[OFFICIAL ENGLISH
TRANSLATION]
Date:
20021113
Dockets:
2000-3125(IT)G, 2000-3126(IT)G, 2000-3127(IT)G
2000-3128(IT)G,
2000-3129(IT)G, 2000-3130(IT)G
BETWEEN:
CAROLINE PELLETIER,
CLAUDE PELLETIER,
RENÉ PELLETIER,
NATHALIE PELLETIER,
LYNE
CREVIER, JOHANNE PELLETIER,
Appellants,
and
Her Majesty The Queen,
Respondent.
Reasons For Judgment
P.R.
Dussault, J.T.C.C.
[1] These appeals, heard on common evidence, are from reassessments
for the 1995 taxation year. By those assessments, the Minister of National
Revenue ("the Minister") included in the income declared by each
of the appellants ("the appellants") an amount of
$50,000 as a benefit conferred by "Bois de sciage Lafontaine
Inc." ("the corporation"), in accordance with
subsections 15(1) and 246(1) of the Income Tax Act ("the Act").
[2] In making the assessments at issue, the Minister relied inter
alia on the assumptions of fact set out in subparagraphs 11(a) to (v) of
the Amended Reply to the Notice of Appeal by Caroline Pelletier
(Docket 2000‑3125(IT)G) ("the Amended Reply"), which,
by consent, apply to all the other appeals. These subparagraphs read as
follows:
[translation]
(a) On
September 16, 1993, an agreement was signed among the shareholders in
Bois de sciage Lafontaine Inc. ("the corporation").
(b) When the
shareholder agreement ("the agreement") was signed, the shareholders
in the corporation were: Clermont Pelletier, Marc Pelletier,
Richard Kéroack, René Pelletier, Lyne Pelletier‑Crevier,
Johanne Pelletier, Claude Pelletier, Nathalie Pelletier and
Caroline Pelletier.
(c) The
shareholders holding class "A" shares are:
Clermont Pelletier, holding 60 shares; Richard Kéroack, holding
20 shares; and Marc Pelletier, holding 20 shares.
(d) The
shareholders holding class "H" shares are Marc Pelletier
and Richard Kéroack, each holding 10 shares.
(e) Clauses 8, 9
and 10 of the agreement set out restrictions on the transfer of shares in the
corporation.
(f) More
specifically, clause 8.1.2 of the agreement stipulates that, during the
lifetime of Clermont Pelletier, the holders of class "A"
shares may dispose of those shares solely to the corporation or to the other
holder of class "A" shares. If neither the corporation nor the
other holder of class "A" shares wishes to acquire the shares,
the person wishing to dispose of the shares must keep them.
(g) On
October 14, 1994, Mr. Kéroack received a notice of dismissal from the
corporation, effective October 28, 1994.
(h) On
December 9, 1994, the corporation made an offer to Mr. Kéroack to
purchase the class "A" and the class "H" shares
he held in the corporation.
(i) On
December 22, 1994, Mr. Kéroack refused the offer made by the
corporation to purchase his shares because the price offered was too low. At
the same time, he asked the corporation to share the costs of valuing the shares.
(j) On
November 10, 1995, the 100 class "A" shares in the
corporation were subdivided into 600 class "A" shares.
Mr. Kéroack therefore owned 120 class "A" shares in
the corporation.
(k) On
November 10, 1995, Richard Kéroack, Caroline Pelletier, Claude Pelletier,
Johanne Pelletier, Lyne Pelletier-Crevier, Nathalie Pelletier,
René Pelletier, Clermont Pelletier, Marc Pelletier and the
corporation engaged in a transaction (the "transaction").
(l) This transaction
provided that the application of the September 16, 1993, agreement be
suspended.
(m) Under the terms of
the November 10, 1995, transaction, which does not reflect reality,
Richard Kéroack sold the 120 shares he held in the corporation to
Caroline Pelletier, Claude Pelletier, Johanne Pelletier, Lyne Pelletier-Crevier,
Nathalie Pelletier and René Pelletier ("the benefiting
members").
(n) The benefiting
members are the children of Clermont Pelletier. They each received
20 class "A" shares in the corporation.
(o) It was agreed
that the shares would be sold for a total price of $10,000.
(p) This price was
negotiated between Mr. Kéroack and the corporation.
