Excise Tax Act ("the Act").
In the assessment, dated October 18, 2007, the Respondent, acting
through the Minister of Revenue of Quebec ("the Minister"),
disallowed the Appellant's claim of a $5,069.66 goods and services tax (GST)
rebate in respect of new housing located at 2335‑2337 Charbonneau Street
in Terrebonne, Quebec ("the new housing").
[2]
In making the
assessment, the Minister relied, among other things, on the following
assumptions of fact:
[TRANSLATION]
(a)
The construction of the new housing in respect
of which a GST rebate was claimed ended on or about December 1, 2006. (admitted).
(b)
The said new housing is a duplex. (admitted)
(c)
The Appellant did not build the new housing for
the purpose of using it as his primary place of residence. (denied)
(d)
The new housing was not the Appellant's primary
place of residence. (denied)
[3]
I note from the Notice
of Appeal that the Appellant in the case at bar is also contesting the
assessment against him under the Act respecting the Québec sales tax, by
which the Minister apparently also disallowed his new housing Québec sales tax
(QST) rebate. In this regard, I should emphasize from the outset that this
Court does not have jurisdiction to hear that appeal. If the Appellant wishes
to appeal from the assessment under the Act respecting the Québec sales tax,
the appropriate relief is set out in sections 93.1.10 et seq. of the Act
respecting the Ministère du Revenu, R.S.Q., c M‑31,
and he must seek it from the Court of Québec, not this Court. This Court
has jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the assessment under Part IX of
the Act.
[4]
The only real issue in
the case at bar is whether the Appellant built new housing for use as a primary
place of residence. This is because subsection 256(2) of the Act states that an
individual who has built a residential complex, for use by the individual as a
primary place of residence, is entitled to a new housing GST rebate.
Preliminary remarks
[5]
I should immediately
note that the Appellant was the only person to testify in support of his
position, and that he adduced only one document (Exhibit A‑1). The
Appellant's evidence in support of his argument that he built the new housing
for use as his primary place of residence was therefore essentially his own
testimony.
The Appellant's testimony
[6]
Essentially, the
Appellant's testimony (which was generally vague, imprecise, ambiguous, and
frequently incomprehensible) was as follows:
(i)
In December 2005, he
mandated a licenced real estate broker to sell his residence, which was located
on Charny Street in Mascouche, and in which he had been residing for several
years. In support of this allegation, the Appellant tendered in evidence
the letter from this broker (Exhibit A‑1) in which he thanks the
Appellant for entrusting the mandate to him.
(ii)
In the spring of 2006, he
had a duplex built on Charbonneau Street in Mascouche.
(iii)
In mid-May 2006, he
packed up his bags and moved to one of the units of this duplex ("the
housing unit") and allegedly lived in that housing unit until July 1
of that year. I note that the Appellant did not see fit to support his
allegations in this regard with serious documentary evidence (such as a
change of postal address, a telephone or electrical bill, a moving-related
invoice, a cable installation bill, etc.)
(iv)
On
July 1, 2006, he rented out the housing unit and moved back to his
Mascouche residence. The reasons that he did so are worth quoting:
[TRANSLATION]
A. That's right. So I had an opportunity there, I
don't have the means to ... I didn't have the means to pay for both residences
in a way that is very... for a long time, especially when the construction came
to an end, when our finances, all of a sudden, were really affected. It's no
longer really regular finances. So, at that stage, I needed to find a solution.
I had tried to sell the house in Mascouche, I tried to rent out my former
residence in Mascouche and then I got an opportunity to rent out the unit in
which I was living at the time.
Q. How long had you been living there?
A. Roughly a month and a half or two months.
(v)
He made no change to
his postal address when he moved in mid‑August. His testimony in
this regard, which I would characterize as incomprehensible to say the least,
is worth quoting:
[TRANSLATION]
A. No, because 154 Charny Street was still vacant
and there was no one else occupying it, I was still kind of at two... because
everything was still... my things were still there, all my address changes,
everything was still there, I let that be sent there, which was vacant, I left
my correspondence there, because, given, also, that ... that's it. That's
pretty much why.
Analysis and conclusion
[7]
In the case at bar, the
burden is on the Appellant to show that he built the new housing for use as his
primary place of residence. I should repeat that the Appellant was the only
person who testified in support of his position, and that he produced no
documentary evidence (other than Exhibit A‑1) in support of it. In
sum, the Appellant's evidence essentially rested on his testimony alone, which
I found to be of little credibility. In the case at bar, the Appellant could
not hope to convince me with generally vague, imprecise and often
incomprehensible answers. The Appellant did not even satisfy me that he lived
in the housing unit in question for a month and a half. The Appellant
could have adduced documentary or testimonial evidence in support of his
allegation in this regard. He did not do so. The inference that I draw from
this is that such evidence would have been unfavourable to him. In addition,
apart from my finding that the Appellant never lived in the housing unit, the
evidence discloses that when the duplex was being built, the Appellant's
intention to make it his primary place of residence was conditional on his selling
his residence in Mascouche. However, subsection 256(2) of the Act is drafted in
such a way that the individual's intent when the new housing is being built
cannot be conditional.
[8]
For these reasons, the
appeal is dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa,
Canada, this 15th day of October 2009.
"Paul Bédard"
Translation certified true
on this 26th day of November 2009.
Brian McCordick, Translator
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