Date:
20020913
Docket:
2002-600-IT-I
BETWEEN:
LAWRENCE R.
BELLMAN,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY
THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons
for Judgment
Little,
J.
A.
FACTS
[1]
The Appellant and his wife Dianne were married in
1975.
[2]
There were three children born of the marriage:
- Karycia D. Bellman - April 24, 1979;
- Kalynka D. Bellman - August 25, 1981;
- Kylaina D. Bellman - September 11, 1984.
[3]
The Appellant and his former spouse separated in 1992.
[4]
On the 19th day of April 1993 a Court Order was issued (the
"First Order"). Under the terms of the First Order, the
Appellant was required to pay Dianne child support payments of
$350.00 per month per child for a total of $1,050.00 per
month.
[5]
Under the terms of the First Order the Appellant was required to
pay Dianne spousal support of $500.00 per month commencing on the
1st day of April, 1993.
[6]
On the 28th day of April 1999 a Court Order was issued (the
"Second Order").
[7]
The Second Order specified as follows:
(i)
the Appellant was in arrears of child support in the sum of
$4,200.00;
(ii)
the child support arrears were to be paid by the Appellant in
addition to the varied child support payments;
(iii)
the Appellant was required to pay the child support arrears at
the rate of $350.00 per month commencing on the 1st day of May,
1999, and continuing to and including the 1st day of April,
2000;
(iv)
the Appellant was required to pay Dianne spousal support of
$250.00 per month commencing on the 1st day of May, 1999, and
continuing to and including the 1st day of April, 2002;
and
(v)
the Appellant was in arrears of spousal support in the sum of
$4,500.00, and the arrears were to be paid at the rate of $250.00
per month commencing on the 1st day of May, 2000 and continuing
on the 1st day of each month thereafter until fully
paid;
(vi)
the child support arrears of $4,200.00 were accumulated from the
period May 1, 1998 through April 1999; and
(vii) in
August or September of 1998, the Appellant ceased to pay Dianne
spousal support as required under the First Order.
[8]
In 1998 and 1999 the Appellant made the following support
payments:
1998
$450.00
1999
$14,200.00
[9]
When the Appellant filed his income tax return for the 1999
taxation year he claimed the amount of $17,782.75 as support
payments.
[10] On the
27th day of December 2001 the Minister of National Revenue (the
"Minister") issued a Notice of Reassessment allowing a
deduction of support payments in the amount of $9,000.00. The
amount of $9,000.00 was determined by the Minister as
follows:
1.
Spousal Support
First
Order
$ Nil
Second Order
$250.00 per month x 8 months
for the period from May, 1999 to
December,
1999
$2,000.00
2.
Child Support
First
Order
$4,200.00
$350.00 per month per child x 3
for the period from January, 1999
to April, 1999.
Arrears of $4,400.00 were accumulated under the
First
Order. The Second Order provided that the
arrears
were accumulated from May, 1998 to April 1999.
Payment of
arrears of $350.00 per month commenced
on May 1,
1999. In 1999, $2,800.00 of the arrears was
paid i.e.
from May, 1999 to December
1999.
$2,800.00
Second
Order
$ NIL
Total Support deductions
allowed
________
by the Minister in
1999
$
$9,000.00
B.
ISSUE
[11] The issue
to be decided is whether the Minister properly calculated the
Appellant's deductions for child support payments and spousal
support payments for the 1999 taxation year.
C.
ANALYSIS
[12] Under what
has been sometimes described as the old régime
(pre-May 1997) spouses making payments to separated or
ex-spouses for the support of the children were allowed to deduct
those payments and the recipient was required to include the
amount of the payments in their income. Following the decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Thibaudeau v. Canada [1995]
2. S.C.R. 627, the Income Tax Act (the
"Act") was amended and new provisions were
introduced to deal with child support payments.
[13] The
amended Act provided that if a pre-May 1997 agreement
remained unchanged the deduction/inclusion system as provided by
the old régime prevailed. However, if a new agreement were
entered into by the parties or if a new Court Order was issued,
or if an old agreement was changed in a particular way the
deduction/inclusion régime did not apply and only payments
made up to the commencement day, as defined, were deductible from
income by the payor and included in income by the
payee.