(q) The persons
acquiring the shares, that is, the benefiting members of the Pelletier
family, paid Mr. Kéroack nothing in consideration of the shares sold.
(r) The corporation
paid Mr. Kéroack the amount of $10,000 in consideration of the shares
sold.
(s) The benefiting
members who received the shares never reimbursed the corporation.
(t) The facts have
shown that the corporation acquired Mr. Kéroack's shares and then
transferred them to the benefiting members of the Pelletier family for no
consideration.
(u) On
November 10, 1995, the date of the transfer, the fair market value of the
120 class "A" shares was $300,000.
(v) In transferring 20 shares
to the appellant for no consideration, the corporation conferred on the
appelant a benefit in the amount of $50,000.
[3] Paragraph 12 of the Amended Reply sets out the basis for the
assessment, as follows:
[translation]
12. The assessment
at issue is made on the following basis: if the corporation had directly
transferred 20 class "A" shares to the appellant, it would have
conferred on the appellant a taxable benefit in the amount of $50,000 under
subsection 15(1) of the Income Tax Act. In this case, since the
benefit is indirect, it is taxable under subsection 246(1) of the Income
Tax Act.
[4] As well, in paragraphs 15 to 18 of the Amended Reply, the
Deputy Attorney General of Canada made the following arguments:
[translation]
15. The Deputy Attorney
General of Canada argues that the corporation acquired 120 shares from
Mr. Kéroack and then transferred them to the six benefiting members of
the Pelletier family. The fair market value of these shares was $300,000.
16. The appellant
received 20 shares in the corporation, with a fair market value of $50,000. The
appellant paid no consideration to the corporation when the 20 shares were
transferred.
17. The Deputy
Attorney General of Canada argues that, under subsection 246(1) of the Act,
the corporation conferred on the appellant a benefit in the amount of $50,000,
either directly or indirectly, by any means whatever. Moreover, under
subsection 15(1) of the Act, if the corporation had transferred
20 shares to the appellant directly, an amount of $50,000 would be taxable
in the appellant's hands as a benefit conferred by the corporation on a
shareholder.
18. Even assuming
that Mr. Kéroack had transferred the shares directly to the benefiting
members, the Deputy Attorney General of Canada argues that this transfer was
made with the consent or on the instructions of the corporation. The
corporation agreed to suspending the shareholders agreement and to selling the
shares to the benefiting members of the Pelletier family; in so doing, it
conferred on these members shares with a fair market value of $300,000.
Furthermore, the price the corporation paid Mr. Kéroack for the shares was
$10,000. By means of all these operations, the corporation conferred on the
appellant a total benefit in the amount of $50,000, in accordance with
subsections 15(1) and 246(1) of the Act.
[5] The assumption of fact set out in subparagraph 11(m) of the
Amended Reply that, under the terms of the November 10, 1995, transaction,
the sale by Mr. Kéroack of 120 class "A" shares of the
corporation's capital stock to the six appellants (who received 20 shares
each) did "not reflect reality" and was in
fact a smokescreen, was set aside at the hearing. Indeed, after the evidence
was adduced, counsel for the
respondent acknowledged that the corporation had never bought back the shares
held by Mr. Kéroack and subsequently transfer them to the appellants for
no consideration. She admitted that there had been only one transaction by
which Mr. Kéroack sold the class "A" shares of the
corporation's capital stock he held directly to the appellants. This admission
subsequently resulted in the new, alternative argument based on
subsection 152(9) of the Act; this new argument is set out in
paragraph 18 of the Amended Reply and is the only argument on which the
respondent now relies.
[6] Pierre-Denis Jacques, a chartered accountant and tax expert
who was the main witness for the appellants, explained in detail the events
that gave rise to the present appeals.
