Date:
20020913
Docket:
1999-4601-IT-G
BETWEEN:
S & C
ROSS ENTERPRISES LTD.,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY
THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons
for Judgment
Teskey,
J.
[1]
The Appellant S & C Ross Enterprises Ltd.
("Enterprises") appeals its reassessment of income tax
for the taxation years 1992, 1993 and 1994 wherein the Minister
of National Revenue (the "Minister") disallowed the
Appellant's claim for the small business deduction in each of
the years and also disallowed the deduction of certain expenses
pursuant to paragraph 18(1)(p) of the Income Tax
Act (the "Act").
Issue
[2]
The issue before the Court is whether the business of Enterprises
in providing services to Clearly Canadian Beverage Corporation
("Clearly Canadian") is a personal services business,
as defined in section 125(7) of the Act. If
Enterprises is found to be a personal services business, then it
is not entitled to the small business deduction and the expenses
to earn the income are disallowed by the provisions of paragraph
18(1)(p).
[3]
Section 125(7) is a definition section and defines "Active
Business" as:
"active business carried on by a corporation"
means any business carried on by the corporation other than a
specified investment business or a personal services business and
includes an adventure or concern in the nature of
trade;
and it also defines
"Personal Services Business" as:
"personal
services business" carried on by a corporation in a taxation
year means a business of providing services where
(a) an individual who performs
services on behalf of the corporation (in this definition and
paragraph 18(1)(p) referred to as an "incorporated
employee"), or
(b) any person related to the
incorporated employee is a specified shareholder of the
corporation and the incorporated employee would reasonably be
regarded as an officer or employee of the person or partnership
to whom or to which the services were provided but for the
existence of the corporation, unless
(c) the corporation employs in the
business throughout the year more than five full-time
employees, or
(d) the amount paid or payable to the
corporation in the year for the services is received or
receivable by it from a corporation with which it was associated
in the year;
[4]
Paragraph 18(1)(p) sets out the limitation re personal
services business expenses and reads:
(p) Limitation re personal services
business expenses - an
outlay or expense to the extent that it was made or incurred by a
corporation in a taxation year for the purpose of gaining or
producing income from a personal services business, other
than
(i) the salary, wages or other
remuneration paid in the year to an incorporated employee of the
corporation,
(ii) the cost to the corporation of any benefit
or allowance provided to an incorporated employee in the
year,
(iii) any amount expended by the corporation in
connection with the selling of property or the negotiating of
contracts by the corporation if the amount would have been
deductible in computing the income of an incorporated employee
for a taxation year from an office or employment if the amount
had been expended by the incorporated employee under a contract
of employment that required him to pay the amount, and
(iv) any amount paid by the corporation in the year
as or on account of legal expenses incurred by it in collecting
amounts owing to it on account of services rendered
that
would, if the income of the corporation were from a business
other than a personal services business, be deductible in
computing its income;
[5]
Stuart Ross ("Ross") is the sole owner and officer of
Enterprises.
[6]
It is common ground that:
(a)
at all
material times Ross was a "specified shareholder" of
the Appellant within the meaning of that term in
subsection 248(1) of the Act;
(b)
Enterprises did not employ more than five full-time employees
during the years under appeal;
(c)
Ross performed services (the "Services") on behalf of
Enterprises for Clearly Canadian;
(d)
Enterprises and Clearly Canadian were not associated during the
years under appeal;
(e)
during the years under appeal Ross was a director and the
Executive Vice-President of Clearly Canadian;
[7]
This appeal is the third appeal before this Court wherein the
Minister alleged that a corporation dealing with Clearly Canadian
was a personal services corporation. The first two are:
Criterion Capital Corporation v. The Queen, 2001 DTC
921 ("Criterion") and Bruce E. Morley Law
Corporation v. The Queen 2002 DTC 1547
("Morley").
[8]
The appeal by Criterion was allowed and my colleague
O'Connor J. found that Criterion was not a
personal services corporation.
[9]
The appeal by Morley was dismissed by my colleague
Hershfield J. as he found Morley to be a personal
services corporation.
[10] I
recommend the readers of these reasons to pause here and read
both of these reasons for judgment.
[11] I agree
with the result of both of these appeals and do not find them in
conflict.
[12] Whether a
corporation is a personal services business or not is one of fact
and the facts in Criterion are quite different from
Morley.