[14] Subsection
56.1(4) of the Act defines "child support
amount", "commencement day" and "support
amount". Subsection 56.1(4) reads as follows:
"child
support amount" means any support amount that is not
identified in the agreement or order under which it is receivable
as being solely for the support of a recipient who is a spouse or
former spouse of the payer or who is a parent of a child of whom
the payer is a natural parent.
"commencement day" at any time of an agreement or
order means
(a)
where the agreement or order is made after April 1997, the day it
is made; and
(b)
where the agreement or order is made before May 1997, the day, if
any, that is after April 1997 and is the earliest of
(i) the day
specified as the commencement day of the agreement or order by
the payer and recipient under the agreement or order in a joint
election filed with the Minister in prescribed form and
manner,
(ii) where
the agreement or order is varied after April 1997 to change the
child support amounts payable to the recipient, the day on which
the first payment of the varied amount is required to be
made,
(iii) where
a subsequent agreement or order is made after April 1997,
the effect of which is to change the total child support amounts
payable to the recipient by the payer, the commencement day of
the first such subsequent agreement or order, and
(iv) the
day specified in the agreement or order, or any variation
thereof, as the commencement day of the agreement or order for
the purposes of this Act.
"support amount" means an amount payable or
receivable as an allowance on a periodic basis for the
maintenance of the recipient, children of the recipient or both
the recipient and children of the recipient, if the recipient has
discretion as to the use of the amount, and
(a)
the recipient is the spouse or former spouse of the payer, the
recipient and payer are living separate and apart because of the
breakdown of their marriage and the amount is receivable under an
order of a competent tribunal or under a written agreement;
or
(b)
the payer is a natural parent of a child of the recipient and the
amount is receivable under an order made by a competent tribunal
in accordance with the laws of a province.
[15] Paragraph
60(b) of the Act reads as follows:
(b)
Support -- the total of all amounts each of which is an
amount determined by the formula
A - (B +
C)
where
A is the
total of all amounts each of which is a support amount paid after
1996 and before the end of the year by the taxpayer to a
particular person, where the taxpayer and the particular person
were living separate and apart at the time the amount was
paid,
B is the
total of all amounts each of which is a child support amount that
became payable by the taxpayer to the particular person under an
agreement or order on or after its commencement day and before
the end of the year in respect of a period that began on or after
its commencement day, and
C is the
total of all amounts each of which is a support amount paid by
the taxpayer to the particular person after 1996 and deductible
in computing the taxpayer's income for a preceding taxation
year;
[16] In my
opinion the Second Order dated April 28, 1999 triggered a
commencement date as that term is defined in section 56.1(4) of
the Act. It therefore follows that the Appellant is caught
by the amended legislation in sections 56.1 and 60 of the
Act and he is only allowed to deduct support payments of
$9,000.00 in determining his income for the 1999 taxation
year.
[17] The appeal
is dismissed.
Signed at
Ottawa, Ontario, this 13th day of September 2002.
J.T.C.C.
COURT FILE
NO.:
2002-600(IT)I
STYLE OF
CAUSE:
Lawrence R. Bellman and
Her Majesty the Queen
PLACE OF
HEARING:
Kelowna, British Columbia
DATE OF
HEARING:
August 23, 2002
REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT BY: The Honourable Judge L.M.
Little
DATE OF
JUDGMENT:
September 13, 2002
APPEARANCES:
For the
Appellant:
The Appellant himself
Counsel for
the
Respondent:
Nadine Taylor
COUNSEL OF
RECORD:
For the
Appellant:
Name:
Firm:
For the
Respondent:
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Canada
2002-600(IT)I
BETWEEN:
LAWRENCE R.
BELLMAN,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY
THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeal heard
on August 23, 2002 at Kelowna, British Columbia, by
the
Honourable Judge L.M. Little
Appearances
For the
Appellant:
The Appellant himself
Counsel for
the
Respondent:
Nadine Taylor
JUDGMENT
The appeal
from the assessment made under the Income Tax Act for the
1999 taxation year is dismissed in accordance with the
attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at
Ottawa, Ontario, this 13th day of September 2002.
J.T.C.C.