[7] In 1993, Clermont Pelletier, for all practical purposes, the
sole shareholder in the corporation, had decided to find someone to take over
after he retired. He did this by making Mr. Kéroack, a forestry engineer
whom he had contacted for this purpose, a partner in the business operated by
the corporation, that is, a fully integrated sawmill. At that time the
corporation was worth approximately $6 million, but Mr. Kéroack had
no money to invest. It was therefore agreed, as part of financial planning and
an estate freeze, that Clermont Pelletier would hold 60 participating
and voting shares (class "A" shares) of the corporation's
capital stock and that Marc Pelletier, one of Clermont Pelletier's
sons who was involved in the business, and Mr. Kéroack would each hold
20 class "A" shares. This arrangement, planned by
Mr. Jacques himself in co-operation with Claude‑André Gendreau,
the lawyer for Clermont Pelletier and for the corporation, provided for
Clermont Pelletier's retirement by means of a short-term buyback by the
corporation of the 60 class "A" shares, as well as the
other class shares of the corporation's capital stock held by
Clermont Pelletier. Since it had been agreed that Marc Pelletier's
participation was not to exceed 20 per cent, Mr. Kéroack could, in the
near future, hold the equivalent of 50 per cent of the shares of the
corporation after buying back the class "A" shares held by
Clermont Pelletier, and, as was also planned, he could then hold the
equivalent of 100 per cent of the shares of the corporation after buying
back the shares held by Marc Pelletier. The purpose of the buyback by the
corporation of the corporation's capital stock shares held by
Clermont Pelletier was to provide him with the $6 million that the
corporation was then worth.
[8] Certain terms and conditions of this plan, particularly concerning
Mr. Kéroack's integration as a partner and certain related guarantees, are
reflected in the September 16, 1993, shareholder agreement ("the
agreement") (Exhibit A‑1, Tab 1) referred to in the
Amended Reply. For example, clause 11.2 of the agreement stipulates as
follows:
[translation]
11.2 Holders of
class "A" shares other than Clermont Pelletier
Under this agreement,
each holder of class "A" shares, other than
Clermont Pelletier, shall make an irrevocable offer to the company to sell
to it all of his or her class "A" and class "B"
shares and any other shares that he or she may hold in the company, except for
the class "G" shares of the company's capital stock now held by
Marc Pelletier, which are the subject of clause 11.3 of this agreement,
for the price established in accordance with clause 16 of this agreement
and in accordance with the terms and conditions set out below, if either of the
following events occurs, which makes this offer suspensive:
(a) withdrawal
from the business; or
(b) death of the
person making the offer.
This offer shall apply
to all the shares held by the person making the offer on the date the
above-mentioned suspension occurs, except for the class "G"
shares of the company's capital stock now held by Marc Pelletier, which
are the subject of clause 11.3 of this agreement.
[9] As well, clause 12 stipulates that [translation] "the terms and conditions of the offer and
its acceptance shall be the same as those set out in clause 8 above".
Clause 12 also sets out various situations considered equivalent to
withdrawal from the business by a shareholder, in particular termination of a
shareholder's employment contract for any reason whatsoever.
[10] Clause 8.1.2 sets out the following terms and conditions for
offering class "A" shares:
[translation]
8.1.2 Holders of
class "A" shares other than Clermont Pelletier
(a) During
Clermont Pelletier's lifetime, if a holder of class "A"
shares wishes, for any reason whatsoever, to sell or otherwise to dispose of or
to transfer all or part of his or her class "A" or
class "H" shares and any other shares of the company's capital
stock that he or she may hold, except for the class "G" shares
of the company's capital stock now held by Marc Pelletier, which are the
subject of clause 8.1.3 of this agreement, to the company by written
notice at the price referred to in clause 16 below or at any lower price
chosen by the person making the offer;
(b) the company
shall have a period of 60 days following the date it receives the notice to
accept the offer in whole or in part;
(c) if the
company does not accept the offer in whole or in part within the 60-day period,
the balance of the shares offered shall accrue to the other holder of
class "A" shares, excluding Clermont Pelletier. This other
holder of class "A" shares shall then have a further period of
30 days to accept this offer at the price offered;
(d) on the expiry
of the periods provided for above, if the company and the other holder of
class "A" shares, excluding Clermont Pelletier, have
declined to acquire all or part of the shares held by the person making the
offer, that person shall keep the shares or the balance thereof, and shall not
offer them to any other person.
[11] Clause 16(b) deals with the value of the participating shares
and reads as follows:
[translation]
(b) For the
purposes of clauses 8, 11 and 14 above, the value of the participating
shares shall be the most recent value established by the shareholders in a
written document attached to this agreement as Appendix "A".
[12] Appendix "A", signed by all the shareholders and
Clermont Pelletier for the corporation, stipulates as follows:
[translation]
For the purposes of
clause 16, starting on this date the established value of the class "A" shares in the company shall be
$1 per share.
