Docket: 2009-2545(IT)G
BETWEEN:
MICHAEL F.G. NOEL,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
____________________________________________________________________
Application
brought under subsection 147(7) of the
Tax Court of Canada Rules (General
Procedure)
Before: The Honourable
Justice Robert J. Hogan
For the Appellant: The
Appellant himself
Counsel for the Respondent: Sheherazade
Ghorashy
____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
Upon application by the Respondent
requesting that the Court reconsider its decision to award costs in the appeal
of Michael F.G. Noel v. The Queen.
And upon having read the submissions filed
by both parties.
The application is dismissed in accordance
with the attached reasons for order.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 14th day of June 2011.
"Robert J. Hogan"
Citation: 2011 TCC 282
Date: 20110614
Docket: 2009-2545(IT)G
BETWEEN:
MICHAEL F.G. NOEL,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
REASONS FOR ORDER
Hogan J.
[1]
This application is
brought under subsection 147(7) of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General
Procedure) (Rules). The Respondent has requested I withdraw the
award of costs at trial since the Appellant did not plead costs in his notice of
appeal, citing Canada (Attorney General) v. Pascal as authority.
[2]
The Appellant replies
that the following sections of the Rules apply to any general proceeding
before the Tax Court of Canada:
7. A failure to comply with these rules is an irregularity and does
not render a proceeding or a step, document or direction in a proceeding a
nullity, and the Court,
(a) may grant all necessary amendments or other relief, on
such terms as are just, to secure the just determination of the real matters in
dispute, or
(b) only where an as necessary in the interests of justice,
may set aside the proceeding or a step, document or direction in the proceeding
in whole or in part.
. . .
9. The Court may, where and as necessary in the interests of
justice, dispense with compliance with any rule at any time.
[3]
This gives the Court
discretion on costs when they are not pled by waiving compliance with the Rules.
The award of costs on January 14, 2011 was therefore within my discretion. The
Appellant in this case was wholly successful in his appeal and so was awarded
party and party costs. I see no reason to disturb that decision now.
[4]
The Respondent however
asks for the costs award to be struck under Pascal. In that case the
Minister asked for costs on a motion to dismiss previously granted by the
Court. In that case, Noël J. refused to award costs. Part of the reason was
that costs were not pled in the motion. However, he went on to say that the
motion was unopposed and would not have warranted costs in any case.
[5]
This case is
distinguishable from the present matter. The motion in Pascal was
unopposed and therefore would not have warranted costs in any respect. The
present matter was a trial, fully opposed (as both parties appeared before me),
and costs were available to be awarded by the Court’s discretion under the Rules.
I therefore will not follow Pascal in the present matter.
[6]
As for the Appellant, he
argues he has no onus to plead relief under the Rules, as the required
forms do not say that relief must be stated or it will be denied. This amounts
to saying that the requirements of the forms are optional. They are not. All
relief sought by appellants must be pled. To say the Appellant is afforded the
opportunity to omit pleading relief is to prejudice the Respondent by denying
the opportunity to respond properly to such requests. This is not the intent of
the Rules, which are designed to insure full disclosure by both sides so
that a matter can be decided on its merits.
[7]
When a party fails to
plead relief they are then at the mercy of the Court who may allow
relief that was not originally pled. This requires considering prejudice to the
other side, which there is little of in this case. However, only the Court has
discretion to waive compliance with the Rules, and it is presumptuous of
the Appellant to think otherwise.
[8]
The Appellant is
correct, however, that denying a party costs when they have not pled them is
unjust. He states that to allow the Respondent’s request would be to deny costs
even though the conduct leading to an award may have happened after pleadings
were filed.
[9]
In this matter, the
Respondent is not prejudiced by this award of costs. While not pled, it is
still in my discretion to award costs under sections 7 and 9 of the Rules.
After losing at trial and failing to refute the evidence offered by the
Appellant, it should come as little surprise to the Respondent that costs were
awarded against it. This does not mean costs will be unreasonable or onerous,
as they must still be based on Tariff B. If there is a dispute to quantum
either party may apply for taxation under section 155 or 156 of the Rules
as the case may be. Since the award of costs in this matter was proper I see no
reason to alter it.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 14th day of June 2011.
"Robert J. Hogan"
CITATION: 2011 TCC 282
COURT FILE NO.: 2009-2545(IT)G
STYLE OF CAUSE: MICHAEL F.G. NOEL v. HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
REASONS FOR ORDER BY: The
Honourable Justice Robert J. Hogan
DATE OF ORDER: June 14, 2011
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For the Appellant:
Name:
Firm:
For the
Respondent: Myles J. Kirvan
Deputy
Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa,
Canada