Date:
20021031
Docket:
2002-1476-IT-I
BETWEEN:
KELLI MARIE
CLEMENS,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY
THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons
for judgment
Little,
J.
[1]
The Appellant and Patrick Clemens ("Husband") were
married in 1989.
[2]
The Appellant and her Husband separated in August 1994. A
separation agreement ("Separation Agreement") was
signed by the parties on the 28th day of October 1994.
[3]
The Separation Agreement contained numerous clauses outlining the
rights and responsibilities of each party. Paragraph 8.1 of the
Separation Agreement provided as follows:
MAINTENANCE
8.1
The Husband covenants and agrees to pay to the Wife for the
maintenance and support of the infant Children of the marriage in
the Wife's custody, as periodic payments within the meaning
of the Income Tax Act (Canada), the sum of $235.00 per month for
each of the following children: Devin, Jacob and Arielle,
commencing on the 1st day of November, 1994, and continuing on
the 1st day of each and every month thereafter until such time as
each respective child:
8.1.1 reaches the
age of nineteen (19) years;
8.1.2 ceases to
reside with the Wife;
8.1.3 obtains
economic independence; or
8.1.4 marries or
dies.
(Note: None
of the above conditions numbered 8.1.1 through 8.1.4 are
applicable to the year under appeal (1999)).
[4]
The Appellant and her Husband reconciled in January 1996 and they
lived together as husband and wife from January 1996 until they
separated again in August 1998. The Appellant and her
Husband have remained separated since August 1998.
[5]
The Appellant and the Husband testified that the child support
payments as specified in the Separation Agreement were not paid
to the Appellant by the Husband during the time of the
reconciliation i.e., from January 1996 to
August 1998.
[6]
The Appellant and her Husband testified that at the time of the
second separation in August 1998 it was verbally agreed that the
Husband would pay the child support payments as specified in the
Separation Agreement dated the 28th day of October 1994. The
Appellant and the Husband also testified that they verbally
agreed after the second separation, i.e., in August 1998, that
the other terms as outlined in the Separation Agreement would
also apply.
[7]
The Husband testified that he paid the sum of $705.00 per month
or a total of $8,460.00 to the Appellant as child support
payments in the 1999 taxation year. The Appellant said that on a
number of occasions the Husband arbitrarily reduced the child
support payments when he took the children out to lunch or made
other payments on behalf of the children.
[8]
The Appellant did not report the amount of $8,460.00 as income in
the 1999 taxation year.
[9]
The Minister of National Revenue (the "Minister")
reassessed the Appellant on the 18th day of December 2000 to
include the amount of $8,460.00 in her income for the 1999
taxation year.
B.
ISSUE
[10] The issue
is whether the Appellant is required to include the child support
payments of $8,460.00 in her income for the 1999 taxation
year.
C.
ANALYSIS
[11] During the
appeal the Appellant stated that her Husband has not followed the
requirements specified in the Separation Agreement and therefore
the Agreement should be ignored. The Appellant also stated that
her Husband has refused to agree to sign a new agreement or amend
the existing agreement to provide for items such as divorce,
child support and other issues.
[12] The Husband
maintains that he has complied with the conditions contained in
the Separation Agreement.
[13] Under what
has sometimes been described as the old tax régime
(pre-May 1997) spouses making payments to separated or
ex-spouses for the support of the children were allowed to deduct
those payments and the recipient was required to include the
amount of the payments in their income. Following the decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Thibaudeau v. Canada,
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 627, the Income Tax Act (the
"Act") was amended and new provisions were
introduced to deal with child support payments.
[14] The amended
Act provided that if a pre-May 1997 agreement or Court
Order remained unchanged the deduction/inclusion system as
provided by the old régime prevailed. However, if a new
agreement was entered into by the parties or if a new Court Order
was issued, or if an old agreement was changed in a particular
way the deduction/inclusion régime would not apply and
only payments made up to the commencement day, as defined in the
Act, were deductible from income by the payor and included
in income by the payee.
[15] Subsection
56.1(4) of the Act defines "child support
amount", "commencement day" and "support
amount". Subsection 56.1(4) reads as follows:
"child
support amount" means any support amount that is not
identified in the agreement or order under which it is receivable
as being solely for the support of a recipient who is a spouse or
former spouse of the payer or who is a parent of a child of whom
the payer is a natural parent.