[13] Although clause 16 makes provision for subsequent valuation
within 90 days following the production of the financial statements of the
preceding fiscal year, the shareholders made no subsequent valuation prior to
the November 10, 1995, transaction.
[14] Making Mr. Kéroack a partner in the corporation did not
produce the desired results and led to a dispute with Clermont Pelletier,
who demanded that Mr. Kéroack resign as early as June 1994.
Mr. Kéroack refused and was dismissed in October 1994.
[15] On December 9, 1994, Marc Pelletier, secretary of
the corporation, sent Mr. Kéroack a letter stating that the corporation agreed
to acquire the 20 class "A" and the
10 class "H" shares of the corporation's capital stock held
by Mr. Kéroack for $1 per share, in accordance with the
automatic offer of sale of these shares provided for in clauses 11, 12 and
8 of the agreement. In his testimony, Mr. Jacques, the accountant and tax
expert, stated that he himself had decided on the terms of this letter.
[16] On December 22, 1994, Jean Blouin,
Mr. Kéroack's lawyer, replied to the letter sent to his client. While
acknowledging that the agreement was applicable, Mr. Blouin stated that he
completely disagreed with the valuation of the shares at $1 per share,
emphasizing that no new valuation had been made within 90 days following
the production of the corporation's financial statements for the fiscal year
ended on August 31, 1993, that is, by November 3, 1993.
Since the corporation had no new value to propose, Mr. Blouin suggested
that the fair market value be used and, in this regard, offered to pay half the
cost of the services of a business valuation expert in order to establish this
value. He added that, otherwise, he relied on clause 36 of the agreement,
which provided for recourse to compulsory arbitration, to the exclusion of the
courts, in resolving any disagreement or dispute concerning the application of
the agreement.
[17] In his testimony, Mr. Jacques stated that he and
Mr. Gendreau were very concerned about the situation following
Mr. Kéroack's dismissal, a situation that threatened the survival of the
business and could have significant financial repercussions, to say the least.
Together, they estimated the financial repercussions of a lawsuit by
Mr. Kéroack at not less than $1 million.
[18] According to Mr. Jacques, Mr. Gendreau wanted to have
sole say with respect to the dispute between the corporation and
Clermont Pelletier on the one hand and Mr. Kéroack on the other. In
the ensuing months, however, delays dragged out and there was little
communication between the parties' lawyers.
[19] Mr. Jacques stated that in September 1995,
Mr. Gendreau telephoned him to tell him about an unhoped-for offer to
settle that he had just received from Mr. Blouin. Mr. Blouin was
asking for immediate payment of $10,000 for the shares held by
Mr. Kéroack, with no tax incidence for Mr. Kéroack. Mr. Blouin
was also asking for payment of his own fees in the amount of $1,500. According
to Mr. Jacques, this offer to settle was presented as being
non-negotiable. Although Mr. Jacques testified that the corporation and
Clermont Pelletier had made only one offer to Mr. Kéroack, that is,
the December 9, 1994, offer at $1 per share, Mr. Kéroack
testified that apparently the offer to settle originated, not with his own
lawyer, Mr. Blouin, but with Mr. Gendreau.
[20] In any case, although the offer to settle was not what he
expected, Mr. Kéroack clearly let it be understood that he was anxious to
settle the matter and be done with it. In his view, the money no longer
mattered at that point: he would have accepted $5,000 just as readily as
$50,000 in order to end the dispute.
[21] An agreement was therefore reached to sell the shares held by Mr. Kéroack
for $10,000 directly to Clermont Pelletier's children, except for
Marc Pelletier, in accordance with the terms and conditions set out by
Mr. Jacques, to which Mr. Kéroack had no objection. Nonetheless, such
a sale involved suspending the agreement.
[22] On September 14, 1995, the corporation issued two
cheques signed by Clermont Pelletier: one to Mr. Blouin in trust for
$10,000, in payment of the shares; the other to Mr. Blouin for
$1,500, in payment of his fees. Mr. Jacques explained that it was
difficult to contact Clermont Pelletier's children on short notice since
most of them did not live in the area; however, it appears that the children
never reimbursed the corporation for the shares it had paid, and that the
corporation claimed the amount it had paid as an expense.
[23] Mr. Jacques stated that he himself had decided, on the spot
and without consulting anyone, to accept the offer communicated to him by
Mr. Gendreau and apparently made by Mr. Blouin. He added that he
immediately contacted either Mr. Guérette, the corporation's in-house
accountant, or Marc Pelletier, telling them to find the required amount of
money by all means and as soon as possible.