Facts
[13] Ross
completed high school in 1962 and had various professional jobs
up to 1969. In 1969, he enrolled in a Certified General
Accounting program. He completed four of the required five
years.
[14] From 1969
onward, Ross had a series of professional jobs. Each one
progressively required a higher degree of skill.
[15] During the
period of 1969 to 1986, Ross became a highly skilled professional
able to perform all the usual functions of a Chief Financial
Officer for various companies together with a sound knowledge of
what is required generally to take a private corporation and turn
it into a public corporation with an initial public offering of
stock. He has learned how to evaluate potential purchases of not
only land and assets but also operating companies. As of 1986, he
now would make a very valuable employee for any company and be a
very valuable consultant for any company.
[16] In 1986,
he along with Bruce Horton ("Horton") and Douglas Mason
("Mason") started up a new company to manufacture and
distribute under a license agreement a high caffeine Cola called
("Jolt").
[17] In 1987,
Mason brought forth a new idea of selling changed water in a
distinctive purple bottle, the product to be called "Clearly
Canadian".
[18] Within the
year it became obvious that the product was a winner, the
"Jolt" franchise was dropped and the Corporation
changed its name to Clearly Canadian.
[19] The
Clearly Canadian sales for the five-year period starting in 1988
demonstrated unbelievable growth. They are:
YEAR
SALES
1988
$2 million
1989
$8 million
1990
$10 million
1991
$120 million
1992
$187 million
[20] In 1989,
Clearly Canadian, who had been using outside consultants for
certain services, decided that it could receive just as good
consulting advice from their own three main personnel, that is
Horton, Mason and Ross.
[21] Horton,
Mason and Ross, each in 1989, incorporated their respective
consulting companies and signed contracts for consulting services
with Clearly Canadian.
[22] The
uncontradicted testimony of both Ross and Mason was to the effect
that the wages Ross received from Clearly Canadian was to run the
Company on a day-to-day basis and that the consulting
fees paid to Enterprises fell into exactly the same category as
the fees to Criterion, that is they were for out of the ordinary
duties and were for services that normally consultants would be
hired to perform.
[23] By having
these three people Horton, Mason and Ross who ran Clearly
Canadian also do this extraordinary and technical work, it saved
a great deal of time as they were always up to speed and thus
saved a great deal of money.
[24] The
skyrocketing of the sales required acquisitions, distribution,
partners, multiple financing packages and patents. The effort put
out by these three to keep up with the tiger was
extraordinary.
[25]
Enterprises was particularly doing the due diligence work as well
as analyzing financial statements to compare with Clearly
Canadian to see if the proposed acquisition was viable. The
services provided by Enterprises were distinct and separate from
the duties Ross performed as a director employee.
[26]
Ross' job as an employee of Clearly Canadian was to
oversee the production of its financial statements, keep tabs on
the receivables and payables and to make sure the general ledger
was posted correctly. He managed the day-to-day
financial operation of Clearly Canadian. He also supervised the
support staff under him.
[27]
Enterprises had, over the period, several other contracts for
consulting work and was paid by stock option, some of which
became very valuable. It also owned property in Arizona which it
managed.
[28] I find
that for all intent and purposes the facts before me regarding
Enterprises are almost identical to the facts in the Criterion
appeal.
[29] The
evidence demonstrates that the activities of President and
Executive Vice-President do not involve due diligence
investigations or any of the other types of activities described
in the 1994 management agreement.
The
Pertinent Law
[30] McLachlin,
J. of the Supreme Court of Canada, as she then was, said in
Shell Canada Limited v. The Queen et al., 99 DTC 5669 in
paragraph 39:
[39] This
Court has repeatedly held that courts must be sensitive to the
economic realities of a particular transaction, rather than being
bound to what first appears to be its legal form: Bronfman
Trust, supra, at pp. 52-53, per Dickson, C.J.;
Tennant, supra, at para. 26, per Iacobucci,
J. But there are at least two caveats to this rule. First, this
Court has never held that the economic realities of a situation
can be used to recharacterize a taxpayer's bona fide
legal relationships. To the contrary, we have held that, absent a
specific provision of the Act to the contrary or a finding
that they are a sham, the taxpayer's legal relationships must
be respected in tax cases. Recharacterization is only permissible
if the label attached by the taxpayer to the particular
transaction does not properly reflect its actual legal effect:
Continental Bank Leasing Corp. v. Canada [98 DTC 6505],
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 298, at para. 21, per Bastarache,
J.