"commencement day" at any time of an agreement or
order means
(a)
where the agreement or order is made after April 1997, the day it
is made; and
(b)
where the agreement or order is made before May 1997, the day, if
any, that is after April 1997 and is the earliest of
(i) the day
specified as the commencement day of the agreement or order by
the payer and recipient under the agreement or order in a joint
election filed with the Minister in prescribed form and
manner,
(ii) where
the agreement or order is varied after April 1997 to change the
child support amounts payable to the recipient, the day on which
the first payment of the varied amount is required to be
made,
(iii) where
a subsequent agreement or order is made after April 1997,
the effect of which is to change the total child support amounts
payable to the recipient by the payer, the commencement day of
the first such subsequent agreement or order, and
(iv) the
day specified in the agreement or order, or any variation
thereof, as the commencement day of the agreement or order for
the purposes of this Act.
"support amount" means an amount payable or
receivable as an allowance on a periodic basis for the
maintenance of the recipient, children of the recipient or both
the recipient and children of the recipient, if the recipient has
discretion as to the use of the amount, and
(a)
the recipient is the spouse or former spouse of the payer, the
recipient and payer are living separate and apart because of the
breakdown of their marriage and the amount is receivable under an
order of a competent tribunal or under a written agreement;
or
(b)
the payer is a natural parent of a child of the recipient and the
amount is receivable under an order made by a competent tribunal
in accordance with the laws of a province.
[16] Paragraph
60(b) of the Act reads as follows:
(b)
Support -- the total of all amounts each of which is an
amount determined by the formula
A - (B +
C)
where
A is the
total of all amounts each of which is a support amount paid after
1996 and before the end of the year by the taxpayer to a
particular person, where the taxpayer and the particular person
were living separate and apart at the time the amount was
paid,
B is the
total of all amounts each of which is a child support amount that
became payable by the taxpayer to the particular person under an
agreement or order on or after its commencement day and before
the end of the year in respect of a period that began on or after
its commencement day, and
C is the
total of all amounts each of which is a support amount paid by
the taxpayer to the particular person after 1996 and deductible
in computing the taxpayer's income for a preceding taxation
year;
[17] In this
situation the Separation Agreement dated the 28th day of October
1994 has never been amended or replaced and the child support
payments made to the Appellant in 1999 were made pursuant to that
agreement. It therefore follows that the old tax régime
remains in place and the Appellant is required to include the
amount of $8,460.00 in determining her income for the 1999
taxation year.
[18] From the
facts that were presented to me by the Appellant I regard this as
a difficult situation and I reluctantly must dismiss the appeal.
However, I have to interpret the law as I find it.
[19] If the
Appellant wishes to come under the new régime with regard
to child support payments she must enter into a new agreement
with her Husband which provides for a commencement day after May
1997. If she is unable to convince her Husband to agree to sign a
new separation agreement she should obtain a Court Order from a
British Columbia Court.
[20] The appeal
is dismissed.
Signed at
Vancouver, British Columbia, this 31st day of October
2002.
J.T.C.C.
COURT FILE
NO.:
20002-1476(IT)I
STYLE OF
CAUSE:
Kelli Marie Clemens and
Her Majesty the Queen
PLACE OF
HEARING:
Kelowna, British Columbia
DATE OF
HEARING:
August 20, 2002
REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT BY: The Honourable Judge L.M.
Little
DATE OF
JUDGMENT:
October 31, 2002
APPEARANCES:
For the
Appellant:
The Appellant herself
Counsel
for the
Respondent:
Jasmine Sidhu
COUNSEL OF
RECORD:
For the
Appellant:
Name:
Firm:
For the
Respondent:
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Canada
2002-1476(IT)I
BETWEEN:
KELLI MARIE
CLEMENS,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY
THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeal heard
on August 20, 2002 at Kelowna, British Columbia, by
the
Honourable Judge L.M. Little
Appearances
Counsel
for the Appellant: The Appellant herself
Counsel
for the
Respondent:
Jasmine Sidhu
JUDGMENT
The appeal from the assessment made under the Income Tax
Act for the 1999 taxation year is dismissed in
accordance with the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at
Vancouver, British Columbia, this 31st day of October
2002.
J.T.C.C.