[24] Mr. Jacques stated that he himself had decided on the terms
of the transaction to be effected. Since the transaction was to have no tax
incidence for Mr. Kéroack, there was no question of having the corporation
buy back the shares held by Mr. Kéroack in the corporation because that
buyback would have generated a deemed dividend. A buyback would also have had
the effect of increasing the percentage of participating shares of the
corporation's capital stock held by Clermont Pelletier and
Marc Pelletier, when it had been agreed that at no time was
Marc Pelletier's percentage of shares to exceed 20 per cent. As for
Clermont Pelletier, he had just implemented an estate freeze, and there
was no question of increasing the percentage of participating shares beyond the
60 per cent he already held.
[25] Accordingly, selling the shares held by Mr. Kéroack to
Clermont Pelletier's children, except to Marc Pelletier, appeared to
be the solution that would meet the requirement of the agreement between the
parties and also maintain the percentages of participating shares held by
Clermont Pelletier and Marc Pelletier. For Mr. Kéroack, the sale
would give rise to a capital gain, which would nevertheless be fully tax exempt
since the corporation qualified as a small business corporation under
section 110.6 of the Act.
[26] Since at the time Mr. Kéroack held 20 class
"A" shares and there were six purchasers, a simple change to the
by-laws and a subdivision of the shares using a multiple of six were carried
out. In this way, under the terms of the November 10, 1995,
transaction (Exhibit A‑1, Tab 4), the 20 class "A"
shares held by Mr. Kéroack thus became 120 class "A"
shares, which were sold to Clermont Pelletier's children, the six
appellants in the present case.
[27] Clause 8 of the transaction stipulates exactly what its title
indicates: that it constitutes a transaction within the meaning of
articles 2631 et seq. of the Civil Code of Québec, by which
the seller, the purchasers, and the intervenors, that is,
Clermont Pelletier, Marc Pelletier and the corporation, confer on
each other full and final discharge of all claims of any nature whatsoever. For
the purposes of this transaction, in which Mr. Kéroack sells
120 class "A" shares of the corporation's capital stock
that he holds for a total price of $10,000, clause 1 provides for
suspension of the agreement signed on September 16, 1993.
[28] According to the respondent's alternative argument stated in
paragraph 18 of the Amended Reply, it was in consenting to the suspension
of the agreement that the corporation conferred on the appellants shares having
a fair market value of $300,000; as well, the corporation itself paid the
$10,000 price of the shares to Mr. Kéroack. By means of all these
transactions, therefore, the corporation apparently conferred a benefit in the
amount of $50,000 on each of the appellants in accordance with
subsections 15(1) and 246(1) of the Act.
[29] For his part, counsel for the appellants stated that the terms of
the transaction were determined by Mr. Jacques primarily in order to
achieve a business objective by ensuring that there was no tax incidence for
Mr. Kéroack. He argued that the corporation did not confer the transferred
shares on the appellants because it did not hold those shares: it could
therefore not confer or transfer shares it did not own. According to counsel for
the appellants, the corporation intervened in the November 10, 1995,
transaction as a party to the agreement merely to agree to the suspension of
the agreement, an action that cannot be considered as a transfer of assets.
[30] In short, counsel for the appellants argued that if a benefit was
conferred on the appellants, that benefit was conferred by Mr. Kéroack,
who agreed to be paid a mere $10,000 for his shares. Since the transaction was
therefore entered into by persons dealing at arm's length, in light of subsection 246(2)
of the Act, there would be no tax incidence for the appellants.
[31] Counsel for the appellants also argued that, by agreeing to the
suspension, the corporation may have waived a right, and this may have resulted
in conferring a benefit on the appellants; however, he noted that the
respondent adduced no evidence of the value of that benefit other than the
value of the shares themselves.
Analysis
[32] It is important to bear in mind from the outset that the
appellants, like Richard Kéroack, Clermont Pelletier and
Marc Pelletier, were already shareholders and parties to the agreement.
The corporation was also a party to the agreement.