[31] In order
for the Appellant to be successful, I must find that he was an
independent contractor and not an employee.
[32] This issue
was dealt with by the Supreme Court of Canada in
671122 Ontario Ltd. v. Sagaz Industries Canada Inc.,
[2001] 2 S.C.R. Although this was a vicarious liability
case, the Court dealt with the employee issue at length.
Major J., for the Court, dealing at length with MacGuigan
J.A.'s decision of Wiebe Door Services Ltd. v. M.N.R.,
87 DTC 5025, said at paragraphs 46, 47 and 48:
46. In my
opinion, there is no one conclusive test which can be universally
applied to determine whether a person is an employee or an
independent contractor. Lord Denning stated in Stevenson
Jordan, supra, that it may be impossible to give a precise
definition of the distinction (p. 111) and, similarly, Fleming
observed that "no single test seems to yield an invariably
clear and acceptable answer to the many variables of every
changing employment relations . . ." (p. 416). Further, I
agree with MacGuigan J.A. in Wiebe Door, at 563, citing
Atiyah, supra, at p. 38, that what must always
occur is a search for the total relationship of the
parties:
It is exceedingly
doubtful whether the search for a formula in the nature of a
single test for identifying a contract of service any longer
serves a useful purpose. ... The most that can profitably be done
is to examine all the possible factors which have been referred
to in these cases as bearing on the nature of the relationship
between the parties concerned. Clearly not all of these factors
will be relevant in all cases, or have the same weight in all
cases. Equally clearly no magic formula can be propounded for
determining which factors should, in any given case, be treated
as the determining ones.
47.
Although there is no universal test to determine whether a person
is an employee or an independent contractor, I agree with
MacGuigan J.A. that a persuasive approach to the issue is that
taken by Cooke J. Market Investigations, supra. The
central question is whether the person who has been engaged to
perform the services is performing them as a person in business
on his own account. In making this determination the level of
control the employer has over the worker's activities will
always be a factor. However, other factors to consider include
whether the worker provides his or her own equipment, whether the
worker hires his or her own helpers, the degree of financial risk
taken by the worker, the degree of responsibility investment and
management held by the worker, and the worker's opportunity
for profit in the performance of his or her tasks.
48. It
bears repeating that the above factors constitute a
non-exhaustive list, and there is no set format as to their
application. The relative weight of each will depend on the
particular facts and circumstances in the case.
[33] In regards
to Wiebe Door, supra, it has been produced so often it is
of no value to set out passages therefrom.
[34] The
Federal Court of Appeal on May 21 of this year in Precision
Gutters Ltd. v. M.N.R., 2002 FCA 207, again visited this
question. Therein, Isaac J., after referring to the above
decision, stated the central question is whether the person who
has been engaged to perform services is performing them as a
person in business on his own account. He then went on to examine
four factors set out in Wiebe Door, that is control,
ownership of tools, chance of profit or risk of loss.
[35] A week
later the Federal Court of Appeal in Meredith v. The
Queen, 2002 FCA 258 stated that lifting the corporate veil is
contrary to long established principles of corporate
law.
[36] The Court
also went on to say that the well-established principle that a
corporation has its own judicial identity distinct from its
shareholders and that this principle applies equally to closely
held corporations.
[37] Dealing
with employee, the Court said at paragraph 15: ..."The
importance lies in the corporation's legal power to control
the employees, not whether the employees feel subject to that
control...".
[38] The Court
went on and said that it was irrelevant that the Appellant was
the sole shareholder and director of the Corporation.
Dealing
with the four factors
Control
[39] Clearly
Canadian exerted no control over Enterprises and had no right to
do so.
Business Tools & Equipment
[40]
Enterprises rented at its own expense the necessary business
tools from Clearly Canadian, an agreement made with the board of
Directors.
Risk
of Loss
[41] Operating
Costs. The risk of loss is a limited issue for Enterprises. In
order to be in a position to provide services to Clearly Canadian
and to its other clients, Enterprises incurred its operating
costs as confirmed by the financial statements. These are
expenses that are not incurred by a person in an
employer-employee relationship. These expenses create a
risk of loss.
