Date:
20020530
Docket:
2001-3102-GST-I
BETWEEN:
SERGIO
MARIANI,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE
QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for
Judgment
(Delivered orally at
Toronto, Ontario on March 14, 2002
and subsequently
edited as to form)
Bonner,
T.C.J.
[1] The
appellant was, at the relevant times, a director of Vaughan Iron
Works Ltd. He has been assessed under section 323 of the
Excise Tax Act which imposes liability for the unpaid
taxes of a corporation on the directors of the
corporation.
[2] Subsection 323(1) reads:
Where a
corporation fails to remit an amount of net tax as required under
subsection 228(2) or (2.3), the directors of the corporation at
the time the corporation was required to remit the amount are
jointly and severally liable, together with the corporation, to
pay that amount and any interest thereon or penalties relating
thereto.
[3] The
appellant relies on the due diligence defence available under
subsection 323(3) which reads:
A director
of a corporation is not liable for a failure under
subsection (1) where the director exercised the degree of
care, diligence and skill to prevent the failure that a
reasonably prudent person would have exercised in comparable
circumstances.
[4] The
appellant's formal education ended with grade 12. After that
he started working in his uncle's welding business. In 1987
he took over his uncle's business which he operated as a
proprietorship under the name North York Welding.
[5] In 1993
the appellant and Aldo Ricciuti incorporated Vaughan Iron Works
Ltd.
[6] The two
individuals became sole shareholders and directors of Vaughan.
Vaughan commenced to carry on the business of fabricating and
installing iron and steel components required in the construction
trades.
[7] The
responsibility for the management of the business of Vaughan was
divided between the two directors. The appellant's primary
responsibility involved the fabrication and installation of iron
and steel products such as stairs and railings. He also drafted
sketches of parts to be made in the course of Vaughan's
business. The appellant's work was performed for the most
part in the field. In the course of a typical day the appellant
visited the company shop first thing in the morning, signed
cheques, and dealt with any papers left on his desk by
Mr. Ricciuti or the bookkeeper. He then changed his clothing
and went out into the field. He returned to the company office at
the end of the day, dealt with any further paperwork left on his
desk by the others and then went home.
[8] Mr. Ricciuti's work involved the preparation of
estimates plus sales and the administration of the company
business. His work was performed largely at Vaughan's office,
particularly after 1994 when he was injured in an automobile
accident.
[9] Vaughan
employed a small number of workers engaged in the shop and in the
field. It also employed a part-time bookkeeper. The
signature of both directors were required on Vaughan company
cheques.
[10] The years 1993,
1994 and most of 1995 appear to have been uneventful in relation
to the collection and remittance of GST. So far as I can tell,
from the somewhat unfocused evidence adduced, the first problem
arose with respect to the period ending December 31, 1995.
The assessment now under appeal stems from Vaughan's failure
to remit net tax for the periods ending December 31, 1995,
March 31, 1996 and September 30, 1996. The assessment
also relates to the period ending December 31, 1996, but the
respondent conceded at the hearing that nothing should have been
assessed against Vaughan in respect of that period.
[11] During the
months of April or May of 1996 the appellant became aware for the
first time that Vaughan was not paying its creditors in a timely
fashion. He started to receive calls from suppliers demanding
payment of overdue accounts. The appellant says that he
approached Ricciuti who told him that while there was a cash flow
problem because customers were slow in paying their debts, the
company was profitable and had more than enough receivables to
enable it to pay what it owed.
[12] The evidence
does not indicate that the appellant specifically addressed
Vaughan's obligations with respect to GST at that or at any
time.
[13] I note in
passing that there is no suggestion that there was ever any
problem relating to Vaughan's employee source deductions. It
seems that the corporation contracted the services of a
professional payroll administrator and that was the reason why
the company was able to stay out of trouble on that
front.
[14] It is the
position of the appellant that he was the victim of deliberate
deception on the part of Aldo Ricciuti. He has concluded that
Ricciuti, at the very least, overstated Vaughan's receivables
when responding to the appellant's enquiries regarding the
ability to pay Vaughan's creditors.
[15] The accountant
who represented the appellant at the hearing attempted to show
that Mr. Ricciuti acted improperly and that dishonesty was
the cause of Vaughan's ultimate downfall.
[16] The evidence
regarding the true state of Vaughan's financial affairs and
the causes of its financial problems which led to the failure to
pay GST is much too foggy and imprecise to permit any conclusion.
Moreover, that evidence was far off target for the relevant
question is whether the appellant exercised the requisite degree
of care, diligence and skill to prevent the failure. It is my
opinion, with great respect to those who disagree, that one
cannot prevent a failure after that failure has taken place.
Section 323 addresses the failure to pay tax when due. It
does not address attempts to remedy failures which have already
occurred.
[17] The
appellant's efforts to carry out Vaughan's contracts in
order to enable Vaughan to collect receivables and raise the
money to pay overdue taxes cannot constitute the exercise of care
to prevent the failure contemplated by subsection 323(3) of the
Excise Tax Act.
[18] The respondent
argues that the appellant was an inside director and was
therefore under an obligation to take positive steps to prevent
any failure. Counsel for the respondent argues that the appellant
took no such steps. She relies on the decision of the Federal
Court of Appeal in Soper v. The Queen, 97 D.T.C. 5407 and
says that because the appellant was an inside director and was
passive in relation to GST he was not duly diligent.
[19] I cannot agree
with the respondent's position. The segregation of directors
into inside and outside categories is not undertaken as part of a
mechanical process of classification into rigidly defined
categories of winners and losers. Rather it is a recognition of
the self-evident. Some directors are better situated than
others, usually by reason of participation in
day-to-day management, to detect the potential for
failure and to deal with it and that situation is a relevant
circumstance.
[20] It is true that
the appellant was part of management but his responsibilities
within the company did not require him to address the payment of
GST on a routine basis, at least initially. The internal
divisions of responsibility within a corporation are
circumstances which must be taken into account in cases such as
this. Where, as here, there was no suggestion of any irregularity
in dealing with GST between the time Vaughan commenced the
business and April or May of 1996, the appellant's failure to
address GST before the spring of 1996 is not inconsistent with
the exercise of the requisite degree of care.
[21] As Robertson
J.A., noted in Soper:
...in the
absence of grounds for suspicion, it is not improper for a
director to rely on company officials to perform honestly duties
that have been properly delegated to them.
This statement applies
equally in my view to reliance on fellow directors to whom duties
have been delegated.
[22] The events of
April or May of 1996 are however grounds for suspicion which
require any director, even one not previously responsible for
attending to the remittance of GST, to move decisively to
ascertain whether taxes are being remitted in accordance with the
statute and to ensure that it is so remitted. Anything short of
such decisive action will, where grounds of suspicion are
present, fall below the statutory standard of care.
[23] I have
concluded that the appellant is not liable by virtue of
subsection 323(3) in respect of the failures which occurred
in the periods before that which ended on September 30,
1996. The complaints came to the attention of the appellant in
April or May of that year and the first failure which the
appellant was in a position to prevent was later, namely, that of
the September 30th quarter. The rather foggy evidence in
this case does not suggest that there was a failure to remit for
the April, May and June quarter.
[24] The appeal will
therefore be allowed and the assessment referred back to the
Minister for reassessment deleting all liability except in
relation to the period ending September 30, 1996.
Signed at Toronto,
Ontario, this 30th day of May 2002.
T.C.J.