[33] Under the terms of the November 10,
1995, transaction, all the
shareholders without exception, including Richard Kéroack and the
corporation, had agreed to the suspension of the agreement in order to carry
out the transaction. Failing suspension of the agreement, clause 8.1.2 of
the agreement provided that a holder of class "A" shares wishing to
sell or otherwise to dispose of his or her shares was obliged to offer them
first to the corporation, which had a period of 60 days to accept the
offer; however, if the corporation decided not to accept the offer, the other
holder of class "A" shares, with the exception of
Clermont Pelletier, could then accept the offer. Clause 11.2 provided
that an irrevocable suspensive offer had to be made by a holder of
class "A" shares, other than Clermont Pelletier, if the
holder of those shares withdrew from the business; in particular, such a
withdrawal was deemed to occur on termination of the shareholder's employment
contract. In that case, it was provided that the terms and conditions of the
offer and its acceptance were the same as those set out in clause 8. Thus,
failing suspension of the agreement, the corporation and, if it declined, then
Marc Pelletier alone had the right to acquire the shares that
Mr. Kéroack had to dispose of following his dismissal. The purchase by the
corporation of the shares held by Mr. Kéroack would have had no incidence
for the corporation since, under corporate law, the corporation would have been
obliged to cancel those shares (see Quebec's Companies Act, R.S.Q.,
c. C‑38, section 123.42; and the Canada Business
Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑44, subsection 39(6)).
[34] That cancellation would have been of no benefit to the corporation
itself, but would have benefited Clermont Pelletier and
Marc Pelletier, whose holdings of class "A" shares would
have increased from 60 per cent to 75 per cent and from 20 per
cent to 25 per cent respectively. If the corporation had declined the
offer, under clause 8.1.2 of the agreement, Marc Pelletier alone
could have acquired the shares, and the percentage of class "A" shares
held by Marc Pelletier would have increased from 20 per cent to
40 per cent. Thus it can be seen that the application of the agreement and
the purchase of the shares of the corporation's capital stock held by
Mr. Kéroack, either by the corporation itself or by Marc Pelletier,
would have benefited only Clermont Pelletier and Marc Pelletier in
the first instance and only Marc Pelletier in the second instance. We
should recall that the primary objective of a shareholder agreement is to
govern the relationship among the shareholders, in accordance with each of
their rights as a shareholder. The consent given by Clermont Pelletier and
Marc Pelletier, more than the consent given by the corporation itself, to
suspending the agreement in order to make it possible to sell the shares held
by Mr. Kéroack to the six appellants in the present case, can definitely
be considered an indirect means of transferring to the appellants the benefit
they could have obtained had the agreement not been suspended. However, that
point was not the basis of the assessment or of the respondent's argument.
[35] Furthermore, the fact that the appellants were able to acquire
shares worth $300,000 for $10,000 is essentially the result of
Mr. Kéroack's decision to accept this much lower amount in order to settle
the dispute between himself and Clermont Pelletier once and for all. The
shares sold to the appellants belonged to Mr. Kéroack, and he alone could
decide to dispose of them at that price. The Court agrees that the appellants
obtained a benefit. However, the Court considers that the benefit was conferred
on the appellants directly by Mr. Kéroack and indirectly by
Clermont Pelletier and Marc Pelletier since, had the agreement not
been suspended, these two persons were the only ones who would have benefited
from the $10,000 offer to settle with Mr. Kéroack. The Court therefore
finds that subsection 246(1) of the Act does not apply to this case
since the corporation did not directly or indirectly give shares to the
appellants. In light of subsection 246(2) of the Act, the Court
considers that the benefit conferred on the appellants by Mr. Kéroack by
means of the November 10, 1995, transaction has no tax incidence.
[36] It might be pointed out that the corporation had at least
conferred a benefit on the appellants in the amount of $10,000 by paying the
price of the shares itself and not requiring reimbursement. Although that point
is valid, the assessments as regards the appellants were not made on that basis
and that point was never argued by counsel for the parties.
[37] Having regard to the foregoing, the appeals are allowed and the
assessments are referred back to the Minister of National Revenue for
reconsideration and reassessment on the basis that the benefit in the amount of
$50,000 included in each appellant's income must be deducted.
[38] The appellants are entitled to their costs. However, since the six
appeals were heard on common evidence, the total amount of costs for the
services of counsel, beginning with the preparation for the hearing, is limited
to the amount of costs that would be applicable in the case of a single appeal.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 13th day of November 2002.
J.T.C.C.
Translation
certified true
on this 16th of May
2003.
Sophie Debbané,
Revisor
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