Negligence Claims
[42]
Enterprises may make an error in analyzing a new business or
financial opportunity for Clearly Canadian. If Clearly Canadian
or another client relies on the recommendation and suffers a
loss, Enterprises as an independent contractor, may be liable for
professional negligence. The loss could be very significant as
the transactions involve millions of dollars. This is a risk not
typically faced by an employee. The indemnity and insurance
provisions in the Management Agreement (which provide that
Enterprises is a name insured on Clearly Canadian policies)
provide coverage on claims by third parties but there is no
limitation on claims that Clearly Canadian was entitled to make.
The most likely person to make a claim for negligence against a
person providing professional services will be his own client.
Enterprises also faced the risks of claims from its other
clients.
Effect
of Retainer
[43] Risk of
loss is not avoided because a person is paid on a retainer basis.
There are provisions in the Management Agreement, which would
allow it to terminate. In any event, a person who has been
operating a successful business for an extended period of time
should be in a position where revenues will exceed expenses and a
loss is only likely to occur as a result of negligence on a major
transaction or an unexpected event (e.g. heart
attack).
Chance
of Profit
[44]
Enterprises is free to offer its services to clients other than
Clearly Canadian and the evidence indicates that it does in fact
do so. It has resulted in revenue. For services performed during
1992 to 1994 taxation years, Ross stated that the compensation
from other clients was limited to stock options. As Enterprises
clients are often public companies with limited financial
resources, this is a common form of compensation. They have a
real value (Enterprises had no wish to work for free) but the
compensation was not realized until later years when the options
are exercised. Ross's evidence was that Enterprises has in
subsequent taxation years, earned significant income from
exercising stock options. Later years have also resulted in cash
payments for Enterprises consulting services - Lasik Vision
(1996) and Lake City Casinos (1998).
Conclusion
[45]
Notwithstanding that I do not consider there is any significant
differences between this appeal and that of Criterion,
supra, and that I agree with the reasoning of my colleague
O'Connor J. even if that case had not been heard or decided
based on the evidence before me, which was uncontested, I find
that Enterprises was an independent contractor of Clearly
Canadian.
[46] I also
find that Enterprises is not a personal services
corporation and therefore it was entitled to the small business
deduction and to deduct from income the expenses for producing
the income.
[47] The
parties agreed that should I find for the Appellant, then it is
entitled to deduct from income expenses in the amount of
$87,435.
[48] The appeal
is allowed with costs and the assessment is referred back to the
Minister for reassessment and reconsideration on the basis that
the services provided by the Appellant to Clearly Canadian
Beverage Corporation did not constitute personal
services business and therefore the Appellant is entitled to the
small business deduction and is entitled to deduct from income
expenses in the amount of $87,435.
Signed at
Ottawa, Canada, this 13th day of September, 2002.
J.T.C.C.
COURT FILE
NO.:
1999-4601(IT)G
STYLE OF
CAUSE:
S & C Ross Enterprises Ltd., and The Queen
PLACE OF
HEARING:
Vancouver, British Columbia
DATE OF
HEARING:
June 27 and 28, 2002
REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT BY: The Hon. Judge Gordon
Teskey
DATE OF
JUDGMENT:
September 13, 2002
APPEARANCES:
Counsel
for the Appellant: Douglas C. Morley
Sadie Wetzel
Counsel
for the
Respondent:
Lynn M. Burch
COUNSEL OF
RECORD:
For the
Appellant:
Name:
Douglas C. Morley
Firm:
Davis and Company
Vancouver, British Columbia
For the
Respondent:
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Canada
1999-4601(IT)G
BETWEEN:
S & C
ROSS ENTERPRISES LTD.,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY
THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals
heard on June 27 and 28, 2002 at Vancouver, British Columbia
by
the
Honourable Judge Gordon Teskey
Appearances
Counsel
for the
Appellant:
Douglas C. Morley
Sadie Wetzel
Counsel
for the
Respondent:
Lynn M. Burch
JUDGMENT
The appeals from the assessments made under the Income Tax
Act for the 1992, 1993 and 1994 taxation years are allowed,
with costs, in accordance with the attached Reasons for
Judgment.
Signed at
Ottawa, Canada, this 13th day of September, 2002.
J.T.C.C.