Date: 20020205
Docket: 2000-3791-IT-I
BETWEEN:
FRANK DELUCA,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Taxation
[1] This
taxation was held by way of a telephone conference on November
21, 2001. It follows a Judgment of the Honourable Associate Chief
Judge Bowman wherein he allowed the appeals and "the
appellant is entitled to his costs, if any, in accordance with
the tariff".
[2] The Appellant was represented by
Bernard Linseman, C.A. and the Respondent by Pascal
Tetreault.
[3] The Appellant's Bill of Costs
as submitted to the Court is reproduced as follows:
(a) filing of Notice of
Appeal
$
100.00
(b) commencement of proceedings
250.00
(c) for taking evidence before
hearing
250.00
(d) preparation of hearing
250.00
(e) conducting the hearing, 1
day
750.00
(f) for all services after judgment
125.00
(g) for photocopies, courier,
faxes
150.00
1,875.00
[4] At the commencement of the
hearing, item (a) was removed and is therefore not before me
since the Appellant had already been reimbursed the filing fee of
$100.00 by the Registry of the Court on October 2, 2001 pursuant
to paragraph 18.26(1)(a) of the Tax Court of Canada
Act. I shall deal with remaining items as they appear
on the Bill of Cost as follows:
[5] Mr. Linseman argued that, in his
opinion, the word 'advocate' includes a
'professional'. Because he is an accountant, he believes
he is therefore an advocate and entitled to counsel fees. In the
alternative, he argues that the costs should be allowed under
disbursements. He indicated that this was a complex tax case
which required much preparation and he should be entitled to the
fees as claimed. He also mentioned that according to
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary the word
'advocate' does not preclude an accountant and that this
is the interpretation of the definition which I should apply to
award him his costs.
[6] Mr. Tetreault argued that
this Court as well as the Federal Court of Appeal have already
dealt with this same argument in an identical matter. He is of
the opinion that the word 'counsel' does not include an
accountant and that in addition, it would be improper to allow
the costs as a disbursement. He referred to the Federal
Court of Appeal decision in Her Majesty the Queen v.
Munro, 98 DTC 6443 (F.C.A.), in which the Court stated at
paragraphs 20 and 21:
[20] The informal procedure set out in the Act specifically
contemplates in section 18.14 representation by an agent; yet,
the Rules Committee has expressly restricted the taxable fees to
those relating to "services of counsel". It does
violence to the very clear intent in rule 11 of restricting fees
to services of counsel to suggest that the words "such other
disbursements" in rule 12(3) can be interpreted in such a
way as to include fees for services of agents and furthermore to
allow such agents the right to claim whatever they want beyond
and above what counsel are allowed to claim. Agents should
not be allowed to claim indirectly under rule 12(3) what has been
directly denied to them in rule 11.
[21] I note that Mrs. Munro herself, in her Bill of Costs, has
claimed her agent fees as being "for services of
counsel", which, of course, they are not. Had her
accountant been called as an expert witness, she could have
claimed her accountant's fees under rule 12(2). But
inasmuch as the costs claimed are with respect to the services of
her accountant as an agent, and not with respect to his services
as an expert witness or in an otherwise permissible capacity,
these costs cannot be allowed under the Rules.
[7] He also referred to the decision
of Kew v. R. [2001] 2 C.T.C.2201 in which Judge Bowie of
this Court had the following to say at paragraph 5:
The first matter that I will deal with is the question of the
Appellant's entitlement to recover a counsel fee. It is
abundantly clear from the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal
in Munro v. R. (1998), 98 D.T.C. 6443 (Fed. C.A.), that a
counsel fee may not be allowed for services of somebody other
than a person who is entitled to practise as a barrister,
advocate, attorney, or solicitor in one of the provinces, which
is the manner in which the Rules define
"counsel" in section 2. Mr. Kew argues that he,
as agent for his wife, and permitted by the Tax Court of
Canada Act to act as agent for his wife, was on the occasion
of the appeal an advocate, and therefore comes within that
definition of "counsel", and that his wife is therefore
entitled to recover a counsel fee in respect of his
services. The Federal Court of Appeal's decision in
Munro leaves no opening for doubt that only persons who
have qualified and been admitted to the bar of one of the
provinces of Canada can qualify as "counsel" and
therefore perform services for which a counsel fee may be
awarded. Therefore I have no alternative but to confirm the
taxing officer's decision on that point.
In addition, he relied on subsection 12(3) of the Tax Court of
Canada Informal Rules which reads as follows:
Such other disbursements may be allowed as were essential for
the conduct of the appeal, if it is established that the
disbursements were made or that the party is liable for
them.
[8] In view of the jurisprudence
cited above, it is evident that the definition of counsel as it
appears in the Rules of this Court does not include fees for an
accountant. Therefore, I will tax off items (b), (c), (d), (e),
and (f) for a total of $1,625.00.
[9] Mr. Linseman indicated that the
amount claimed under item (g) in the Bill of Costs is for
disbursements incurred for photocopies, courier and fax charges.
He stated that over 500 photocopies were made for use by the
parties and the Court for which his office charges 30 cents per
copy. The courier and fax charges are the normal items charged
for the run of his office. He did not specify the amount of fax
charges or couriers used nor the cost to his office.
[10] Mr. Tetreault stated that he cannot
comment if 500 copies is reasonable since he has no documentation
from Mr. Linseman. Also, since he was not counsel at the hearing
of the appeal, he is unaware if that amount of copies is
reasonable. He further stated, however, that if I grant the
request for the photocopies, I should allow 20 cents per page in
accordance with subsection 1(2) of Schedule II Tariff of the
General Procedure Rules. Once again, as far as the courier and
fax charges, he has no details before him pertaining to these
charges and, therefore, in the absence of any proof as to those
costs, I should not allow them.
[11] On consideration, I will allow for 500
photocopies but at 20 cents per page for a total of $100.00.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 5th day
of February 2002.
Registrar