Docket: 2009-3263(IT)I
BETWEEN:
NATHALIE BRAZEAU,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH
TRANSLATION]
____________________________________________________________________
Appeal heard on August 23, 2010, at Montréal, Quebec
Before: The Honourable Justice
Alain Tardif
Appearances:
|
For the appellant:
|
The appellant herself
|
|
Counsel for the respondent:
|
Chantal Roberge
|
____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
The
appeal of the assessment made pursuant to the Income Tax Act is allowed such
that the appellant is eligible for the Child Disability Benefit (CDB) for the
months of January to June 2008, all without costs.
Signed
at Ottawa, Canada, this 26th day of October 2010.
"Alain Tardif"
Translation
certified true
on this 2nd day of December
2010.
Elizabeth Tan, Translator
Citation: 2010 TCC 546
Date: 20101026
Docket: 2009-3263(IT)I
BETWEEN:
NATHALIE BRAZEAU,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH
TRANSLATION]
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Tardif J.
[1]
This is an appeal regarding the
appellant's eligibility to receive a tax credit for persons with disabilities
for the 2006 base tax year. The other part of the case was disallowed because
the evidence showed that the assessment for 2008 was nul.
[2]
First, the appellant explained and
described the concerns, issues and requirements she and her son had to face
because of her son's type 1 diabetes. She prepared a summary of information showing
the amount of time that was spent maintaining a balance between hypoclycemia
and hyperglycemia using insulin injections.
[3]
The evidence also showed that her
son was very active and was on a soccer team. In addition to participating on
the soccer team, he trained in a gym and attended physical education classes.
[4]
The respondent claimed that the
time spent was much lower than the established threshold of 15 hours a week to
be eligible for the credit.
[5]
To demonstrate this, she relied on
two documents, Exhibits I-3 and I-4. First it mentions one and a half hours and
then two hours for the same tasks, times that are significantly lower than the
criterion of 15 hours.
[6]
In
support of her evidence, the respondent had the appellant's son testify; he
explained he had a very active life with training and sports. He also indicated
the activities directly impacted his diabetes level.
[7]
When
it was time to assess the time spent, he indicated that generally, every day it
took him 1½ hours, to which time had to be added for many particular situations
related to his intense sporting activities.
[8]
The
problem with this case is clearly in terms of the evaluation of time required for
the appellant's son's illness. On one hand, two health-care workers provided
input. In one case, the time was assessed at 1½ and in the other, 2 hours; this
is a significant difference of 25%.
[9]
The
person directly involved, called to testify by the respondent and not the
appellant, submitted only his evidence as testimony, and came to a very
different conclusion, 1½ every day without including the time for specific
situations after particular efforts, errors and unexpected situations.
[10]
Although
the approach is mathematical, it is clear to me that the calculations are not
absolute. In fact, if it is acceptable to take into consideration two
assessments by doctors with a 25% gap, I feel it is possible and likely that a
very active young person would require more than an essentially arbitrary
evaluation resulting from experience.
[11]
It
is significant that the ideal rate sought is directly affected by physical
effort. I am sure that in order to participate in sports and recreation
activities, a method that demanded a great deal of time was required, making
his assessment likely.
[12]
In my opinion, the balance of
evidence that consisted mainly of the young man's testimony is sufficient to
exclude the two assessments submitted by the contributing doctors and to
conclude that this young man spent a minimum of fourteen hours during the
relevant periods.
[13]
I have no reason to dismiss the testimony
of the appellant's son; he seemed very credible to me, and moreover, the
respondent likely granted the same quality to the young man, as he testified at
the respondent's request.
[14]
As a result, the appeal is allowed
such that the appellant is eligible for the Child Disability Benefit (CDB) for
the months of January to June 2008, all without costs.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this
26th day of October 2010.
"Alain Tardif"
Translation certified true
on this 2nd day of December
2010.
Elizabeth Tan, Translator
CITATION: 2010 TCC 546
COURT FILE NO. : 2009-3263(IT)I
STYLE OF CAUSE: NATHALIE BRAZEAU AND HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal, Quebec
DATE OF HEARING: August 31, 2010
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: The Honourable Justice Alain Tardif
DATE OF JUDGMENT: October 26, 2010
APPEARANCES:
|
For the appellant:
|
The appellant herself
|
|
|
|
|
Counsel for the respondent:
|
Chantal Roberge
|
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For the
appellant:
For the respondent: Myles J. Kirvan
Deputy
Attorney general of Canada
Ottawa,
Canada